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Abstract 
 
Peasants, workers, worker-peasants, nomenklatura and the state in northern Poland’s 
‘Recovered Territories’ have employed a strategy they call ‘kombinacja’ to survive 
economic transitions into and out of socialism from 1945 to the present. Kombinacja is 
the process of manipulating space and legal, political, or cultural rules in order to 
appropriate a resource—food, commodities, labour, information, power—and then 
combine them into an ersatz product to meet an economic, cultural, or political end. No 
person, class, institution, or economy ‘owns’ kombinacja. The ‘who’ and ‘what’ are 
relational. The ‘when’ and ‘where’ are contextual. Yet, it is not ubiquitous; every 
kombinacja is a form of speech that charts a terrain of economic and political 
trajectories intended to shift the balance of power at a given point in time. 
 
This multi-sited historical ethnography tracks how these ‘arts of combination’ have 
pirouetted across agrarian and industrial, formal and informal, socialist and capitalist 
boundaries in the agro-industrial commune of Dobra. The arts of combination were 
forged through the exploitation of workers in Poland’s industrialising cities during the 
19th century, across its popularisation as a survival strategy during Nazi-occupation, and 
towards its reformulation into an economic stabiliser for both villagers and the state 
during the ‘socialist’ era from 1945 to 1989. Villagers used kombinacja to access or 
hide resources from the state in the midst of broken supply chains, bureaucratic 
gridlock, food shortages, and complex regulations. When commune officials turned a 
blind eye to kombinacja to stay in power, they too drew from the arts of combination to 
‘fix’ formal state problems in the commune. Kombinacja was used to subvert and 
accommodate the state. Reworking the state through kombinacja to ensure that no one 
went hungry informalised the command economy and contributed to the incremental 
breakdown of the local state apparatus into a feudal-like order. I then turn to 
nomenklatura privatisation, potato pilfering, alcohol consumption, mushroom foraging, 
and other practices to trace how kombinacja is being reformulated (or not) to rework 
post-socialism. 
 
The arts of combination call attention to practices that cut across a series of binaries—
capitalist/socialist, formal/informal, state/non-state—to show how those marginalised 
by power seek to control the conditions of their subjection and how those in position of 
power seek to control the conditions of others’ subjection. Building upon J.K. Gibson-
Graham’s ‘diverse economies’, the case of kombinacja shows us that informality does 
not always create alternatives that subjugate hegemony; rather, they can alternatively be 
used to crystallise a hegemonic imaginary. I suggest a much broader understanding of 
how informality has been a site of ingenuity and inequality, innovation and suffering, 
across time and space. 
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Chapter 1 
The arts of combination 
1.1. Growing up with kombinacja 
In 1985, I was born into a worker-peasant (robotnik-chłop) family in Dobra—an agro-
industrial village in northern Poland. My father Arkadiusz was a manager in the state 
Agricultural Circle; my mother Cecylia was a secretary in the state tannery; my 
maternal grandfather Konrad was a tractor operator in the Agricultural Circle and had a 
seasonal income as the patriarchal head (Gospodarz) of his peasant (chłop) farm, on 
which he produced agricultural quotas for the state; my grandmother Zuzanna was the 
matriarchal head (Gospodyni) of the household who worked primarily to meet the 
farm’s quota but earned seasonal income by helping out with washing linen and the beet 
harvests on the collective farm and in the Agricultural Circle; uncles Roman and 
Ludwik worked in the state mechanical enterprise and state forestry; and aunt Kinga 
was a biology teacher who belonged to the Party. Everyone in the family—peasants, 
workers, and nomenklatura alike—earned wages in state workplaces and helped the 
peasant farm meet its quota and produce enough food to feed our extended family. 
Worker-peasant families—the ‘awkward class’ (Shanin, 1972) whose members 
commuted between the peasant farm and state workplaces with an enhanced ‘autonomy 
and flexibility within the labour market’ (Kolankiewicz, 1980, pg. 30)—dominated the 
gmina 1  of Dobra. In Dobra proper, gmina development projects concentrated the 
nomenklatura2 in the village centre along Reunification Street, peasant farms in the 
northeast near the fields (pola), factory workers near the tannery (garbarnia) in the 
southeast, state forestry workers along the village peripheries, and state farm workers on 
state farm settlements away from plain sight. By the late 1980s, however, due to the 
necessities wrought by the ‘economy of shortage’ (Kornai, 1986), most households had 
one foot in agriculture and the other in industry or the state services sector.  
                                                
1 Commune. Dobra was a village and the commune headquarters of other villages. 
2 Locals called them the szycha (important people). 
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Figure 1 Childhood photograph with Zuzanna 
in Dobra, late 1980s. My private collection. 
 
Class divisions between peasants, workers, and nomenklatura were not publicly 
visible—but varied on a household basis. Although universal employment was enforced 
by the state, each household—based on where its members worked—secured a different 
combination of rations, entitlements, wages, bonuses (premia), and access to state 
knowledge. In order to meet subsistence needs, villagers engaged in ‘kombinacja’ 
which was critical to finding innovative and creative solutions to the constant instability 
wrought by scarcity. Kombinacja (colloq.) is a contextual term in Poland used to 
describe the process of manipulating legal, political, or cultural rules in order to access a 
resource—food, commodities, labour, information, power—to meet an economic or 
political goal. It encapsulates the creative and innovative practices used to acquire and 
‘combine’ resources needed for survival or accumulation. Highly skilled kombinators3 
                                                
3  An individual, group, institution, or state can use kombinacja and be called a 
‘kombinator’. 
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in the nomenklatura fared better during the privatisation period and contributed to the 
class inequality that began to emerge during the transition out of socialism. Most 
worker-peasants who lost their jobs when state socialism ceased to exist became, quite 
simply, the ‘rural poor’. Emigration to Australia, the United States, and other Western 
and Northern European countries became one of the only options to secure decent jobs. 
In 1990, Jakub—my paternal uncle who lived in Greenpoint, New York—formally 
invited my mother to the United States. This invitation ‘entered’ her name into the U.S. 
Department of State’s Green Card Lottery held in 1991. When her name was chosen, 
the five of us were given a once in a life-time opportunity of an interview at the U.S. 
Embassy in Warsaw. We drove to Warsaw for the interview and we were granted 
permanent green cards to Ameryka. In September 1992, we flew from Warsaw to 
Newark Airport, were picked up by my paternal aunt Gabriela, and settled in a Polish 
immigrant community in Trenton, New Jersey. My father joined a Polish construction 
firm and my mother joined a cleaning service—occupations they held for the rest of 
their working lives4. I started in 1st grade elementary school. 
We lived in an apartment complex populated with Eastern European and Russian 
immigrants who were mostly cleaning maids and construction workers. Some Polish 
tenants in the neighbourhood called it a ‘PGR’ because of its close resemblance to 
collective life on State Agricultural Farms (PGRs or Soviet sovkhoz). The rectangular 
apartment blocks were built in the 1970s and were connected through small pathways 
and one circular road that isolated them like a small island. Construction vans started 
their engines at 4:30AM and the mini-vans filled with Polish cleaning maids left after 
they dropped off their children at an elderly woman’s apartment (ó Babci) in the 
complex. The surrogate grandmother would charge $5 per child per day and teach 
Polish songs and poems5. Some legal immigrant families like mine stayed away from 
relations with undocumented immigrants, unlike my friend Dagna’s father who used 
kombinacja to profit from their legal status by pulling in (ściągnać) families and 
villagers from Poland through the U.S.-Canadian border. In the 2000s, their three-
bedroom apartment was filled with something like ten Poles.  
                                                
4 Father earned formal wages doing construction work. Mother earned cash cleaning 
houses. Our household had both formal and informal wages. 
5 The Romanian local childcare market is similar (Kovács, 2014, pgs. 68, 76).  
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Kombinacja was all around us. Construction workers stole materials or evaded labour 
from construction companies; cleaning maids stole food and jewellery from the 
suburban homes. Skilled people in the community produced fake passports and social 
security cards for a hefty fee. Our neighbours told us how they were only eating potato 
pirogues because they were saving up $20,000 per person to secure fake green cards 
from someone in Trenton (they did and later bought a house). In addition to smuggling 
people, Dagna’s father (with whom my father worked in the same construction 
company) purportedly ‘rented’ out his legal immigrant status and documentation to 
immigrants—like his brother—who wanted to start a construction business or get a 
driver’s license. It was like voluntary identity theft. One year, that brother gave us a 
bathroom makeover and when we asked the price, he said it was for ‘free’. He imposed 
it as a favour. What else did he want, if not protection or for us to keep our mouth’s shut 
should he need our help in the future? The police cars parked along the perimeter of the 
apartment complex were a fixture in our community. After September 11th, there were 
many nightly police raids and deportations were immediate—but overall, only a handful 
of families got caught. 
Access to medical services was a source of kombinacja. When we arrived in the United 
States, a man who lived in our shared apartment used my father’s identity to get medical 
treatment in the hospital and departed leaving us with the bill. Another example was 
when my mother found out that she had thyroid cancer in 2007 and her friend found out 
that she had breast cancer. Both women cleaned houses for a living and both lived in the 
same apartment complex. But, while my mother submitted her income taxes, she earned 
too little to qualify for health insurance and too much to get Charity Care. Her friend 
Irena—an undocumented immigrant—filed no income taxes, went to a clinic as a 
‘dependent’ of her daughter on a ‘sponsored’ student visa and got full, free medical 
treatment. Sometime later, she boasted to my mother about her free medical treatments 
and how she ‘got around’ the system, despite being aware that my mother had not. The 
experience continued to cause tensions especially when I became burdened with the 
‘daughter’s duty’ of ‘fixing’ the American system and navigating it for my mother who 
speaks very little English. Such kombinacja stories in Ameryka reflect the competition 
between immigrants over the limited pool of state resources for poor families. 
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Young people often become the ‘chattels’ of kombinacja. One young man in the 
neighborhood who was studying to become a police officer used his legal identity to 
buy a house for his undocumented family members. My friend Sabina got pregnant at 
16 by her neighbour, who was an undocumented immigrant and ten years her senior, 
and eloped with him a year later. This Polish girl who loved science, became a cleaning 
maid and drove an Aston Martin. Her cousin Ofelia, on the other hand, arrived without 
papers with her mother to our PGR, went to a community college under the sponsorship 
of another legal immigrant and then met an American businessman with who became 
engaged in order to achieve legal status. She became a cleaning maid. Kombinacja and 
its ‘pull’ within the Polish community has a stickiness that marries Polish women to the 
cleaning service and the immigrant community, with little room for economic and 
cultural liberation.  
Kombinacja networks are the glue that keeps the Polish diaspora clustered together and 
the ideal of the ‘American Dream’ a difficult prospect behind this curtain of kombinacja 
activity that sucks everyone in. When Al Pacino in The Godfather: Part III famously 
says, ‘Just when I thought I was out...they pull me back in’—he expressed my fear of 
being destined to become another cleaning maid in the PGR. It is frustrating to know 
that by getting an education, moving out of Trenton, traveling the world, and choosing 
academia over the cleaning service, I am working against the gendered expectation of 
living like my mother, going to church every Sunday, cleaning houses for cash, getting 
married, and having children. It is both frightening and comforting to know that if I ever 
struggle to find formal work, there will always be a place for me in a cleaning service 
van in Trenton. Then, I will be a ‘true’ Polish woman. 
Father, undoubtedly using a little bit of kombinacja back in the village during the 
socialism era, but drew the line at such kombinacja that might constitute illegal activity 
on American soil6. While he earned an extra $20 or so selling scrap metal from the 
construction sites and accepted tips on the job, he was against the moonlighting 
practiced by some of the other Polish construction workers. He made it a point to draw 
this boundary of legality/illegality during my upbringing: we often talked about what 
other Poles did and what we did not do for money. In fact, it was one of the reasons 
                                                
6 I cleaned houses with my mother to earn cash.  
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why my parents justified our inability to purchase a house or move out of the 
neighbourhood—we ‘followed’ the rules of being poor and not upwardly mobile. My 
parents drilled it into our heads that they had ‘sacrificed everything’ so that we could 
‘get a higher education’. My father insisted that he would not do anything during the 
day that he would lose sleep over at night—sometimes at the expense of being laughed 
at by other Polish men. 
We perceived ourselves to be ‘different’ from the immigrants who had arrived za 
chlebem (‘for bread’; see Erdmans, 1998, pg. 21; Zaretsky, 1996, pg. 123) with the 
intention of ‘using the system’ and returning back to Poland where they would build an 
enviable house with their dollars. The ‘lure’ of kombinacja was that it was a method of 
achieving a higher-class status in Poland, a utopia after decades of grueling, physical 
labour in the West7. Halinka, a fellow villager from Dobra who made it to Trenton 
without papers in the 1990s, has been working as a cleaning maid and sending back 
remittances to her husband and two daughters without ever going back to visit them. 
She lives in a single-bedroom apartment in inner-city Trenton; they live in a brand new 
house in the ‘new’ part of Dobra. I only know of one couple that has returned. Everyone 
else just has ‘plans to return’ but have been in Trenton for decades. Our family had no 
intention of a triumphant return, but whenever my mother did visit the village, she 
always purchased thousands of dollars’ worth of gifts for the entire family, put on an air 
of opulence, and spoke with an authoritative voice about ‘life in America’8.  
After my father’s death and with no formal income coming into the house, my mother 
embraced kombinacja. She sublet a room to a Polish woman for several months to help 
pay the apartment bill. When the U.S. Census enumerators were walking around asking 
how many people lived in the house, the woman pressured my mother to lie about her 
undocumented status. My mother refused, the woman moved out, and since then has 
used her personal connections with the Polish landlord to intimidate my mother by 
                                                
7 Polish worker-peasants have traveled to the West to earn money. Zuzanna’s parents 
emmigrated to Chicago to become workers in the early 1900s and then returned during 
the interwar period to buy a farm in central Poland. 
8 Our priest in the Trenton diocese stole $140,000 from the church when he retired to 
return to Poland in 2004.  
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breaking into her apartment9. Mother has become deeply entrenched in ‘gift’ exchange 
networks with immigrant women. Since my mother knows how to use the Internet, her 
friends who do not own computers call her with different questions she could Google 
for them. They also drop off food and gifts in return for the ‘free’ rides that she gives 
them to Brooklyn whenever she goes to visit. Or, when I go to IKEA, she asks for ten 
jars of raspberry jam to distribute to her acquaintances. Because she does not qualify for 
welfare or any other state programmes, these relationships help her get by while living 
dangerously close to the poverty line.  
A new word has entered her lexicon, ‘acquaintances’ (znajomi), and she has 
nonchalantly begun slipping their stories into our everyday conversations. Recently, she 
told me that her acquaintances—who are quite well off and own a house—offered to 
volunteer at a church festival in Pennsylvania and instead of helping out, focused on 
stealing huge quantities of food from the church. Another znajoma told my mother that 
undocumented immigrants get their car insurance from All State Insurance. My mother 
called me one day to say that she spoke with the ASI specialist’s Polish wife who 
distributes insurance on behalf of her husband from their home10. She had imposed a 
‘fine’ on my mother’s insurance bill without explanation, and then began distributing 
ASI ‘credit’ to cover it up when my mother complained about the high cost. The theme 
of these kombinacja stories is that economic opportunities are not systemic. They must 
be carved out using a time-sensitive calibration of networks and resources. This is a 
skillset that some immigrants seem to possess, unlike those follow the rules, wait for the 
system to reform, or ‘try out’ one of those loopholes that have long closed.  
These kombinacja stories are bundles of information about what is possible when 
‘getting around’ the American system. For an aging, Polish woman living below the 
poverty line, with no formal employment, wanting to make no real changes in her life, 
and who speaks almost no English, these myths carry messages of survival and hope. 
                                                
9 The Polish landlords of the apartment complex have turned a blind-eye to housing 
undocumented immigrants and accept bribes and gifts for renovations. My mother says 
that this ‘ruling class’ in the complex is similar to the socialist-era nomenklatura that 
offered its members positions of power and protection from the law.   
10 English speaking Poles take bribes from immigrants to arrange access to medical, 
real-estate, and insurance services. This replicates the socialist-era relationships 
between the people and the nomenklatura that received bribes in order to gain access to 
state entitlements.  
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For me, this is bad news because my mother expects me to perform a daughter’s duty in 
making sure that she too has access to these resources like other immigrants. Take for 
instance, the myth of the $100 apartment. My mother heard from a znajoma that a 
Polish real estate agent in Trenton secured a low-income state apartment for her aging 
parents for $100 per month. Of course, when I tell her that this is probably a lie or the 
acquisition is conducted illegally she does not believe me, yet she pressures me for 
years to secure it for her through whatever means possible. When I refuse, she says that 
she has to reach out to the Polish PGR for ‘help’ because her own daughters will not. 
When she herself went to the real estate agent who supposedly secured this apartment 
and even gave her gifts and bribes, the deal fell flat.  
These myths extended to medical services and ‘miracles’. A znajoma informed my 
mother that there was a woman in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, who knew of a Polish 
pharmacy that sold a special white powder that would heal my grandmother’s leg in 
Poland. We acquired the powder and mother took it to Poland where she advertised it as 
American medicine and applied it to grandmother’s leg; proclaiming proudly that it had 
cured her from the inferior quality Polish medicine. No proof could dispel this myth. 
This system of informal information reveals an alternative mentality about entitlements 
and a different dimension of observed reality that trumps any other source of 
information. The message is that in order to acquire that ‘possibility’ in this American 
system, one must blur the distinctions between legal and illegal, observed and perceived 
phenomena. It is a different dimension of existence in this world. 
Since kombinacja has entered our lives in a real economic sense, it has transformed my 
relationship with my mother into a series of economic transactions. She packs her car 
trunk full of food whenever she visits and once I accept, she takes out a packet of 
envelopes with translations and calls that she wants me to make on her behalf. If I 
refuse to perform these tasks that have now become entitltements via her gifts to me, 
she claims it is because I am ‘too rich’ or want ‘money’ to do it—treating me as if I 
were a corrupt, socialist-era ‘doctor’ who demands money in order to perform a service. 
In other words, she has ‘domesticated’ those relationships with public figures in the 
socialist period as a way of managing her household and children in the post-socialist 
one. For me, of course, it is one thing to study informal economies and another to be 
indoctrinated into them and threatened with negative sanctions if I do not ‘help’ in those 
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household duties. It is as if I have had to choose between being an upright citizen and 
being a good daughter. 
Thus, growing up with kombinacja I learned that the ‘formal’ way of doing things—
whether economic transactions or legally immigrating to a state—were constantly being 
negotiated and blurred across my neighbourhood. In The Polish Peasant in Europe and 
America, William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (1918/1996) write that ‘assimilation’ 
into American society for the Polish diaspora was an ‘entirely secondary and 
unimportant issue’ and that the ‘fundamental process’ underlying Polish communities 
has been the ‘formation of a new Polish-American society out of the fragments 
separated from Polish society and embedded in American society’ (pg. 107). 
Kombinacja’s role during my upbringing in Trenton was exactly what strengthened 
Polish immigrants’ economic networks, that has territorially clustered them into 
neighbourhoods like the PGR or innercity Trenton, while ‘separating’ that community 
from what I perceived to be the ‘American’ way of life. It has been one of the basic 
building blocks of the Polish diaspora—that has economically and territorially marked 
‘us’ Poles from ‘them’ Americans.  
Kombinacja has had a separate career in modern-day Norway. My maternal uncle 
Ludwik’s family members (and many other villagers from Dobra) are all construction 
workers and labourers on horse-breeding farms in Norway (see Napierała & Trevena, 
2010). Before the Schengen Agreement in 1997, Poles like Ludwik migrated without 
papers and sometimes even got caught; but networks formed and passage became easier 
over time when the law opened up the borders. They live in feudal-like arrangements—
they stay for free in a Norwegian farmers’ guesthouse or basement and work the land 
for pay. When I visited them in 2009, they spoke eagerly about kombinacja as a 
necessary means to supplement their incomes. They siphon construction material, eat 
food off the farm, and negotiate wages through various theatrics. I even observed some 
of their activity of ‘taking’ cabbage from a farm, to which they—knowing I was 
interested in the term—would laugh and say, ‘kombinacja!’ The kombinacja in Norway, 
however, appears to be different than that which I have experienced in Trenton, which 
shows that not all forms of post-socialist kombinacja are alike across geographic 
contexts.  
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While in Norway, I became more interested—and somewhat involved—in the 
transnational facets of kombinacja, especially its role in migration. Ludwik stays in 
Norway for most of the year but his wife Magdalena goes back once a month to Dobra 
because their teenage daughter Karolina goes to school there. Each month Magdalena 
packs cheap Polish food into suitcases to bring back to Norway and at the airport buys 
vodka and cigarettes that she sells to Polish workers for a higher price in the Norwegian 
countryside. With an intimate knowledge of how Dobra functioned under socialism, 
they can transplant that system into working knowledge in Norway and earn a decent 
living for themselves and their four children. Agata in particular has become fluent in 
Norwegian, has recently purchased a house in the village, and is a caretaker at the local 
elementary school where her daughter attends. Ludwik told me that he is now living out 
his socialist utopia—which Poland had failed to deliver—in Norway.  
In my family, kombinacja has been a versatile strategy that has been adopted in various 
ways to make ends meet from socialism to post-socialism, from Dobra to America and 
Norway. It has served as a template for identifying ‘good’ kombinacja (that protects our 
interests) versus ‘bad’ kombinacja (that does not represent our interests, or is illegal). 
The social reproduction of kombinacja can take many forms from engaging in gift 
economies, providing protection to immigrants, and enforcing gender roles. By 
narrating the economic relations of this concept, we can see how it is used creatively by 
multiple classes towards various economic and social goals.  
1.2. How kombinacja found me in 2008 
Although I was aware of the term and its application, I did not narrate others’ or my 
personal history through kombinacja. After high school, when the Polish girls in my age 
group were falling into the ranks of the cleaning services and boys went to earn ‘good 
money’ in their fathers’ construction businesses, I followed my siblings’ route and 
attended university. After a study abroad experience in 2005 when I joined a land-rights 
movement in post-tsunami Thailand that sparked my interest in writing about property 
rights among marginalised communities, I returned to Dobra in 2008 to research 
peasants’ post-socialist property rights for my senior undergraduate thesis. It helped me 
to ‘fill in’ what I had missed when I migrated to the United States and simultaneously 
pursue my newfound academic interests. 
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What caught me by surprise during that short trip was how varied the process of 
privatisation had been from village to village, because of how they had responded to the 
state’s collectivisation drives in the late 1940s and 1950s. Adjacent villages only 
kilometres apart had vastly different privatisation trajectories. In general, the few 
villages that had opted out of collectivisation—usually because they were populated by 
a single extended family or ethnic group that acted in unison—continued some degree 
of farming while most other villages that once had a collective farm (kołchoz) were 
attached to a state farm (sovkhoz, PGR) which had much more complex, partially 
privatised landscapes. My gatekeeper Alfred and my interviewees continuously 
referenced the socialist era—especially the 1950s—to explain the trajectory of 
development in their villages. There was no ‘beginning’ of capitalism in 1989. Rather, I 
learned that in order to understand economic and developmental differentiation, it is 
imperative to understand the conditions under which some villages accepted, 
negotiated, or rejected collectivisation in the 1950s. 
I noticed that peasants ordered time differently from the ‘history’ familiar in textbooks 
and televised world events. When I asked my grandmother Zuzanna how her life had 
changed from the socialist to capitalist eras she responded, ‘For me, not much has 
changed’. She was using a basic ordering principle of survival; that the transition of the 
formal economy and state apparatus had not been able to transform during the transition 
process in the 1980s and 1990s. Time was not aligned neatly with the timeline of 
transition from socialism to capitalism in 1989—various interlocutors claimed that 
Communism collapsed in 1983, 1987, and 1995—which led me to think that there are 
other ways that people narrate their relationship to the state and formal economy. 
Villagers who could legally purchase a state restaurant and run it privately would say 
that Communism ended in 1983; workers who were left unemployed when the state 
tannery became privastised in 1995 claimed that Communism ended then for them. The 
spatio-temporal boundaries of socialism versus capitalism were defined by individual 
experiences with new and old economic flows. It was the point in time when individuals 
and families had to make economic adjustments—like becoming restaurant owners or 
migrant workers—in order to survive outside of the state workplaces where they had 
worked for decades. Peasants’ and workers’ perceptions of time emerged as an 
interesting way to gauge the ‘process’ of privatisation unraveling onto the village 
landscape.  
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When I commenced my doctoral fieldwork in May 2009, I set off to explore how 
peasants chose to accept, reject, or integrate state development plans, such as the 
collectivisation of their farms during the Stalinist era in the 1950s. Although 
interviewees often referred to the term ‘kombinacja’ or ‘kombinowanie’ as the main 
method of survival against the socialist state, the term evaded my radar because it 
appeared so familiar that I failed to question its conceptual significance. It was not until 
I interviewed Fidelis, a ninety-year-old Kashubian11 who was the village’s unofficial 
intellectual because he had occupied multiple positions (state forestry worker, forestry 
director, and administrator at the local government office) under socialism, that the term 
resurfaced as an important process. When I asked him why he kept on referring to the 
socialist aesthetic and mentality as ‘grey’ (szaryzna), he responded that it referred to the 
lack of resource flows and unfinished state building projects:  
Because not everything is finished. The city of Słupsk or Dobra itself, it 
was grey! Grey! Everywhere grey! Grey! It is not the case that a house 
would be painted somewhere because immediately (someone would ask), 
‘How does he have money? From what has he made money?’ And as a 
matter of fact, one did not buy paint because there was no paint. Some 
might have had that type of money, but he could not do it because he did 
not receive—so he stole it from somewhere. Because simply put, then, it 
was not called ‘stealing’, it was called (pointing his index finger up) 
‘Kombinacja’! Yes! It was not stealing!”  
How could stealing not be stealing!? Growing up with kombinacja in Trenton, I had 
associated it with some form of theft, yet in the socialist context, it had been watered 
down and even positively sanctioned to acquire scarce resources. It was at this point that 
I began to reimagine kombinacja as a flexible process across socialism and capitalism; 
that kombinacja in one context may not be identical to the same concept in another 
economic, political or geographic context. Although it was not a part of my formal 
research proposal, this is where my rediscovery of kombinacja began, both as a category 
and its significance in my life. When I returned to the interviews, the term resurfaced in 
almost all of them in the discussion about the state and survival under communism. 
Furthermore, when I spoke to people about it in subsequent interviews, people would 
intersperse their answer with laughter and refer positively to the concept as an ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ strategy.  
                                                
11 An ethnic group in northern Poland have their own language and alphabet.  
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Everyone knew what kombinacja meant within the specific context of stealing from the 
state, had examples of it, and claimed they never used it personally but appeared to have 
supported it. If there was any ‘formula’ to the kombinacja stories, it would include a 
workplace setting in the field or factory, the acknowledgement of surveillance from a 
party official, an explanation of how something ought to be done and then how the 
kombinator worked individually or collectively to evade the gaze of the state. Finally, 
the account would relate to how they brought that resource home or benefitted privately 
from it at the expense of the state. I realised that talking about kombinacja was how I 
could become ‘included’ in the conversation and learn what it means to be a part of the 
‘us’. In other words, connecting with kombinacja connected me to the heart of the 
Polish community.  
This rediscovery was problematic to my role as an ethnographer and to my newfound 
‘subject’, because my personal experiences with kombinacja could not be separated 
from what I had ‘rediscovered’ during fieldwork. Could, and indeed should, I write 
from the perspective of a Western ethnographer who stumbled across an odd term, or a 
subject that with some training from relatives one could learn this skill-set of thinking 
like a kombinator? It never occurred to me to identify myself as ‘traversing’ both 
subject and ethnographer sides even though I have evidently done so. I played along 
with the dualism of being either an ethnographer or a subject. When I embraced my 
‘subject’ voice, I felt accountable for any negative representations of my community12. 
In other words, in order to figure out kombinacja, I thought that I had to position myself 
at the centre of analysis by undoing or contesting my opinions about kombinacja that I 
developed as a defence mechanism to aid integration into American society. In order to 
write from an auto-ethnographic perspective13, I had to rework my own prejudices, 
understanding, and experiences with kombinacja. I had not imagined kombinacja as 
having ‘multiple roles’ or as pluralised across geographies and time. Instead of 
questioning dualities, for a long time I reinforced them.  
The more I knew about kombinacja, the more I gravitated towards the subject voice 
without knowing it. The narrative began to accidentally take the shape of the 
                                                
12 See Skott-Myhre et al. (2012) on accountability in auto-ethnography. 
13 Reed-Danahay (1997) writes that auto-ethnography stands at the intersection of 
native, ethnic, and autobiographic ethnography (pg. 2). 
 22 
‘vulnerable observer’ (Behar, 1996) or ‘autoethnography’ (Steedman, 2003; Limón, 
1994). I began narrating kombinacja through a voice which represented the community 
rather than as an ‘ethnographer’ conducting analysis from a more distanced perspective. 
I did not know which voice was the subject or the ethnographer. However I could easily 
find explanations without specific ties to empirical evidence but just knowing that if this 
was the case or this were the context, this is how the villagers would perceive or act on 
it. I sometimes took the voice of the state and sometimes took on prejudices and 
misconceptions that were not even my own. Whose voice was it really;14 the UK-based 
ethnographer ‘I’, the Trenton/immigrant ‘I’, or the Dobra/local ‘I’? Or were they 
‘blended voices’? (Brettell, 1997, pg. 243). In her memoirs, Hoffman (1989) writes 
about the multiplicity of voices that emerge due to her dislocation from Poland to 
America and struggles with ‘searching for a true voice’, wondering whether she can 
‘trust English to speak my childhood self’. She attributes these voices to the lack of a 
geographic centre in her life ‘pulling the world together’. Instead, she struggles with the 
‘scattered nodules competing for our attention’ in the form of multiple voices (pgs. 274-
275). Struggling with these voices, I realised that reflexivity would be a continuous 
process. In order to write the ethnography, I would have to rewrite myself.  
It was difficult to question my family’s narration of kombinacja. On the one hand, my 
mother would say that kombinacja is a global phenomenon, ‘The whole world is one 
big kombinacja’ even if the world did not know that this concept existed or was aware 
that an action could be defined as such. Ludwik told me that having lived both under 
socialism and capitalism he knew that Westerners—including myself—could not 
understand or think in the logic of kombinacja because they mostly engaged in formal 
economic activities. They never experienced socialism and could not inhabit this other 
dimension of dancing around formal structures, dislocating resources from formal 
economic flows and reformulating them into new economic objects for private 
advantage.  
                                                
14 O’Reilly (2009) writes that insider ethnographers differentiate themselves from 
outsiders in that ‘rather than describing the unconscious grammar of the community; 
their ethnographies are expressions of it, the result of a superior insider knowledge 
gained through primary socialisation’ (pg. 114). 
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The suggestion dawned that in order to tap into this mentality and understand it, I would 
have to re-indoctrinate myself into this ‘other’ world of kombinators. I thought that 
engaging in the conversation about kombinacja would somehow help me bridge that 
linguistic and cultural gap with the rest of my family of farm labourers and the rural 
poor. ‘Diasporic’ Poles and ‘native’ Poles are basically perceived to be two different 
species. Eager to please and learn, if they told me kombinacja was something 
Westerners could not understand because they had not been raised in a society such as 
ours under socialism, then I believed that binary and included it in how I presented my 
work. I have had the tedious task of undoing some of these conceptions and prejudices; 
as a diasporic ‘native’ ethnographer, I have in turn brought on board a lot of ideological 
baggage. 
1.3. Kombinacja’s origins  
Part of this project of undoing these prejudices emerged through my investigation about 
kombinacja’s existence in historical records. Kombinacja, as it has been described thus 
far, is a colloquial term with no formal definition in the Polish dictionary other than 
what we define to be ‘combination’ in English (i.e. ‘to mix’). Given its multivalent and 
multi-sited existence in socialist Dobra, post-socialist America and Norway, the 
question of whether kombinacja operates as an isolated phenomenon—specific to 
Dobranians who had exercised the strategy under socialism and adapted it to their 
survival strategies to their host countries—is a legitimate one. In other words, is 
kombinacja a phenomenon that can be studied across Poland?  
In his investigation of urban survival strategies in post-socialist Warsaw, Kusiak (2012) 
defines kombinować15 as an historical narrative in the survival of the Polish nation:  
Since feudal times in Poland it has been considered a skill which one 
should be proud of, as it allows the underprivileged to access otherwise 
inaccessible resources and trick the oppressor. It was the exceptional 
ability to kombinować that helped the majority of Poles to survive the 
Nazi occupation, the socialist shortages, and the shock of post-1989 
inflation (pgs. 296-297).  
                                                
15 Verb tense of kombinacja.  
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In her investigation of ‘resourcefulness’ in 1970s Warsaw, Mazurek (2012) defines 
kombinowanie—in the past tense—‘as a family tradition’ which ‘was a defense against 
negative circumstances, against the cyclic trauma caused by property loss and 
diminished social status’ (pg. 306). Barcikowska (2004) defines kombinowanie on 
open.democracy.net, ‘as part of an indefinite struggle for biological survival, an all-too-
human defense mechanism against an inhuman system’ (pg. 1). While it is a relief that 
other anthropologists and sociologists had noticed this process in other parts of Poland, 
they all situate kombinacja in the ‘feudalism’, ‘family tradition’, and ‘human instinct’ 
boxes that propagate the myth of kombinacja rather than supporting it with historical 
evidence. Furthermore, all studies of kombinacja are time-capsuled into the ‘socialist’ 
or ‘post-socialist’ period rather than understanding its transformations over time. Since 
kombinacja is a colloquial term and it has been in the Polish ‘tradition’ for a long time, 
would it not have at least one entry in the dictionary? I began to suspect that the term 
kombinacja, which sounds a lot like English ‘combination’, was a cognate to a foreign 
term.  
I began enquiring about its etymology and historical origins. After conducting some 
archival, historical, and literary research, my best guess at the time of writing this thesis 
is that kombinacja originates from the Latin sociare (to combine)—the origin of the 
word ‘socialism’ that became popularised during the rise of British socialism in the late 
19th century (Bevir, 2011, pg. 14) —and its popularisation is likely the product of West-
East labour and literary movements. This is not to imply that these sets of practices did 
not exist prior to the import of the term ‘kombinacja’ into the Polish lexicon. Instead, 
calling them kombinacja linked with a broader political and economic movement of 
‘combinations’ that swept across industrialising Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
During the Industrial Revolution in 19th-century Britain, ‘combination’ (organised 
alliance, association) was a term used in legal texts and newspapers to describe 
workplace struggles between skilled workers (or journeymen) and masters, prior to the 
advent of formally recognised trade and labour unions. Masters entered into 
combinations with one another to set prices, wages, and working hours in response to 
the technological advancement of industry; journeymen organised meetings with each 
other to agree upon wages and their limitations on the number of apprentices they 
would allow on the workshop floor. The introduction of new industrial technology 
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meant that skilled workers who wanted higher wages could be replaced by the masses 
of unskilled labourers migrating into the cities and who were willing to work longer and 
for less. Then, when combinations of both masters and workers settled on their plan the 
two sides in each workplace met annually or bi-annually to establish the conditions of 
their working contract. Given that there were no trade or labour unions, this was highly 
variable from workplace to workplace (see Whatley, 1987; Thompson, 1963). Master 
combinations versus worker combinations represented the struggle over who got to set 
limitations on capital flows, labour output, and the overall development trajectory of the 
Industrial Revolution. Thus, the association between ‘combining’ and ‘socialism’ was 
false because masters’ combinations pushed back on the workers’ combinations for 
better wages and hours. 
Thus, ‘combination’ was not borne out of industrial ‘capitalism’, nor was it specifically 
related to workers’ solidarity. In ‘Chartism’ (1853) written to the New York Daily 
Tribune, Karl Marx writes that combinations do not belong to anyone in particular and 
even though many combinations fizzled out, combinations over time amounted to the 
turnover of economic and political power as they had done so in the pre-capitalist era 
(pg.1). Combinations generated economic difference which disrupted the formal 
economic order. In The Poverty of Philosophy (1867), Marx similarly stated that 
feudalism was overthrown through the ‘partial’ combinations of the bourgeoisie: 
In the bourgeoisie we have two phases to distinguish: that in which it 
constituted itself as a class under the regime of feudalism and absolute 
monarchy, and that in  which, already constituted as a class, it overthrew 
feudalism and monarchy to make society into a bourgeois society. The 
first of these phases was the longer and necessitated the greater efforts. 
This too began by partial combinations against the feudal lords (pg. 125).  
Not all bourgeoisies entered into combinations. Those who did, however, generated 
enough differentiation within the system in order to disrupt it and establish their 
leverage over its trajectory. Combination, as a tactic to gain control over formal 
economic development, helps us understand why masters’ combinations existed in the 
first place (they were the residue of the overthrow of feudalism) and why they pushed 
back against workers’ combinations (they were protecting their formal order). Workers 
were disrupting the behemoth of industrial capitalism created by the masters, and 
securing control over capital flows, wages, and the expansion of technological 
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innovation that contributed to the struggle over formal economic and political power. 
Entering into combinations meant making a claim through economic differentiation 
over existing formations of economic and political power. 
During the Industrial Revolution, combinations exemplified the workers’ budding class-
consciousness akin to how the bourgeoisie had acquired class consciousness via their 
combinations to overthrow feudalism. Marx (1867) wrote that the ‘first attempt of 
workers to associate among themselves always takes place in the form of 
combinations’. Workers’ combinations as a ‘common thought of resistance’ had a 
‘double aim’: ‘that of stopping competition among the workers, so that they can carry 
on general competition with the capitalist’. (pg. 125). Marx was wary, however, that 
workers’ combinations could generate a shift in the distribution of political power, of 
which socialists as well as capitalists were members. This third method of economic 
self-determination did not please ‘economists’ or ‘socialists’: 
The economists say to workers: Do not combine. By combination you 
hinder the regular progress of industry, you prevent manufacturers from 
carrying out their orders, you disturb trade and you precipitate the 
invasion of machines which, by rendering your labour in part useless, 
force you to accept a still lower wage […] The socialists say to the 
workers: Do not combine, because what will you gain by it anyway? A 
rise in wages? […] Skilled calculators will prove to you that it would 
take you years merely to recover, through the increase in your wages, the 
expenses incurred for the organisation and upkeep of the combinations. 
And we, as socialists, tell you that, apart from the money question, you 
will continue nonetheless to be workers, and the masters will still 
continue to be the masters, just as before. So no combination! No 
politics! For is not entering into combination engaging in politics? (pgs. 
123-124).  
Unlike in Britain, combinations in Poland became a radical mix of class consciousness 
and nationalist resistance against foreign colonisation 16 . During the Industrial 
Revolution, Poland had been partitioned by the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and 
Prussian empires (since the 18th century). Formal education about these partitions was 
banned, thus the Polish language and national identity was taught in transient ‘flying 
universities’ (universytety latające). Due to limitations on political organisation and 
expression, much of the commentary on economic and political liberation was taught 
                                                
16 In France, they engaged in combiner; in Germany, kombinieren. 
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through Polish literature. Polish authors, in the 19th century Young Poland (Młoda 
Polska) modernist movement, began using the term ‘kombinacja’ to explain Poles’ 
economic struggles against industrialisation and nationalist struggles against 
Russification 17 . In the novel Ziemia Obiecana (Promised Land, 1899) about 
industrialising Łódź in the 19th century, Nobel Laureate Władysław Stanisław Reymont 
claims that ‘kombinacya’ [sic.] is something that is ‘unfolding’ in the world: 
Think, what is this strange kombinacya that is unfolding today in the 
world: the human enslaved nature’s forces, discovered masses of 
strength—and went into his own shackles exactly into his own forces. 
The human created the machine, and the machine made him its own 
slave; the machine will expand itself and grow until infinity and so will 
the human’s enslavement expand and grow (pgs. 345-346). 
Similar to the workers in Britain’s industrialising centres who were faced with the 
substitution of their labour with machines, so Reymont’s description of machines 
represents a threat to human freedom. While in the British case the workers combined 
against the masters’ combinations, in the Polish case, the reader is not so ‘sure’ who the 
Master is or who is responsible for this top-down ‘kombinacya’. However, Reymont 
later describes the worker retaliating against that kombinacya with his own individual 
kombinacya: ‘He wandered around Łódź for entire days, submerged only in 
kombinacyas that sought to harm the manufacturer’ (pg. 355). Again, this references the 
British workers’ combinations that were partially engaged in Luddism on the workshop 
floor in order to physically wreck the machines that cheapened their wages and 
eventually substituted their labour. However, unlike the British workers’ combinations, 
the Polish worker was isolated and carried out kombinacya on his own. So, while we 
see the same dualism between masters’ and workers’ combinations to control the 
progression of industry, in the Polish case, rather than being a specific employer, the 
master is a more mystical category for a process that is engulfing and enslaving the 
country. Rather than engaging in group kombinacya, the worker is left to his own 
devices. Reymont’s usage of kombinacya functioned as a commentary on Polish 
workers’ fettering to the (foreign) machine and future potential for solidarity with the 
‘combination’ labour movements spreading across industrialising Europe.  
                                                
17 I could not find usage of the term prior to the 19th century. 
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Polish kombinacja acquired a dimension of aesthetic resistance. Since public 
demonstrations against the occupiers were illegal, resistance became embedded onto the 
site of the body and its ability to dance around the institutions of the occupier. 
Kombinacja was no longer something specific to the workers, the workplace, wages, or 
machines, but instead was democratised and pluralised as a strategy that could be used 
by anyone for any purpose.  
Stefan Żeromski in Syzyfowe prace (Labours of Sisyphus, 1897) revealed this magical 
and nationalist dimension of kombinacja (‘nacja’, in Polish, means ‘nation’). The novel 
takes place in a schoolhouse in Tsarist-occupied Congress Poland, where children were 
not allowed to speak Polish on school-grounds and were taught Polish history by 
Russian teachers. The children used kombinacja to distort reality and achieve a sense of 
distance and liberation from the educational institution. When one student met his 
Russian teacher with big glasses, he wondered whether she could even ‘see’ him and 
then ‘by a process of strange associations of impressions’ he used the process of 
kombinacja to help imagine the teacher as ‘similar to […] a huge fly’ (pg. 4). 
Kombinacja here represents the ability to imagine different possibilities. In a later 
passage, the teacher identified students using kombinacja—‘Around the first class 
Radek noticed, that this student kombinóje with hardship and that he almost has no 
memory’ (pg. 77). We still see this interaction with the ‘master’s gaze’ that is able to 
identify kombinacja. It was only in the physical education class that children’s bodies 
were free from institutionalisation—‘Without an understanding of any type of method 
action, blindly and through conjecture, gave birth to character, excited the memory, and 
with using his own elements or horsing around [the] perceptiveness and strength of 
using kombinacja’ (pg. 78). Żeromski clearly shows that kombinacja is like a form of 
childish deviance that seriously undermines the ‘Other’ but which in itself should not be 
castigated too seriously. Through kombinacja, nationalist resistance could now be 
embodied in deviant thought and displayed in bodily movements. 
During the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviets combined both the British combination 
and Polish kombinacja. State-censored Soviet literature in the 1920s reframed the 
kombinator—‘dystopia’s Provocateur’ and the ‘Truly Free Individual’ (Zholkovsky, 
1994, pg. 254) as a bourgeoise capitalist. Ostap Bender—the Velikii Kombinator 
(‘Grand Schemer’)—was introduced in Ilia Ilf and Evgenii Petrov’s novel The Twelve 
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Chairs (1928). Ostap, whose dream was to become a millionaire and move to Rio de 
Janeiro, ‘effortlessly squeezes information out of people, slips in and out of roles, and 
penetrates through situations’ in a ‘brilliant twistiness in the aesthetic of other worlds’ 
(Pesmen, 2000, pg. 204). Ostap hunted ‘individual treasure in his collectivist land’ and 
‘subverts the very idea of conformity by artistically aping the official clichés’ 
(Zholkovsky, 1994, pg. 242). The Soviet kombinator was a mix of the British masters’ 
capitalist spirit, the Polish workers’ Luddism in Łódź, and the Polish children’s 
innovative strategies for subverting Russification.  
What is fascinating is that even with these nuances of kombinacja in the Soviet case, the 
word and strategy remains to be used to describe deviance. If they had followed the 
British model of combinations that strove for workers’ rights—a model that seems like 
it would fit well with the proletarian revolution—then the kombinator would have been 
a worker’s hero. Yet, the kombinator was a deviant, more akin to Marx’s definition of 
combination as representing a subversion of a formal order; which in this case, 
represented the Soviet state. Even if the proletarian revolution was the product of 
workers combinations against the Czar and the bourgeoisie, the kombinator figures 
continued to be the wrecker under the dictatorship of the proletariat18.  
Between the rise of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and the end of the Second World War 
in 1944, kombinacja took on another dimension: kombinacja was a method of using 
personal networks to transfer scarce resources from the public realm into the private. 
Pesmen (2000) writes that the Soviet kombinator’s strategies, akin to the Russian chess 
strategy of kombinatsiia (‘a planned sequence of moves that bring unexpectedly great 
profit’), became ‘the prerequisite for understanding Soviet life’. It became a 
fundamental component of how people acquired scarce resources which they were not 
legally entitled to or could not acquire by going to a store (pg. 204). It represents a 
horizontal diversification of the economic fields in which kombinacja could be 
organised and practiced. Here, the formation and reproduction of class consciousness, 
nationalism, and political submission are of secondary importance to the role of 
kombinacja in socially and physically reproducing the household and family unit. 
                                                
18 In 1996, Petrov’s chapter ‘The Grand Kombinator’ came out as a book with the 
Cyrillic on one side and Hebrew on the other—which suggests a renewed admiration 
for this literacy character. 
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This adaptation of kombinacja as a basic instinct of survival was most powerfully 
illustrated in war survivor’s oral narratives and Jewish Holocaust literature. In Primo 
Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz (1958), the Häftling (inmates) used it to acquire third-rate 
tobacco in the concentration camps: ‘The traffic is an instance of a kind of 
“kombinacja” frequently practiced: the Häftling, somehow saving a ration of bread, 
invests it in Mahorca; he cautiously gets in touch with a civilian addict who acquires the 
Mahorca, paying in cash with a portion of bread greater than that initially invested’ (pg. 
80). The narrator claims that, ‘Whosoever does not know how to become an 
“Organisator”, “Kombinator”[...] soon becomes a “musselman”—a walking cadaver’ 
(pg. 89). In a similar vein, in Art Spiegelman’s Maus (1973), Haskel uses ‘kombinacya’ 
to get past the German guards in Sosnowiec camp (pg. 116), as seen in Figure 2. The 
Hebrew ‘combina’ (הניבמוק) used in Israel (Jauregui, 2014, pg. 30) is the only other 
term that is used in the same context as kombinacja19. We see how Jewish kombinacya 
that subverted one formal order under the Nazi occupation was then adopted as 
‘combina’ to support a new formal order.  
This brief historical sketch covering 19th century Britain, partitioned Poland, Soviet 
Russia, and Nazi concentration camps reveals several important qualities about 
kombinacja: (a) it can take the form of a group, individual, institution, or process (e.g. 
‘industrialisation’); (b) it can be both physically traceable in the form of wage increase 
and resource flows through networks, as well as not traceable but only expressed in 
politicised forms of creative thinking with bodily movements; (c) it has no geographic, 
ethnic, or class loyalties: it can be adapted and used by multiple actors in different 
countries (and places) during different economic and political transitions; (d) it is a 
process that can produce economic difference or preserve (or impose) a formal 
economic and political order; (e) it is not ubiquitous, meaning that each combination or 
kombinacja are specific actions and activities that exemplify contextual struggles over 
resources and power within a specific space and time.  
                                                
19 Sivan (2010) writes that it is ‘a slogan word referring to the bypassing of rules or 
commitments’ in which ‘each of us gets to decide whether to follow the rules or change 
them’, a concept of economic and political self-determination that was critical to the 
state-making process for Israel in 1948 (pg. 1). 
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Figure 2 Kombinator in Spiegelman’s Maus (1973, pg. 116). 
 
The irony of kombinacja is that it resists binaries that give form to economic, political 
or cultural rules, but that it in itself preserves some semblance of an identifiable ‘form’. 
This rubric of kombinacja, revealing its internal flexibility as a strategy as well as its 
external application to multiple geographic, historical, economic, and political contexts, 
is what I mean when I refer to ‘the arts of combination’20. Not only does it take 
innovative thinking to subvert or preserve a formal order through skillful adaptation to 
and manipulation of shifting activities and binaries, but the flexibility of the strategy 
across time and space exposes how it in itself has woven itself around the narrative of 
‘history’ without getting caught or seriously researched, while at the same time 
diffusing and infusing economic projects and changing historical trajectories.  
                                                
20 Thanks to Professor Sharad Chari for this phrase. 
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1.4. Researching kombinacja from socialism to post-socialism 
My experiences with post-socialist kombinacja in Trenton and the types of kombinacja 
exercised before the Second World War are very different, even though they are 
referred to by the same term. Its post-socialist expressions in reproducing gender roles, 
easing migration and smuggling patterns across national borders, preserving the 
geographic cluster of the diaspora, defining economic ethics (‘good’ versus ‘bad’ 
kombinacja), and providing political protection to immigrants, are new expressions of 
kombinacja. Ethnographic studies of kombinacja in Poland reemerged in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, however nothing seems to have been written about how it adapted to the 
postwar socialist state-making project, from early to late socialism, and from socialism 
into the ‘transition’ into capitalism after 1989. My research attempts to address this 
‘blind-spot’ on the transformation of kombinacja. My guiding questions are:   
(a) How has kombinacja changed and evolved over time?  
(b) How did each expression of kombinacja affect the formal economy 
and state development processes such as postwar reconstruction, 
collectivisation, de-collectivisation, and marketisation?  
(c) In what ways did the state benefit (or not) from the economic 
differentiation reproduced through kombinacja?  
I track these ‘arts of combination’ across the boundaries of the agrarian and industrial, 
formal and informal, socialist and capitalist in the gmina of Dobra located in Poland’s 
Recovered Territories (Odzyskane Ziemie) which make up the western and northern part 
of the country. These territories that were annexed from Germany after the Second 
World War are an interesting fieldwork site for investigating kombinacja’s 
transformations from the socialist state-making period to the post-socialist period. The 
territories were a site of immense economic struggle over the postwar development 
trajectory between Poles and the Soviet-backed Polish state that was attempting to 
establish its own state presence on the German lands. Unlike the rest of Poland that 
resisted collectivisation in the 1940s and 1950s, the Recovered Territories became 
Poland’s most Sovietised region. Densely populated with enormous state farms 
(sovkhozy), collective farms (kołchozy), and nationalised industry, they resembled 
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Soviet Russia more than the rest of the country that was dominated instead with private 
family farms.  
The territories are a prime location for investigating how kombinacja is transmitted 
between groups that come in to contact with one another. After the war, the territories 
were the location of one of the largest human resettlement campaigns in modern history, 
with millions of Germans replaced by millions of forcibly resettled Ukrainians, 
repatriated Belarusians, and ‘wild-cats’ from central Poland—who all spoke different 
Slavic languages, practiced different religions, had fought on opposite sides in the war, 
and had experienced different degrees of Sovietisation. Did each ethnicity produce its 
own variant of kombinacja? How did the local state representatives manage kombinacja 
to build or disrupt solidarities between these ethnic groups? At what point did 
kombinacja become such a part of everyday life that it could be described as such by a 
Kashubian who had few prewar ties to the Polish community? How was it socially 
reproduced within each household? These questions aim to reveal how kombinacja 
became adopted by other groups as part of a broader process of assimilation to local 
economic conditions and how it became embedded into the everyday way of life 
alongside the ‘formal’ state and economy, even changing the very binary of formality 
and informality. 
Investigating kombinacja across the socialist, capitalist, and post-socialist contexts in 
Poland can illustrate informality’s flexibility across time and space. Informality is a 
response to what Polanyi (1944) identified as the 19th century formation of the state-
market nexus that positioned the modern state as the regulator of formal economic 
activity (see Castells & Portes, 1989, pg. 12-16; Hart, 1973, pg. 69; De Soto, 1989, pg. 
12). It enables labour and capital to imperfectly align, establishing systemic linkages 
between the formal and informal sectors, and transforming the state’s formal power 
(Hart, 1973, pg. 78). As Alsayyad and Roy (2004) define informality, ‘if formality 
operates through the fixing of value, including the mapping of spatial value, then 
informality operates through the constant negotiability of value and the unmapping of 
space’ (pg. 5) and drives home its relationship with kombinacja’s evasion of form. As 
Hart (1987) underscores, the ‘informal’ has theoretical applicability across economic 
contexts: so long, he writes that ‘there is formal economic analysis and the partial 
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institutionalisation of economies around the globe along capitalist or socialist lines, 
there will be a need for some such remedial concepts as the informal economy’ (pg. 1).  
In this thesis, I explore the uneasy fit between ‘kombinacja' and 'informality. Both 
kombinacja and informality blur spatial, legal, or cultural boundaries that limit material 
and immaterial resources to a very specific group of people. By investigating 
kombinacja, we can establish some methodological precedent for tracing informality’s 
transformations over time, under and through the current of ‘formal’ economic and 
political changes. What role does informality play in the function of the state-market 
nexus across socialist and capitalist economies? In what ways does informality benefit 
the ‘formal’ economy or state? How does it get reproduced alongside the ‘formal’? 
These questions can help reposition informality at the centre of historical and 
ethnographic investigation to uncover new histories and processes at work in ordering 
or disordering economic, political, and social life. 
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Chapter 2 
Making possible worlds 
2.1. Introduction 
Tracing kombinacja’s evolutions across socialist and capitalist transitions complicates 
the existence of capitalist/non-capitalist, capitalist/socialist/post-socialist, 
informal/second economies, formal/informal, private/public, and private/collective 
binaries. Binaries limit our understanding of the complex political, economic, and social 
processes that are produced and reproduced through the bridging and blurring of these 
‘ideal-types’. They diminish the human creativity and innovation that gets channelled 
into the production of economic alternatives that are co-opted into hegemony through 
the binary structure. Kombinacja’s refusal and refutation of binaries links it empirically 
to multiple post-structuralist and constructivist theories of heterogeneity, relational 
property, and the complexity of space.  
Kombinacja is polysemic and allows us to think across different sets of literatures. 
When we investigate ‘what it does’, kombinacja links up with informality (Alsayyad 
and Roy, 2004), habitus (Bourdieu, 1993); the study of ‘how it does it’ links up with 
‘domestication’ (Creed, 1995, 1998, 2011); ‘what its effects are’ connects with the 
complexity and relationality of space (Massey, 2005) as well as the ideas of alternative 
and diverse economies (Gibson-Graham 1996, 2006), ‘second economies’ (Grossman, 
1977) and ‘informal economies’ (Hart, 1973). No single one of these categories, 
however, can encompass the totality of kombinacja, and this is for the better, because 
this encapsulates what it does best—the evasion of form. Nevertheless, because most of 
them are connected through the discourse of possibilities and openness to difference, 
there are strong links to the spirit of the art of the combination project. This thesis will 
consider what our knowledge of kombinacja and informality can bring to the idea of 
diverse economies, as well as the existing split between informal and second economy 
studies. 
This chapter is an attempt to create theoretical space for the study of kombinacja 
through the blurring of aforementioned multiple binaries that currently limit rather than 
 36 
illuminate its functions and transformations across economies, states, time, and space. 
The initial section begins weaving this narrative by first laying out Gibson-Graham’s 
work on diverse economies which blurs the capitalist/non-capitalist binary and then 
using their project to structure the remainder of the chapter. In the second part, I blur the 
capitalist and socialist binaries by bridging the gap between the highly politicised 
‘informal’ versus ‘second’ economy literatures, by demonstrating how informality has 
existed in both sets in similar ways.  
Informality, in my view, deals with a category that relates to the relationship to the 
state-market nexus rather than to any political claim about the ‘problems’ of capitalism 
or socialism. It is relational in that it can be co-opted by anyone; by people as well as 
states themselves. In the third part, I provide some additional theoretical tools, like 
domestication, habitus, fields, and complexity theory that can help provide a much more 
fluid theoretical landscape for the investigation of kombinacja across economies, time, 
and space. By blurring these boundaries through kombinacja, and connecting it to the 
literature on informality, I hope to connect the practices and lessons of Russian, and 
Central and Eastern European communities—that have been isolated from informality 
debates—to the global struggles of the rural and urban poor. 
2.2. The diverse economies turn 
Feminist geographers J.K. Gibson-Graham argue that capitalism is ‘just one particular 
set of economic relations situated in a vast sea of economic activity’ (pg. 70). 
‘Capitalocentric’ discourse, however, deterministically relates these other forms of 
economy21 to capitalism; namely that they are ‘fundamentally the same as (or modeled 
upon) capitalism, or as being deficient or substandard imitations; as being opposite to 
capitalism; as being the complement of capitalism; as existing in capitalisms’ orbit’ 
(Gibson-Graham, 1996, pg. 6). Capitalism, through the prism of this post-Cold War, 
hegemonic imagery22, is ‘an object of transformation that cannot be transformed’ (Ibid. 
pg. 253) and which exists ‘outside politics and society’ (Gibson-Graham, 2006, pg. 53).  
                                                
21 Like self-employment, unpaid work, gifts, barter, moonlighting, informal lending, 
illegal exchanges, self-provisioning, and under-the-table exchanges (pg. 77). 
22 Hegemony ‘entails the persuasive expansion of a discourse into widely shared norms, 
values and perceptions’ so that it feels naturalised and fixed (2006, pg. 55).  
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They suggest a language of the ‘diverse economy’ in which the ‘economic landscape is 
represented as populated by a myriad of contingent forms and interactions’ and in which 
we use the thinking technique of ‘reading for difference rather than dominance’ (pg. 
54). This includes conceptualising economies in terms of ‘different kinds of transaction 
and ways of negotiating commensurability’, ‘different types of labor and ways of 
compensating it’ and ‘different forms of enterprise and ways of producing, 
appropriating, and distributing surplus’ (pg. 60). Thus, the language of diverse 
economies includes nonmarket/market/alternative market transactions, 
unpaid/wage/alternative paid labour, non-capitalist/capitalist/alternative capitalist 
enterprises rather than just an economy conceived of only wage labour, market 
exchange of commodities, and capitalist enterprise (pgs. 53-68).  
The diverse economy, which gives theoretical life to this ‘multidimensional nature of 
economic existence’ (pg. 77), is not static, but a messy ‘space of recognition and 
negotiation’ (pg. xxx). Economic relations are contingent, not deterministic; value is 
‘liberally distributed rather than sequestered in certain activities and denied to others’; 
dynamics are ‘proliferating rather than reducible to a set of governing laws and logics’ 
(pg. 60). Subjects weave in and out of different forms of transactions, labour and 
enterprise. Class becomes decentered and diverse as individuals ‘participate in various 
class processes, moulding multiple class positions at one moment and over time’ (1996, 
pg. 59). When considered in their totality, subjects’ economic activities can be 
identified not as fixed and singular, but as complex combinations of capitalist and non-
capitalist transactions and forms of labour, interacting with multiple types of enterprises 
at different points in time.  
Gibson-Graham deconstruct the capitalist/non-capitalist binary by challenging us to 
imagine the totality of the economy as ‘a site of multiple forms of economy whose 
relation to each other are only ever partially fixed and always under subversion’ (2006, 
pg. 12). They point to evolving research on informal economies23 which challenge 
capitalist hegemony because of the ‘alternative representations of society as decentred, 
incoherent and complex’ in which production takes place at home and elsewhere and 
not at the ‘center of the economy or the locus of its principal driving force’ (1996, pgs. 
                                                
23 ‘Informal economies’ include any quasi-legal and illegal activities that operate 
alongside of and/or through ‘formal’ economies regulated by law (Rakowski, 1994).  
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5; 172-173). Informal economies challenge the Marxian definition of class because, ‘As 
more people hold down two jobs, as more women enter the paid workforce, as work 
practices are changed to include the decision making input of workers, as the “informal 
sector” and hidden workforce increases, so traditional class mappings seem less and less 
relevant’ (2006, pgs. 52-58).  
Gibson-Graham identify transition studies as a fruitful site for the re-envisioning of 
hegemonic neoliberal capitalism in the post-Cold War era. They point out that 
cartographic maps of the Soviet Union before 1989 were uniformly coloured red as if 
the economy had been completely socialist (1996, pg. 244). Then after 1989, ‘it seems 
that the eastern bloc countries are homogeneously capitalist’ (pg. 259). The authors 
question what this eastern European ‘capitalism’ means: 
Does it mean that collective and communal and feudal and individual and 
family processes of production (some of which may be the same thing, 
and many of which co-existed with the presumptively hegemonic state 
sector) no longer exist […] that non market exchange networks and 
barter systems that were in place before 1989 are no longer operative or 
are not now being created to deal with new problems of privation and 
scarcity, problems associated with a new economic and political and 
social order? […] What about the so-called “mixed economies” that 
existed in the conceptual third-space created by the duality of capitalism 
and communism? Are these mixtures now homogenized, purified, 
because “communism” no longer exists? (1996, pg. 244). 
In the 1980s, scholars of the second world pondered the same question —what would 
happen to the ‘second economy’ during the capitalist transition24? In Soviet Russia, the 
second economy provided up to 12% of the total workforce, which was subcontracted 
by the ‘formal’ command economy (Treml, 1992, in Pavlovskaya, 2004, pg. 337). 
Skeptical that it would just be ‘solved’ by a dose of ‘capitalism’, Korbonski (1981) 
claimed that the ‘second economy in Poland is there to stay for an indefinite period of 
time, certainly for as long as the “first” economy does not succeed in satisfying the 
basic needs of the population, by eliminating persisting shortages of goods and services 
                                                
24 Kornai (1992) writes that the ‘first economy’ covered everything that ‘qualifies in the 
official ideology of the classical system as the “socialist sector,” that is, the 
bureaucratic state and cooperative sector’. The ‘second economy’ then ‘consists of the 
sum of the formal private sector composed of officially permitted, small family 
undertakings, and the informal private sector’ (pg. 85).  
 39 
and sources of illegal income’ (pg. 12). Ethnographers had detected the early signs of 
the second economies’ internal transformations. Szelenyi (1988) claimed that 
Hungarian polgárosodás (‘embourgeisement’) that encompassed differing ‘strategies 
for breaking free of the straightjacket of Soviet-style state socialism’ began to change. 
In the 1970s, the term polgár (burgher/bourgeoise) referred to individuals with 
sufficient autonomy to distinguish them from ‘state subjects’, but by the 1980s 
polgárosodás began to signify a process of economic growth for the second economy 
and private sector (pgs. 51-52). The ‘Capitalist’ transition converged upon not only a 
deteriorating command economy but a robust and transformative second economy that 
could adapt to new economic conditions. 
The 1990s were a boom for the ‘second economy’ which presented real problems to the 
capitalist model, because rather than being included as marginal activities in the new 
capitalist hegemony—using Gibson-Graham’s language—it both subverted parts of it 
while linking up with its processes. The decline of formal employment since 1989, with 
the loss of about six million jobs in the first decade of transition in the ex-Soviet bloc, 
resulted in a ‘forced flexibilization’ of the workforce through which ‘workers have had 
to engage in flexible and multiple employment strategies to ensure an adequate income’ 
(Smith & Stenning, 2006, pgs. 193-194). Terms like ‘multiskilling’ and ‘garbage 
contracts’ (śmieciowe umowy) entered the Polish lexicon. In Russia, the second 
economy increased from an estimated 16% of GDP in 1989-90 to 35-44% in 1994-95 
(Schneider & Enste, 2000, in Smith & Stenning, 2006, pg. 193)25. It contributed an 
estimated 8-12% to the GDP in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 20-25% in Hungary 
and Poland, and up to 54% in Yugoslavia (Milanovic, 1998, in Smith & Stenning, 2006, 
pg. 195). Without jobs, money or food, some people diversified their economic activity 
to survive; others, like the old elites, profited from partial capitalism. Morris and Polese 
(2014), claim that ‘there is one certainty about informality26 in the region’, that ‘it has 
increased markedly since the end of the socialist period’ (pg. 195). 
                                                
25  In 1996, the second economy produced an estimated 46% of Russia’s GDP 
(Pavlovskaya, 2004, pg. 337; Goble, 1999).  
26 I use informality, second economy, and informal economy synonymously because 
there is no consensus on which words to use in the post-socialist literature.  
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Ethnographic studies have shown that the second economy followed multiple 
trajectories in the ex-Soviet bloc during the 1990s and 2000s. Some elements of second 
economies adapted to capitalism, some faded, some carved out economic niches to 
stave off the influx of capitalism, and some burrowed deep into the state that monitored, 
legalised, and regulated the sanctity of capitalist transition. Second economy practices 
were continued when people were met with similar if not worse economic conditions 
during the transition they experienced under ‘socialism’. For example, when formal 
food distribution systems broke down in Bulgaria in the 1990s, villagers and city-
dwellers survived off of their networks and resource flows that they had developed 
under socialism (Creed, 1995, pg. 543; Cellarius, 2000, pg. 70). In this case, the second 
economy ‘carried over’ to conditions that mirrored the past shortages and when people 
realised that this new ‘capitalism’ was not actually making their lives any easier. 
Others continued to engage in second economy activity to socially reproduce their 
trusted networks. When the American Gerber factory came to Poland in the 1990s, local 
managers were replaced with non-locals because the former had ‘built networks by 
giving one another gifts and favours of various sorts, then used those networks to obtain 
access to goods in shortage’ (Dunn, 2004, pg. 52). Gerber sought to break apart 
activities that diverted company resources and hampered productivity. The second 
economy affected the ability of foreign, private entrepreneurs (who knew ‘capitalism’ 
best) to import formal capitalist workplaces in the first place. Unlike the Bulgarian case, 
the Polish case showed how the second economy was a way to adapt to new economic 
conditions to ensure that the social structure stayed the same (see domestication in the 
following section). 
Other examples show how second economy activities were restructured to blur into the 
formal economy. Russian Blat and tolkachi27, initially based upon material exchanges, 
were now becoming monetised (Ledeneva, 2006, pg. 1). The informal institution of 
kompromat—a Soviet-era term used to describe the dissemination of compromising 
information about another citizen—became embedded in democratically-elected 
governments where public officials used blackmail, misappropriation of budget funds, 
giving and accepting of bribes, embezzlement, cronyism and nepotism, discrediting 
                                                
27 Ledeneva (1998) below. 
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connections, and spying and tapping for political gain (Ibid. pg. 61). The second 
economy has been adjusted to new economic and political conditions in such a way that 
it has burrowed itself into the very ‘formal’ institutions responsible for ushering these 
countries through the capitalist transition.  
Other transitions of this economy have been more ambivalent. Lampland’s (1995) 
ethnographic study of 1990s Hungary reveals disagreement among the peasantry 
regarding the existence of their second economy: ‘“Protekció28 has been eliminated in 
socialism; now one has ‘socialist connections’” one claimed, accenting the 
depoliticisation of the activity with a capital ‘P’. Another, however, stated that it 
‘“makes the world go round. As long as the world is the world, this is the way things 
will be. That’ll never change!” (pg. 262). For some, the second economy was diluted 
while its importance grew for others. People tailored protekció to their own economic 
goals although there is considerable disagreement about the precise trajectory the 
second economy took in people’s lives.  
To bring this back to Gibson-Graham’s ‘mixed economies’ during the transition into 
capitalism, the ethnographic evidence demonstrates that second economies both 
increased and diversified with multiple economic trajectories. This exposes the frailty 
and incompleteness of the capitalist transition in the ex-Soviet bloc. Even into the 
2000s, the second economy constitutes an estimated 20% of the GDP in Central and 
Eastern European states and an estimated 40% or more in Russia, Ukraine, in the 
Caucasus and central Asia (Schneider et al., 2010 in Morris & Polese, 2014, pg. 2). The 
second economy has not only survived the economic transition, but has grown into a 
major economic sector, challenging at points and supporting at others, the hegemony of 
neoliberal capitalism. It both changes and is changed by capitalism. This is not good 
news for the idea of capitalist hegemony, for economic difference is one of the ‘ghosts 
that haunt the concept of capitalism’ (Gibson-Graham, 1996, pg. 243).  
Investigating the transformation of the second economy, from the socialist to the 
capitalist transition, through the language of the diverse economy shows how important 
post-socialist informality is in current debates on capitalist hegemony. What can post-
socialist informality contribute to the literature on diverse economies? This question 
                                                
28 Lampland (1995) below. 
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requires us to investigate how an increased focus on informality, post-socialism, and 
diverse economies is transforming the very analytical and theoretical debates among 
scholars of post-socialist studies. 
2.3. Towards a post-socialist informality approach 
‘Informality is here to stay’, Morris and Polese (2014) write, and its persistence in post-
socialist states, is ‘evidence of a lack of hegemony of capitalist relations in these spaces’ 
(pg. 6)29. Smith and Stenning (2006) echo the observation, stating that capitalist 
development in post-socialist states ‘should be seen as one part of a diverse economy, 
constituted by a host of economic practices, articulated with one another in dynamic and 
complex ways and in multiple sites and spaces’ (pg. 190). Informality is not going to be 
neatly tucked under capitalism’s wing but is producing versions of it and pushing post-
socialist scholars to drop the limiting transitology approach30 and embrace concepts of 
informality and diverse economy as a means towards ‘de-othering the study of post-
socialist space’ (Morris & Polese, 2014, pg. 7) 31. According to Morris and Polese 
(2014), transitology has ‘othered’ informality as a negative vestige of the past or a 
transient phenomenon which is likely to disappear through monetisation or further 
capitalist development and democratic governance. They demonstrate this claim by 
pointing to aspects of informality such as ‘Soviet-era blat-type practices in healthcare 
and trade/entrepreneurialism, the thirst for unobtainable commodity items in informal 
trade, some blue-collar practices that are partly parasitic on the formal enterprise’, that 
resemble a socialist past. Its other aspects, however, informality can be ‘closely tied to 
emerging forms of marketed relations and the particular role (or non-role) of the state’, 
or used as a way of ‘choosing their own distance, even withdrawal […] from state-
society relations as much as practically possible’ (pg. 6-9). A single transition narrative 
from one formal economy to another cannot explain the complex trajectories of post-
socialist informality as it changes, reacts, and interacts—or not—with capitalism. 
                                                
29 Morris and Polese (2014) define informality as a diverse ‘“repertoire” of strategies 
and tactics which include engagement with the formal on some level as well’ (pg. 6).  
30 Kubik (2014) writes that the six assumptions that underlie the transitology approach 
are compartmentalisation, emphasis on agency, presentism, naturalism, focus on formal 
institutions, and focus on whole states as units of analyses (pg. 31). 
31 I treat informality as the process of carving out niches that give life to alternative and 
diverse economies.  
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Standard theories of transition overlook other transitions and do not capture the 
complexity of post-socialist economies (Pavlovskaya, 2004, pg. 329). 
Kubik (2014) similarly argues that ‘considerable analytical leverage can be gained from 
thinking about informality, not as an unwelcome legacy of the communist system or an 
undesired by-product of the new capitalist/democratic system, but rather as an 
inescapable albeit “functional” component of the transitory process’. Informality’s 
diverse formal-informal hybrids ‘resemble neither the clear-cut blueprints of 
institutional reformers nor the concealed informal networks sometimes blamed for all 
the ills of post communism. Those half-visible, half-hidden networks of influence have 
often been overlooked by scholars relying on “imported” analytical categories of 
transitology and the “normal” categories of social science’. Importantly, these hybrids 
have a dual nature: On the one hand, they empower the ex-communist elites who are 
struggling against new elites. For example, old elites use ‘complex recombinations of 
the newly acquired formal prerogatives and long-standing informal connections 
inherited from the old regime’ that had the effect of moving resources ‘from plan to 
clan’ and thus are allowing old elites to retain their power. The second nature is that 
these informal-formal hybrids empower ordinary people who are struggling to survive 
under new economic reforms (pgs. 59-60). 
Furthermore, the language of diverse economies helps open up new post-socialist 
spaces for investigation. Current post-socialist studies, based on the second economy 
canon, focus on the centrality of the household and fail to address other multiple 
geographies—urban housing blocks, urban and rural linkages, remittance economies—
that constitute, enable, and constrain non-capitalist practices (Smith & Stenning, 2006, 
pg. 191). The diverse economy literature helps ‘rescale’ the transition by unearthing and 
defining a large quantity of economic practices ‘in order to connect national structural 
change, transformation of local urban spaces, and household experiences’ (Pavlovskaya, 
2004, pgs. 329-330). It provides a language that helps articulate ‘capitalist and non-
capitalist economies to the mutually constitutive sets of social relations that underpin 
the diverse economies of post-socialism’ (Smith & Stenning, 2006, pg. 191). Its 
poststructuralist approach allows us to look beyond the language of structural 
explanations (global capitalism, neoliberal reform) or dual sector approaches 
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(informal/formal) by favouring a grounded, ‘interpretive and analytical understanding 
of informal economy’ (Morris & Polese, 2014, pgs. 6-9).  
In confluence with the diverse economies language, Kubik (2014) proposes a 
methodological approach of ‘contextual holism’ which emphasises complexity, 
multidimensionality, and relationalism in post-socialist transformations. By contextual 
holism, he does not mean an emphasis on ‘wholes’ as indivisible entities, but rather a 
‘call to treat each phenomenon as a part of a field of relations with other phenomena, as 
an element interconnected with others within a specific configuration’. Rather, a 
‘whole’ is a ‘specific configuration of elements’ and each ‘whole’ is contextual, in that 
it is ‘articulated differently in different contexts’ (pgs. 27-28). Contextual holism 
embraces the principles of relationalism 32  (‘weak’ structuralism), history matters, 
constructivism33, formal-informal hybrids, and localism (pg. 45). He adds that the 
concept of ‘recombination’—in which ‘new and old elements, are incessantly 
recombined in a creative manner’ (pg. 48)—is ‘one of the most powerful tools for 
focusing on holistic analysis’ (pg. 48). He emphasises that informal-formal hybrids are 
best investigated through an ethnographic focus to identify these contextual 
configurations (pg. 66). 
Building upon the idea of multiplicity and the complexity of economic activities, in her 
investigation of household economic practices in post-socialist Moscow, Pavlovskaya 
(2004) argues that people have had to ‘radically change their occupations, take on 
multiple jobs, work informally, increase domestic production of goods and services, and 
rely extensively on networks of extended family, relatives, and friends’ (pg. 329). Smith 
and Stenning (2006) argue that these multidimensional practices—that ‘range from 
work in the formal economy, to growing food on a household plot, to selling 
possessions in the street or produce grown or collected, to providing help and assistance 
either gratis or on a reciprocal basis’—help reproduce a sociality to economic life, in 
that they ‘are part of a regular set of activities undertaken and used by individuals, 
households, and communities to try to sustain livelihoods but to sustain a sociality to 
                                                
32 Relationalism is defined as ‘an approach to a sociopolitical reality that avoids the 
extremes of individualism and holism or agency and structure’ (Kubik, 2014, pg. 49). 
33 Constructivism is ‘the manner in which people conceptualize, model, or envision 
how the world around them matters for what they do politically’ (Kubik, 2014, pg. 54). 
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economic life which requires mutual, reciprocal, and embedded forms of economic 
activity (pg. 192). 
Importantly, linking post-socialism to the diverse economy and informality language to 
explain these processes can help empower and ‘de-other’ post-socialist studies which 
are often omitted from mainstream informality and diverse economy literatures coming 
from the ex-first and third worlds. Since the Cold War, post-socialist countries have 
been ‘othered' as passive, acted upon by capitalist development, and located behind the 
(still) closed borders of the ex-Soviet bloc (Buchowski, 2006, pg. 478, footnote 4). A 
major theoretical work on ‘urban informality’ (see AlSayaad & Roy, 2004) will omit 
the entire ex-Soviet bloc from analytical engagement and an important work on 
‘domesticating neoliberalism’ (see Stenning et al., 2010) will not explain its career 
outside of the ex-Soviet bloc. There is a mutually comfortable silence in not engaging 
the ‘other’. Using the diverse economy and informality language, however, puts into 
question whether post-socialist countries adapt to the capitalist model or whether they 
are adapting it to post-socialism. A renewed focus on post-socialist informality opens 
up much more academic space for linking phenomena of post-socialist countries to the 
rest of the world34. 
There is a growing consensus that investigating informality and diverse economies in 
the context of post-socialism can be beneficial to theoretical and analytical debates on a 
global scale. Morris and Polese (2014) argue that it is a mistake to see informality ‘as a 
purely “transition” phenomenon—something that institutionally-deficient Eastern 
European countries are plagued by’. Embedded socially, and in the formal economy, in 
post-socialist countries, informality can help map the futures of many developed 
countries’ economies undergoing economic crises—‘a mere foretaste of lasting change’ 
(pg. 1). This is a variant of modernity that ‘the West needs to take note of, as we stand 
on the cusp of centrifugal economic and social forces at the heart of the formalisation 
project of the EU acquis’. Post-socialist informality adds to the multiple modernities 
perspective and can help in the ‘re-framing of debates as diverse as those around 
globalization, transnationalism, and substantive, versus formal, economic models of 
social behavior […] a transformational pendulum away from ‘homo economicus’ and 
                                                
34 There is a push towards understanding ‘how Cold War representations of space and 
time have shaped knowledge and practice everywhere’ (Chari & Verdery, 2009, pg. 12).  
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towards more “embedded” forms of economics: human, diverse and “real-world”’ (pgs. 
7,9). Wanner (2014) has the best interpretation; that post-socialist informality studies 
‘suggest myriad possibilities for finding solutions that neither lie squarely within 
“capitalism” nor in “socialism,” but rather in some innovative selection of aspects of 
each system that still leaves a space for the human will to improvise’ (pg. xvii). Thus, 
adopting the informality and diverse economies language can both de-other post-
socialist countries from mainstream debates and rebrand post-socialist countries from 
being sites of economic failure to being engines of economic innovation.  
2.4. Blurring the capitalist/socialist binary  
Informality is part of the modern experience in both capitalist and socialist economies. 
Italian worker-peasants have engaged in combinazione, the ‘surreptitious harvesting of 
grains or potatoes’ on other people’s farms (Holmes, 1989, pg. 53); Ghanaians in Accra 
have depended on a ‘combination of income sources’ from both informal and formal 
sectors that constituted a ‘buffer against unemployment’ (Hart, 1973, pgs. 78-79); 
Russians have used blat and tolkachi to access and swap scarce state goods and services 
under socialism (Ledeneva, 1988, pg. 25); Chinese cooperative farm workers have 
hidden state production and distributed through the quanxi (social connections) which 
‘greased the socialist economy’ and operated ‘according to a logic and organisational 
structure that is different from that of the centralised state and its administrative, 
military and legal arms’ (Chan & Unger, 1982, pgs. 452-453; Friedman, et al. 2005, pg. 
126; Nee, 1991, pg. 268; Smart, 1993, pg. 399; Wallace & Latcheva, 2006: 81; Yang, 
1989, pg. 35); Angolans have used esquema (scheme) or the ‘ability and capacity of an 
individual to build networks to solve economic problems’ and candonga or ‘illegal 
appropriation of a product for sale on the grey or black market’ that developed under 
colonial capitalism and have become central to alleviating food shortages (Santos, 1990, 
pg. 161); Chileans have used cuña, Israelis have used protexia and combina, and 
Mexicans have used palanca (Lomnitz, 1988, pg. 53), etc. The literature shows how 
marginalised and powerful groups have devised innovative practices and strategies to 
survive (and/or manipulate) the economic crises that have arisen from their state’s 
regulatory power (Henken, 2005, pg. 362).  
Although ‘informality’ theoretically applies to socialist and capitalist contexts, 
approximately 95% of the literature on informality since the 1970s has been produced in 
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the ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds, and has only referred to the relationship between ‘informal 
economies’ and capitalism. Because many Western scholars have had no access to 
fieldwork behind the Iron Curtain and because much of the Soviet academic work was 
censored, the debates on informality and informal economies have been uneven.  
While a synthesis of these varieties of informality across socialist and capitalist 
economies seems an almost common sense exercise, it refutes decades of Cold-War era 
politicisation that has separated informality into the geopolitical camps of ‘informal 
economies’ in the first and third worlds on the one hand, and ‘second economies’ in the 
second world on the other. In capitalist contexts, the term ‘informal economy’ has been 
used to define any quasi-legal and illegal activities that operate alongside of and/or 
through ‘formal’ economies regulated by law (Rakowski, 1994). In socialist contexts, 
that same division existed between ‘second’ and ‘first’ economies. According to Kornai 
(1992) the ‘first economy’ covered everything that qualified ‘in the official ideology of 
the classical system as the “socialist sector,” that is, the bureaucratic state and 
cooperative sector’. The ‘second economy’ then consisted ‘of the sum of the formal 
private sector composed of officially permitted, small family undertakings and the 
informal private sector’ (pg. 85). The differences between various second and informal 
economies were probably not too different from the various degrees of differentiation 
between informal economies across capitalist contexts or second economies across 
socialist contexts. Informality clearly lies at the crux of both literatures as both ‘second’ 
and ‘informal’ economies are reactions to state-regulated ‘formal’ economies. 
Yet, into the 2010s, the ‘academic curtain’ between ‘studies of the ‘second’ and 
‘informal’ economies has barely been lifted. This absence of conversation poses the 
question, echoing Gibson-Graham’s question above about what happened to socialism’s 
“second economies”, that if ‘second economies’ were particular to socialism and 
‘informal economies’ specific to capitalism, then what does one call the existence and 
adaptation of ‘second economy’ practices in the post-socialist period? Some scholars 
like Verdery (1996) have simply substituted the term ‘second economy’ with the term 
‘informal economy’ (pg. 27). As other scholars have shown in their work, picking up on 
informality and diverse economy literatures reveals that the idea of capitalist hegemony 
in the ex-Soviet bloc is a myth. Indeed, post-socialist informality helps blur the 
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capitalist/non-capitalist binary35, concurrent with Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006), and 
links the post-socialist experience to a global political economy.  
However, while post-socialist scholars focus on ‘not-quite’ capitalism, they use post-
socialist informality or diverse economies without explaining the political, analytical, 
and theoretical implications of a shift from ‘second’ to ‘informal economy’ and 
‘informality’ literature. The silence is perfectly understandable; tackling the informal 
and second economy literatures is a grueling task, but it neglects some very important 
opportunities to analyse how informality changes over time and economic periods. 
What is it about these second/mixed economies discussed above that allows them to 
transition so effortlessly between seemingly different economic systems? How did 
informality work to dismantle (or establish) socialist hegemony? How does this blur the 
boundary between capitalism and socialism? In the spirit of Gibson-Graham’s 
reasoning, was there a similar binary of socialism/non-socialism that we need to 
consider? If the issue of informality across capitalism and socialism puts into question a 
more fundamental way that all of our societies are ordered, then the idea follows of the 
modern nation-state as an organising apparatus that defines and regulates ‘formal’ 
economic activity. If informality is on the rise, what does this mean for the modern 
state?  
History still matters, especially when people are able to adapt informality (like 
kombinacja) to form ‘second economies’ in the socialist era and then adapt that same 
strategy to form ‘informal economies’ (let us say even if they are different from second 
economies) in the post-socialist era or even capitalist countries as demonstrated in 
Chapter 1. The finding that different varieties of informality harbour culturally-
engrained logics and imageries that can adapt to any type of ‘formal economy’ should 
not get lost in the attractive language of ‘post-socialist informality’ and ‘diverse 
economies’ that seeks to put history in the backseat.  
When we merge the findings from the second and informal economy literatures, we see 
that the broader significance of informality lies not in identifying the failures of ideal-
type economic systems like ‘socialism’ or ‘capitalism’, but more importantly, 
informality’s contestation of the modern-state’s (and its representatives’) self-
                                                
35 Thanks to Dr. Keith Halfacree for this point.  
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proclaimed role as mediator and enforcer of ‘formal’ economic activity that propagates 
the myth of these formal/informal binaries and ‘isms’. They complement one another. 
For example, second economy studies have focused more on centralising informality in 
the private sphere, whereas informal economy studies have focused more on the public 
sphere. Second economies have placed more emphasis on the role of informality in the 
state and elite informality while informal economy studies are just beginning to breach 
that subject. The following sections first explain how informal and second economy 
literature emerged independently of one another and what roadmaps they can provide 
for one another to study informality in spaces that have been their ‘blind-spots’ since 
the 1970s. In this way, we can begin building a more globally cohesive theory of 
informality. 
2.5. Rethinking informal economy literature  
Informal economy research emerged out of ‘unemployment’ studies in urban settings in 
the early 1970s (Hart, 1971, 1973; ILO, 1972). Hart (1973) coined the term ‘informal 
economy’ to refer to legal and illegal ‘self-employment’ as an income-generation 
strategy used by unemployed and employed Ghanaians in Accra (pg. 69). The 
International Labour Organisation (1972) identified ‘informal sector’ activity performed 
by profit-making ‘petty traders, hawkers, shoeshine boys’ on Kenyan streets, who it 
claimed had little connection with the formal sector and reinforced the binary (pg. 6). 
Both revealed a variation in how informal activities relate to different formal economies 
across geographic contexts and encouraged more research on dual-sector dynamics, as 
the existence of a tertiary informal-formal division of labour was symptomatic of a 
weakening state-market nexus in the spread of market capitalism. Although informal 
economies did not ‘begin’ in the 1970s, they were seen to be growing and have become 
central to how resources flow among the booming global population. 
Since the 1980s, scholars began to critique the informal economy concept i.e.; that only 
the poor engage in it, that it is unorganised and unstructured, and that all its activities 
are illegal (ILO, 2000, pg. iv). Instead, they have found the informal-formal hybrids of 
many economic activities, that capital finds a way to offer economic incentives for 
formal actors to informalise their relations and engage in, or overlook, informal actors 
operating through, or parallel to, formal institutions and economic relations (Bromley, 
2004, pg. 278). Informal activities subsidise capitalist enterprises with low-cost goods 
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and services (Portes & Shauffler, 1993a, pg. 49). For example, comisionistas 
(unsalaried Mexican workers who earn commission) are legally hired by informal firms 
that are illegally unregistered with the Mexican Institute of Social Security, a federal 
agency (Levy, 2008, pg. 33); formal construction firms in Mexico City employ informal 
subcontractors who hire temporary workers on demand (Lomnitz, 1976); department 
stores in Bogotá subcontract production to informal shops (Peattie, 1982); garbage 
pickers in Calí provide industries with recyclable inputs (Birkbeck, 1978). These 
dynamics in the ‘interstices of the formal system’ are horizontal and create ‘a porous 
membrane, not a rigid boundary’ between the two sectors (Fernández-Kelly, 2006, pg. 
4; Lomnitz, 1988, pg. 43).  
Horizontal networks operate through ethnicity, patronage, etc. based on a working 
understanding or trust (Lomnitz, 1988, 48; Castells & Portes, 1989, pg. 12; Gilbert, 
2004, pg. 76). With certain members of the network in the formal economy and others 
in the informal, both communicate through their networks which allows them to predict 
the state’s ‘next steps’ and readjust faster than the state can enforce or pass legislation to 
regulate them (Berger & Piore, 1980; Bromley, 2004; Castells & Portes, 1989; Gorz, 
1982). This revised approach has rejected the usage of broad occupational categories to 
assign workers to a sector, because many workers use both informal and formal sectors 
to generate income by either continuously or discontinuously alternating between 
sectors or concurrently combining earnings from both (Portes & Shauffler, 1993a, pg. 
46).  
Many of these accounts reveal capitalocentric renditions of how the informal economy 
relates to, or could be fixed or augmented through, more or less formal reforms and 
regulations. Hart (2010) argues that their grounded innovation in reworking formal 
economies to redistribute access to income generation to a larger number of people is 
significant for future development models (pg. 145). However, scholars have argued 
whether more or fewer state policies are needed to steer informal economic 
development (Rakowski, 1994). Informal economy actors have been identified as 
marginalised outsiders from the exclusionary formal economy who need the job 
creation initiatives of development agencies; pro-capitalist actors struggling against 
state regulations and demanding loosened state regulations; proletariats engaged in class 
struggle against the capitalist state-market matrix; a heterogeneous group of actors 
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engaged in the ‘routine operation of capitalism’ that need more flexible labour codes 
and entrepreneurial development programmes (Portes & Böröcz, 1988; Portes & 
Shauffler, 1993a,b; De Soto, 1989, 2000; Nun et. al, 1967; Gilbert, 2004; Hart, 2010). 
Castells and Portes (1989) argued that the informal economy is the bastion of market 
capitalism rather than a threat, and that ‘in an ideal market economy, with no regulation 
of any kind, the distinction between formal and informal would lose meaning since all 
activities would be performed in the manner we now call informal’ (pg. 13). They 
propose that the problem of the informal is that the state apparatus is too rigid an 
institution to flexibly adapt to the complexity, multiplicity, and temporality of human 
economies. They question whether the state-market nexus could ever effectively contain 
or develop informal economies.  
Furthermore, new research on informality in capitalist countries, coming out of 
developed and developing countries (not including the ex-Soviet bloc), shows that one 
of the important effects of this systemic bridging of the economic informal-formal 
divide is that it informalises the state itself. Roy (2004) uses the terms ‘informal 
vesting’ or ‘informalisation of the state’ to refer to the ‘structural informalisation that 
comes to be systematized and institutionalized’ based upon multiple intersections of 
ethnicity, religion, fundamentalism, etc. that serve as bridges to the informalisation of 
formal institutions (pg. 159). Israel, for example, uses ethnic identity to justify ‘urban 
informality as a planning strategy’ to isolate minorities on the West Bank (Yiftachel & 
Yakobi, 2004, pg. 218). In Accra, the ‘commanding heights’ of the informal economy 
are in the ‘corrupt fortunes of public office-holders’ that use it to get around 
bureaucratic gridlock (Hart, 2010, pgs. 144-145). In her study on urban poverty in 
Kolkata, Roy (2011) shows that upper-class towns, built on the periphery of the city and 
that are in violation of state law protecting agricultural land and wetlands, are not seen 
as illegal and informal—such ‘elite informality’ ‘is often legitimized and even practiced 
by the state’ (pg. 270). In Peru, Uzzell (1994) writes that there ‘has been a tendency to 
formalize elite informality, using legislation to create market distortions of which, with 
privileged access to information and capital, only the elite can take advantage’ (pg. 
161). Control over the formal is waged at the site of the informal—formal institutions 
begin to practice their formal powers for informally defined goals. Whoever wields the 
power to exercise and define informal activity within the formal possesses the ability to 
exercise leverage in all forms of political life. 
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Informal economy studies often neglect to tell the ‘other’ side of the story. For example, 
what ‘services’ does informality provide that actually reproduce the state-market nexus? 
How does the state co-opt the diverse economies produced through informality to 
ensure that their services can be channelled towards formal projects? How does 
informality function in the reproduction of elite power for the state over the long term? 
What role does informality play in the actual formation of the state? Researchers 
studying state informality in capitalist contexts can refer to a similar pattern to that 
investigated in the second economy literature on how horizontal networks took over the 
state as the organisational logic of capital flows. There is an overlap in relations 
between informalisation and the state, in which the late stages of state-regulated 
capitalism are beginning to resemble the late stages of state socialism as informalisation 
ushers in the transformation of an economic and political order. Thus, learning about the 
role of informality in the socialist period can provide important parallels of how 
informality actually reproduces the state’s formal functions and its role as regulator of 
the ‘formal economy’.  
This is related to issues surrounding corruption. Most informal economies offer a class-
based approach to corruption in their investigations of ‘elite informality’, however, what 
about the reproduction of positively-sanctioned ‘corruption’ in households and 
communities? Deliberation about cases in which engaging in illegal or unregulated 
informal activity is considered more ‘moral’ than joining a formal workplace. Second 
economy literature can provide an insight into the intimate reproduction of informality 
in the family, household, social group, that makes us uncomfortable but which gets into 
the very basic question of how informality is ingrained in the atomic levels of our 
societies.  
2.6. The transformations of the second economy  
In the 1970s, around the same time that Keith Hart introduced the idea of the ‘informal 
economy’, Gregory Grossman coined the term ‘second economy’ to refer to the 
unplanned, unregulated, unreported, private, legal, illegal, semi-legal, or suspicious 
income-generating activities—through which resources like goods, services, benefits, 
privileges, information were channelled via networks—which were inconsistent with, or 
in direct violation of, the command economy in the second world (see Grossman, 1977, 
1979; Łoś, 1990a, pg. 2; O’Hearn, 1980, pg. 218; Sampson, 1987, pg. 124; Sik, 1992, 
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pg. 155; Stark, 1989, pg. 651). Some anthropologists equated the ‘second economy’ 
with the ‘informal economy’, lightly suggesting the need to investigate both forms of 
informality existing on both sides of the Iron Curtain (see Pine 1993, pg. 241, footnote 
2; Wedel, 1986, pg. 36). While scholars of the first and third worlds focused on 
exposing informal economies as proof of the limitations of capitalism, scholars of the 
second world equated second economies with the incorrigible downfall of the command 
economy. Historical investigations regarding the second economy’s existence prior to 
the prewar period—or its role in the socialist state-making process in the postwar 
period—never came to light. 
Nevertheless, anthropologists working across the Soviet bloc reported the second 
economy practices of peasants, workers, worker-peasants, professionals, nomenklatura 
and state officials in factories, fields, bureaucracies, and government offices at all scales 
of the command economy. These included petty theft of socialist property (stealing or 
withholding state goods and services), foot-dragging, refusal to take initiative, 
moonlighting, production of ersatz resources using state resources and selling them on 
the black market, speculation of garden plots allotted by the state, slowing down 
production to steal time, taking paid or holiday leave to go shopping, selling smuggled 
state goods, selling state building materials in the private housing sector, diverting 
deliveries of scarce commodities into state warehouses, borrowing state cars to operate 
unofficial taxis, illegally hiring state or informal construction crews, bribing officials, 
accepting bribes, small-scale production and selling of handicrafts, operating 
underground factories that are fed off of diverted materials from state factories, and 
many other activities that grew in the interstices of state ownership through the means 
of production and central economic planning. (Grossman, 1977, pg. 29; Grossman, 
1979, pgs. 837-847; Henken, 2005, pg. 369; Humphrey, 1996, 1998; Korbonski, 1981, 
pgs. 1, 5-9; Lomnitz, 1988, pg. 49; Lampland, 1995; O’Hearn, 1980, pg. 218; Pine, 
2002, pg. 80; Sampson, 1987; Stark, 1989, pg. 652; Verdery, 2003, pg. 67). 
Extensive price controls, state suppression of private activity through the imposition of 
high self-employment taxes, government corruption, and unsatisfied demand cultivated 
fertile ground for these practices. The second economy grew during the economic 
liberalisation reforms and roll-back of the state in the 1970s. Economic demand 
reworked the ‘formal’ or ‘first’ economy. At the time, Poland took Western loans to 
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modernise industry and the influx of capital flows, urbanisation, and foreign influences 
strengthened the second economy’s grip (Sampson, 1987, pgs. 133-134). When 
inflation continued and disposable income was not met with more output and supply of 
consumer goods and food, the second economy became central to the redistribution 
process (Korbonski, 1981, pg. 3). More scarcity within the formal system meant greater 
economic opportunity and innovation for alleviating scarcity through informal 
economic practices. A ‘class of self-employed entrepreneurs’ emerged, who became 
increasingly independent from state wages (Kemeny, 1990, pg. 56; Szelenyi, 1988, pg. 
50).   
‘Red-collar crime’ was rampant (Łoś, 1990c, pg. 204). ‘Nomenklatura capitalists,’ 
managers acted like owners to ensure the proper function of the firm through report 
padding, price violations, producing the wrong assortment of products, falsifying 
accounts of goods in process, lowering quality of output, and misappropriating funds. 
Diversifying production outside of the plan and diverting state resources into the second 
economy while simultaneously claiming accounting books as ‘spoiled’ or ‘lost in 
transit’ was a form of using barter to access necessary production supplies from external 
sources when they were not available through formal channels. During the 1970s, they 
used their state position to become liquidators, selling out the state to the highest bidder 
for private gain. Through second economy dealings, they increased the efficiency of the 
first economy, food and resource circulation to more people, and became profitable for 
private goals. It was through the second economy that they could meet the state plan 
while benefitting from it individually. Thus, through the managers’ and officials’ 
actions, first and second economies operated in a symbiotic relationship (Berliner, 1952, 
pg. 355; Grossman, 1977, pg. 30; Korbonski, 1981, pgs. 9-11; Lomnitz, 1988, pg. 43; 
O’Hearn, 1980, pg. 219; Stark, 1989, pg. 637; Walder, 1995, seen in Henken, 2005, pg. 
371).  
By the 1980s, the second economy ‘came into its own’. Korbonski (1981) argues that 
the failure of formal distribution chains of food between urban and rural areas resulted 
in peasants and their agents marketing meat and food products to urban consumers door 
to door at high prices, and in effect the second economy’s ‘contribution to maintaining 
the food supply at a reasonable level was absolutely crucial’. Its surrogate role in 
alleviating the malfunctioning formal economy made the ‘government’s crisis 
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management incomparably easier’ (pg. 11). By the 1980s, it became ‘an integral feature 
of state socialism’ (Stark, 1989, pg. 651). In a move reminiscent to debates on the 
breakdown of the formal and informal economy binary, the ‘first’ and ‘second’ 
economies too became a false binary—both were interdependent upon each other to 
ensure that a maximum number of people as possible could live a decent life under state 
socialism. 
2.7. Blurring the first/second economy binary 
Networks constituted the basic unit of second economy activity. Even if a person acted 
alone, there was no way that they could circumvent the state without a web of 
protections that helped divert and circulate state resources. Manipulating the flow of 
resources around, through or via the state required a type of knowledge about how state 
resources enter and exit the system, who patrols it, and how transactions could occur 
multiple times but without being predictable enough to be caught (Scott, 1988, pgs. 
177-178; see Lonkila & Salmi, 2005, pg. 681). Thus, government officials and 
workplace managers were often—if not always—connected at some point to the 
networks that reproduced the second economy. 
Some networks were so ingrained in everyday life that new colloquialisms —often not 
formally defined in dictionaries and encyclopedias—were used to describe them. In 
Hungary, there was protekció which Lampland (1995) defines as the ‘diversion of 
collective resources for private gain’ through a series of ‘elaborate strategies’ that were 
‘required to negotiate the strongly personalised character of economic transactions in 
socialism’ and which often relied upon personal relations with representatives of the 
state (pgs. 261-263, 348). In Russia, the term prinosheniye (bringing to) referred to the 
act of giving gifts to authorities for long-term protection. When Russian state-owned 
retail stores received goods, salespeople laid certain ones aside for favoured customers 
who gave them tips which they then split with their supervisors, who then split it with 
their superiors (Grossman, 1977, pgs. 30-40). There was blat, which encompassed a 
broad range of activities like bribery, patronage, protection, acquaintanceship, and 
reciprocal favours to acquire scarce resources (Berliner, 1952, pgs. 356-7; Cellarius, 
2000, pg. 84; Creed, 1998, pg. 205; Fitzpatrick, 1994, pg. 62; Lonkila, 1997; Ledeneva, 
1998, pg. 41; Sampson, 1987, pg. 128). In Poland, there was znajomość, which referred 
to acquaintanceship with economic undertones, and załatwienie spraw which meant 
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running economic errands, doing things na lewo (‘to the left’ or illegally) and of course 
there was kombinacja (Dunn, 2004; Hann, 1985; Kusiak 2012; Korbonski, 1981; 
Mazurek, 2012; Wedel, 1986). All of these examples show that negotiation, innovative 
strategies, and leveraging were implemented to build networks solely to extract 
resources from the state plan (Grossman, 1977, pg. 29). 
This diversion of resources through networks created new informal spaces. For 
example, the Russian term dolgostroi meant ‘unfinished spaces’ that were planned but 
never completed due to lack of resources which were purportedly diverted through 
second economy activity (Borén & Gentile, 2007, pg. 100; Grossman, 1977, pg. 29). In 
Poland, there were meliny, informal bars in people’s homes that sold illegally acquired 
vodka and illegally-produced alcohols like śliwowica (fruit brandy) and bimber 
(moonshine). Thus, second economies were so engrained in everyday life that they 
carved out physical landscapes. While informal economies in the capitalist world were 
often depicted as being physically visible in public spaces, the second economies were 
marked by the spatial dislocation of resources from the sites where the state had 
intended to put them. 
These second economy systems ‘created’ new shadow economic actors who became 
well-known for the specific services that they provided to the people and to the state. In 
Hungary, there were the polgár, or entrepreneurs who began to operate ‘market-oriented 
mini-farms’ and ran them as enterprises with returns on investments and economising 
them with labour and capital. They depended upon legal protection from state agents 
and party cadres ‘for whom the opportunism and self-interest of the market came to 
predominate over and provide greater rewards than loyalty and commitment to the 
Party’ and who became ‘naturally self-interested in an environment of scarcity’ 
(Henken, 2005, pgs. 371-372; Szelenyi, 1988, pg. 50). When the state apparatus began 
to break down and could no longer feed its own people, allowing these actors to thrive 
was, in a way, a strategy used by the state officials in order to ensure that all chaos did 
not break loose.  
Similarly, in Russia, enterprise managers faced with workplace shortages sent out 
tokachi or ‘pushers’ to seek out resources for the state firm on the black market so that 
the workplace could complete the plan. Thus, these networks brought resources to the 
state which shows how the second economy facilitated legal sector goals on the one 
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hand while simultaneously corroding the state construction plans elsewhere (Berliner, 
1952, pgs. 356-7; Cellarius, 2000, pg. 84; Creed, 1998, pg. 205; Fitzpatrick, 1994, pg. 
62; Lonkila, 1997; Ledeneva, 1998, pg. 41; Sampson, 1987, pg. 128). Shabashniki were 
moonlighting construction crews from Russian state firms who provided services 
outside or during working hours and contracted themselves out to build homes. They 
were a favorite among officials who employed them to build their summer homes 
(Borén & Gentile, 2007, pg. 100; Grossman, 1977, pg. 29; O’Hearn, 1980, pg. 225). In 
Poland, there were the kombinators (see Chapters 5-7). Importantly, these shadow 
actors were not trying to tear down the command economy but were providing services 
that made it work better, or at all. 
2.8. Blurring collective/private property 
Building upon the previous point, one of the most fascinating lessons that I have taken 
away from second economy literatures is the management of property relations that 
systematically occurred on an everyday level. ‘Theft’ of socialist property was one such 
phenomenon because it blurred the distinction between supporting versus undermining 
the state plan. Take the collective farm, for example. Collective farms, created through 
‘voluntary’ collectivisation of private peasant farms, were theoretically owned by the 
peasant farm workers and managed by the state administration. Yet, studies have 
recorded peasant second economy strategies of stealing collective farm resources for 
their private gain even though a poorly-functioning collective farm would hurt them in 
the long run. Peasants ‘stole’ fodder from the farm to feed and maintain their private 
livestock, surreptitiously exceeded limitations on plot areas and livestock holdings, 
marketed collective farm goods on the black market with the help of middlemen, and 
borrowed machines for use on their own land or other purposes (Fitzpatrick, 1994, pg. 
4; Grossman, 1977, pgs. 26-29; Sampson, 1987, pg. 127).  
But ‘theft’ is the ‘capitalist’ way of looking at it in that we imagine that the state 
‘owned’ property and that it did not belong to the people (thus undermining the very 
idea of the socialist revolution). Verdery (2003) described how Romanian peasants 
substituted the word ‘stealing’ with the word ‘taking’ of socialist property on collective 
farms (pg. 67). Those who justified theft of socialist property as ‘taking’ shrewdly 
situated second economy practices in line with the state propaganda of collective 
property, of everyone building socialism, of everything that belonged to the state 
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belonging to the people. Similarly, Polish workers and peasants justified theft of 
socialist property as ‘stealing from oneself’ and in effect, denying any existence of a 
division between state and workers’ economic interests (Korbonski, 1981, pg. 9). 
Both workers and peasants manipulated this ‘paradoxical role as simultaneous employee 
and co-owner’ (Firlit & Chłopecki, 1992, pg. 100) by paying themselves ‘dividends’ 
from their factory or collective farms. ‘Taking from the state’ or ‘stealing from oneself’ 
implied that citizens who had constructed the state had the natural right to take the state 
back should their economic situation become dire because they were the ones who had 
built and managed it. This put the state in an awkward position. Cracking down on 
widespread petty theft would have been a public declaration of a divergence in state and 
worker economic interests. Since workers and peasants justified their position to 
appropriate state resources based upon the state logic that they constructed the state and 
voluntarily collectivised their private land, isolating a collective farm’s economic 
interests from the workers and peasants would have been a rejection of the state’s 
propaganda campaigns. Thus, people were in solidarity by justifying their second 
economy practices within the state’s formal logic rather than against the plan. ‘Taking’ 
socialist property showed an evolutionary adaptation of populist vernacular language 
that situated the workers and peasants as more proletarianised than the state and in 
which their justification of the practices was ‘inescapably tied to official political 
processes’ (Humphrey, 1998, pgs. 226-227). They justified informality using state 
propaganda. 
Due to ever-present labour shortages under state socialism, ‘stealing from oneself’ or 
‘taking from the state’ is how workers and peasants—who had no independent unions—
bargained wages and labour hours with their state bosses. Although workers and 
peasants were universally employed, they were allowed to switch to workplaces that 
provided better wages, working conditions, and second economy perks. Managers were 
forced to make concessions on the state plan to meet their demands and preferences, to 
compete against other workplaces for much-needed labour. While this was incongruent 
with the rules of the internal labour market, it was congruent with market principles that 
workers operated by to choose workplaces as well as with the competition for labour 
between managers for sought-after labour forces like migrant workers. The continual 
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allowance of petty theft of goods and moonlighting was a necessary concession 
managers had to make to keep workers working.  
By allowing moonlighting, however, managers contributed to labour shortages on the 
workshop floor, which in turn caused shortages in state goods and services (Pine, 2002, 
pg. 80; Sampson, 1987, pg. 134). By ‘taking’, workers and peasants were telling the 
managers ‘listen, this is what we want and need in order to come to work’ (Henken, 
2005, pg. 369; Sabel & Stark, 1982, pg. 451; Stark, 1989, pg. 637). Access to the 
second economy in the state workplaces doubled as a form of social control as 
managers rewarded workers’ submission to the state via access to second economy 
practices for their private gain. Thus, managers had to strike a balance between 
comfortable quota completion and workers’ access to state resources for private usage. 
This relational oscillation between the people and their workplaces over how much they 
could pilfer was at the crux of the reproduction of socialist labour in the command 
economy.  
‘Stealing’ operated under a different set of rules between private households. While 
socially accepted in collective spaces, ‘taking’ in the private spaces between networks 
was condemned because the second economy was dependent upon the circulation of 
resource flows between grouped households within a given locality (Grossman, 1977, 
pg. 29). In Lampland’s (1995) study, Hungarian peasants explained that ‘If you don’t 
steal from the state, then you’re stealing from your family’ which referred to the 
opprobrium of stealing from fellow villagers—‘us’—who shared resources rather than 
stealing from the state—‘them’—which received its capital from elsewhere (pg. 260). 
Stealing from ‘us’, or of the resources already in second economy circulation, was a 
way of contributing to inequality, while stealing from the state resources that came from 
outside of the village contributed to the overall developmental growth of the entire 
community. People were willing to blur the difference between collective and private 
ownership when they operated in public, but they reinforced private ownership in 
private. 
State officials knew this because they too were a part of the community, and had homes 
and families who depended upon others for resources that they did not have access to. 
In the second economy literature, households used a wide range of monetised and non-
monetised transactions, e.g. reciprocity, patron-client relations, and trade of 
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commodities and services (Cellarius, 2000, pg. 73; Grossman, 1977, pg. 29; Hann & 
Hart, 2011, pg. 126; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones, 1992; Łoś, 1990b, pg. 41). These 
networks acted as safety nets and each member became a ‘resource to others—a link in 
a chain upon which many others may depend’ (Mars & Altman, 1983, pg. 558). This 
established a ‘flow’ of resources and services that bound households together. State 
agents who carried out and protected the law were simultaneously included in 
culturally-defined reciprocity networks that included family and friends and 
manipulated state resources to reciprocate favours, goods, and services they received 
from their networks (Hann & Hart, 2011, pg. 126; Lomnitz, 1988, pg. 45). A manager 
who engaged in theft from the enterprise was part of the ‘us’ (locals) who stole against 
‘them’ (higher authorities); in turn, higher authorities and managers may have 
constituted an ‘us’ by meddling with records and accounting books against an invisible 
‘them’ who could have been the worker-peasants below or higher authorities above.  
The terms were flexible and provided social protection for anyone who identified with 
the ‘us’ and close inspection of those who did not (if they dared). Or, they were engaged 
in patron-client relations and clientelism among political elites, who appointed kin and 
acquaintances to government positions to secure state resources within the network. 
Networks that shared disproportionate food and resources emerged as a shadow class 
that enjoyed more state resources and hoarded material wealth (Eisenstadt & Roninger, 
1981, pgs. 233-245; Korbonski, 1981, pg. 12). The households which controlled access 
to resources articulated the duality of second economy activity as a source of economic 
independence and political corruption. It was crucial to maintain multiple identities, to 
jump spaces and identities, and not have a linear identity or identifiable site of 
movement, transactions and opinions36. 
Verdery (2004) pointed out that we need to consider how the command economy did 
not have a clear definition of where individual interests began and collective interests 
ended. In her description of the socialist property system in Romania, she writes that it 
was difficult to decipher ‘who owns what’ in a state enterprise. Due to budget 
constraints and ambiguous property laws, ‘managers’’ right to move items of the 
socialist patrimony around at will contributed to one of the hallmarks of socialist 
                                                
36 Thanks to Professor Gareth A. Jones for this point. 
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political economies: the widespread barter and trading of the goods necessary for 
production in socialism's ‘economies of shortage’. Underground factories emerged as 
‘managers employed entire sections of the workforce and the infrastructure of the 
factory for production entirely on their own’. There were cases where ‘enterprises that 
regularly traded raw materials for production, for example, a shoe factory and a factory 
that made leather coats, might not have clear boundaries around their 'inventory', since 
the goods in any firm's fund of circulating capital were fungible, enabling timely 
substitution of materials from other enterprises’ (pg. 1). This ‘relational management of 
resources’ existed at every level, as managers hoarded and hid state property and 
commodities from higher scales of state surveillance37. They adjusted their ‘private’ and 
‘state’ interests whenever it was necessary to keep their job and elite status. 
When we carefully inspect the role that second and first economies played in ensuring 
that the everyday socialism worked properly, it is difficult to identify second economy 
practices as merely a sign of protest against the centrally-planned economy. Rather, it is 
more helpful to identify the advancement that the proletarianisation of a workforce has 
on adjusting and transforming the rigid operations of a centrally-planned economy. 
Workers propagated informality and second economy practices to increase the 
efficiency of the system because they wanted more resources or services, not to tear 
down state socialism. In other words, through their actions, they were making a call for 
a reform of the system. Due to the complexity of informal-formal combinations that 
required the constant switch between formal and informal, first and second economic 
practices, it is clear that anyone who engaged in the second economy had an economic 
stake in ensuring that the state plan was completed, that the next quota was announced, 
and that they earned an income and ensured access to those state resources that secured 
their livelihoods.  
Thus, the second economy should not just be written off as a form of passive protest, or 
solidarity against the plan because these actors were deeply dependent upon the state 
and did not possess an alternate, autonomous economic strategy exclusive of state 
resources and production (Sampson, 1987, pg. 135). Rather, they possessed intimate 
knowledge of how the state (mal)functioned and where the grey areas of the law existed 
                                                
37 Thanks to Dr. Frances Pine for this point. 
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on the local state level, where goods were circulated, at what time, what was expected 
and what could be leveraged for their benefit, who had access to which state resources 
in the area, etc. Every working adult had access to some piece of this knowledge and 
combining that knowledge was vital to ensuring that the entire community survived 
during decades of shortages and poverty. 
2.9. State informality  
One of the main revelations that came from second economy studies is that informality 
both supported and subverted the state. Creed (1998) has claimed that in times of 
shortages, second economies were necessary to alleviate shortages at the formal, 
institutional level. Therefore, the tension between which activity to allow or not allow 
towards the preservation of the formal system was at the core of local state dynamics 
under socialism. Utilising informal economic activity to enhance the circulation flows 
of resources that would have by definition been carried out by formal mechanisms was 
‘inherently unstable, requiring continual renegotiation’ and it was this negotiation on 
the local level that signified change under socialism (pgs. 530-531). The second 
economy became the means through which the site of the formal and who got to define 
the formal was waged between struggling forces in society. The second economy was a 
very fluid space through which local power struggles over state resources played out. At 
the heart of the negotiation was who would gain the most from informal activity. From 
the lessons of the second economy, we need to ask what specific structural and systemic 
boundaries are being resisted (or not) with informality in ‘informal economies?’ 
The second economy met consumer demand for goods, income and services which was 
caused by the state’s bureaucratic gridlocks and redistributive deficiencies and broke 
down the state, which in turn, increased that demand. While the first economy was 
paralysed in its centralised structure, rigidity, speed, inefficiency, and responsiveness to 
quota completion, the second economy was decentralised, efficient, flexible, and 
adaptable to local demand. The second economy increasingly substituted the state’s 
formal economic objectives and became a more reliable distribution network, increasing 
the flow of goods and services, providing extra sources of income, building consumer 
trust, and producing cyclical output more than the formal, first economy. Paradoxically, 
because the second economy diverted state resource flows, it became dependent on the 
state while simultaneously subverting its first economy. As a ‘corrective mechanism’, 
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the second economy encouraged the centralisation and rigidity of the Soviet plan 
because it was a quick fix and gave the state ‘no incentive to improve central planning’. 
The state broke down because it continued to follow its bureaucratic rationalisation, did 
not adapt, and retained its political hegemony (Grossman, 1977, pgs. 38-40; Henken, 
2005, pg. 362; Ledeneva, 2006, pg. 21; O’Hearn, 1980, pgs. 231-232; Stark, 1989, pg. 
654). This is very similar to the pattern of informalisation discussed in the informal 
economy literature. There is a lot of discussion to be had between the two literatures on 
how the state co-opts informality for its own purposes.  
What informal economy researchers can learn from second economy studies in late 
stage socialism is that the state preserved its political hegemony through its acceptance 
of the economic benefits provided by second economy activity. For example, in Poland, 
the state’s crisis was caused and propagated by the people’s disobedience towards the 
plan; thus, the state grew aware that a crack-down on the second economy was 
impractical and instead, tolerated it. Since everyone was universally employed and 
provided social welfare benefits from the state, the state actually subsidised the second 
economy, while at the same time contributing to labour shortages and in turn, 
augmenting workers’ bargaining power to increase working conditions. The state was in 
a position to consent to second economy activity with partial labour shortages or a 
crackdown on the second economy and widespread disobedience. As the state 
informalised and accepted the second economy’s more formal functions inside of its 
workplaces, what emerged was a partial institutionalisation of market relations and the 
expansion of informal private entrepreneurialism in the workplaces, evidenced in the 
rise of the entrepreneurial class within the socialist workplaces (Korbonski, 1981, pg. 7; 
Portes & Böröcz, 1988, pg. 23; Sabel & Stark, 1982, pg. 458; Stark, 1989, pg. 637). 
These entrepreneurs carved out the state workplaces to distribute resources to meet local 
demand. In a way, the state itself co-opted informality as a way to stabilise the formal 
economy. Thus, learning from the second economy literature, we should ask what ways 
the state in the ‘informal economies’ are benefitting from informality in their formal 
economic systems. This can bring us closer to the purpose informality serves in the 
reproduction of the state. 
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2.10. Beyond second and informal economy literatures 
When Hart and Hann (2011) suggested a second world equivalent to the ‘informal 
economy’, they referenced Creed’s (1998) work on how Bulgarian worker-peasants 
‘domesticated revolution’ by implementing multiple strategies to economically improve 
their household economy. He writes that the worker-peasants gradually ‘forced 
concessions from central planners and administrators that eventually transformed an 
oppressive, intrusive system into a tolerable one (pg. 3). Households were the building 
blocks of second economy activity because all resources eventually made their way 
back into the home in some shape or form. This was where families analysed the 
material demands caused by scarcity and shortages, consolidated knowledge about 
access points (i.e. individuals) to alleviate those shortages, formed short and long term 
household strategies, and hid stolen resources outside of the state’s gaze. Multiple 
households grouped together to secure a wider range of state resources like goods and 
services, but new economic opportunities, access to promotions, education, and legal 
protection for second economy activity (Kotkin, 1995, pgs. 532-533, footnote 163; 
Lomnitz, 1988, pg. 52; Rev, 1987, pg. 344). 
 The idea of domestication is a much more flexible category that omits the historical 
politicisation and analytical limitations of informal and second economy studies 
because it zooms in on the household reproduction of informality on an intimate level. 
In effect, it is a better analytical category for understanding informality over time. 
Building upon Creed’s work, Stenning et al. (2010) have documented how Poles and 
Slovakians ‘domesticate neoliberalism’ by implementing their socialist-era networks to 
survive in the capitalist era (see Chapter 8). Domestication in both systems, helped 
produce concessions and a readjustment of the state-market nexus in line with 
household needs. 
Domestication helps produce economic difference and this provides an important link to 
Gibson-Graham’s propositions on further investigations into diverse economies. In their 
description of promising academic sites for investigating non-capitalist economies, 
Gibson-Graham (1996) argue that we need to pay more attention to the ‘process of 
dislocation’ by which they mean ‘identifying the alternative economic activities, events, 
and experiences that have been domesticated, symbolised or integrated within a 
dominant capitalocentric discourse of economy and giving them space to fully “exist”’ 
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(pg. 57). They too point towards the household as ‘the greatest light upon the discourse 
of Capitalism’ because they are major sites of non-capitalist production and because 
there are more people involved in the household than there are in the capitalist sector, 
the household is far from being ‘marginal’ and ‘it can arguably be seen as equivalent to 
or more important than the capitalist sector’ (pg. 261). The household is ‘a major site of 
class processes, sometimes incorporating a “feudal” domestic class process in which 
one partner produces surplus labor in the form of use values to be appropriated by the 
other’ (pgs. 58-59; see Chapter 8). Domestication coming from second economy and 
post-socialist informality studies can help fill in their call for more academic 
investigations of the process of dislocation and household economies.  
Domestication propagates a more blurred perspective towards public and private spaces. 
In a way, it emphasises the private sphere, but blurs the barriers within public spaces. It 
emphasises the household as the central site of economic activity that ‘domesticates’ the 
resources scattered around in the ‘public sphere’ (and its laws and regulations 
encompassing those resources) and through it, produces economic difference to the 
‘ism’. The emphasis on shifting resources rather than on appeasing any law or state is a 
much more accommodating theoretical framework than ‘second economy’ that 
emphasises its relationship to the ‘formal’ or ‘official’ economy (something that those 
who exercise kombinacja do not always prioritise). For example, in a domestication 
mindset, the workers in the socialist era were able to spin the idea of collective property 
in the workplace in order to ‘appropriate’ it for themselves without calling it theft. The 
factory or collective farm was their property and thus they could do what they wished to 
do with it. Again, this emphasises how domestication can work in a blurred 
private/public binary. ‘Domesticating’ can help explain the continuation of such 
practices across transitions—unlike the ‘second economy’ that emphasises the 
relationship of informality to the socialist state—because the next ‘formal’ economy in 
the ‘public’ arena becomes just another site where strategies have to be slightly adjusted 
in order to access the resources and be brought back into the private sphere. 
Domestication adjusts to shifting public (i.e. privatisation of universal healthcare, 
factories, etc.) and private spheres (i.e. privatisation of land, migrant worker households 
split along transnational lines, etc.). This prioritisation of the household needs over the 
public rules in effect produces economic difference by producing new linkages between 
the public and private spheres. 
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The fact that informal economies focused on public spaces and second economies 
focused on private spaces was one of the major differences between the two economies. 
If domestication is applied to our understanding of informal economies, then we can 
analyse them differently; as not simply existing in public space but rather that they (like 
second economies) channelled earnings and resources into the household and 
incorporated them into non-capitalist processes at some point. Domestication as the 
engine of producing difference and the household as an important site in that process 
provides academic space for understanding how informality blurs capitalist/non-
capitalist, formal/informal, informal/second economies, and public/private binaries.  
The idea of domestication carries a precaution of the opposite circumstance. I share 
Morris and Polese’s (2014) wariness of ‘an easy celebration of non-capitalist practices 
in the context of “postsocialism”’ (pgs. 191-192). They explain that ‘Whereas in the 
previous system workplace relations and activities were more likely to be used to 
develop social capital networks for favours and access, market transactions have 
become key as opportunities for cash earnings are now seen as of primary importance. 
In this sense, the informal economy under emergent capitalism represents a form of 
self-exploitative social relation, appropriating one’s own labour to sustain a livelihood, 
often in conjunction of course with other economic practices’ (pg. 195). For example, 
‘domesticating neoliberalism’ is not a way of calling out for reform but a vehicle for 
exploitation. Similarly, non-capitalist economies in the household—i.e. feudalism—can 
be both a source of economic self-determination but of oppression and exploitation.  
There is the danger to the process of domestication, in that it can be co-opted. States can 
‘domesticate’ or ‘co-opt’ economic difference in the private and public domains 
towards their own hegemonic rule. This idea emphasises the homogeneity of the public 
realm. The domestication of alternatives is important to the production of the 
hegemonic norm and the domestication of the hegemonic norm is important to the 
production of economic alternatives. This struggle over who gets to domesticate what is 
one of the ideas behind kombinacja discussed in Chapter 1, that it is a constant field of 
struggle over a limited pool of resources. Through this investigation of kombinacja, 
from 1945 to the present, we can learn how the domestication process occurs on both 
fronts (from the state-making process to the state-breaking process) and how 
domestication can become both a producer of diverse economies as well as the process 
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through which those economies are co-opted, homogenised and erased under the myth 
of capitalist hegemony.  
2.10.1. Habitus and fields  
The fluidity and flexibility of kombinacja, as a strategy that operates in multiple 
settings, can be best described using Bourdieu’s (1993) concepts of fields and habitus. 
He defines a field (champ) as ‘a separate social universe having its own laws of 
functioning independent of those of politics and the economy’ (pg. 162). The field is a 
social or institutional arena—a system of relations, alliances, power struggles—within 
which agents maneuver and struggle to access, appropriate, and redistribute a limited 
pool of capital. A field can be a network, setting, set of relationships, or structure with 
different characteristics (public, economic, political, academic, religious, cultural, etc.). 
In order to ‘enter’ the field, an agent must possess what Bourdieu calls ‘habitus’—a 
‘feel for the game’, a ‘second sense’ or ‘practical sense’—in order to investigate one’s 
objectives, hopefully with a profit, in that given field (Johnson, 1993, pgs. 5, 8). A field 
is relational as each agent experiences power differently based upon her temporal 
positionality within a given field (Bourdieu, 1993, pg. 64). The agent thus appropriates 
capital through multiple configurations of relations and sites at a given point in time. 
Understandings fields requires a mapping of inter-agent relations and the contexts 
where they take certain positions in opposition to others (pg. 181).  
Fields are dynamic, in that agents’ actions across the field change the field itself. The 
field faces ‘endless changes’ (pg. 55) because the ‘unifying principle of this “system” is 
the struggle, with all the contradictions it engenders’ (pg. 34). The various trajectories 
that a certain field takes depend on the ‘“repertoire” of possibilities which it offers, but 
on the balance of forces between social agents who have entirely real interests in the 
different possibilities available to them as stakes and who deploy every sort of strategy 
to make one set or the over prevail’ (pg. 34). The field is culturally reproduced because 
it upholds the promise of supplying the limited pool of resources to the actors: ‘Because 
the fields of cultural production are universes of belief which can only function in so far 
as they succeed in simultaneously producing products and the need for those products 
through practices which are the denial of ordinary practices of the “economy”, the 
struggles which take place within them are ultimate conflicts involving the whole’s 
relation to the “economy”’ (pg. 82). The imagery of an economic field as a site of 
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resources that are competed for by agents with a certain repertoire of habitus provides a 
much broader range of possibilities for acquiring those resources than what any ‘ism’ 
could supply with its legal rules and economic regulations. Yet, any long-standing 
imagery of an economic field transforms itself into an ‘ism’, and this is why it is 
important for the field to be fluid and dynamic, so that it takes no long-lasting form, and 
that it interacts and hybridises with other fields (e.g. the revolving door between the 
political and academic fields in American politics). What gives characteristics to a field 
is its ‘system of common references, a common framework’, or what Bourdieu (1993) 
calls the “space of possibles”’ (pg. 179). 
The association of kombinacja and habitus is not new. Mazurek (2012) has already 
equated kombinacja with habitus because it ‘means an embodied, internalised, and 
therefore natural and self-evident way of behavior that helped people improvise or even 
prosper in times of crisis and rupture’ (pg. 317, footnote 6). As in Mazurek’s example, 
kombinacja is the habitus that allows families in need to navigate the economic field 
and find ways of accessing, appropriating, and domesticating those limited resources 
towards basic survival. However, Bourdieu defines a field as relational and dynamic, in 
that there are no specific actors who enter it and it is a constant site of struggle. 
Similarly, agents in the world of kombinacja can be both the families in need or they 
could be the state, nomenklatura, church leaders, etc. The state may enter the field as an 
agent and use kombinacja to co-opt peasant forms of agricultural labour as a survival 
mechanism in order to save the state’s harvest quota plan (see Chapters 4 and 5). This 
latter set of kombinator who merge fields for private benefit fits well with Bourdieu’s 
description of the field as one in which agents can occupy multiple positions as a 
strategy to gain a competitive edge for limited resources. Similar to habitus, kombinacja 
is used by multiple actors to rework the spatial distribution of resources across a given 
economic field.  
However, the type of actors who engage in the struggle over resources has an impact on 
the diversification of the homogenisation of economies vis-à-vis the hegemonic norm 
(using Gibson-Graham’s terms). Some kombinators like the poor families can 
domesticate those resources and channel them into the ‘private’ sphere, contributing to 
the economic differentiation of the formal economy. But the process can go the other 
way as well. Other kombinators can use kombinacja to extract those domesticated 
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resources and rework them to take them out into the ‘public’ sphere. Looking at who 
uses kombinacja and for what purpose reveals a constant reworking of networks and 
space through which resources flow. Many resources are moving from the public to 
private spheres, once more blurring any notion of neats binaries. When the resources are 
domesticated, we see more economic differentiation to the hegemonic norm; when the 
resources are commandeered to benefit the state or formal economy, we see a 
homogenisation of economic difference under the wing of the hegemonic norm. This 
fluctuation of the field as a space of possibles gives rise to economic differentiation, 
away from the ideal-type, providing a forum for diverse economies and alternative 
economies from that of the hegemonic socialist or capitalist norm. 
Thus, contextual stories about kombinacja which are passed down through generations 
relay the ‘system of references’ that are necessary for anyone to understand how 
kombinacja works and what the rules of the game are in the economic field, that do or 
do not coincide with formal legal rules and economic regulations. There is ‘good’ 
kombinacja—when the agent or kombinator works to secure resources that benefit the 
milieu—and ‘bad’ kombinacja –when an agent of kombinator works to secure limited 
resources from another milieu. What constitutes good or bad kombinacja is in the eye of 
the beholder. Nevertheless, these good and bad contexts of kombinacja help expose this 
‘separate social universe’ and its laws for navigating the economic field. This space of 
possibles is what is in these contextual stories of kombinacja, which tell us about the 
possibilites of survival under dire conditions. 
2.10.2. Multiplicity of space 
Investigating kombinacja requires a rethinking of space, namely how its production of 
economic difference carves out different spaces within any formal economy. In For 
Space, Doreen Massey aimed to pursue an ‘alternative imagination’ of space, by 
uprooting it from stasis, closure, representation and to resettle it among heterogeneity 
and relationality (2005, pg. 13). She captures its anti-essentialist and relational spirit 
when she writes that any specific space is a ‘product of interrelations—connections and 
disconnections—and their (combinatory) effects’ (pg. 67). These interrelations produce 
multiple manifestations of space. In her definition, space and multiplicity are mutually 
exclusive—‘without space, no multiplicity; without multiplicity, no space’ (pg. 9-10). 
Rather than seeing space as static, echoing the ‘possibilities’ language created by 
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Gibson-Graham’s ‘politics of possibility’, Massey imagines space ‘as the sphere of the 
possibility of the existence of multiplicity’ with a focus on heterogeneity and difference 
(pg. 10). This can help explain how a process that focuses on producing difference can 
carve out spaces for its own existence.  
Kombinacja’s polysemic nature works well with this relational notion of space because 
it has affected different people, at different times, and on different spatial scales38. Its 
differentiation, appropriation, and transformation over time is reproduced through the 
constant blurring of boundaries and contact with multiple scales. Kombinacja is a 
spatial act in that the agent must scope out the distribution of resources across space and 
then find a way of appropriating and redistributing them to a site or set of sites. It rests 
on the assumption that space is malleable and subject to transformation through the 
manipulation of informal, cultural, and linguistic avenues. A kombinator believes in the 
possibility of complexity—sometimes stirring complexity, and producing trajectories 
and difference is exactly what makes kombiancja worthwhile. It confuses order. 
Building upon this idea in theoretical terms, kombinacja is a type of habitus that 
operates in an economic field and reproduces a space of activity that gives mass and life 
to alternative economies, which furthers the idea of a diverse economy composed of 
capitalist and non-capitalist forms. Massey’s (2005) definition of space can help 
illustrate kombinacja’s reproduction of multiple trajectories, spaces of economic 
difference, as well as its own transformations and processes of creative destruction over 
time. 
The last important point which Massey’s work adds to the study of kombinacja is her 
acknowledgment of space as an open, fluid system that is ‘always in the process of 
being made’, which gives it an ‘openness of the future’ (pgs. 9-11). Thus, time and 
space become ‘co-implicated’ in that ‘On the side of space, there is the integral 
temporality of a dynamic simultaneity. On the side of time, there is the necessary 
production of change through practices of interrelation’ (pg. 55). What she means is that 
when we look at space, we see multiple simultaneous activities occurring on its plane. 
Similarly, when we think of kombinacja, it represents a multiplicity of activities taking 
place by individuals, producing different representations of economies and resource 
                                                
38 Thanks to Dr. Sharad Chari for this point. 
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flows, and producing a heterogeneous landscape. This brings to mind how important 
manipulation of time, and action through time, is to the exercise of kombinacja and the 
extraction of resources. Time is of the essence, in order to evade the gaze of the state, 
the surveillance of relatives, and the time it takes for gossip to travel around a village. 
Time is the kombinators' co-conspirator against (formal) space. 
2.11.  Conclusion: embracing complexity 
The kombinacja imagery fits into a perception of the world in which economies, space, 
time, people, institutions are interconnected through a heterogeneous clustering of 
relations that can be augmented and reconnected to allow new resource flows. Thus, it 
necessitates an open theoretical framework that gives space to possibilities of 
heterogeneity, complexity, relational space, multiplicity, that provide the loose structure 
for defining kombinacja, but not limiting it in its fluidity and temporality. To this end, 
this chapter has attempted to bridge multiple sets of literatures, some of which have 
been comfortably situated in their time-tested binaries but which were limiting 
theoretical investigations into informality and diverse economies. 
Firstly, I have shown the common political and economic project of Gibson-Graham’s 
diverse economies in the ‘capitalist’ countries and the burgeoning field of post-socialist 
informality in the ex-Soviet bloc which both seek to demonstrate the farce of capitalist 
hegemony in the midst of multiple economic alternatives. This helps pave the way for 
investigations of kombinacja under post-socialism; both in Poland and beyond (i.e. 
America), because it provides the theoretical support that allows economic alternatives 
to be exercised even in sites that are considered to be ‘capitalist’. Given that studies on 
post-socialism are on the rise, I have attempted to bridge the gap between informal and 
second economy literatures that have treated informality within ‘capitalist’ and 
‘socialist’ systems as examples of defunct systems—which may be true—but ones 
which could not be bridged because capitalism and socialism were binaries. I have 
shown how they have both been ways of making formal-informal hybrids and both 
share common ground in the study, for example, of state informality. This blurring of 
the socialist/capitalist binary carves out academic space for investigating kombinacja 
and informality across different economic systems (especially how they change or not 
during economic and political transition). This blurring adds to Gibson-Graham’s 
diverse economies, in that it suggests the theory requires a attention to the state and its 
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particular relationship to non-capitalism, non-socialism, informality, and the processes 
that generate new economic alternatives under a formal or regulated economy. 
Secondly, I have provided some direction into the blurred binary between private and 
collective property explored in the second economy literature. This paves the way for 
thinking about the relational property that changes rules according to circumstances, 
which goes into the management and subversion of the formal economy. This relates to 
the blurred binary between public and private spheres (and the possibility of multiple 
privates and publics) that is encapsulated in the domestication literature. These 
literatures obfuscate any clear association of private with informality and public with 
formality. This leaves some academic room for comparing and contrasting 
‘domesticating neoliberalism’ and ‘post-socialist informality’. All of these categories 
break down Marxian notions of neatly boxed class status or single category definitions 
like a workplace , because they show how subjects are engaging in multiple class 
relations in multiple sites on an everyday level. It again points to the state not being the 
bastion of formality, but as somehow benefitting or co-opting these expanding 
processes. These are new, ambiguous areas of research that need attention because they 
can chart new sites of economic possibilities. 
Thirdly, I provided several sites where kombinacja can expand the application of 
informality. Habitus and fields enhance our understanding of kombinacja as a strategy 
of entering into a game over resources that changes the field with every action. The 
field itself is changed by habitus. Finally, I open up this idea even further to the 
complexity and multiplicity of space in the process of being made, which works with 
the notion of fields as being transformed by habitus. This is helpful in imagining how 
the process of informality—although producing multiple trajectories—can reproduce its 
function within economic and political fields over time. I will pick up on this again in 
Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 3 
Remembering kombinacja  
3.1. The ‘plan’ 
Perplexed by the historical chess-board of privatisation and collectivisation across 
adjacent villages that I had encountered during ethnographic fieldwork in Poland’s 
‘Recovered Territories’ (Ziemie Odzyskane; henceforth ‘territories’) in 2008, my initial 
data collection was oriented around some key questions: Why did some villages 
collectivise while other adjacent villages did not? Was there a ‘choice’ to collectivise 
and how was it defined, calculated, and negotiated? What was the economic 
relationship between collectivised and non-collectivised villages? Did they negotiate 
capital and resources between them, and if so, how? I had hoped that these questions 
would complicate ideas of the ‘transition’ from socialism to capitalism by 
demonstrating how mixed-economies already existed during the socialist period.  
The theoretical questions revolved around how ideas about territoriality, property 
ownership, and resource and land management had evolved and diverged between the 
people and the state. The territories annexed by Poland from Germany towards the end 
of the Second World War were a unique site for investigating these processes (Figure 
3). The territories had been the site of massive population upheaval as the Polish state 
deported millions of Germans and repopulated them with an ethnically, nationally, 
religiously, linguistically, and culturally diverse group of Slavic peoples—many of 
whom had fought on opposite sides of the war (Chapter 4). Their experiences differed 
from those in central Poland who had simply returned to their pre-war home. How is it 
that some villages possessed a stronger sense of territoriality? Did the people’s and 
state’s territoriality narratives ‘line up’ and deviate? How did territoriality turn ‘on’ and 
‘off’? I aimed to compare and contrast the people’s local narrative and state’s official 
narrative about the formation of the territories in the mid-1940s and the gradual 
trajectory towards the collectivisation drive in the 1950s.  
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Figure 3 Recovered Territories (X marks fieldwork site). 
The Polish People's Republic (Davies, 1982, pg. 612). 
 
I spent the 2008-2009 academic year reading around fifty state-censored books 
published in Poland through state publishers between 1944 and 1989 about the 
territories. This literature was found at the British, LSE, Senate House, and SSEES 
Libraries in London as well as at the Butler Library during my stay as a Visiting Scholar 
at the East Central European Studies Center at Columbia University in New York City. 
I planned to locate the remainder of the literature in Warsaw’s academic libraries during 
my stay as a Visiting Scholar at Collegium Civitas and the Polish Academy of Sciences 
prior to the commencement of my fieldwork. The state discourse was quite prevalent in 
the state-censored academic literature—often coauthored by Party officials 
themselves—which justified the annexation of the territories (in the midst of 
international controversy about the land grab) by the state and used the tools of 
 75 
anthropology, geography, linguistics, archeology, and historical investigation to ‘prove’ 
the Polishness of the territories (see Chapter 4). This was the state ‘voice’. 
One point of contrast that stood out was that the socialist state-making and Polish 
nation-building projects were concurrently unravelling on the territories. While 
advertising the territories as Poland’s Wild West and the place for starting a new life on 
reclaimed national territories, ethnic Poles by no means formed a majority among the 
settlers. The Polish state was resettling Siberian gulag survivors from all over the Slavic 
world, Jewish Holocaust survivors, Ukrainian insurgents from the newly re-drawn 
Polish-Ukrainian border, Belausians who did not agree to Soviet collectivisation drives 
in the east and chose to be repatriated as Polish citizens, Kashubians who had lived 
there for generations, Germans who married settlers and stayed behind, and even Greek 
minorities who were resettled by the state. The state was creating the environs for a 
Soviet, not a Polish society. This mix further complicated the investigation. How did 
past experiences with Soviet collectivisation in the east affect the discourses against 
collectivisation? Did experiences with the new state while coming to the territories 
affect their trust in the state’s development policies? Did ethnicity play a role in whether 
a village collectivised?  
The next phase of the plan was to compare the national state discourse with interviews 
that I would conduct with the very people who had settled in those territories after the 
war and who were part of the group who decided for or against collectivisation. 
Anthropological research on Polish agriculture during the socialist period was 
concentrated in the mostly uncollectivised, central and southern parts of the country 
(Hann, 1986; Pine, 1993) while most research coming out of the newly annexed 
northern and western territories, that had gotten a heavy dose of Sovietisation and where 
my fieldwork sites were located, were concentrated in Wrocław (Kenney, 1997; Thum, 
2011). I would have to find local statistics and archives about the resettlement 
campaigns and collectivisation drives in addition to conducting interviews. 
Finally, the official state narratives would be compared to those from on-the-ground 
interviews that I would conduct during fieldwork for three and a half months in the 
village of Dobra (collectivised) while living with my grandmother Zuzanna (peasant 
farmer) and the same block of time would be spent in the village of Zag 
(uncollectivised)—thirteen kilometres north of Dobra—where I would live with my 
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aunt Kinga and uncle Alfred (retired teachers). I expected my family to help me locate a 
snowball sample.  
I developed a questionnaire to ensure that the responses were standardised so that I 
could search for code words that related to the state narrative and turn rich life histories 
into percentages. It asked about the participant’s date of birth, ethnic identity, 
nationality, origin prior to settlement in the territories, number of languages spoken and 
so forth. The pre-migration section asked questions about their old farm size, if 
collective farms and a Communist party existed in their old village, and what had 
happened to the property after the war. Migration questions enquired about their 
experience of coming to the territories, what they brought with them, if they were 
forcibly resettled, if they had the choice to be settled in the city. Arrival questions asked 
how they acquired their property, how many parcels and hectares they received from the 
state, what early property relations with neighbours looked like, if they had to engage in 
trade with villagers to get needed resources, if they thought that the border transfer was 
legitimate. Village life questions focused on their evolving sense of community, if they 
participated in village life, if they had contact with other villagers. Collectivisation 
questions were brief, asking if they supported collectivisation, if they liked the local 
government, how much land they would have to (or did) give away to collectivisation, 
and if the state listened to them. The only question about the present-day was 
concerning what they planned to do with their home. I had naïvely expected individuals 
who had survived enough upheavals to write a book that their lives could be reduced to 
‘check-marks’ on a form. I was looking for alternative histories and territorialities, but 
my awful questionnaire confined interviewees to official history.  
3.2. Warsaw 
In order to gain access to archives and libraries in London and New York City, all I had 
to do was present a university document and student identification card. Warsaw was a 
totally different experience. A document or institutional support was not enough to get 
through the door. Conducting research there required a different skill-set—namely, of 
being able to identify and manoeuvre through informal and formal relations and 
exchanges—that I had not developed. Initially, I was under the impression that I needed 
institutional support through a Polish university to gain access to the national archives 
and secured two visiting scholar positions at two separate universities in Warsaw to that 
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end. However, when I met with the departmental director of one of the universities, he 
casually told me in a hallway to pay him (and only him) $US 300 as a fee for the 
benefits I would accrue from being associated with that university. This was not 
something we had established in the emails prior to my ‘acceptance’ and arrival to 
Warsaw. Regretfully, I paid him, but I received no receipt, document, or assistance. 
When I presented my student card to the female clerk at Warsaw University Library, 
she refused me access because she did not ‘believe’ that what I held was a ‘real’ student 
card. After multiple complaints to see the manager and after showing my letter of 
affiliation with the other university in the city, she was still ‘unconvinced’. Baffled—
thinking that I was probably not the first person to ever present a foreign identification 
card—I began to wonder whether she, knowing that I was a foreign Pole by my 
identification, could manipulate the context so that I could ‘convince’ her to let me in. 
Again, I had to assume that she wanted something under the table. I sent in two 
complaint letters explaining the incident to the director of the library and received no 
response. Ironically, bribing her on the spot would have been the more efficient route in 
getting access to the university resources.  
Experiences like these made me suspicious of every encounter with strangers and 
institutions. There were ‘exceptions’, ‘hidden fees’, ‘miscommunication’, ‘delays’ and 
‘hidden documents’ that justified another course of action which was necessary in order 
to gain access. I was new to fieldwork in Poland and could not tell when someone was 
bluffing or whether I had actually somehow missed the details. Eventually, my rule of 
thumb was that when something obvious was being barred from me and the ball was in 
my court to make a concession on what is legal then chances were something was 
amiss. I could not get accustomed to bribery in order to access information that I felt I 
had a right to access, but it became too tedious to work around the constant gridlock of 
‘private’ barriers. 
People’s activities in public spaces raised some questions. It was in Warsaw where, for 
the first time in my life, I witnessed an elderly woman who wore church attire and a 
beret attempting to shoplift chicken wings from a small supermarket. I stood in line 
behind her. When two girls in their 20s noticed that the woman to whom they had just 
handed a plastic bag with the wings was buying only a newspaper, they started to 
accuse her of theft. The woman denied it saying that she put the chicken away because 
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she did not want it. Then the girls responded with conviction that she could say that to 
the police when they arrived. The woman nonchalantly responded, ‘Oh! I just remember 
that I may have put something in my bag’. She slowly opened it up, briefly rummaged 
through and slowly declared ‘Oh I put it here!’. Rolling her eyes, the cashier briefly 
‘chastised’ the woman to admit wrong-doing but she did not even have a guilty look 
about her. She bought the chicken, newspaper, and left. I felt like I had witnessed 
something from a distant past, where ‘incessant finagling’, ‘creativity’, and 
‘resourcefulness’ were the everyday norm (Mazurek, 2012). I had observed 
‘resourceful’ old woman who manipulates her church-going identity to save money, 
‘softens’ her illegal act and may have even conjured up a hint of guilt from the girls 
who decided not to call the police. The woman’s attempt at kombinacja felt more 
elusive than the Vietnamese black market or Stadium-Bazaar sprawled outside of a bus 
station across the Wisła River (Sulima, 2012). 
Concurrently, I experienced a less comedic glimpse of kombinacja in the domestic 
sphere. Prior to my arrival in Warsaw, my mother had secured a home-stay with 
Zuzanna’s one-legged brother Artur whom I had wanted to meet because he purportedly 
escaped from a Siberian gulag during the Second World War. He and his family 
sounded excited to have me live with them in one of the largest apartment complexes in 
Warsaw. Karol who lived with Artur was a historian and Artur’s other son, Dawid, had 
a daughter my age, Urszula, who would help me out. But the illusion wore off. After 
Dawid dropped me off at Artur’s small apartment, it was suggested to me that I pay him 
$200 to keep good relations. I refused, saying that I could have paid for limo transport 
for that amount. Relations went downhill from there. It turned out Urszula was a Polish 
bride who had just been ‘purchased’ by an African-American Seattle businessman, and 
was leaving for America that month. Her capacity to assist with orientation in Warsaw 
was therefore limited. Differently, Karol’s ability to be a reliable source on Polish 
history came to very little due to his alcoholism. He would sit on the toilet at night 
drinking vodka and, as my room had no lock, would barge in and ramble about 
something or other before being made to leave. Afraid, I kept a knife under the bed. 
What was maddening and intriguing was watching the cycle of kombinacja play out 
between the two men. Who would outsmart the other? Karol would ask Artur for money 
for ‘meat’ or ‘one beer’ or ‘taking the dog out for a walk’ and his father would respond 
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that he knew the prices. Then Karol would return with excuses about how the prices had 
gone up and he had no spare change. One night, Artur got a massive nose-bleed and I 
took care of him in the bathroom for six hours straight while Karol sat on the sofa drunk 
and watching television. Neither wanted to call the ambulance, saying that it would take 
too long for it to arrive and it would be too expensive. By then, I was through with 
family and moved into a hostel. No matter how many times I explained my reasons for 
leaving, they did not understand. Several months later, Artur had another nose-bleed 
and died of a brain aneurism. I never recorded his gulag story. 
My encounters with kombinacja in Warsaw should have been a caution for what 
awaited me in Dobra. Depending on the context, sometimes I was treated as a 
‘foreigner’, other times as a ‘Pole’, which then qualified me to become a site upon 
which kombinacja could be enacted. I was suspicious of anyone who charged me 
dollars (not złoty or pounds) and whenever the amount was in the ‘several’ hundreds. 
Importantly, even when a family relationship seemed ‘informally’ established, the other 
person could turn on ‘formality’ without any prior agreement for a transaction, and vice 
versa. As Dr. Sławomir Kapralski, a sociologist whom I met at Collegium Civitas 
located in the Palace of Culture and Science—Stalin’s towering ‘gift’ to Warsaw—and 
who had taken an interest in my work, warned, I would have to learn how to ‘play the 
game’ to conduct fieldwork in the villages. Although I was getting a sense of what the 
game was, I still did not know how to play it. Still, I hoped that Dobra would be 
different since it was my ‘home’ village. In fact, it was not too different from Warsaw. 
Leveraging formality and informality became key to accessing sites, people, and 
information, which in turn transformed me and changed my original research plan.   
3.3. Searching for history  
Bureaucratic walls in Słupsk and Dobra were as tall as those in Warsaw. Humiliation, 
frustration, and anger marked all of my encounters with bureaucracy and the state. My 
‘American’ identity appeared to have mattered more to people than my status as a 
student from London. When I went into the cartographic office of Słupsk city hall, I 
walked into a room occupied by four, twenty-something-year-old secretaries and several 
of their co-workers standing around their desks. I asked if I could look at some old 
cartographic blueprints of the commune from the Stalinist period. They all glanced at 
one another with smiling eyes and mockingly repeated the question back to me in 
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‘Americanised Polish’. I walked out humiliated. Janine Wedel (1986) who had similar 
experiences conducting fieldwork wrote that humiliation in Poland ‘is one of the 
features of almost any contact with the formal organs of the state’ and a ‘means through 
which people are socialised into the system’ (pg. 149). Many who sat behind a desk 
were power-tripping. 
Yet, people who represented the state territories seemed to have an additional disregard 
for ‘formality’—especially when it was dictated from Warsaw. In the national 
archives39 in Słupsk, the documentation I had brought from a university in Warsaw 
which granted me legal access to the archive was practically worthless. ‘What are we, 
monkeys?’ the director asked when he looked at my consent forms and documents. 
He—not a document—would authorise access. The director first asked detailed 
questions about my research, my marital status, my age and finances before ‘agreeing’ 
to give me access to the archives. He explained that since the old office had burnt down 
in 1953, only scraps from the 1945-1953 era remained and that they were disheveled in 
the folders where only he knew what existed. The idea that ‘history does not exist’ or 
‘archives do not exist’ is a common reaction that other anthropologists have 
encountered when working in the archives in Warsaw. He brought a folder of 
disheveled archives from Dobra but rather than bringing me documents from Zag, he 
brought archives from a nearby commune and said, ‘Eh, the history is all the same 
around here’. The basis of my project was that it was not the same history from village 
to village, but it was peculiar that the uncollectivised village had no ‘documented’ 
history40. 
When I took out my camera to take photographs of the archives, he nonchalantly told 
me that each photograph would cost 1 grosz (a penny). I thought that this was odd 
because nothing on the website suggested that there was a price to pay other than for 
photocopies. I reluctantly agreed to it. After I had spent several hours taking over a 
thousand photographs and turned to pay the 100 złoty ($4), he said that the cost was 
actually 1 złoty per photograph, so $400! I demanded to see written proof of these 
payments which I did not see anywhere on the walls. He took out a huge booklet from 
                                                
39 Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe. 
40 Dr. Małgorzata Mazurek, who also conducts research on kombinacja, told me that 
she had a similar experience in an archival office in Poland (February 2014).  
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deep within his desk drawer, slammed it on the desk, and pointed at the price in the 
middle of some page. Evidently, in Poland, ‘rules’ are a matter of opportunity. I refused 
to pay, prompting him to demand that I erase the photographs from my computer and 
that (in true Soviet fashion) he would strike my presence from the archival register, and 
that the state could take me to court if I ever used any of the information in published 
format. In the end, I—just like the Zag archives—ceased to ‘exist’. 
One might interpret this encounter as a figure in power leveraging informal and formal 
scare tactics to create a field of the ‘unknown’. Given the number of such encounters 
with Polish institutions I suspected that this was not a coincidence. But, this form of 
kombinacja worked both ways. I backed up the photographs, showed him a blank 
external hard-drive as if I had deleted them, threw a złoty at him and left in tears. I am 
not proud of that moment, but it explains my level of frustration with Polish institutions. 
How does one define and choose what is and is not ethical when agents representing 
formal institutions operate in the grey zone? It was this repertoire of emotions, of 
feeling ‘justified’ for conducting an ‘illegal’ act, which I began to understand.  
On such days I was relieved to escape to Dobra. It was not too different there. The 
gmina mayor from Dobra whose family had been in village politics since the socialist 
era refused an interview three times and told me to seek history ‘among the elderly’ and 
‘archives’ in Słupsk. A village teacher who had gathered old photographs from villagers 
for an exhibition at the local elementary school told me she would share them with me 
for an agreed price and only after I brought cake to a sit down with the school director. 
Some of the excuses that the gmina secretaries gave for denying access to local archives 
were that they too were working on the same exact articles and research questions as I 
was and could not share it at that moment. Some of these barriers were breached when I 
approached the secretary several times over a longer period of time. It is surprising that 
Zbierski-Salameh (2013), who conducted research on post-socialist transformation in a 
similar agro-industrial village in central Poland, wrote that she had ‘unrestricted access 
to personnel and local council meetings’ as well as multiple interviews with the staff 
and access to documents (pg. 11). What was frustrating was not knowing ‘why’ these 
barriers were around and showing I could overcome them to access the information that 
I needed. Every encounter required me to make a major concession to ‘make things 
happen’. Yet, the public libraries at both Dobra and Słupsk were open, had internet 
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connection, digitized archives, and the librarians were accommodating with the 
information that they could supply.  
These exceptions aside, my experience with institutions was defined by the systematic 
encounter with nomenklatura ‘superiority’. Individuals who granted access to the public 
resources domesticated public information as their private ownership and used their 
formal positions of power to leverage resources from me—whether money, coffee, and 
cake, or information about my personal life, family, and life in America. This sense that 
‘corruption was everywhere’ was difficult to come to terms with because I did not have 
the skill-set that I needed to get around these mind-games. How else could I have 
approached these encounters? I felt that my ‘own people’ did not want to help me. In 
hindsight, I think what they meant was: ‘let’s combine our resources to make something 
happen’ but it took a long time to work this out.  
3.4. Domesticating research 
The Zag plan was slipping from my grasp. Although Kinga and Alfred had initially 
agreed to host me, they discontinued their interest soon after my arrival. Mother took 
time off and came to the village to loosen up some family tensions and to put me in 
contact with her acquaintances (znajomi) with whom she and my father had worked in 
the state factory and mechanical enterprises in the 1970s and 1980s. She had not spoken 
to some of them for decades; thus, my fieldwork actually required the rejuvenation of 
old socialist-era networks. She negotiated access to their cars through various gifts and 
favours (which were not identical). Adam, a police officer, Hela and Tadeusz, both 
factory workers, and Marek, a retired mechanical enterprise worker took turns driving 
me around the commune to the original settlers they knew could engage with me. Adam 
was personally interested in the project and only accepted chocolates. Hela and Tadeusz 
received a bottle of Jack Daniels and a promise from mother that she would send them a 
formal invitation to the United States. I paid Marek $200 to cover fuel costs. As the 
following chapters demonstrate, this same process of reworking the formal and 
rerouting resources and access was key to survival under socialism. Similar to a state 
plan, my research plan was too rigid and full of shortages. It was incredible that these 
mechanisms could be adapted to rework my fieldwork plan. Fieldwork became a family 
enterprise! 
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Prior to this fieldwork, whenever mother travelled to Poland in the 1990s and 2000s, I 
had questioned her spending thousands of dollars on gifts to distribute to family 
members, friends, and anyone else who might come to visit her in the village. Many of 
these gifts were never seen again. Family members probably traded and sold them to 
other villagers for other favours. Interpreting it as wasteful spending used to show her 
as an American success story, whereas I had failed to see the more functional ‘economy 
of the gift’ (Mauss, 1950/1990, pg. 54). This time, I learned that whenever she comes to 
Poland, she has a lot of errands to run, thus, gift giving is a way of making sure that 
everyone is ‘happy to help’ whenever she needed to get something done in the village, 
city, or when she returned to Trenton. It is a way of carving out economic and social 
space and the timing and strategising of whom to give gifts has a lot to do with 
minimising and protecting oneself from possible future risk. These gifts help reproduce 
familial bonds and socialist-era networks ‘just in case’ she ever needs to return to the 
village after she retires in America.  
Because villagers saw me first as a ‘Materkowa’ (woman from the Materka family), and 
secondly as a researcher from somewhere, mother’s gift-giving helped legitimate my 
work and presence. It was not enough for me to ‘explain’ my work, someone from the 
‘inside’ had to explain it, even if the language was the same. Somehow, people 
understood it differently. To ‘make space’ for me to conduct my fieldwork, she paid 
people off, helped explain my work, loosened tensions, etc. which was a gift in itself 
(which she would later use as leverage for me to reciprocate ‘daughter’s duty’ services 
for her back in Trenton). I found it ironic because my mother rarely mentions anything 
about my academic interests with her fellow working-class friends. Yet, in the village, 
by helping me rework my plan, she helped me show other villagers that young women 
can be researchers and achieve a higher education. Mother helped embed my fieldwork 
into village life through her artful manipulation of local discourse, distribution of gifts, 
and rejuvenation of her old networks. This repositioned my work in a different ‘social 
field’ because by accepting gifts or agreeing to share their networks, villagers began 
helping me to secure information as a way of reproducing good relations with the 
Materka family. 
Two codes of ‘ethics’ affected my research plan. I feared deviating from the original 
framework of the funded protocol. This was the framework where I would parachute 
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into the community, present documents to grant access to offices and interviewees, 
participate little in village life, and exit. If I had stayed at a hotel and hired a translator 
and gatekeeper, I would have been able to keep it that way. However, since I stayed 
with family, a different set of ethics tugged at me, which brings to mind Wedel’s (1986) 
keen observation that in Poland, ‘one moral code is reserved for the private world of 
family and friends, another one for the public’ (pg. 16). At the time, I was not aware 
that I had engaged in ‘domestication’—a positively sanctioned process during the 
socialist and post-socialist periods that I later ‘rediscovered’ during my fieldwork. The 
‘Domestication’ of research funds to pay for coal—which served my fieldwork goals 
and helped my family economically—was the ‘right’ thing to do in that code of ethics 
even though it would have raised questions in the West. Funds from mother’s pocket 
went to giving gifts in order to ‘pay off’ people who would help me with fieldwork, 
although some wanted a reciprocated invitation to America which I could not provide! 
Local realities challenged ethics almost daily.  
While mother helped situate my fieldwork in the ‘social field’, she helped me 
understand the ‘habitus’ or the set of skills necessary to navigate the changing field. By 
shadowing her on several occasions, I learned ‘how to get things done’. When she was 
assembling documentation of her work history in the state factory towards her 
retirement application, she had to use her personal contacts and gifts to locate the exact 
household in Słupsk that during the 1990s had privatised the state’s copies of pay stubs 
that proved her employment history. She walked into private homes where she sat at 
dining room tables with people who went into their drawers and took out her work 
history that had been recorded by the state and which she needed to get her retirement. 
Of course, once she was in these people’s homes, she had to disburse gifts of gratitude 
(coffee, chocolates). These were private gate-keepers to the workers’ histories under the 
previous state. I found it outrageous that middle-aged workers who wanted to retire in 
2008 had to ‘find’ the privatised state archives (by asking people on the street) in 
people’s homes. These documents were necessary for workers to prove their work-
history to the state. ‘Official’ processes like securing a retirement pension required one 
to navigate through public and private spheres.  
It was in joining her on these scavenger hunts for the remnants of the socialist state’s 
bureaucratic footprints that I began to appreciate how boundaries of ‘public’ and 
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‘private’ had changed in the last twenty years. When conducting fieldwork in 1980s 
Poland, Wedel (1986) observed that ‘Poles shape their lives to mesh with the varying 
demands of private and public worlds. They have developed a keen ability, not only to 
live with the contradictions of their society, but to manipulate them creatively’ (pg. 16). 
She called this the ‘art of adjustment’, something which I failed at miserably and which 
mother excelled at in 2009. When I witnessed mother manoeuvre through people and 
sites, I saw her exert agency in such a way that I had never seen in Trenton. There—I 
was the translator and mediator—while in Dobra she was mine. Mother used her 
habitus, a keen sensory reception, to identify a changing field—which in this case were 
the fluid public and private boundaries of where the ‘state’ was located—and then 
adjusted her positionality to ensure that she secured the resources (documents) she 
needed out of them.  
Unlike some native ethnographers who have a ‘deep understanding’ of local relations 
(e.g. Abufarha, 2009), I did not have the intimate historical knowledge and radar for 
sensitive topics in order to carry out the interviews alone. Not quite a native 
ethnographer and not quite a foreign one either, I was more like a diasporic 
ethnographer who had partial linkages to the people but with an incomplete box of 
linguistic and cultural tools to stand on my own. When mother left, Zuzanna took over 
full-time as mentor and collaborator. She had dreamed of being a geographer, so it 
pleased her to take on such a project that included visiting her friends and engaging in 
the exchange of gossip, gifts, resources (jars), prices, and personal histories. It gave her 
a chance to see villagers’ homes, state farms, and state forestries for the first time since 
arriving to the territories in 1946. Instead of researching Zag, I would stay with her in 
Dobra until December 2009. I would open up my research sites to the villages within 
the Dobra commune (gmina). The coal money that was supposed to go to Zag would 
instead be used to buy Zuzanna her first electric stove. Zuzanna would be my main 
gatekeeper in Dobra and three lesser gatekeepers would help me conduct interviews in 
the smaller villages scattered throughout the commune. 
My desk in Dobra was situated on the top floor of Zuzanna’s old German-era home 
from the early 1900s. There, I kept my books and wrote all of my field notes while 
keeping an eye out for any informal exchanges and activities that were taking place on 
the farm. I bought a half-ton of coal to keep my room warm throughout my stay but 
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Zuzanna hardly ever used it. She rationed the coal and warmed up the kitchen only with 
the steam from her cooking pots. When temperatures dropped in October, I began to 
complain that I could not write with frozen fingers. Yet, she always danced around the 
subject of getting Roman to put coal in the oven. I respected Zuzanna’s resourcefulness 
(oszczędność) as it was one of her character traits. So, without coal to heat the furnace, I 
learned to adjust by cutting off the finger-tips on my gloves and drinking hot tea (Figure 
4).  
A fine line existed between domesticating my research protocol and domesticating ‘me’ 
into village life. Studies on the feminisation of poverty in rural Poland show that 
women are unequally burdened by the multiplication of tasks inside the household—
including household chores, money management (to protect household money from 
male drinking), making extra money through informal jobs throughout the year, 
engaging in trade relations, picking mushrooms and berries—that blended both their 
traditional and their worker roles during the socialist era. Women are strapped into 
‘time poverty’ in which Polish women have little leisure time on an everyday basis 
(Tarkowska, 2002, pg. 429). Zuzanna was in a similar position. Her ordinary day was 
packed from when she woke up at dawn to the moment she went to bed. She explained 
that the body has to be in constant motion, like a machine (maszyna). Making time to go 
on interviews was about me helping ‘make leisure time’ for her. 
Thus, I ‘lived the part’ of domestic life (Ring, 2006, pg. 30). There was no way that I 
could emotionally distance myself from family obligations and visits, such as going to 
church, and events. In the morning, her bachelor son Roman, suffering from severe 
alcoholism since the 1970s, performed some small chore, then harassed Zuzanna for 
money, and was out of the house. I would then see him drinking on what I termed the 
‘alcohol benches’ and then either dragged in unconscious by the police at 11PM or he 
would disappear for several days at a time before returning, being ‘good’ for a week, 
and then fall into an intoxicated state once more. Saddest of all was how much he was 
destroying the farm and worked against Zuzanna’s decisions. She put most of the labour 
into the farm and wanted to minimise production to lower the household’s annual 
expenditures while he kept on ploughing the same amount of land which he did not 
work 
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Zuzanna was adept at filling in his chores when he was not around and preferred that I 
stuck to my own work when she did them. Nevertheless, as Roman’s leg hurt and he 
could not go into the forest from August to September to forage for mushrooms, I went 
instead and became known in the family and the surrounding neighbourhoods as a bona 
fide grzybowiara (skilled mushroom forager), taking after my dad who was a fine 
grzybowarz. In this way, I found some way to connect to his legacy in the village. He 
would have been proud. I helped out with chores in the kitchen or vegetable garden to 
help free up time for Zuzanna to go out with me to access her social networks which she 
tapped for interviews as a favour. Rain or shine, we set out before lunch at 13:00. 
 
Figure 4 Zuzanna standing with her half-ton shipment of 
coal I purchased to keep us warm during the winter. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
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Zuzanna’s participation (and that of the other gatekeepers’ too) was critical in accessing 
interviews. Most villagers did not open doors to outsiders whom they suspected to be 
Jehovahs Witnesses or German tourists coming to look at their old family house. In 
addition, I did not know where people lived. She was necessary to carry out the 
interviews because, as she put it, I had to ‘learn how to talk’ to the villagers even though 
I spoke Polish. Like mother, Zuzanna was a bona fide kombinatorka (woman 
kombinator) who could expertly manipulate and manoeuvre through social grid-locks 
which was most often when I took out the consent forms and questionnaire, artifacts of 
Western formality. This was obviously a mistake, especially when people in the 
interviews were telling me about networks, access, kombinacja while I attempted to 
check them into boxes. The forms provoked tensions and Zuzanna was there to soothe 
them. Eventually, I picked up certain forms of street slang, started discussing food 
prices on the street, wore village clothing, gossiped, attended church, and conducted 
some interviews by myself. 
We came home and ate supper at 19:00 with an intoxicated Roman at the head of the 
table. I was expected to set the table and clean his dishes if I did not want to put more 
stress on the household, but frankly, I was scared of Roman’s unpredictability, 
vulgarity, and aggression when he was drunk. I felt that the Warsaw experience with her 
brother and his son was replaying in the territories. I locked my door at night and 
Zuzanna’s door which she would reopen later because she was ‘not afraid of her own 
son’. But there were just too many times where he came home late howling and yelling 
to himself in the kitchen before he fell and then slithered his way up the stairs to 
recover. The emotional connection to domestic life was related to the realisation that I 
was not as emotionally ‘detached’ from the village and its problems as I would have 
liked to be, and that there was actually a place in the village for me should I ever want 
to return permanently. Imagining the possibility that this alternative timeline might 
actually play out horrified me. 
Fieldwork was an intergenerational gift bestowed upon me by mother and grandmother, 
who carved out the space for me to investigate the complex histories and realities of 
village life. With Zuzanna’s extensive on-the-ground support and deployment of her 
skills to extract information from a variety of sensitive subjects, and mother’s 
diplomatic skills in smoothing over relations with locals and connecting me to her 
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socialist-era networks, this dissertation has been an intergenerational project between 
me, my mother and grandmother. In a way, this thesis is in conversation with Caroyln 
Kay Steedman’s Landscape for a Good Woman (2000) which brings the often invisible 
history and culture of working-class women to the forefront of historical investigation 
through her own relationship with her mother. Likewise, this dissertation would not 
have been possible if it were not for the support of the women in my family whose 
voices and experiences might have otherwise not been heard if it were not for this 
project. This project represents their hope that it will help me get away from the world 
of physical labour and the optimism that another world is possible for Polish women 
coming from the village.  
Despite a ‘debt’ to the women of my family their gift of ‘open reciprocity’ ‘keeps no 
accounts’ (Graeber, 2001, pg. 220). I do not feel obligated to uphold my family’s 
reputation or self-censor village history. At no point did anyone tell me to write ‘good 
things’ about them or the village. Mother, Zuzanna, and the family know that 
kombinacja is at the crux of this thesis. That kombinacja in itself has positive and 
negative sanctions is an important element that can help readers ‘identify’ whether they 
are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ kombinators or distance themselves from those acts. The Roman and 
Zuzanna story is well-known in the family, and since then, Roman has had a stroke that 
paralysed the left half of his body and he has since been in physical rehabilitation. 
Zuzanna lives in slightly less stressful conditions. My experience herein is now a past 
reality. Anything that I have written about uncle Alfred and aunt Kinga is quite well 
known in the family, that has been ‘split’ about supporting or not supporting my studies. 
In other words, I doubt that there are any major ‘surprises’. Conversely, my mother is 
not aware of the extent that I have incorporated her into the thesis and there may be data 
that it would be wise to change if this thesis can published at a later date.I do not want 
her to be put into harm’s way from her neighbours or suffer the attentions of the state. 
She has expressed some hesitation about me conducting future fieldwork on kombinacja 
in Trenton, which only sheds further light on Zuzanna’s gift in helping me conduct 
fieldwork at the risk of her own reputation in Dobra. 
3.5. Abandonment 
All research was conducted in the Dobra commune (gmina)—population 9,422—which 
is spread over 300 square kilometres. It includes 48 villages (wioski) and many smaller 
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colonies (kolonie) usually connected to the villages. They are all connected by narrow, 
tree-lined roads—built by the Nazis—surrounded by a patchwork of expansive fields 
and forests. The settlements are economically diverse. Agriculturally productive 
villages—usually dominated by a single ethnic group like Belausians or Poles—are still 
engaged in peasant farming and even raise livestock and horses. Livestock are rare and 
only visible in either the most isolated villages in the commune or the ones that have 
had a long tradition of family farming. Ukrainian colonies—which used to be collective 
farms (kołchoz) until 1989—often lack basic amenities like internal plumbing and 
electricity and still use ‘collective’ gmina barns and land for their domestic production 
to live off the land.  
State farm worker settlements converted into villages after 1989—are populated with 
the rural poor who receive state welfare, pay rent to the state or squat, and produce most 
of their food on their old worker allotment garden (działka) they received as state farm 
workers. These isolated islands are littered with the skeletal structures of state farms and 
surrounded by a sea of agricultural wastelands (odłogi) waiting for a buyer. In the 
middle of these settlements are gigantic deteriorating, 19th century, Junker mansions 
that were occupied by wealthy German families who were expelled or murdered by the 
Red Army and its collaborators towards the end of the Second World War and 
converted into Soviet state farms as early as 1945. Most abandoned mansions are still 
owned by the state. Other converted state farm colonies like Buda have a new ‘master’ 
who purchased the state farm, resides in the German-era mansion, and employs ex-state 
farm workers to work the land subsidised by European Union funds. These settlements 
are hostile to outsiders. 
There were forest villages. These were once German villages converted into forestries 
after the gmina forced the peasantry through corvée (szarwark) labour to plant trees on 
a massive scale. These ‘forest settlements’ were then carefully managed by the state. 
Under socialism, they bordered, and sometimes were the borders of, state farms. 
Although they were given ‘village’ status after 1989, the forestries still remained 
nationalised to this day and the state provides partial employment to those forest 
workers and their families. However, today they are becoming increasingly isolated as 
the forests they once planted are spreading across the agricultural wastelands (Figure 5). 
This spread brings an uncanny ‘national’ presence in the form of wilderness—with wild 
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boar, mink, foxes, deer, mushrooms, and berries inching closer to the edges of the 
villages. This forested wilderness with Soviet roots is spreading across the commune, a 
trend seen in other post-Soviet states too (Schwatz, 2006).  
 
Figure 5 Forests encroaching onto privatised fields in Dobra. Author's photo (2009). 
 
Dobra—population 3,220—is the village headquarters of the gmina. It is the largest and 
most developed of all the settlements and formed the heart of my ethnographic work. It 
has a bucolic, post-industrial landscape. Ex-peasants and worker-peasants are 
concentrated near the fields (pole) on the northern and western edge of the village; ex-
workers live in apartments near the tannery at the southeastern end; ex-officials and 
bureaucrats live in the homes along Reunification Street; and the ex-state forestry 
workers live along the forested peripheries that encircle the village. A sea of agricultural 
wastelands encompasses the entire village in places where the forests has not yet 
reached.  
Reunification Street (Ulica Zjednoczona)—built by the Nazis and renamed by the 
Soviets—runs through the heart of the village and is populated by alcohol shops and 
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several family-owned convenience stores. Back in 1998, I remember that the street 
bustled with restaurants and bars with outside seating and umbrellas as well as a 
discotheque. By 2009, that initial flush of entrepreneurial spirit was gone. Everything is 
boarded up. There were no street markets41 or informal vendors like in Warsaw where 
one could walk up to someone and start a conversation. Only the alcohol shops, 
convenience stores, and bakery are open. An occasional German family visiting their 
Heimat drives by and takes photographs of the houses; sometimes tour buses of 
Japanese tourists visit the meat shops to buy kiełbasa. A good portion of the middle-
aged villagers who failed to secure jobs in the 1990s and almost all of the youth above 
the age of 18 have become migrant workers in Western and Northern European 
countries. (Gdańsk, 113 kilometres east, is a gateway to that world). With the exception 
of cars driving by, the village is mostly quiet. 
 
Figure 6 Dobra’s agro-industrial landscape from the window of an ex-factory 
worker’s home. Author’s photo (2009). 
                                                
41 Specialised foods like cheese, honey, and vegetables were sold from individual 
households. One had to arrange with the owner to access and buy them.  
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The elderly and middle-aged villagers who stayed behind survive off of remittances, 
welfare and retirement cheques, temporary agricultural, forestry and factory jobs on 
part-time, underpaid shifts with no benefits whatsoever, and free services they exchange 
with one another. These nostalgic Dobranians complain that under socialism the fields 
were once all harvested, the hotels and restaurants were bustling, and all the farms were 
spotlessly clean—because the state had cared about it. Yet under ‘capitalism’, where 
business is supposed to boom, state, capital, and development have all packed up and 
left behind an apocalyptic landscape of poverty. Zuzanna’s neighbour Kornelia, a 97-
year-old woman who still harvested her own potatoes in 2009, visited Zuzanna one day 
and said sadly that the youth do not have the ‘will’ (chęć) to work the land. Kornelia, 
like many of the elderly, expressed that they felt deserted by their daughters and sons 
who instead of carrying on the family tradition of agricultural production, chose 
professional lives or became migrant workers. Abandonment began in the 1980s when 
the elderly, who were not allowed to legally sell farmland, gave their children the option 
of taking it over. As in Zuzanna’s case, no one wanted it so she and Konrad ‘returned it’ 
(oddali) to the gmina in return for a pension. It was not until the 1990s privatisation that 
people could both sell land and receive pensions. In 2009, there was only one 
Gospodarz left in Dobra village who worked only a portion of his land. Labour had left 
the village. 
Alcoholism in the village has reached epidemic proportions (Zbierski-Salameh, 2013; 
Schneider, 2006). Public alcoholism is rampant among the older men who congregate 
daily outside the gmina headquarters in the middle of Reunification Street. This is no 
ordinary ‘hanging out with friends over a drink’ Local newspapers have covered 
alcoholism stories that included women pouring gasoline over their drunken husbands 
and burning them to death, intoxicated individuals murdering their lovers through 
defenestration and drunks setting others’ genitalia on fire during libation. The saddest 
image of all was driving past villages and seeing teenagers falling over and urinating on 
the bus stops—filling the new ranks of public alcoholism. I later heard that in 2012, one 
of Zuzanna’s neighbours whom I had taken a photograph of on numerous occasions 
during fieldwork had perished tragically in the forest after she went to cut trees with a 
group of intoxicated men and was squashed by a falling tree. Dobranians do not discuss 
‘what to do about alcoholism’ but who is responsible for perpetrating alcoholism. They 
will blame the ‘Other’: a weakened police force, the lack of forced rehabilitation, 
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elderly women, the Polish People’s Army, an incurable ‘disease’, etc. No one—not 
even the gmina—admits that this requires a ‘collective’ rather than a ‘family’ solution. 
In effect, everyone tiptoes around the passed out men on the village benches and in the 
ditches along Reunification Street (see Chapter 8). At night, the police make their 
rounds picking up the men and driving them home to their family.  
Villagers are aware of this decline. A common complaint has been that since the end of 
communism, everyone has retreated into their household, life has become atomised, 
people do not talk to one another anymore, and there is no more communality or 
conviviality. This is not only the narrative of Dobranians. Similar narratives can be 
found all over the ex-Soviet bloc, such as on the streets of post-socialist Bucharest, as 
demonstrated in Alyssa Grossman’s film In the Light of Memory (2011), where women 
discuss the loss of communication. One narrator explains that under socialism, the 
simple project of baking a cake was a community effort because one did not have all of 
the ingredients and needed to borrow them from neighbours with the promise of 
returning them later. Now, everyone has become ‘self-sufficient’. Time was different in 
that everything was done in that day, whereas today, things are constantly left undone 
and spill over to the next. ‘We experience time differently now’, she said. 
The church is not a beacon of morality in the village either. Ukrainian and Polish flags 
both hang over its entrance. Since 1989, the Ukrainian minority in the village demanded 
that Greco-Orthodox mass should be held on Saturdays, which continues to this day. 
When I visited another village called Niepoględzie in the commune, I spoke to a 
priest—who sported a mustache, smoked a cigarette, wore a Hawaiian shirt, and was 
served by a sexy, blonde secretary—who told me that the territories continue to be 
‘missionary lands’ for the Vatican. During the Nazi era, their lands were owned by 
Evangelical Lutherans and Protestants. During the Soviet state-building and Polish 
nation-building after the Second World War, the Polish socialists planted regime-
friendly priests into the ex-German congregations. The church and state were 
bedfellows. Even today, Dobranians who are devout to the Catholic faith are suspicious 
of the local priest. Villager gossip about how the priest drinks alcohol, sleeps around, 
and is misappropriating European Union redevelopment funds. The church has been 
‘under renovation’ for years, and the villagers are increasingly calling for 
accountability. 
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Figure 7 Rusting socialist-era machinery on Zuzanna’s farm. Photo by Neil 
Anderson (2008). 
 
Dobra’s dog problem affected fieldwork logistics on a daily basis (Figure 8). People 
train large dogs to protect their property. Even Zuzanna’s mutt Puszek was aggressive. 
Many do not keep their pit-bulls, Rottweilers, and German shepherds locked up. If they 
do during the day then they let them out to prowl along the streets at night. I could not 
walk around the village without watching out for an attack and could not walk up to 
interviewees’ properties without first setting up an interview on the street or asking the 
owner to take the dog away. Large dogs were contained by fences they could easily 
jump over. Colonies had to be accessed only by car because even locals were afraid to 
approach due to the dog problem. While out on a mushroom picking expedition with 
Puszek in a nearby forest, several dogs from nearby farms picked up our scent and 
chased us. I ran for my life and held my mushroom knife in my pocket. When I 
complained to a police officer who drove me around, he agreed that it was a problem, 
but he too had too large huskies guarding his property.  
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Violent geographies, Gregory and Pred (2007) write, are defined by their ‘pervasive 
intimacy of terror, fear, and violence’ (pg. 5). These unpredictable spaces, marked by 
masculinity and ferocious dogs, affected my movements as a woman. Granted, some 
women in the village would say ‘I am not afraid of dogs’ or would ridicule the 
intoxicated men, but I did not have that level of grit. I was too afraid to access 
masculinised spaces like the alcohol benches or the vodka parties held in people’s 
homes or gatherings in the forest; too afraid to go door-to-door because of the dog 
problem; and too afraid to be dropped off in a little known village for several days to 
conduct fieldwork and then get picked up again. I had to be constantly vigilant and able 
to imagine threats before I inserted myself into those spaces. Violence affected my 
ability to meet up with other women as well. There were no comfortable ‘public’ spaces 
to meet and share stories. Zuzanna and I made special arrangements with women who 
had aggressive husbands to come to Zuzanna’s house for the interview. I cannot 
imagine how much risk I could have put those women into if I had arrived 
unannounced. This was no ordinary method, such as ‘get a local haircut’ and ’buy 
clothes in the country’, that other male anthropologists (e.g. Peritore, 1990) have cited 
as a way to minimise danger during fieldwork.  
This paralysis in avoiding violent spaces affected the rhythm of the fieldwork and the 
actual structure of the project. Kovats-Bernat (2002) writes that ‘dangerous fields are 
customarily approached and engaged through a broad but interrelated range of 
improvised field strategies’ which have methodological effects that complicate 
traditional research strategies (pgs. 209-210). Reflecting on her ethnographic 
investigation of police practices in Uttar Pradesh, Jauregui (2013) argues that 
anthropologists working in violent spaces must engage in a ‘strategic complicity’, 
meaning being aware of one’s complicity in witnessing those acts but using one’s 
position in strategic ways to understand its complexity, questioning the actions of the 
individuals inflicting the violence, while simultaneously maintaining one’s integrity and 
ethical responsibility as an anthropologist (pg. 16). I engaged with more of what could 
be called ‘strategic avoidance’, negotiating networks and deals around those spaces, 
usually at the expense of ethical integrity but at the benefit of my physical protection. 
Most interviews were planned well in advance so that the owners could put their dogs 
away and so that I could secure transport and a gate-keeper. This delayed the pace of 
interviews because I then had to wait until people could make time to see me. Personal 
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connections and bribes that helped me grant mobility and access were key to making me 
feel physically safer. They added some feeling of physical protection along with actual 
physical access to spaces that were closed off by multiple barriers of canine aggression, 
gates, and interrogations. The fact that I could not just ‘walk around’ and ‘conduct’ 
fieldwork without real physical risk was supremely frustrating. I had to improvise, and 
actually use kombinacja. Being part of the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy began to 
matter. 
 
Figure 8 A Rottweiler, without owner, at a fork in the road in Dobra. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Constant encounters with these gruelling and raw experiences wore me down. Intimacy 
is the key word because the most frightening realisation about Dobra’s pervasive 
violence that I had was the blurry boundary where the ethnographic ‘I’ ended and the 
local ‘I’ began. In other words, it was the fear that I was being sucked into the fabric of 
local violence; an experience that an outside ethnographer would not experience if he 
(especially he) or she were in my place. My body as a local woman was being affected 
by the threat. I found it difficult to imagine a villager hurting an ‘outsider’, but women 
who were part of the culture were subjected to a different set of rules. The village 
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narrative became my narrative and vice-versa. This is where my voice as a ‘vulnerable 
observer’ (Behar, 1996) emerged because I began to see myself emotionally attached to 
village spaces and events against my own will. I did not want it to happen. It was the 
first time that the realisation that I was a ‘woman of the border’ began, stuck between 
worlds, when fieldwork began forming the roots of a sort-of testimony; being stuck in 
the middle of a village peasant girl and urban scholar (pg. 27). My ‘objectivity’ had 
become ‘domesticated’ by the village. Some type of blurring of the public and private 
boundary between my body and the outside village occurred. Rather than controlling the 
‘field’, I had somehow become linked with it, ‘embodied by the violence’ (Kovats-
Bernat, 2002, pg. 211). 
3.6. Interviews 
My partially reformulated research protocol was still focused on gathering information 
on the state-making project in the commune in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
I interviewed those individuals whom my gatekeepers and drivers could access on a day 
that they had some free time. Interviews were conducted in Dobra village, five ex-state 
farms (turned ‘villages’), four other villages, and one colony in the commune. One 
villager was interviewed in another commune because she had moved there to be with 
family—but the interview was about Dobra. By that time, the comparative ethnography 
of two villages had collapsed. In some villages that had not been collectivised, only a 
handful of interviewees were still alive. There were not as many alive as in Zag. These 
two interviews could not balance out the compendium of stories from Dobra village. 
The ethnography would have to become a multi-sited one that investigated 
collectivisation in a single commune.  
Relying on one gatekeeper for all of my access was limiting; the best strategy was to 
have multiple gatekeepers with multiple network types (i.e. peasants, factory workers, 
state farm workers). It would not be fruitful, for example, to bring a Pole to a discussion 
with Belausians about post-war repatriation. These logistics were complex. Different 
gatekeepers knew different secrets. ‘Hidden’ or ‘invisible’ sites such as desecrated 
German cemeteries in the forests were impossible to locate without a certain gate-
keeper with a car. Adam, a police officer, drove me to interviews during his evening 
shifts and dropped me off at people’s houses. He was of Prussian decent, thus he 
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showed me the hidden German cemeteries, but again, these had to be trusted people as I 
would have not have gone with a stranger deep into a forest. 
When I went to other villages with Hela and Tadeusz, they established connections by 
first figuring out their common ‘old origins’ (pochodzenie z starych stron) prior to 
arrival in the territories. Then, the gatekeepers linked my family network to the 
interviewees by saying, ‘Edyta is Arkadiusz’s daughter—Arkadiusz who worked in the 
enterprise with X’ or ‘Edyta is Konrad’s granddaughter—Konrad who operated the 
tractor with X’ or ‘Edyta is Franciszek’s little sister—Franciszek who played the piano 
in church’. Frowns turned into smiles on the spot. Then, a transaction of some sort had 
to occur in the form of local gossip, local food prices, and information about America. 
No one particularly cared about London—they cared about the information that carried 
weight as gossip: ‘How were the Materkas doing in Ameryka?’  
Gatekeepers were interested in establishing economic contacts with the interviewees. 
They often piggy-backed on my interviews to villages to buy cheese from an an 
interviewee because they were the only ones producing real cheese, or to pick 
mushrooms in their backyards, or to acquire high quality apples from the allotment 
garden of an ex-state farm worker still living on the privatised state farm, to exchange 
potato and egg prices with another villager to get a gauge of what they are being sold 
outside of the supermarkets, or to receive raspberry jam jars. I never realised until now 
just how many economic relations were being established between my gatekeepers and 
the interviewees. The lure of helping me was that they got to travel to another village, 
scope out their resources, and acquire them for a cheaper price. It made perfect sense to 
help me out. 
Gatekeepers were necessary for identifying signs of danger. We sometimes had to 
discuss what we would say to the locals as to why we were there and how they had 
never seen us before. Marek, my driver who was raised on a state farm and took me to 
the settlements, was cognisant of the danger levels. Usually, we first drove up to the 
German-era mansion that presided over the small settlement of workers’ homes. One 
was filled with squatter families, but Marek wanted to enter it just to check if one of his 
old acquaintances would agree to an interview. We drove up to the mansion with car 
windows rolled up and Marek said that if anyone grew suspicious of our presence, we 
would have to feign nonchalance and say that we were called in by so and so and were 
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looking for her. The problem was that we had never seen that property before. When we 
walked into the large hallway and searched for the correct buzzer, a young man in 
worker clothing appeared in the doorway with his right hand in his breast pocket. I 
thought that he was just comfortably resting his hand, but Marek suspected something 
was amiss. The young man interrogated us about our business in that building and 
before the conversation continued, Marek said that his friend was probably not home 
and escorted us out. He later said that the young man could have been holding a 
weapon.  
Squatters could have been suspicious of government auditing or German families 
‘touring’ their Heimat. Ex-state farms in particular are populated by people who still 
have not privatised their properties and still pay rent to the state. The fear of a German 
owner coming back to reclaim the land and leave them homeless is a real one. These 
people are poor and marginalised. This type of encounter, however, highlights the 
importance of a local like Marek who owns a car and who knows the area and people’s 
temperaments well. Marek was not only a gate-keeper to the interviewees in isolated 
settlements, but kept me protected on numerous other occasions. He displayed a similar 
hesitation when he and I observed—from afar—a massive potato theft occurring on 
privatised state farm fields (see Chapter 8). This distance was a sign of respect, not to 
give too much attention to people who were taking potatoes because they needed them 
to survive.   
Some people lived in such impoverished conditions that it was better not to ask about 
their recollections of ‘history’. When Marek drove me to an ex-state forestry settlement, 
we approached what looked like a dilapidated ruin. When we walked towards the rear, 
we found a small entrance that managed to stand in the middle of bricks lying around 
everywhere. We entered a dark kitchen and went towards the light of a room where 
there was a tiny woman with large glasses sitting on her bed, next to the furnace on full. 
She was the wife of the deceased state forestry director and told us that she was waiting 
for death and could not find the strength to answer even one question. Then her son 
arrived and ushered us out of the house as we pleaded just for any information about the 
forestry’s history. Then we went to her neighbour’s house who said that the old woman 
had a good memory! I wonder to this day about that space in the forest with this tiny 
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woman in her own post-socialist dystopia sitting next to a huge German furnace on full. 
I arrived at a bad time without the ‘right’ people.  
Zuzanna was the main gatekeeper for most interviews—even those outside of Dobra. 
Her transformations made her an expert on village history and transition. As a little girl, 
she helped out on her family’s and neighbour’s farm in central Poland, survived the 
war, then migrated to the territories in 1946 where she was put into corvée labour by the 
state, then became a peasant farmer, then a kułak, then a sporadic collective farm 
worker (kołchoznik), then a peasant once again, then a sporadic worker-peasant, and 
then gave away her land to the state in the 1980s. She raised her four children and her 
grandchildren while running a productive worker-peasant farm. Now, she is living off 
her retirement cheques and exchange networks that she and Roman keep with 
neighbours, family, and acquaintances. Yet, I am grateful that she took time out of her 
busy schedule and eventful life to share her networks and spend some time with me. 
This was the only, and the last, time in my life that I had spent quality time together 
with her since we migrated to America.  
Zuzanna and I found a way to use kombinacja to get information from the interviewees. 
The plan was this: I let her speak first and establish positive relations through a catch up 
of family events and good times. She knew exactly what to say and how to say it. Then, 
she would pause and provide a formal introduction where she asked if they could ‘help’ 
(pomóc) me in my school project. She framed the interview as something that the 
villagers should do for the village youth (me). I ran through the consent forms and she 
smoothed any rough edges to some sensitive questions like whether there were any 
‘problems’ in the community in the early-time period. She usually said something like 
‘everything was good and we all lived in peace’. And the interviewees liked that 
because it showed she was on their side. Zuzanna always agreed with the interviewees 
to keep them talking. To get around ethnically sensitive subjects like postwar revenge 
that played out among families and groups in the village—Zuzanna would say 
diplomatically that ‘There are people and there are barbarians’ (Są ludzie i ludziska) 
within every ethnic group. In fact, Zuzanna was so good at dealing with people without 
giving her own views that it is no wonder she was recruited by the Party; she would 
have made a fine politician (Konrad did not let her). I eventually realised during the 
interview translation that I too could no longer keep track of Zuzanna’s real views; she 
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would never divulge her true opinion to anyone, but rather adjusted to everyone else’s. 
This was the art of adjustment, knowing how to agree with everyone.  
Still, interviewees answered questionnaire questions nervously, like a test. There was 
the ‘formal’ answer they gave, and they then told me something totally different ‘behind 
the scenes’. Some villagers refused to be interviewed and others were hostile towards 
the questionnaire. What I realised pretty quickly was that if I stated that I was 
responsible for creating this questionnaire and interview, I would get a negative 
backlash from the interviewees (and I even cried in one interview after an ex-Party 
official verbally attacked me about the ‘stupidity’ of the questions). Less information 
would flow. However, if it was inferred that ‘London’ had sent me to fill out this pre-
designed questionnaire, I was then put into the ‘local subject’ position and would not be 
faulted for responsibility. So, now if I posed a ‘stupid’ question, informants would yell 
something out about London and professors while answering the questions respectfully 
to me, only the executor of a grander design that I could not control. While they 
protested to the questions, they consented to the interview because I was still considered 
a ‘local’ and they were helping me out due to a common desire to help a student from 
their village wanting to learn about their history.  
The body, not a standardised questionnaire, was a better way to get people talking 
(McDowell, 2009). It was this portable museum of memories that opened the door to 
the history of violence, work, and resistance. They began by discussing and showing me 
wartime gun-shot wounds that had never fully healed, scars from puncturing feet and 
legs on sharp military ruins left behind on postwar fields, swollen hands from years of 
work in the factories and fields, chemical poisoning from working in poor factory 
conditions, cut-off fingers in freak mechanical accidents, various species of funguses 
from standing in chemical water on the factory floor, varieties of cancers attributed to 
Chernobyl, botched surgeries that made life worse, alcoholism that was the result of 
corruption in the Polish People’s Army and forced rehabilitation programmes under 
socialism, and other life-long pains that were contracted during the Second World War, 
nation-building under Stalinism, unhealthy factory conditions under socialism, and 
capitalism. Wartime wounds were those from flight, postwar wounds were those of 
adjustment, socialist-era wounds were those of machine-like repetition of the same 
moves, late socialist wounds were those of shortages, and capitalist wounds were those 
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of anxiety (nerwica) from a sense of economic and social isolation. Body parts were 
documents of their physical presence in historical events42.  
These body narratives were co-implicated with the passage of time, or transition. 
Villagers often stated something along the lines of—‘the human worked and worked, 
but now, everything is ‘coming out’ (wychodzi)’—meaning, that the illnesses that were 
bottled up during the socialist period were now seeking revenge on the body, as if 
punishment for living in this post-socialist era. Tarkowska (2013) writes that this health 
transition was how people narrated a ‘social time’ or ‘joint expectations, mindset and 
symbolised phenomena of change and duration, of succession and simultaneity, 
common notions of the past, present and future’. Social time, especially through the 
body, helps balance both collective and individual experience. I like Skultan’s (1998) 
description, that narratives are constructed around ‘dialectic between the accidents of 
time and timeless truths’ (pg. 31). This helps explain the body as entering ‘social time’ 
because everyone uses their body to enter history, but the wounds themselves are 
different, signaling individual experience. This idea of illness ‘coming out’ (and history 
thawing along with it) may be attributed to the suppression of pain during the socialist 
period. Narrating history through the body exposes the former and present state’s 
biopower (Foucault 1978/1990). What these stories began to reveal is that biopower 
leaves actual physical scars that do not fade, long after the state apparatus that imposes 
it does. The body does not forget biopower, past and present, rather it domesticates it, 
merges it with personal experiences, and then critiques biopower itself. 
Their personal histories were unravelled in bodily pains, family events, encounters on 
the farm, and the way that families assembled networks of resource flows that evaded 
the state’s gaze. People knew the in-depth historical relations between other families in 
the village, their economic and political relations, etc. Zuzanna, for example, often 
spoke about how she saved several families’ lives that had arrived in 1946 from 
Siberian gulags and had nothing to eat in Dobra. A Ukrainian interviewee who was 
forcibly resettled in the Vistula Action from southeastern Poland by the state in 1946 
claimed that she introduced the best species of garlic to the villagers. When Kacper 
refused an interview and said that he did not ‘remember history’, Zuzanna went into a 
                                                
42 See Behar (1998), Skultans (1998), Petryna (2003) for more about body and memory. 
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flurry of spreading gossip about how much pain his family had caused the community 
but that he himself had no recollection of the problem. Although I had discussed the 
confidentiality of the interviews with Zuzanna, she could not help but spread that piece 
of gossip around and my relationship to her as her granddaughter, not manager, meant 
that she held higher authority. Her gossip about Kacper to her friends usually opened up 
some debate about the issue of ‘rehabilitated’ Communists who had ‘admitted’ their 
false consciousness and could live peacefully without accountability in the post-socialist 
period. The second time around, I went alone and Kacper was helpful. Agreeing to an 
interview with me became a public declaration of ‘I have nothing to hide’ among the 
villagers—itself an act that would be footnoted in villagers’ familial narratives.  
Each informant received a box of chocolates at the end of the interview. The decision to 
give chocolates came from Zuzanna. She said that one box should be enough and that it 
should be given after, not before the interview. The usual response was a rejection of 
the present and then once I insisted, they accepted. Timing mattered. In some interviews 
especially with ex-officials or other members of the nomenklatura, I must admit, I gave 
the chocolates first so that they could then feel indebted to open up. If I detected in the 
‘network’ introductions that the person would not be talkative or was reluctant, I took 
out the chocolates. In a way, I was acting on their old socialist-era practices. But then I 
stated something like that it would be nice to have the chocolates during the interview, 
so it was treated as a form of sharing their hospitality. Over time I realised that people 
were more open to the interviews and it is possible that they were enticed by the 
chocolates at the end. While available at the local supermarket, the chocolates were a bit 
more expensive than what many of these people could probably afford, so it made 
logical sense to spend some time being interviewed and then have a nice box of 
chocolates at the end. In actuality, giving chocolates instead of money reinforced the 
resource flows going on in the village at the time. 
After several weeks of interviewing, I mustered up the courage to canvas people door-
to-door for interviews without Zuzanna’s help (she suffered from a bad knee and lupus). 
I knocked on one door and explained in plain Polish my reason for being there but the 
man at the door just gave me a blank look. It was not until a woman’s voice from inside 
of the house yelled at him ‘Let her in! It is Cecylia’s daughter!’ and then I was granted 
immediate entry with coffee and cake. It was amazing how antagonistic people were to 
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any outsider and conversely how warm they were to any insider. Only in one village 
populated with Belarusian peasant farmers was I able to cold-knock on people’s doors 
and get a warm reception. Even there, the intoxicated men on the side of the road 
explained to me that the small supermarket stood on a desecrated synagogue and were 
helpful in taking me to some of the original settlers without seeming to want anything in 
return for their service. 
I conducted over 60 interviews with the original settlers. Poles made up 41% of my 
interview sample—the other 59% were Ukrainian (27%), Kashubian (12%), Belarusian 
(10%), German (8%), and Lithuanian (2%). My sample population is ethnically diverse 
because the Polish state forcibly expelled the German population, Polonised the 
Kashubian ethnic group in the region, forcibly resettled Ukrainian populations from 
southeastern Poland, repatriated Belarusians from eastern Poland’s old eastern border, 
and allowed for the voluntary migration of ethnic Poles from central Poland into the 
territories. Often their children joined the interview to add background information, thus 
the interview data includes many more voices than just those on the ‘official’ informed 
consent forms (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9 Interviewees 
 107 
3.7. Fidelis 
The villagers told me that they knew nothing about ‘history’ (historia) and its 
‘structures’ (struktury). They directed me to Fidelis, a brilliant 90-year-old Kashubian. 
He lived with his wife down the street from Zuzanna in a small house with an unusually 
clean yard. He was certainly one of the most intelligent people I have ever met in my 
entire life. He spoke Esperanto, Polish, German, Kashubian, and Russian—and I 
believed it when he boasted about it. However, there were several other facts about him 
that made me uneasy. He mentioned that after the Second World War, the Communists 
in Poland had seen him as an ‘uncertain person’ (nie pewny człowiek) after they had 
seized ‘his documents from the Gestapo’ (moje dokumenty z Gestapo)—he then 
described to me in an abnormally light and diminutive voice that it had once been ‘the 
German security service’. Did he mean that the Gestapo had kept documents on him 
that the Communists seized, or did Communists get the documents stating that he was 
in the Gestapo? Nevertheless, the Communists stripped him of his rifle and threw him 
into jail. When I began to ask him ‘why’, he cut me off, said it was irrelevant, and 
changed the subject.  
Nevertheless, Fidelis became my mentor who explained to me the broader structural 
politics in the village, in the factories, bureaucracies, state forestry divisions, state 
farms, etc. After he got out of prison, he became a state forestry worker, then a Party 
official and state forestry official in the village, and then worked in the local gmina 
office. He became the nomenklatura! He provided a perspective of Polonisation and 
Sovietisation from an insider-outsider, ‘Kashubian’ perspective. He was the first to 
isolate the term ‘kombinacja’ with a capital ‘K’, something that I myself had been blind 
to identify on my own43. Fidelis’s greatest contribution to understanding kombinacja 
was that it was a process that ‘outsiders’ could understand and appropriate for their own 
use. Through his narratives, he helped me locate the contexts in which the balance of 
power between the villagers and the nomenklatura was waged during the various 
transitions in and out of socialism. Zuzanna helped me fill in the ‘peasant’ side of 
                                                
43 After Fidelis explained the concept to me, I still continued conducting interviews 
around the original questions. It was only after I returned to London and discussed my 
general findings with Professors Gareth A. Jones and Sharad Chari that I began to focus 
on kombinacja. 
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kombinacja as well to ‘show’ me how kombinacja worked. Thus, their joint ‘insider’ 
and ‘outsider’ narratives about kombinacja are at the core of this thesis. 
My newfound knowledge of kombinacja connected me to the field of discourse about 
the state shared by the villagers. Once I became aware of it, I realised how often the 
interviewees were using the term to explain their property relations with other families 
in the village, state farm, or forestry. Or, when I asked informants to explain 
kombinacja to me, their eyes and smiles widened and they would say something along 
the lines of ‘Ah! Kombinacja!’ and went straight into their myriad of personal 
experiences and state encounters. These stories simultaneously transmitted ‘know-how’ 
about the contexts in which kombinacja could be used and villagers’ narration of their 
local history produced within and by this ‘shadow world’ (Watson, 1994, pg. 4). 
Villagers explained kombinacja through contexts and vignettes drawn from personal 
experiences rather than via a standard definition. It appeared to be a counter-narrative 
device that marked ‘private time’ (Verdery, 1996, pg. 40)—outside of the linear 
progression of the state-produced ‘official’ history. Yet, it was tied to the official 
history. For example, in cases where informants entered history through their body, they 
used their body as a field to describe hunger, needs, wants, which then justified their 
kombinacja. Villagers used the term kombinacja to tell their story of the state through a 
series of struggles over scarce resources between village families. Kombinacja itself 
was multi sited and practiced by everyone in the village; peasants, workers, and 
nomenklatura alike towards multiple ends. 
During their discussions of kombinacja, several elderly men had independently referred 
to the Czech literary character Švejk, from anarchist novelist Jaroslav Hašek’s The 
Good Soldier Švejk (1923), a satirical novel about the educated Everyman during the 
First World War who travels as a local Czech soldier of the Austrian army from (Czech) 
Bohemia to (Polish) Galicia (both in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the time) to reach 
the battle front with the Russian Empire across the Bug River. However, while in 
uniform, his cunning wordplay (or ‘double-talk’), drinking, ability to act like a fool, and 
general resourcefulness enable him, in some way or another, to get away from the 
battlefields where he would have to ‘fight on the wrong side’. One of Švejk’s 
characteristics—which mirrored Zuzanna’s interview tactics—was agreeing with 
everything that the other individual said (Parrott, 1973 pg. xv). His trick was irony, and 
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being able to proclaim to do one thing, when that action subverts the objective. Švejk 
was the Everyman, ‘who gets caught up in the wheels of a big bureaucratic machine’ 
(pg. xv). He was the ‘Ostap Bender’ of Central European literature, in that while 
Ostap’s actions were against the Soviet command economy and ideology, Švejk was the 
kombinator who emphasised the small man’s resistance against the organised forces of 
bureaucracy, foreign occupation, war, and the church. That Švejk travelled across the 
Austria-Hungarian empire and had contact with many nations, like Poles, under that 
occupation, meant his story connected with the nationalist visions that still evidently 
had an effect in serving as the template for the everyday man in the postwar period, to 
the point that he came up during our discussions of kombinacja.  
When I consolidated the interviews together, I noticed a collective pattern which 
showed how kombinacja was ‘etatised’ (Verdery, 1996, pg. 40) into some eras while 
not others. Most villagers did not recall using kombinacja in the interwar period (1919-
1939) because there was supposedly no need or scarcity. Most said that kombinacja 
emerged as a survival strategy under Nazi occupation in 1939-1944. However, when I 
looked at their postwar recollections from 1945-1949 when there was undoubtedly 
scarcity and a need to acquire food and resources for survival, traces of kombinacja as a 
narrative device were difficult to find. Villagers only began to use the term again 
starting with the Stalinist period (1949-1953)—when, coincidentally the term appeared 
in the state archives. This fragmented historical narrative of kombinacja weaving into 
‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ appeared to be too symmetrical. Skultans (1998) writes 
that memories of Soviet Latvia were often ‘conflicted with official versions of history’ 
(pg. 28). It therefore became far from straightforward to position kombinacja 
comfortably at the centre of the research, simply attributing an activity as kombinacja 
when the villagers had not narrated it as such. Tarkowska (2013) writes that ‘social 
time’ can have ‘empty periods’ (pg. 291), can ‘stop’ and ‘speed up’, and ‘does not flow 
in one direction, but is reversible’, can be ‘cyclical, like a pendulum’ rather than ‘linear’ 
(pg. 291). I began to wonder whether kombinacja represented ‘memories of the state or 
memories of the people?’ (Davis, 2005, pg. 227).  
Villagers painted a complex portrait of kombinacja. It was a concept that occupied a 
multiplicity of spaces (Massey, 2005) and resided in social, cultural and economic fields 
(Bourdieu, 1990). It could be told from a bodily, archival, or a literary standpoint. Every 
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kombinacja story demonstrated how property was contextual and defined through 
relational encounters between agents who struggled on some field or another over 
certain resources. It was understood by outsiders, exercised by peasants and 
nomenklatura alike, and was straddled between state, body, and literary narratives. 
Reading through the kombinacja narratives paved a multi-sited skeletal framework for 
this thesis where I have spent years filling in and reconstructing the histories, people, 
and places in which it dwelled and created alternative ways of living life. This thesis 
outlines the types of possibilities kombinacja provided in different points in time to 
different types of people. The more I learned about it, the more I too began to 
‘remember’ kombinacja in my own life and began to dissect my own fieldwork 
experience through its kaleidoscopic vision. 
3.8. Methods  
I did not ‘finish’ fieldwork. Rather, I fled the field. When I returned from fieldwork in 
December 2009, I spent the next year translating and transcribing the interviews into a 
500 page, single-spaced document. Although this was back-breaking work which I will 
never do again for as long as I live, I did not let anyone else touch the recordings 
because I suspected that there would be certain words (like kombinacja) that would be 
translated into English rather than kept intact. I would be the only person who would 
know which words to identify. Furthermore, I needed to ‘know’ the village history. My 
mother helped me to untangle the old Polish and Slavic dialects in the commune, which 
was a language lesson in itself. I asked many follow-up questions to Zuzanna, mother, 
uncle Ludwik, and my brother Franciszek to check up on whether I was getting a good 
sense of what life was like under socialism from multiple generations. Analysis, 
therefore, was a family effort.  
In October 2010, I took a short, one-week trip with my mother back to the village to 
conduct some follow-up interviews with Zuzanna, Fidelis, and Kacper in order to verify 
some thematic holes about kombinacja. I have spent years just trying to figure out 
‘what’ kombinacja is, how it acts, and how to explain it to a broader academic audience. 
The most enjoyable part was breaking the language codes. Once I was aware of 
kombinacja I could engage in a certain hidden transcript or dialogue with the 
interviewees and perceive the world through their eyes. After a while, mother and I 
began sharing a similar language and an understanding of village life. I knew the locals, 
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their stories, and the gossip, which created a cultural field of discussion with my mother 
in Trenton. 
I organised the narratives through code words like kombinacja, kołchoz, szarwark, and 
daniny in order to bring together those narratives and form a cohesive whole along with 
background information. Most villagers’ narratives were hazy and did not include 
important dates such as when the collective farm opened up, when the property was 
decollectivised, how workplaces were structured, etc. Thus, along with the translations, 
I had to read a lot of the local historical literature that I gathered in the library in Dobra, 
the Akademia Pomorska (Pomeranian Academy) in Słupsk, and generate my own 
translations of German literature that I had acquired from the native German women. 
Unfortunately, much of the Polish literature on the territories had been plagiarised. 
Masters’ theses from the academy had entire passages cut and pasted into others’ work. 
Many lacked proper citation. Furthermore, they were ‘fact-driven’ and provided no 
critical or analytical information about the territory’s transformations. In fact, I was able 
to link much of that history to the state censored literature that I had read about the 
territories. The language was emotionless, and stiff, as if reciting orders, rather than 
thinking critically about the processes in the territories. Other passages possessed an 
optimistic tone concerning the history that read like residual propaganda still taught in 
the classroom by socialist-era-educated teachers.  
While I found some dates useful, I conducted a lot of background information for each 
historical period that included an exhaustive excavation of Polish law (Dziennik Ustaw) 
and the national legal journal (Monitor Polski) from the 1930s to 1989. Following this, I 
overlapped the laws with the archives as well as any other relevant historical literature 
to get a scalar sense of what the national-level processes were at a given time and how 
the local state deviated from them. The archival material is picked up in Chapters 4 and 
5 while the laws and other literature is usedin the latter part of the thesis.  
The physical composition of Dobra's archives revealed a lot about regime change in the 
postwar period and the state’s ambivalence in preserving its legibility. The socialist-era 
cover of each booklet was written out by hand, which described the name, type, and 
date of the archives inside. At the bottom left of each cover was a stamp that gave the 
name of the national archive branch, the title of the archive, page number, and number. 
Inside, the archives were disheveled. Archives from 1947 were stuffed into the 1946 
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folders and there were many loose, hand-written notes (‘exceptions to the rule’ perhaps) 
that were haphazardly inserted into the booklet. For example, in an archive from 1945 
to 1950, we find that there was an archival fire in 1955. Citation would later become 
quite confusing, especially when referencing events that did not ‘fit’ into the date or 
name of the title of the archive. I found no pattern of legible order in the archives. 
Inside the physical Dobra archives, those between 1944 and 1946 displayed a 
fascinating historical capsule of regime change in the village. When the Communist 
powers took over, they still used Nazi administrative paper that had been produced in 
the German paper factory in Dobra. On the Third Reich page, one would see German 
language printed in a gothic font, official swastika stamps, and ‘Heil Hitler’ signatures 
referring to one farmer’s transfer of property. Official correspondence had dates, 
identification numbers, graphics, neatly-printed underlines, etc. On the People’s 
Republic of Poland page, there were cryptic, faded type-written paragraphs written in 
Polish by Władysław Gomułka, the Minister of the Recovered Territories, about the 
historical meaning of the socialist revolution and the state’s role in reopening hospitals 
and taking care of the postwar survivors. There were no dates, stamps, or numbers, just 
the distanced ‘voice’ of an official spewing general propaganda to the citizens. There 
were many such archives, revealing the hybrid period when one modern state apparatus 
took over the formal functions of another modern state apparatus; even using its old 
paper documents. Although the Communists were bringing a socialist revolution, they 
still needed the same materials like any other modern state—a headquarters, paper, 
typewriters—to pronounce their grasp of power. I wondered whether the German 
archives were retained as a template for the new Communist state officials.  
The archives of individual edicts, handwritten and typed by commune and country-level 
officials from the mid-1940s, tell bits and pieces of a turbulent period in which the new 
state struggled with out-breaks of tuberculosis, measles, diphtheria, typhoid fever, 
scarlet fever, massacred 137 dogs infected with rabies, settled newcomers, conducted 
property surveys, rounded up German livestock and put it under the ownership of the 
Red Army, redistributed German livestock which caused struggles between the new 
settlers and the state, struggled with famine and shortages of clothing during the winter, 
had struggles with armed bands of Germans in villages, had to find common ground 
between the settlers and their distrust of the Red Army, dealt with coal shortages, 
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received letters written by settlers begging for help, resettled random people such as 
Italians, arrested Germans, carried out land reforms, dealt with crop failure, and so 
forth. It is in these archives that I discovered the use of forced corvée labour on people, 
and record of peasants standing up in gmina meetings and voicing their argument 
against the state. The budgets were empty or filled with rounded-up numbers without 
much explanation for how expenses were calculated. Dispersed among these local 
happenings were copies of laws and propaganda from higher echelons of the state. All 
of these local, regional, and national documents helped create the ‘voice’ of the state.  
By the late 1940s, many familiar names began to appear in the archives (including my 
grandfather’s name). The bulk of the archives took the form of the commune meeting 
which was dated, laid out the plan for discussion ahead of time, included the discussion 
comments, and provided a plan looking forward to solve the problems mentioned 
within. Participants were commune officials and authorities from other places in the 
commune which did not share budgetary and plan goals with the commune (e.g. state 
farms). Yet, the authorities all discussed the plan shortages within the entire territory of 
the commune (not just its budgetary boundaries) and planned across those budgetary 
boundaries in order to meet the plan as a territorial entity. In the 1950s, we begin to see 
another addition to the commune meeting. An open floor emerges at the end of the 
meeting for anyone who wants to speak about the conditions in the commune. These 
were platforms for peasants to vocalise their opinions—and usually to be shunned by 
the officials—but nevertheless preserved their voices and the dynamic between the 
officials and village peasants. In the early 1950s, many peasants came to beg the 
officials to relieve them of their forced state agricultural quotas because their children 
were dying of starvation. Indeed, in Dobra’s cemetery, there were many newborns that 
died in the early 1950s.  
Some of my interviewees in 2009 were the officials from that time who actually wrote 
the archives. I could detect the linguistic similarities between their colloquial and 
written language. Their role in the archives, and locals’ stories about these characters, 
helped shape the narrative frameworks of Chapters 4 and 5. It helped visualise the idea 
that the people in the village ‘were’ the local state and moulded it to their own ‘voices’. 
Many colloquialisms and processes like ‘kombinacja’ and ‘szarwark’ (corvée) and 
‘daniny’ (tithes) appeared in the gmina archives that did not appear in the national laws 
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or other official edicts. Then progressively, they were substituted with the ‘official’ 
state term for those processes that linked them to the rule of law. Linking these 
processes to national laws was in itself a process of readjusting the state narrative 
(which itself seems to be multiple on various scales of governance) as well as of 
investigating how ‘official’ terms for forced labour and taxes were euphemisms for the 
more oppressive and exploitative ‘tinge’ of using the colloquial terms for those 
processes.  
Reading through the archives and reconstructing a historical narrative of the commune 
took months, partly because growing up I had not learned to read and write formal 
Polish. I only finished a month of first grade in Poland and the rest of my language 
skills were colloquially learned in the household. I had to learn how to read Polish. I 
asked my mother to help me decipher many of the archives—especially ones that were 
written in cursive, not typed, and ones in which I just did not understand the colloquial 
terms like szarwark and daniny. She helped to explain those terms. In the process of 
reading archives, I learned the very structure of how the commune functioned, who the 
main players were, and how they tackled economic and political problems. I learned a 
side of history that I had never learned in an American classroom. Lastly, I overlapped 
the ‘official’ with the ‘narrative’ histories to get a full sense of the economic and 
political arenas in which villagers used kombinacja in various workplaces. This is 
where, essentially, the narrative of informality lurks: when we know the ‘official’ voice 
of the state on multiple scales we can then identify how kombinacja manipulates those 
blind-spots of surveillances in order to extract the resources from under the state’s nose. 
The interviews, matched with the archives, produced an uneven amount of information 
about the postwar period than in the late socialist and post-socialist periods. 
3.9. Conclusion: reflections 
This ethnography has been through many internal reconceptualisations. There was no 
‘lightbulb’ moment per se that helped me to arrive at the topic and my newfound 
research questions. Rather, a confluence of events, terms, and contexts pronounced 
themselves in the data. In order to find out the broader trajectory of meaning and 
practice of kombinacja, here I investigated how my initial research protocol was 
transformed through a process of informalisation as my Western expectations towards 
transparency, ‘location’ of historical information, and access to it differed from the lack 
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of transparency and need for social networking to access information. As I became 
more entrenched in local networks through the process of fieldwork, a different ‘voice’ 
of positionality and subjectivity began to emerge in my own historical narrative of 
kombinacja. While this voice developed further in the course of my write-up, I wanted 
to share it first because it explains the identity struggles involved with writing about 
kombinacja as an ethnographer versus as a ‘subject’. My experience with this 
dissertation is a testament to the powerful forces of informality, social networks, and 
subjectivity that dictate the social reproduction of the domestic in post-socialist Poland. 
Still, I would have planned fieldwork in a totally different way. I would have created a 
research protocol that asked for life-histories of the interviewees rather than abiding by 
the questionnaire; read more about how to conduct ethnographic fieldwork rather than 
relying on my instincts; taken some Polish classes to brush-up on my language skills so 
that I could relay my research in the native language of the locals; relied less on my 
family contacts and would have established more English-speaking academic 
relationships with scholars in Berlin and other major Polish cities rather than just from 
Warsaw and Słupsk; would not have gone to Warsaw but to one of the major cities like 
Wrocław or Stettin in the territories; taken ethics standards more seriously given that 
there were ethical issues that I came across; gathered more resources on the history of 
socialism in Poland rather than just on the territories. During fieldwork, I shot over 
5,000 photographs. I did not realise until I had the photographs in hand, how much of 
the present I had been missing. Kombinacja—the process I studied—had been all 
around me. 
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Chapter 4  
Domesticating the state: 1944-1949 
4.1. A ‘quasi-government’ 
In his portrayal of how German Breslau became Polish Wrocław from 1944 to 1949, 
Kenney (1997) writes that the postwar period in the territories was one of ‘negotiation’ 
between the settlers and those who represented the state. The identity of the ‘authorities’ 
was unclear; compliance ‘was not automatic’; and ‘control was incomplete’. The 
‘state’s search for legitimacy and control’ was continuously subverted through ‘social 
resistance, pressure, and accommodation’ (pgs. 29, 344). Villagers who had arrived in 
Dobra after 1944 recalled that the state was negotiated. Janusz, a gmina44 official, 
defined it as a ‘quasi-government’ (pół-rząd) structured by family interests. Irena, a 
Polish seamstress, echoed the view that the state was ‘like one family’. So too Anna—a 
Ukrainian repatriate who was forcibly resettled in 1947—who defined it as a ‘couple of 
families’. State resources were scooped up in a winner-takes-all game. ‘It was a 
government, but it was nothing. Whoever won, lost’, said Weronika, a Polish repatriate 
from East Prussia. Settlers struggled with state power to recreate the territories in their 
own image. 
This chapter shows how the process of ‘domesticating’ was critical to securing state 
power. It reveals how the Polish state secured German territory through Soviet-backed 
military power, propaganda, and agrarian reform, and how the settlers further 
domesticated that space for their own private needs. An emergent nomenklatura45 
domesticated capital, labour, and use of state power for private gain to help the state 
secure political and economic power on the frontier but at a cost to its legitimacy as a 
state apparatus. Both the state and settlers secured cheap German labour for agricultural 
production and how the state later secured peasants’ and workers’ labour towards gmina 
and domestic goals. It was this bifurcated, family-based division of state power that 
                                                
44 Gmina and commune are used interchangeably.  
45 A ruling class of administrators in bureaucratic, managerial, and party positions who 
exercised economic and political power over the working and peasant classes 
(Voslensky, 1984, pgs. 70-74).  
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formed the family and class-based ‘us’/ ‘them’ binary between villagers that later 
defined the ‘masters’ and ‘workers’ groups who subsequently used kombinacja against 
one another. Weber’s (1946/1958) definition of the state as a ‘relation of men 
dominating men’ (pg. 78) accurately describes this early socialist state-making and 
Polish nation-building projects in the Recovered Territories. 
The state-making process in Dobra from 1944 to 1949 encourages us to look beyond 
classical definitions of the state or the image of peasants, workers, and nomenklatura 
located neatly within their own niches and economic functions in a Soviet society. 
Residual institutions of serfdom were co-opted by the state and exploited by the new 
authorities in the state-making projects. The entitled nomenklatura ‘pulled’ themselves 
into state positions, gmina officials granted themselves landed estates and secured cheap 
German labour on them, forestry division directors treated workers as their own 
domestic labourers. In doing so, the state was defined not by the rule of law from 
Warsaw, but in the networks that formed between families in Dobra. Party officials did 
not always carry out state policy and peasants who resisted state law were not always 
acting against the spirit of the socialist revolution.  
4.2.  ‘Recovering’ territories in the Polish imagination 
On its eastward march toward Berlin in March 1945, the Red Army equipped the 
Soviet-backed Polish state with the military presence to Polonise and Sovietise the 
German territory east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers (Figure 10). The Polish Committee 
of National Liberation (PKWN) divided the territories into four administrative regions 
and populated each with appointed ministers of reconstruction, agriculture, finance, and 
economic aid; the Polish Worker’s Party (PPR) set up political cells and rural offices; 
and the Red Army transformed German estates into Soviet state farms (sovkhozy) and 
jumpstarted agricultural production. These lands, ceded to Poland as a ‘prize of war’ by 
the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, became known as its ‘Recovered Territories’ 
(Dulczewski & Kwilecki, 1963, pg. 7; Davies, 1982, pg. 562; Pagel, 1989, pgs. 800-
811).  
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Figure 10 The Red Army in western Poland, 1945 (Applebaum, 2013, pg. 125). 
 
Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister of the London-based, Polish Government-in-
Exile, rejected the cession on the grounds that a third of Poland’s eastern territories, 
including cities like Lwów and Vilno, would be ceded to Soviet Russia (Mikołajczyk, 
1972, pg. 41). The Federal Republic of Germany disputed the Soviet land grab—‘the 
Potsdam solution is not a German, not a Polish, not even a Russian solution; it is a 
Bolshevik solution. What we need is a European solution’, one politician claimed (Szaz, 
1960, pg. xiii). Dobrzyski (1947), a state censored scholar, wrote that the territories 
were the ‘ideological battle ground between eastern socialism and western capitalistic 
Europe’ and a ‘political test of the sturdiness and the resilience of leftist politics against 
those of the West’ (pg. 190). Whether the transfer of the territories was legal under 
international law, and how international law ought to be interpreted in the first place, 
continued to be the subject of debate between the Soviet bloc and the West for the 
duration of the Cold War. 
As the Iron Curtain descended upon Poland, the PPR worked steadfastly with the Soviet 
military to swap the German population for a Polish one in what became one of the 
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‘greatest demographic upheavals in European History’ (Davies, 1982, pg. 563). State-
censored literature referred to this as a physical and historical ‘cleansing’ 
(podporządkowanie) of the territories for the Polish state (e.g. Pollak, 1946). The PPR 
advertised itself as the only candidate with the resources and organisational capacity 
necessary to carry out such a massive resettlement campaign. It sent settler crews to 
occupy German villages, cities, and landed estates, to scout terrain, to measure war 
damage, establish resettlement arrangements, organise local administrative units, and to 
fill militia, medical and transportation posts for population control. The Polish 
Repatriation Bureau (PUR) 46  organised free transport, food distribution, shelters, 
pharmacies, medical care, and train tickets. The Polish Western Committee (PZZ) 47 
took care of educating settlers and government helpers on the ‘political, societal and 
economic meaning of the resettlement’. By November 1945, the Ministry of Recovered 
Territories (MZO)48, headed by Władysław Gomułka—First Secretary of the PPR, 
officially centralised the administrative, technical, and political apparatus in the new 
territories (Dulczewski & Kwilecki, 1963, pgs. 6-9). 
The territories were the PPR’s opportunity to create ‘state-sponsored historical memory’ 
or a ‘collective understanding that a specific group shares about events in the past’ 
(Davis, 2005, pg. 4). Propaganda advertised the myth that the territories were where the 
birth of Polish nationalism had occurred in the 10th century and thus had to be 
‘recovered’ from centuries of German colonisation. One state scholar, Kolpiński (1959), 
wrote that ‘This territory was the cradle of the Polish State and here, one thousand years 
ago, a consciousness of Polish nationality was born’ (pg. 211). ‘Recovery’ meant 
restoring repolonisation in the ‘rightful’ geographic location. Barcikowski (1946), 
another state scholar, wrote that ‘we are not here to colonise but to return to the 
fatherland based in historical traditions’ (pg. 7). Anthropologists worked with Slavic 
archeologists on sites in the territories; linguists related the Polish roots of German 
village names; historians claimed that ‘recovering’ simply formalised the Poles’ 
westward migratory patterns and high reproductive rates of the Polish ‘rural proletariat’ 
that had ‘strengthened the ranks of the Polish autochthonous population in the German 
eastern provinces’ since the 19th century; political writers critiqued ‘mistakes’ in pre-
                                                
46  Państwowy Urząd Repatriatyjny. 
47  Polski Związek Zachodni. 
48  Ministerswto Ziem Odzyskanych. 
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war, capitalist, Polish policies that focused on eastern colonisation rather than 
embracing this westward expansion (Barcikowski, 1946; Chojanski, 1946; Kiełczewska 
& Grodek, 1946; Ziółkowski, 1959).  
 
Figure 11 Nazi administrative paper recycled by the new Polish state found in gmina 
archives. (Nr. 5, 1945/1946, pgs. 20-21). 
 
The war ravaged nation needed an imaginary paradise and the German lands filled with 
riches satiated that vision. Propaganda posters depicted quaint German homes (see 
Figure 12) and PPR-censored memoirs advertised them as a western escape, the land of 
beautiful landscapes, a ‘new world of objects and phenomena’ to be studied for the 
purposes of education, understanding new problems, and new possibilities. The physical 
openness of the territories, with greater access to the Baltic Sea, would inspire a 
generation of Polish artists. The PPR invited Poles to become citizen ‘pioneers’ 
(pionierzy)—an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983)—that would populate the 
German lands and return Poland’s cities, churches, and castles back to the mother 
country (Dylik, 1946, pg. 248). The PPR created a Soviet state-making project in which 
migration to the annexed German territories would become an act of reclaiming the 
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lands of Polish consciousness through the specific action of colonising its natural and 
man-made beauty, without it being actually called colonialism.  
 
Figure 12 ‘To the Oder river border for our fathers’ 
land and prosperity’. Pioneer steps from ravaged 
homestead onto German property (Oracz, 1946). 
 
When settlers arrived to the territories, they were overwhelmed with the widespread 
devastation: 54% of the cities were destroyed; 78% (3.8 million acres) of agricultural 
lands lay fallow; 73% of equipment and machinery has been looted; 27% (123,800) of 
farms were damaged (Kruszewski, 1972, pgs. 115-123). War trenches and artillery 
littered the fields, livestock and animals were missing, homes were looted, and 
buildings were bombed. In order to differentiate the myth of the territories from the 
reality, settlers renamed them the ‘Wild West’ (Dziki Zachód). German colonists had 
once referred to lands east of the Elbe River—Pomerania and Prussia—as the German 
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‘Wilderness’ (Carsten, 1947, pg. 155). Evidently, German influences were still strong in 
the territories after the war. 
The territories were far from an ethnic Polish paradise. The actual migration and 
settlement policy was to ‘Polonise the west and pacify the east’ (Zielinski, 2009, pg. 
194). German and East Prussian expulsion suffered delays and the Kashubians, an 
ethnic group native to the region, were repatriated as ‘Poles’ (Ahonen & Stark, 2008). 
The PUR repatriated politically active Ukrainians from the southeastern border; 
Belarusians who rejected Soviet collectivisation in the east (Brown, 2004); Jewish 
Holocaust survivors; Siberian gulag survivors; and Roma, Czechs, and political 
refugees from the Greek civil war of 1944-48 (Gatrell, 2011; Kruszewski, 1972). 
Different nationalities were settled into the same villages; neighbours spoke different 
languages on the street and practiced different religions. Thus, the irony of this state-
making project was that its goal was to reclaim Polish consciousness but it would be a 
multitude of nationalities reclaiming it. In the process, they would become not a Polish, 
but a Soviet, society. 
4.3.  Germans, the first proletarians? 
The influx of skilled Polish labour was slow in the territories. Many Polish arrivals who 
saw the poor living conditions without water, electricity, gas, or public transportation, 
returned home (Thum, 2011, pg. 83). Faced with labour shortages in newly nationalised 
state farms and factories, local governments delayed the German expulsion (Figure 13) 
as a strategy to secure a cheap labour pool. Thus, German labour became for the 
communes what Humphrey (2002) would call ‘manipulable resources’—labour or 
goods that were the surplus product beyond the amount supplied to the state under the 
planned order (pg. 11). In the first months after the war, Germans were forced to give 
reparations in the form of forced labour. In late 1945, expulsion was delayed across the 
territories so that the Soviet-run state farms (sovkhozy) could use German labour to 
complete the spring sowing in 1946 (Korbonski, 1965, pg. 83). Germans became the 
‘first wave’ of workers who worked for this new state.  
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Figure 13 German expulsion, 1945 (Kirschbaum, 2006). 
 
When Władysław Gomułka—Minister of the Recovered Territories—was asked in 
March 1946 how the effort to ‘cleanse the Recovered Territories of German elements’ 
was proceeding he responded, ‘We evacuate the “nonproductive elements” first. In the 
late phase, it is the German workers in our employ who go. There is also a possibility of 
retaining a small number of qualified specialists whom we cannot replace’49. The state 
formalised this classification system of German labourers and offered them pay, legal 
status, and protection. White ‘category 1’ were low-skilled German workers who would 
be quickly replaced with Polish workers; Blue ‘category 2’ were German workers who 
had to train Polish workers first in order to qualify for expulsion; Red ‘category 3’ 
workers were specialists whose expulsion would have to be permitted by the authorities. 
While the first two categories were granted personal security and the right to retain their 
residences, private property, and good working conditions, the last category became ‘an 
odd kind of forced labourer’ who ‘lacked freedom of movement but enjoyed relatively 
                                                
49 ‘Nonproductive’ workers were the elderly, children, and disabled (Thum, 2011, pg. 
84). 
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good pay and treatment’ (Thum, 2011, pgs. 84-85). The state retained an estimated 
65,000 German specialists in the (re)construction of the territories and state economy 
(Kruszewski, 1972, pg. 67).  
Delaying or manipulating the German expulsion in order to secure a cheap labour pool 
for the state-making process was practiced by Soviet, regional, and gmina authorities. 
The use of this method to cut production costs, grow gmina budgets, and secure capital 
and labour for one’s farm shows how market socialism—defined as the process through 
which the market becomes the ‘basic coordinator of the socialist economy’ (Kornai, 
1992, pg. 474)—already expressed itself at the onset of the state-making process in the 
territories. If authorities distorted the socialist economy or message of proletarianism 
and Polonisation, then it sent the message that the state-making process was a free-for-
all enterprise based on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
Krystyna, one of the handful of German women who still live in Dobra, told me about 
her family’s experience during this transition period. She was born into a German 
peasant family who lived, owned property, and worked on a German Junker Estate right 
next to Dobra (then ‘Rathsdamnitz’). When the war ended, Ukrainians—who had been 
caught by the Nazis and enslaved as forced labourers on the estate—rose up against the 
estate owner and awaited the arrival of the Red Army. When the Soviets arrived, they 
murdered the owner and transformed the estate into a state farm (sovkhoz). Instead of 
expelling her family, the Soviets used her father’s specialist role as a tractor operator to 
work on state farms while she was transferred to a bakery in Dobra. 
K: Then, you had to work. So then, we all received this cup of soup for 
dinner and a piece of bread. Everyday we had to. We only worked and 
those who did not work, got nothing. 
Self: So it was forced labour? 
K: It was forced, yes. But I am not saying anything because father had it 
good. He was a tractor operator and he knew how to do everything, 
whatever it was. So once, when we were on the fields, we look and the 
Russians are coming after my father. Everyone says, “Look, they are 
taking your father now. They will kill him”! But they took him to 
Lipowo (state farm) because there was no tractor operator there and they 
gave him a horse so that he could go everyday on the horse to Lipowo to 
work and there were Russian women there. One Christmas Eve, the 
Russian woman came and brought my father such a huge circle of butter 
and there were pirogues which we had never seen. Inside the pirogues 
was cheese. I say that when father was with us the entire time, we had it 
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good. Then in 1948, that one Russian said that I have to go to the barn to 
milk the cows. I say “I don’t know how to milk the cow” and he says, 
“How do you not know how to milk a cow? Your sisters are younger and 
know” and I said that “I did not know how to”. So he gave me a note and 
said “Go to Dobra to the Russian bakery and give them this” and so I 
went. We had to bake bread for all of the estates all night. We transported 
it in the morning. And so I say, I had it very good—this was until the 
Russians moved out of here (in 1949). 
 
State farms produced for the Soviet Union, so cheap German labour decreased 
production costs. Germans received 75% of the standard food ration and their wages 
were often deducted to support gmina reconstruction funds (Thum, 2011, pgs. 85-86). 
Between 1945 and 1946, gmina archives reveal that German families ‘donated’ 149,949 
złoty to its budget. In 1947, they paid an additional 50 złoty per household50. Hiring 
Polish workers—who were entitled to a special bonus for coming to work in the 
territories—became secondary (Ibid. 86). Jan and Elżbieta, a Kashubian couple who in 
1946 sought employment on the state farm where Krystyna’s father worked, said that 
the settlement of Polish workers did not begin until after the Soviets transferred the 
farm over to Polish administration in 1949. Even then, the German specialists were 
allowed to relocate to a smaller state farm nearby and set up their own colony equipped 
with a German school-house that lasted into the 1950s (Pagel, 1989, pg. 660). The 
gmina and the Soviets cared less about giving Poles entry into the socialist revolution 
and more about cheap German labour.  
Some gmina officials took this a step further by blurring ‘state’ and ‘private’ work. 
When Janusz—a founding Party official who organised Dobra’s resettlement process—
arrived to Dobra in 1944, he acquired a 40-hectare German farm that rested between the 
village and a (new) state farm. As a Party official and a proprietor (Gospodarz), he 
employed both the German owners and other Germans on ‘his’ new farm. When I 
interviewed Janusz in his house located along Reunification Street, his daughter 
Danusia had to repeat some of the questions because he had lost his hearing at the age 
of 94 (he passed away in 2012):  
J: I lived with Germans. 
D: And you ate together. 
                                                
50 Archives: Nr. 5, 1945/1946, pg. 20 and Nr. 1, 1947, pgs. 11, 29. 
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J: And why not!? They (Poles and Germans) ate together.  
D: Together they ate, together they worked. They (Germans) helped 
(pomagali) you out too. 
J: They worked for me—the Gospodarz—all the Germans.  
D: They worked for money or for food or a bit of both? 
J: There was no money, only food. We had cereals (zboże). The Russians 
gave us cereals. There were entire fields filled with potatoes. In mounds, 
we took the potatoes. There were potatoes and later, we planted potatoes. 
We gave milk to the Germans. And to them all, we gave potatoes. One 
had to give them food. The Germans who were living with us, they had 
two children. One had to feed them. 
 
Janusz used his state authority to fulfill his economic needs as a proprietor and his 
Germans’ subsistence needs. Was he acting as a bourgeois proprietor or the 
nomenklatura—or both? He treated his new farm as a quasi-state workplace through 
which he negotiated Soviet resources towards potato planting projects, employing 
Germans, producing food, and feeding his workers. In doing so, he secured free Russian 
cereals and unpaid German labour!  
Settlers benefitted from German labour to jumpstart agricultural production. Domestic 
arrangements varied on a case-by-case basis. There was no rubric on how to renegotiate 
labour and resources between two peoples who had just fought through a brutal war. 
Zuzanna and Konrad, for instance, took over the executive authority of Frau Agathe’s 
farm. During my interview with Krystyna, Zuzanna explained how she supported Frau 
Agathe and employed Heinz as a farmhand: 
They were poor. They had huge poverty. We came here, then my 
husband brought a cow because two children had already been born. 
Upstairs lived Frau Agathe. She was such a good woman. How much I 
liked her! She said that she worked in a hospital in Słupsk in the 
children’s division and she came to me, I had a cow, and we helped her 
out a lot because I felt bad for her children. She had a son, Heinz, he 
milked our cows, and he said that “Frau Zuzanna” that he will sleep here 
and I said “good”. I always gave them milk, about 3 liters a day. 
Others imposed their own regimes upon their German co-habitants. Mimicking the state 
that collected its ‘reparations’ in the form of forced labour, some—who had suffered 
Nazi atrocities—were thirsty for their own revenge. Jawoda, a Belausian who had been 
repatriated to the village of Podwoda (10 kilometres south of Dobra) in 1946, recalled 
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that one of her Polish neighbours enslaved the German women with whom he shared his 
new farm: 
There were the types who lived here three houses from ours. When the 
Germans were around, they came from Toruń so they harnessed the 
Germans to the plough, to the wagon, and worked with them! And they 
dragged them and tortured them! Poles! Yes! It was not everyone. And 
those young German women were innocent! They did not murder people. 
They tortured those women. 
Of course most Germans did not wait for the new Polish settlers to decide what to do 
with them. Many took an active role in searching for jobs and strengthening reciprocal 
labour arrangements. Trauta, another German woman in Dobra who still lives in the 
house in which she was born, explained to me how the women in her family worked at 
Polish and Russian settlers’ homes:  
Later, I went to work to a Polish household. I cleaned there and worked 
there in the house. I received food for it. And my father later worked in 
the forest for the Poles when they took people into the forest. My mother 
and sister worked for the L. family, in the house. L. family had a store. 
Sister took care of their children and mother cooked. So that was 
something. My grandmother went to one woman because she always had 
to sew for those Russians. She said to grandmother, “Come cook for me. 
I will give you food and you can take some home with you”. 
As the state delayed expulsions, domestic labour arrangements between Germans and 
settlers became embedded into everyday life. Fictive kinships and friendships formed 
among this caste system. As networks strengthened over the years, Poles and Germans 
got over some of their prejudices through the realisation that they had to work together 
to survive—and that kept the relative ‘peace’ in Dobra. This experience highlighted the 
important role of exchange networks as key to survival.  
4.4. ‘Working off’ corvées 
The state tried to keep peasants locked into their land grants and to immobilise them 
from seeking other sources of income outside of the village. One effective mechanism, 
which many peasants like Zuzanna who lived along the same street in Dobra all claimed 
to have shared, was ‘working off’ (odrabiać) corvées (szarwark) for the state. There 
was only one gmina archive from 1947 which recorded that authorities ‘unanimously 
agreed’ to ‘rally Germans into szarwark labour’, to shovel snow and ice and for other 
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urgent gmina projects51. Yet the peasants who shared this experience were Polish and 
Ukrainian. Even Kacper, the son of the gmina official who ordered the corvées in 
Dobra, confirmed their existence: 
There were szarwarks. The peasant farmers were burdened with the 
szarwarks, if one had to go somewhere, or something, one had to bring 
one’s wagon and horse, and they (authorities) were taking advantage of 
it, there were szarwarks. (emphasis his). It was written out, that this 
many had to be done within a year, and how many times one could take 
advantage of it [...] And we took advantage of it.  
The term szarwark originates from the German scharwerk (‘schar’ meaning ‘crowd’ 
and ‘werk’ meaning ‘work’) that magistrates and municipalities had imposed upon the 
peasantry from 1280 to 184852. Peasants (including children) were forced to provide 
unpaid, statutory labour for dignitaries and the state such as ploughing, harrowing, 
transport of grain, wood, hay, manure, building material, cutting grain, mowing grass, 
chopping wood, running errands, fixing bridges and roads, hunting harmful animals, 
constructing fortifications, military service and being border guards, feeding and 
managing hunting dogs during dignitaries’ hunts in the forests, and so on. The only way 
to get out of compulsory labour was by paying a fine and finding a replacement. This 
was a major cause of disputes between subjects and authorities because the szarwark 
was constantly updated by the authorities based upon the work-force ratio. Less labour 
meant more unpaid obligations imposed upon the peasantry (Blickle, 2014; Cinnirella & 
Hornung, 2013, pg. 8). 
Chodakiewicz (2004) writes that, beginning in September 1939, the Nazis imposed 
scharwerk labour upon the Polish citizens of Janów Lubelski County, in central Poland, 
instead of throwing them into concentration camps. Poles had to deliver goods, ferry 
people, do construction work, clean, tend German graves, repair roads, clean snow and 
railway tracks, deliver construction materials, be night watchmen, and so forth. 
Individuals could only ‘legally’ opt out on the condition that they put forward their 
neighbours in their place; however, foot-dragging, feigning illness, and choosing to do 
lighter szarwarks like transportation instead of road repair were common. Men 
                                                
51 Archives: Nr. 2, 1946/1948, pg. 16 and Nr. 4, 1946, pg. 1. 
52 The Polish szarwark and German scharwerk have each been compared to the French 
corvée (Cinnirella & Hornung, 2013, pg. 8; Chodakiewicz, 2004 pg. 50). 
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delegated women and children to do their work for them as they did fieldwork. Nazis 
fined, beat, expropriated, and arrested those suspected of sabotaging the szarwarks. 
Chodakiewicz estimates that about 75% of the adult Polish population had ‘toiled 
involuntarily on various official projects’ at one point or another during the Nazi 
occupation (2004, pg. 117). Wartime scharwerks were a method of ethnic and class 
domination.  
How could there be only one gmina archive about this entire institution of serfdom? I 
searched without success for the term ‘szarwark’ in Poland’s laws passed after 1944. It 
was not until an extensive investigation into the Polish legal journal Monitor Polski 
where I found the phrase ‘świadczeń obowiązkowych w naturze (szarwark)’53 that 
decoded the state’s ‘formal’ term for the colloquial term54. When I returned to Dobra's 
archives, I saw that indeed, aside from that single slip-up in 1947, the gmina used the 
formal state term. In November 1946, the regional administrative level (powiat) of 
government sent an order to the gminas notifying them that they could enforce 
‘payment-in-kind’ (świadczenie w naturze) upon their citizens based on the legal 
precedent of the 1935 law, that authorised the state to enforce ‘straight-forward labour 
on foot and with machines’; including the building and upkeep of roads, water repairs in 
the public interest, building government structures, cultivating wastelands, and planting 
trees in fields. 
In Dobra, szarwarks were a form of labour tax paid by non-wage earners, for Germans 
and peasants even though they already had to pay other taxes for their land grants from 
the agrarian reform. Peasants who received more German land from the gmina during 
the agrarian reform were burdened with more szarwark labour, even though they had no 
choice on how much land they received, did not use all of the land, and could not 
legally abandon, rent, or sell it (this is a major characteristic of serfdom, see Blum, 
1957). Presented below is the gmina’s breakdown of how much peasants with a certain 
amount of land had to give in labour55:   
                                                
53 ‘Performance of payment-in-kind (szawark)’. 
54 Legal journal entry: M.P. 1956r. Nr. 18. Poz. 253. Art. 4. Nr. 6. Pt. 1. pg. 280. 
55 Nr. 1, 1946-1947, pgs. 5-6. 
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Category A: < 5 hectares: 1 day/year with wagon and pair of horses; 3 days on foot. 
Category B: 5-10 hectares: 2 days/year with wagon and pair of horses; 6 days on foot. 
Category C: 10-15 hectares: 3 days/year with wagon and pair of horses; 9 days on foot. 
Category D: 15-20 hectares: 4 days/year with wagon and pair of horses; 12 days on foot. 
The gmina could mobilise szarwark efforts towards fixing bridges and clearing shrubs 
around them, fixing roads and sidewalks, transporting rubble to bridges, or transporting 
sand to build a road to the city. Zuzanna, who worked in szarwarks, explained that 
Hektor’s men from the gmina went door to door telling peasants—‘Tomorrow you have 
to go to the szarwark’. Usually, pregnant women, children, and the ill were exempted, 
but when there were severe labour shortages, they even ‘rallied the women’. She added 
that these were ‘orders’ (nakazy) and thus, ‘every person had to go and to work it off 
(odrobić)’. When I asked Zuzanna what would happen if one resisted, she responded 
‘You know, he had to [...] If they ordered it, people went. A peasant paid 300 złoty per 
missed szarwark day and a 100 złoty penalty for renting a labour substitute56. ‘They did 
not care where you got the money from, what they cared about is that you had to work 
your’s off (odrobić) and that is that’, Zuzanna explained. 
Winter szarwarks were the grimmest. Anna, a Ukrainian peasant, explained some of the 
awful conditions—‘There were szarwarks, because back then, when there was winter, 
they shoveled by hand because there were no ploughs. No! To Słupsk itself there was a 
szarwark and people shoveled snow, working the road. And how? For free! We worked. 
Yes!’ Peasants received a shovel, lined up, and were presented with a state warrant 
(nakaz) that explained the work had to be completed from Dobra, past the state farms, 
and into the edge of the commune boundary eight kilometres northwest. The brigadier 
then outlined the plot to shovel for each peasant. No food was provided. ‘They gave us 
nothing! No food, no drink, because when one went to work it off (odrabiać) then he 
took a sandwich of some sort’. A szarwark day lasted from 8AM-2PM, but when more 
ploughing was involved, the day was extended. If snow fell the following day, the 
szarwark was repeated. 
                                                
56 Nr. 14, 1953/1954, pg. 43. 
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Hektor organised the szarwarks and his men patrolled the peasants. Zuzanna recalled 
that Hektor ‘observed everything and walked around and looked’ over the whole 
operation while brigadiers patrolled individual peasants to ensure no one fell behind or 
imposed extra hardship on other peasants. Her recollection suggests some signs of 
resistance against these gulag-like conditions: 
And sometimes if someone did not want to work, then, they had this 
measuring stick, which they traced out the metres and “You must do it”. 
Oh. Because there were some who even were tricking around in the 
szarwark because, “You work and I will stand!” and “I will bounce 
around and will not do work, but I will bounce around because I do not 
feel like working—but you work!”  
It was only in this singular moment when Zuzanna discussed Hektor’s role in the 
szarwark, that she said that he was a ‘kombinator’ and ‘liar’ but did not provide much 
detail concerning his role. It shows the crystallisation of the idea that kombinacja was 
being used by Hektor who corrupted state power towards his own advancement. It may 
have stemmed from the stark image of certain villagers in Dobra using such an 
exploitative institution to force other villagers—with whom they shared village streets 
and neighbourhoods—into such grizzly conditions. Such experiences set the stage for 
the peasants’ later retaliation through kombinacja against Hektor.  
Once each peasant had signed the list to say that they had ‘worked off’ their szarwark 
day, the list was taken to the gmina and obligations deducted from the peasants’ 
balance. To me, it looks like the values for how much each szarwark ‘saved’ in the 
gmina budget were chosen arbitrarily. They represented relative values—like a gift. In 
1947, a peasant who worked a full day with only a wagon and one horse ‘saved’ the 
state 240 złoty but 400 złoty if worked with two horses. In 1948, 619 szarwark days on 
foot saved 123,800 złoty. In addition to the peasant szarwark labour, the accounts 
recorded that the state forestry volunteered a whopping 7,760 szarwark days at a value 
of 1,552,000 złoty to the state57. Here we see some differentiation to the rule, as state 
workplaces entered into some patronage relations with the gmina. These were forced 
                                                
57 Nr. 1, 1946-1947, pg. 72; Nr. 3, 1948/1950, pg. 3. 
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‘gifts of unpaid labour’ to the state—a symbol of their accommodation to the socialist 
revolution58. The state had become the new ‘master’. 
Even though peasants had been subjected to ‘payment-in-kind’ during the interwar 
period, they still used the colloquial, Germanised word ‘szarwark’ in order to emphasise 
the feudal and oppressive tactics used by the postwar state to coerce their labour. In 
1905, Lenin critiqued the Polish Socialist Party’s agrarian reform programme that 
sought to abolish the ‘szarwark’ and obligatory cartage for simply adhering to the 
‘minimum demands’ of Marxism that embraced ‘the struggle against remnants of 
serfdom as the basis and content of the present-day peasant movement’ (Polish Socialist 
Party, 1905, clause 6). Elimination of feudal institutions was the bare minimum of a 
socialist revolution. Yet, the szarwark was being used by the Soviets to help in their 
postwar, state-building projects. Szarwarks marked the continuity between Nazi and 
Soviet occupation. A similar trend occurred in Hungary. Lampland (1998) writes that 
cadastral maps from the 1850s that had determined the taxation of the peasantry were 
used as a basis for taxation during the Second World War and used to determine class 
enemies (kulak) during the Stalinist period in the 1950s (pg. 17). Although each of these 
state apparatuses attempted to install a new regime, they were all using the same tools. 
4.5.  ‘Neighbourly help’ for the state  
According to Zuzanna’s recollections, peasants in central Poland during the interwar 
period pooled their labour under a reciprocal, agrarian labour arrangement called 
‘neighbourly help’ (pomoc sąsiedzka). Due to labour shortages during harvests 
(omłoty), peasants voluntarily pooled their tools and reciprocated labour on each other’s 
private farms. Terms were negotiable—a peasant could send labour to another farm in 
return for permission to rent that farm’s horse. Usually, however, the hosting family 
would reciprocate with the same amount of members from their family on the other's 
farm the next time around. At the end of the working day, the host would throw a party 
with food and drink for those who helped. Through neighbourly help, peasants secured 
labour, could own more land than they could physically harvest with their family unit, 
                                                
58 The szarwark was phased out in a series of laws between 1957-1958 that overhauled 
the tax system and introduced the contract (umowa) as a standard of service relations 
between the local state and peasantry. See: Dz.U. z. 1958. Nr. 31. Poz. 136; Dz.U. z. 
1958. Nr. 17. Poz. 72; Dz.U. z. 1958. Nr. 6. Poz. 17; Dz.U. z. 1958. Nr. 3. Poz. 7.  
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and were able to produce enough for family consumption and surplus to sell on the 
market. Antonina, another Polish peasant from southern Poland, mentioned that when 
the men went off to war, neighbourly help continued among the women during the Nazi 
occupation in her village as an important way to get through the crisis.  
The similarities between szarwark and pomoc sąsiedzka is that the peasantry were 
bound by an obligation to engage in unpaid labour. In the former, they were obligated to 
do so under law and for a higher authority like a lord or gmina; in the latter, they were 
obliged to do so by familial authorities (i.e. in-laws, family guardians, fictive kinship). 
Polish neighbourly help had a German variant called Bittarbeit (neighbourly help) in 
which neighbours reciprocated unpaid labour during harvests and then celebrated with 
food and song at the end of the working day (Bücher, 1901, pgs. 268-269; Kelen, 2010, 
pg. 1296; Malinowski, 1967, pg. 72). Weber (1972) argued that Bittarbeit’s flexibility 
was problematic—at one point it could take the form of the genuine support of mutual 
help between community members, and at another point swing into the domain of 
oppression especially in contexts where unpaid labour would be given for ‘protection’ 
that would not be reciprocated in like form by the receiver (see Kelen, 2010).  
Indeed, in 1947, the Polish state passed its ‘neighbourly help law’ that forced peasants 
to pool labour and machinery during major sowing, ploughing and harvest periods as a 
form of neighbourly help, both to their fellow neighbours and to the state 59 . 
Neighbourly help was no longer voluntary. Strikingly, while many informants knew 
about the exploitation of their labour by szarwarks, I do not think they knew that 
neighbourly help was an active project propagated and clandestinely patrolled by the 
state. Second, when the gmina needed a supply of cheap labour to harvest newly 
nationalised land in the state farms or on the gmina estates, it co-opted peasants’ 
arrangements of neighbourly help to aid state goals (Żurawski, 1985, pg. 51). So, the 
state became a ‘neighbour’, but the state did not ‘reciprocate’ that labour as peasants 
had once done in their pre and inter-war arrangements. Thus, while szarwark labour 
applied to labour around public projects as a way to ‘pay’ taxes, neighbourly help was a 
more direct form of unpaid labour that could be adjusted by the state depending on the 
work ratio. By enforcing neighbourly help, the state allowed gmina authorities to tap 
                                                
59 Dz.U. z 1947r. Nr. 59. Poz. 320. Art. 1-2.  
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into the peasants’ communal labour arrangements and force them to become the state’s 
agricultural workforce as an obligation to the state and the revolution. The state 
exploited this form of servitude—that normally would take place during harvests and 
emergencies—to fulfill command economy quotas! This is exemplies the state’s active 
interest in co-opting informality towards its own formal goals.  
In autumn 1947, gmina archives reported that villagers fulfilled their neighbourly help 
obligations by planting 1,000 hectares of grain on gmina land. The law authorised 
gmina and powiat authorities to mobilise neighbourly help across administrative lines—
meaning they nominated their peasantries to work other gmina harvests. This move 
ended the competition between state workplaces that struggled to secure migrant 
peasant labour; rather, they could ask the gmina to get its peasants to work for free. 
Blum (1957) writes that a common misconception of serfdom is that the serf was bound 
to the soil. Rather, he writes, ‘the deepest and most complete form of serfdom was 
precisely when the lord was able (as he often was) to move his peasants about as he 
wished, transferring them from one holding to another, converting them into landless 
field hands or into household servants, or even selling, giving, or gambling them away 
without land’ (pg. 808). Those who held state power in the gmina legally exploited 
these tools of serfdom—moving peasants around—in order to meet the command plan 
across workplaces and administrative lines. 
In 1948, the state passed another law that exempted military personnel, gmina officials, 
administrators, and other Party authorities from the practice of neighbourly help—
creating a caste system of those whose labour the state co-opted to ‘help’ the state and 
those who were exempt from giving unpaid labour60. The gmina recorded which groups 
of peasants in Dobra exercised neighbourly help among themselves and which did not61. 
Blum (1957) writes that one of the features of serfdom all over Europe was that ‘the 
lord had legal jurisdiction over his peasants to the complete, or nearly complete, 
exclusion of the state, so that to all intents and purposes the only rights the peasants had 
were those that the lord was willing to allow them’ (pg. 809). In the gmina, the peasants 
were promised permission to buy limited resources from the nomenklatura in return for 
                                                
60 Nr. 40, 1947, pg. 66; Dz.U. z 1947r. Nr. 59. Poz. 320. Arts. 2-3; Dz.U. z. 1948r. Nr. 
11. Poz. 89. Art. 1. 
61 Dz.U. z 1947r. Nr. 59. Poz. 320. Art 2; Nr. 14, 1953/1954, pg. 86. 
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their unpaid labour. The archives later reveal peasant resistance to these ‘deals’ in 
which the nomenklatura never met their end of the bargain. When the peasants 
complained in the archives, they seemed to have no legal avenues to take their cases to 
court. Rather, their complaints were shut down by the nomenklatura. That the 
nomenklatura were exempt from this tribute of unpaid labour to the state to fulfill the 
quota meant that the nomenklatura had become the new ‘lords’. They used neighbourly 
help to fix the gmina’s labour problem and szarwarks to fix its taxation problem.  
Gmina authorities began domesticating the labour arrangement into their private 
households. Aneta and Bohdan, a couple from Ukraine, worked and lived in a forestry 
division settlement of about a dozen homes located on the outskirts of Dobra. It was 
populated by Polish, Ukrainian, and Kashubian workers. Cezary, a Kashubian who had 
lived in Germany prior to the border changes in 1945, was the Forestry Director 
(Leśniczy) who lived in the settlement with his wife Anna, a seamstress who worked on 
site and sewed for private customers. As state forestry workers, each settler family was 
allotted a German home and worker garden (działka, <1 hectare) on which they grew 
their crops and livestock to supplement their wages62. They were entitled to material 
goods (deputat) like wood, clothing, and food from the state forestry on a monthly, 
biannual, and annual basis. Men worked full time in the forestry while the women 
usually stayed home to take care of the farms and worker gardens63.  
Cezary treated his farm as an extension of the workplace. Aneta explained that in 
addition to working in the state forestry division, both men and women in the division 
were expected to work the director’s worker garden and offered domestic services to his 
wife in order to get their wages and material entitlements which they had already 
worked for on time. Aneta explained the experience of ‘helping out’ (pomagać) as the 
‘Director’s worker’: 
A: The human back then had to fucking work one’s ass off—children, 
cow, house. And one even have to work at Mr. Sz.’s house, for our good 
health, for free. 
Self: Why? What was that? 
                                                
62 Workers did not have to supply agricultural quotas to the state.  
63 Pregnant and child-rearing women opted out of compulsory labour. 
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A: The Director’s worker! The worker had to work one’s off (swoje 
odrobić) at the Director’s (house). He did not pay!  
Self: Meaning, that one worked in the forestry, but also had to plough his 
land?  
A: One worked (uprawiał) the land which the Director had just like us 
and one helped him, worked it and every woman helped (pomagała) 
Z: Hmmm. [pensively] 
Self: So it was privately done— 
A: Just Paluch did not help out, she did not help out. 
Self: And so one had to help? 
A: Well, you know. If one did not want to, then one did not want to— 
Z: Yes. 
A: But if one wanted to live well with them, one went to help because 
back then one disseminated seeds by hand and one planted by hand the 
potatoes and barley one dug, and today there are ploughs, but back then it 
was by hand. 
 
It is interesting to see how Aneta switches between describing the arrangement as an 
obligation to ‘work one’s off’ and as a form of ‘help’ in the field. Bohdan, Aneta and 
the other workers eventually ‘broke free’ of these obligations after a series of events in 
which Cezary and Anna showed bourgeois inclinations and bragged about having 
workers as servants on their settlement:  
A: Anna was always like something that I was not. She was like this. I, in 
the beginning, helped out. I will not say. I went over there to milk her 
cows because she did not know how to milk the cows so I milked the 
cows. My husband also went there. But when Beata in holy memory, 
Anna’s sister came, Ala went there to throw out the (livestock) dung for 
her. Ala went in rubber boots because she would not go in nice shoes to 
throw out the livestock dung. And Anna said this (to Beata) “My God, 
Aneta has five children and she comes always over here so clean, nicely 
dressed—” 
Z: She was like that. 
A: Yes. And she said, “—but Ala smells”. And you know something 
threw me inside here (points to her chest). 
Z: Yes. 
A: I thought to myself. “You tight-arse. I will not come in rubber boots 
because I do not throw out your livestock dung. I will put on regular 
shoes, get dressed, and walk over to your place. But when Ala comes 
over to throw out livestock dung, when Anna calls her over into the 
kitchen, then she has to have rubber boots” No?  
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Z: Of course!  
A: When I heard that, I said, “Enough!” and I told my husband, “I will no 
longer go milk her cows”. And when Cezary had horses that belonged to 
the forestry—because at his place there was a barn which he built for 
himself because he raised horses. And Magda’s husband Tomek worked 
with those horses—because they belonged to the state—and he fed those 
horses at Cezary’s because if he worked with those horses, then he feeds 
them. Cezary drove over to Z. (village) and began to brag that he has 
horses and Tomek is his groom and works for him—and in the beginning 
they lived upstairs at Cezary’s—and Magda is his cook! Cleaning maid! 
That she cleans the house! When Magda went to Z., and people were 
asking “What are you doing!? You are working as a cook for Anna?” 
Magda came back home, she began to cry and began to tell it to Tomek 
and that very night they moved out of the house. There, there were no 
windows (at the new place), so Tomek took some tar and nailed the 
windows shut and he moved out there and renovated a bit of it himself 
and there he lived. They went their separate ways and Cezary moved out 
and from that hour everyone lived in peace.  
 
Anna’s story shows that her and her fellow settler’s resistance was not caused by any 
specific problem about the arrangement of helping out a local official on his farm, but 
because he had expressed the relationship in decadent and bourgeois terms. In the 
previous section, it was reported that Janusz the gmina official kept a cheap labour 
force—Germans—on his large estate and manipulated the boundary between ‘work for 
proprietor’ versus ‘work for the state’. Granted, the Germans had less of a choice than 
the workers who eventually abdicated the neighbourly help arrangement. However, both 
examples show how the gmina officials ‘domesticated’ the state and established 
neighbourly help relationships with workers for their own private benefit.  
This labour arrangement is similar to German Gesindezwangsdienste (servants’ forced 
services) wherein the employees were forced to provide extra unpaid services for their 
employer in their employer’s home (Blickle, 2014). This practice was abolished along 
with the scharwerk in the 19th century, but evidently it made a comeback in Dobra in 
the postwar period. The overlaps between serfdom and socialist state-building were 
staggering. Party officials subsequently became the largest landowners who did what 
they wished with the peasantry and imposed labour and tribute obligations on the 
populace as a way of solving labour shortages. They switched between the socialist 
revolution when they were politically pressured to do so by the state apparatus, but 
delved deep into the tools of serfdom to keep local control of the peasant population to 
suit their private needs. There was not much deviation from this serf-like structure of 
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life, except that the new state power was the socialist state, serfdom was adapting to the 
state, and the state was co-opting it to gain control over the territories and build the 
state.  
4.6. Involuntary gifts to the state  
Reciprocity was built into the formal function of the state on multiple scales. Population 
transfers in the territories were based on the ‘principle of reciprocity’ between modern 
states (Gousseff, 2011, pg. 94). Poland lost 180,000 square kilometres of its eastern 
territory to the Soviet Union, but gained 103,000 square kilometres of territory in the 
West (Yoshioka (2008) pg. 274). Belarusians who were repatriated to the territories and 
left all their property behind, received property ‘in exchange’ in the territories. Peasants 
and politically suspect groups were forced into involuntary labour in return for settling 
on the new territories and not paying ‘monetary taxes’ (even though many did anyway). 
‘Reciprocity’ is how Poland and the Soviet Union ‘exchanged’ territories and peoples 
(although to the benefit of the Soviet Union), and how the Polish state organised 
economic and political life in the territories (at the expense of the settlers). 
In postwar Dobra, a blend of feudal szarwark and ‘pomoc sasiedzka’ (neighbourly help) 
was used to secure socialist state power. The ‘state’ fulfilled the ‘master’ role and the 
‘peasants and workers’ fit the ‘serf’ role. Gifts and reciprocal labour arrangements—
although treated by anthropologists as different from ‘compulsory labour’ (see Algazi, 
2003, pg. 13)—were co-opted by the state and imposed upon certain groups of people to 
subsidise the state-making project. While the socialist state advocated a socialist 
revolution, its adoption of prewar and interwar institutions showed signs of continuity 
with the past. What we see is a blurring of the boundary between reciprocity as an 
informal relationship and reciprocity as a way of establishing a hierarchy between the 
state and the peasantry and workers in the village.  
Strathern (1992) writes that ‘Coercion is essential in which the “gift” is created’ (pg. 
177), in that the giver has to persuade the receiver to accept what is offered. Villagers 
were forced to carry out labour without any reciprocal return from the state. Scott 
(1976) writes that ‘The claims of the state (taxes, corvée, conscription) speak for 
themselves and it is questionable whether the peasant ever sees these claims as a 
repayment for services received (law and order? peace? religious functions?)’ (pg. 28). 
Whether the gift of labour was voluntary or involuntary established the field of the 
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moral economy. Mauss (1990) reminds us that the ‘unreciprocated gift still makes the 
person who has accepted it inferior’ (pg. 65). The nomenklatura had to at least 
acknowledge the demands of the moral economy in order to stay in power. 
The politics of unpaid work began to shape the class divides between the nomenklatura 
versus everyone else in the village. The state co-opted peasant arrangements and 
peasants co-opted state arrangements and looked to the state’s exploitative techniques to 
hire their own German labour. Masters and peasants/workers were adopting strategies 
from each other in order to stay competitive and to increase their own production profits 
on their state and private farms. Algazi (2003) writes that a gift is by no means fixed. It 
is ‘contested’ and the ‘meanings and implications of such transactions are neither 
evident nor inherent in the acts themselves’ (pg. 10). Negotiation was a two-way street. 
Others negotiated with the state in more subtle ways. Blum (1957) writes that in the 
feudal model that constrained peasants’ mobility in Eastern Europe, serfs became free 
through the abandonment of land holdings. Similarly, peasants in the postwar period 
abandoned their land grants to seek jobs in the city—they abandoned one facet of the 
socialist revolution playing out in the rural areas and went to the city to engage with 
another facet of the revolution that promised a better quality of life. 
4.7. (Re)collecting gotyks 
In 2009, some villagers’ homes were time capsules still adorned with German-era (po 
Niemieckie) wallpaper, paintings, crosses, photographs, and furniture. They did not 
change the Prussian timber framing or update their German-era kitchen layouts. 
Others—predominantly Poles—had burned German clothing, furniture, linen, toys, 
books, paintings, documents, photographs, and banners, which they had found inside 
their new homes and did not deem to be valuable or something that they wished to be 
associated with. Burning served as an aesthetic cleansing of the German landscape. 
These objects gave homes a unique aesthetic quality that differentiated them from the 
identical, socialist-era, furnishings still standing in many homes. Burning was a touchy 
subject. Mychaljo, a Ukrainian peasant who arrived in 1947 and whose beautiful home 
was still tapestried with German wallpaper and hanging plates claimed that when Poles 
burned German furniture, it was a symbol of hatred, ‘a pain inflicted to Hitler’. His 
home was untouched.  
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Figure 14 German gotyk with ‘God bless our home’ inscription hangs in Mychaljo’s 
kitchen still decorated with the original German wallpaper. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Whether settlers chose to keep or discard these objects said a lot about their sense of 
‘belonging’ to the territories. Settlers who perceived the German-Polish border as 
temporary refused to invest in their ‘German’ properties (Mach, 1993, pg. 192). 
Weronika—who had been repatriated from East Prussia as a ‘Pole’—but who lived in 
the factory houses on the other side of the village, informed me that these artifacts were 
called gotyks (‘gothics’). ‘A gotyk is a type of memory gift (pamiątka) [...] One can 
neither chop it, or take it. It must stand, because they must stand’ she said. Recently, 
when her daughter wanted to burn the German antiques, Weronika had stopped her, 
saying that ‘It is not mine, it is not yours. So let them stand!’ For an East Prussian, 
German furniture may have been a source of nostalgia that still held emotional value. 
Mychaljo and Weronika’s homes felt eerie, as if they were being temporarily occupied. 
The gotyks seemed like a physical insurance policy for a ‘recoverable past’ (Grossman, 
2013, pg. 142) should the German owners ever return to the East. Gotyks exposed how 
villagers like Mychaljo and Weronika today calculate the riskiness of their economic 
actions based on a much broader political time-frame into the distant past and future. 
History is not ‘over’, nor is their future ‘secure’. In this aspect, the moral economy 
conflicted with their investment in their farms. 
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Figure 15 Gotyk photo of the farm with faded-out German text, ‘The Tree of My 
Childhood’ still hangs on a wall as a memory of what the farm looked like before 1945. 
Wallpaper is German-era as well. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Gotyks are the objects and spaces that domesticated the German landscape into the 
settler household. They are a sort of border narrative that advocates porosity, co-
ownership, and reciprocity, rather than the state narrative of the territories discussed in 
the above sections. Their meaning brings to light Stewart’s (1993) claim that ‘We do 
not need or desire souvenirs of events that are repeatable. Rather we need and desire 
souvenirs of events that are reportable’ (pg. 135). Similar to the bodily wounds that 
interviewees pointed to in order to retell their histories, these objects were souvenirs 
that helped locate specific events in the village. Almost all of the interviewees 
possessed a gotyk, but the stories behind each item represented individualised narratives 
of human bonds and economic relations with the Germans (or lack thereof). 
Zuzanna said that her gotyk was a gift. When the Germans were being deported from 
the territories, the gmina ordered each of the new settlers to transport ‘their Germans’ to 
Słupsk. Her husband Konrad refused to be involved. When Zuzanna was parting ways 
with Frau Agathe whom she had hired to raise her children, Agathe gave her a large 
black and silver cross as a ‘memory’ gift (pamiątka). During the interview, Zuzanna 
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escaped into the dining room where the cross stood, front and centre, on the credenza 
and brought it out for me to inspect. She explained that,  
Frau Agathe gave me a cross in two parts because “What am I going to 
give you for keepsake?”—because they were leaving for the Oder. I said 
that, “I do not want anything because I will remember you anyway”. 
They were good people. And she took out the cross but in two pieces the 
cross was broken in two, right? I said ‘Who broke your cross?’ (and 
Agathe replied) “Russian! He took it from me, threw it and stomped on 
it!” He stomped on it. I took the cross. Love, I have it to this day. There 
was this one whose name was Giera, a welder who came over and he was 
from Warsaw. And I tell his wife about it and he listens and he tells me 
this: “Zuzanna, give me the cross. I will weld it for you. But I will 
shorten it” because it was longer. He says “It is so destroyed that I have 
to shorten it, to cut it evenly”. Whenever I look (at it), I see Frau Agathe 
and those Russians who are stomping on it. 
Zuzanna’s story of how she was gifted a cross and then ‘recovered’ it is her way of 
telling the border narrative of the territories. While the state was promoting revenge and 
expulsion, Zuzanna and the German family practiced reconciliation and transnational 
reciprocity through multiple gifts. They acted like a fictive extended family who ‘co-
managed’ the farm. Zuzanna took good care of the old German property while the 
German family stayed in close contact throughout the socialist period, sent packages, 
money, and even visited in the 1970s. The gift of German property was more 
meaningful than the right over German property bestowed upon them by the state, 
because it symbolically clarified the sanctity of the domestic sphere. Through it, settlers 
informally ‘recovered’ the territories from the Germans through the preservation of 
these artifacts. Rather than settlers representing the state’s conquest of the state 
territories, the gotyk symbolised the family-based transmission of property into the 
ownership of the settler families who would treat the property well. Gotyks preserved a 
sense of diversity. 
 
Villagers never quite believed the socialist state’s claim that the border treaty was final. 
Gotyk narratives represent ‘refracted meanings’ (Humphrey, 2005, pg. 55) from the 
dominant ideological discourse and narrative of the border (see Grossman 2014, pg. 25). 
While the nomenklatura’s official looting of the furniture represented a combination of 
capital that pitted an ‘us’ against ‘them’ mentality on the village scale, the gotyks 
represented a combination of capital into other cultural meanings of power and 
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solidarity that did not include the authority or regulation of the state or economic 
activity. These objects are arti(facts) of ideological alterity (see Henare, Holbraad, et. al. 
2007, pg. 12) that marked the domestic ‘front’ against the Sovietisation of everyday life 
(Buchli, 1999, pg. 24). They commemorated ‘unofficial’ contexts in a contested past 
(Grossman, 2013, pg. 133). The idea of a shared Germany-Poland borderland, a 
‘Central’ European imagery, is socially and culturally reproduced through them. They 
are a peaceful marker of this flexible ownership of property and of the perception of a 
Polish-German border that is permeable and subject to the mixing and co-habitation of 
populations.  
 
 
Figure 16 Frau Agathe’s cross with inscriptions. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Nevertheless, this gift of the gotyk had serf-like connotations because it established a 
hierarchy between the German families and the Polish settlers; as if the settlers were 
‘renters’ of the German property and ‘maintained’ it through their labour to then be 
‘rewarded’ with German packages sent from time to time. The gotyk signified the 
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settlers’ protection of German objects from becoming incorporated into the construction 
of the socialist state German owners still had some hope that they would eventually 
return to their homes, and it made perfect sense to keep good relations with the settlers 
in order to take good care of the house while the Germans were away. The gotyks, thus, 
represented a link to another cross-border hierarchy, an economic link to West and East 
Germany. These gifts represented a domestic version of transferring ownership and land 
in a peaceful manner from one family to another—creating an ‘open border’ of resource 
flows between them over the Polish-German border. 
 
 
Figure 17 Frau Agathe (blonde woman outside with beige dress) visits Zuzanna and 
checks up on her old farm in the 1970s. My mother Cecylia and grandfather Konrad 
speak to her while Zuzanna stands in the doorway. Zuzanna’s private collection. 
 
The more I stepped into villagers’ homes, the more I noticed variations of Zuzanna’s 
artifacts—even plastic replicas! It is as if the replicas functioned as dream-catchers, 
representing a form of protection. The replicas suggest that the reproduction of the idea 
of the gotyk was an important way in which villagers ‘legitimised’ their stay in the 
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territories in the midst of politicised restitution battles between Poland and Germany 
that are still being waged to this day. Stefania, a Ukrainian peasant who was one of the 
original settlers, told me that she keeps a special room just for the German family to 
stay on their old property. The gotyks preserve the spaces that give life to German 
nostalgia, Heimat—a term villagers often use to describe Germans’ sentiments towards 
the lands. Heimat is short for Heimatgefühle or ‘feelings of home’ (Bammer, 2012, pg. 
110). Krystyna, a German woman who stayed behind in Dobra, showed me one German 
book with German names of villages and towns which gave the details of how each 
German village was transformed into a Polish one and how many people died in the 
process. ‘When I open this up, I am back in Germany’, she told me. These objects carry 
a powerful, transformational value of experiencing different landscapes. 
 
 
Figure 18 German barometer that hangs on Zuzanna’s wall. Roman received it from his 
neighbour as a confirmation gift. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Gotyks’ cultural and social value is still felt today. Aunt Kinga, who was born in the 
territories in the late 1940s and who has never met the owner of the house she 
eventually bought, takes special care of a German apple tree in her backyard. In the 
 146 
1990s, the German owners’ daughters returned to the house and wanted to taste the 
apples from their childhood. When Kinga showed them the tree and gave them the 
apples, the women cried. The tree is collapsing, but Kinga and Alfred take special care 
of it and have propped up the branches ‘just in case’ the Germans return. Gotyks are 
passed down inter-generationally as family heirlooms—I even have one from my 
mother. Whether they are transferred or purchased as replicas, the gotyks represent a 
responsible, ethical, stewardship and a respect for the German property and landscape. 
 
4.8. Conclusion: relation of men dominating men 
Domestication was a multi-scalar process. On the national scale, Polish state authorities 
in Warsaw domesticated the Soviet state model to create their own path to socialism, by 
recreating the territories as a cradle of Polish consciousness. On the regional level, 
authorities used skilled and cheap German labour to secure the first proletarian workers 
in their nationalised state workplaces. These practices were all indicators of how the 
nomenklatura domesticated the state-making process by manipulating the gap between 
‘state’ and ‘individual’ interests. On the domestic level, villagers created relations with 
the Germans through gotyks and neighbourly help which domesticated the new frontier 
regardless of the state’s participation. This multi-scalar phenomenon of domestication 
differentiated the state apparatus, creating numerous versions of it, which created the 
confusion and ‘space’ for further domestication, especially on the commune level.  
The state passed legislation that forced peasants and Germans to work to pay the labour 
price of the state-making process, while the nomenklatura established neighbourly help 
arrangements on a local level to transform workers into private servants. This 
exploitative era set the stage for the villagers’ common perception of kombinacja as 
something that was used by the ruling class, state, or authority against the people, and 
that the people would have to then retaliate by using kombinacja against them to protect 
their own interests. Workers’ and peasants’ revolts against individual gmina officials 
had little to do with the actual socialist revolution—rather these were revolts against the 
domestication of state power by the nomenklatura. We have already seen in this chapter 
that both settlers who represented the state apparatus, and those who did not, 
manipulated space, resources, and labour to ensure that their family’s subsistence needs 
were met. 
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Chapter 5 
Peasants’ kombinacja: 1948-1956 
5.1. Homo Sovieticus  
During the Stalinist era from 1948 to 1956, the Polish People’s Republic (PPR) sought 
to co-opt all economic activity and formally link it to state supply chains. Village 
agriculture was collectivised into state farms (sovkhozy) and collective farms (kołchozy) 
64. The state would buy cheap produce at fixed prices from the peasants and sell them at 
cheap prices to the workers in industrialising urban centres across Poland and the Soviet 
bloc. In order for the system to work, citizens would have to acquire a new socialist 
discipline of labour that prioritised the state over private needs. Stakhanovite 
propaganda in the state-run media depicted labour heroines (przodownica pracy) who 
went ‘beyond’ the plan out of their zeal for the revolution. Still, shortages emerged. 
Rather than passing reforms to adjust the imported Stalinist structures to local 
conditions, it blamed shortages on politically motivated economic saboteurs (Lukowski 
& Zawadzki, 2006, pg. 287; Davies, 1982, pg. 579; Fidelis, 2010, pg. 58; Gibney, 1959, 
pg. 227; Kenney, 1997, pg. 206). 
The PPR became paranoid of this enemy (wróg) who lurked in its workplaces and 
engaged in ‘faulty production’ (brakorobstwo). In 1950 a law was passed on socialist 
work discipline which sentenced 44,443 workers (21% of all convictions in Poland that 
year) to jail for absenteeism, drunkenness, leaving the factory during the work day, 
lowered effectiveness, and many other minor ‘crimes’. Between 1949 and 1952, 46,700 
people were sentenced to labour camps on the charges of ‘office crimes’, ‘actions 
against the state monopoly’ and ‘plunder and appropriation of public property’ (Fidelis, 
2010, pg. 75; Kenney, 1997, pg. 201). Purges focused on those recruited from the 
liquidated private sector and who looked for employment ‘with an eye for social 
benefits’ such as ‘cheaper apartment rent, electricity, fat coupons, etc’. (Kenney, 1997, 
                                                
64 The sovkhoz was called a ‘State Agricultural Farm’ (Państwowe Gospodarstwo 
Rolne) and the kolkhoz was called a ‘Production Cooperative’ (spółdzielnie 
produkcyjne) even though they were identical to the Soviet model.  
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pg. 193). All citizens had to follow the socialist labour discipline; anyone who engaged 
in unauthorised work threatened the entire structure of the economy.   
Stalinist collectivisation came to Dobra in 1948. By then, the Red Army had converted 
the archipelao of Junker estates across the gmina into Soviet state farms that they 
occupied until 1949. Gmina officials set out to collectivise peasant land—the same land 
that it was still redistributing through the agrarian reform—into Soviet style collective 
farms (kolkhoz)65. Peasants were confused. The gmina had just praised them as pioneers 
of Polish nationalism and handed them Akt Nadania documents that formalised their 
settlement on the new land grants. Now, those same officials called them ‘rich peasants’ 
(kułak), imposed agricultural quotas and persuaded them to collectivise their land. 
Peasants from the east had already been Polonised and Catholicised in the territories. 
Now, the Stalinist campaigns would transform all peasants into the Homo Sovieticus—
the Soviet Man. 
This chapter is loosely structured around Zuzanna’s interactions with peasants and 
officials during my interviews with them about the period spanning from de-
kulakisation in 1948 to de-collectivisation in 1956. During that period, Zuzanna had 
gone from being a propertied peasant, into a kułak forced to supply agricultural quotas 
to the state, then into a collective farm worker (kołchoznik), and then finally back to a 
propertied peasant who was still forced to supply agricultural quotas. During the 
interviews, she came face-to-face with both her oppressors and her fellow collective 
farm workers. What I found interesting about their exchanges is how the term 
‘kombinacja’ emerged in the descriptions of various power struggles. It did not apply to 
a specific activity, rather it was a term used to describe conscious and multifarious 
reformulations of the command economy. During this time period, gmina archives 
introduced the character called the kombinator—the arch nemesis of the Homo 
Sovieticus—whose sole purpose was to wreck the command economy by diverting 
resources away from the state supply chains. Peculiarly, the gmina and the villagers 
were collectively silent about kombinacja in the postwar period and collectively vocal 
in their acknowledgement of it during Stalinism. This is not a coincidence. Stalinism 
reoriented settlers’ Westward-looking imagery, as self-determining colonialists who 
                                                
65 Villagers liked the state farms and adopted the formal ‘PGR’ term, while they hated 
the collective farms and called it by the pejorative Soviet term kołchoz.  
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would reclaim lost Polish lands and remake them into their own image, toward the East, 
chained to Mother Russia, who would colonise them. It crystallised their class position 
in the command economy, namely their economic subservience to urban and 
international demand. Villagers who had survived similar conditions under Nazi 
occupation, or who fled collectivisation in the East, knew exactly what they were up 
against, and concurrently, how to survive through it. The term kombinacja thus 
‘marked’ the encounter between a new version of the state and the people.  
Officials and state representatives recalled using kombinacja. Stasiek—the gmina 
mayor in 1953—claimed to have used kombinacja while he held office to show 
Zuzanna that he had been on the villagers’ side all along. Fidelis, who was a state 
forestry worker and an activist forced to travel around villages and attempt to persuade 
(namawiać) peasants to collectivise, is another important source. His recollections show 
how state representatives accepted others’ kombinacja to evade collectivisation while 
‘agreeing’ to it. Archival evidence supports the oral history. Villagers had a vested 
interest in keeping the farm broken enough to ensure that everyone got their share of 
unauthorised resources, but stabilised enough for the state to replenish its warehouses.  
Kombinacja permeated into all stages, scales, and interactions of economic and political 
life on the collective farm. It served as an economic and political stabiliser. It helped 
limit the penetration of collectivisation but to accommodate plans on existing collective 
farms. It played a vital role in splitting—domesticating—collective farm resources 
along competing economic and political factions of villagers who were still struggling 
over legitimacy and power in the village. The methods of how to keep the collective 
farms broken and how to fix them were key to deciding ‘who’ controlled the reworking 
of Stalinist reforms. By investigating the sites where kombinacja occurred between the 
peasants and officials, I am able to show how Stalinism was domesticated to serve local 
economic and political conditions.  
5.2. From pioneers to kułaks  
By 1952, the territories boasted 2,000 ‘Production Cooperatives’—the highest number 
in the country—composed of collectivised 50,000 peasant farms that spanned 1,235,000 
acres (Jędrychowski, 1952, pg. 8). Its landscape resembled Soviet Russia, not the 
‘privatised’ Poland found in history books. This was the product of a multi-phase 
process that included the imposition of high taxes and agricultural quotas upon the 
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peasantry before persuading them to collectivise their farms. In the first phase, 
beginning in 1948, the PPR mobilised poor and middle peasants into a class war against 
the rich peasant (kułak)—which politician Hilary Minc defined as anyone who was 
wealthy enough to hire labour on his or her farm. The territories were composed of 
uprooted settlers whose class standing was largely based on their ethnicity. Small 
peasants (< 5 hectares) were predominantly Ukrainian and Belarusian who were settled 
in isolated colonies; medium peasants (> 5 hectares) were predominantly Polish and 
were settled in the village centres. By playing off of ethnic tensions, the PPR could 
mobilise the term ‘kułak’ more effectively in the heterogeneous peasantry in the 
territories than in the rooted, more homogeneous, peasantry in central Poland.  
Collectivisation was an awkward project for the gmina officials in Dobra. The same 
officials who had distributed land to the settlers, allocated the largest parcels for 
themselves, and employed German labour on them, were the ones leading the de-
kulakisation (rozkułaczanie) campaign. During interviews, peasants often repeated the 
phrase ‘And then They made us into kułaks!’  
There was no correlation between being a kułak and being called a kułak. The archives 
provide no definitive guidelines. In the villagers’ view, anyone could have been 
suspected of being one. Identification had less to do with land size and more to do with 
what peasants did with their farms. Officials observed peasants who practiced superior 
extraction techniques and resource management, were productive, wore nice attire, 
‘fared better’, possessed an ‘economic mentality’, owned 3 cows or 2 horses, or had 
multiple wagons. Fidelis argued that the term was used by the gmina to set economic 
restrictions upon those who were a political threat to the officials. Weronika  recalled 
her brother’s dumbfounded response to being labeled a kułak: ‘I am a “kułak”, but I 
have poverty at home!’ Others claimed that it had nothing to do with the individual and 
everything to do with their land. Arena, a Ukrainian peasant, argued that they (small 
peasants) were called kułaks because their colony had rich soil and the gmina wanted to 
establish a political justification for converting them into a collective farm. Officials 
used the term in a myriad of ways to create the farms and protect their positions of state 
power against political competitors.  
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The penalties were harsh. A Polish kułak had to pay an ‘enrichment tax’ (wzbogacenie, 
sometimes referred to as ‘F.O.R’66). Polish peasants who had voluntarily migrated to 
the territories, rather than coming through a state resettlement programme like the 
Ukrainians and Belarusians, had to pay this tax because they had enriched their families 
off of German land and property67. Ukrainians and Belarusians received ‘land swaps’ 
for their expropriated land back East. During our interviews, Zuzanna was surprised to 
discover that many of her neighbours—fellow kułaks—never paid the enrichment tax. 
Either the tax code lacked transparency or the enrichment tax was an inter-war tax 
obligation adapted by the gmina officials.  
 
Figure 19 State’s anti-kułak propaganda: ‘The 
“good” kułak: old wisdom teaches, do not trust the 
rich man! He will give you one hand, and he will 
take something with the second one!’ 
(http://www.blogpress.pl/node/6664). 
 
                                                
66 It is unclear what F.O.R. means, but the Polish peasants had to pay it. 
67 Archive: Nr. 3, 1948/1950, pg. 3. 
  152 
When ex-gmina officials were hesitant to discuss the kułak period with me, Zuzanna 
embarked on a personal mission of ‘kułak’s revenge’ in outing their participation in the 
campaign. During an interview with Kacper—the late Hektor’s son and gmina 
official—his partner Gosia defensively repeated that Kacper ‘does not remember 
history’ (On nie pamięta historii) and shut the door on us. Zuzanna, flustered, spread 
gossip all across Dobra that Kacper had ‘forgotten’ all that he had done to the villagers! 
When I went back to them in 2011, I received a warm welcome and got the interview. 
Zuzanna’s gossiping certainly demonstrated its power (and hers) in gaining leverage 
over villagers. 
Zuzanna’s next victim was Stasiek, who was appointed gmina mayor in 1953. He first 
told me that he came ‘after’ the kułak era. He explained, ‘Here, there weren’t any kułaks 
because farms that large did not exist here’ and emphasised that ‘If someone had 15 
hectares of land (then) he was called a kułak’. Zuzanna—who perhaps for the first time 
ever spoke to a gmina official about this—would not let him get away with it and 
interjected with: 
Stasiu, we worked 5 hectares of land—because the Germans left 33 
hectares behind. The S. family, the J. family, and us took the land, split it 
equally, so we each had 11 hectares. I went to the gmina, to Hektor, and 
told him and wrote a request to use only 5 hectares to which he 
responded, ‘No’ because we were written under 11 hectares and that is 
what we had to pay. We had to pay taxes for 11 hectares and they made 
us into kułaks! And we had to pay the F.O.R.   
Even when peasants wanted to self-dekulakise, the gmina needed their taxes and kept 
them locked into a constructed class status. This helped establish distrust for local 
officials but a generally positive outlook on the socialist revolution in general. Stasiek 
quickly confirmed, ‘Yes, yes, yes’. The state wanted to de-kulakise peasants on its own 
terms; self-dekulakisation expressed a rejection of the state and paved the possibility for 
alternative economic activity that existed outside of it. 
When I enquired about the actual definition of the kułak, Stasiek responded, ‘It was like 
this: If one had more land, then They counted him as a rich man (bogacz). And if one 
was a rich man, one was a kułak. And They illustrated him with a large sack across his 
back which he carries and hides the grain’. Zuzanna then interjected—‘That was 
unfair’. He added defensively, ‘But listen, the concept of the kułak was not produced as 
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a Polish initiative. This all came from the East, from the Soviet Union. All the politics 
came from there!’ The Polish version was much more lenient than in the Soviet Union 
where kułak with 5 hectares were deported and ‘If he was labeled as a kułak, They never 
asked twice’. He framed this diluted brand of dekulakisation as the gmina’s attempt to 
protect villagers from ‘real’ Soviet purges.  
The same officials who executed the de-kulakisation campaign were some of the largest 
land owners in the gmina. During one interview, Zuzanna bought another ex-gmina 
official—Kaźimierz—to ‘justice’ when he mentioned that he had owned 40 hectares of 
land in Dobra. ‘Hoh!’ Zuzanna responded in shock, ‘so kułak!’ Danusia, his daughter 
added, ‘A kułak you were! 40 hectares and They called you a kułak!’ He meekly 
responded, ‘Yes’. I asked how it was possible to be both a kułak and a gmina official. 
Interested, Danusia interjected, ‘But he was a kułak very shortly! Because the kułak era 
was brief. Didn’t they focus on liquidating the wealthier farms?’ To which Kaźimierz 
defensively responded, ‘Here, no one liquidated anything!’ to which Danusia 
responded, ‘Why did they call you a kułak?’ Defeated, he said, ‘Because I—(sigh)—
many are’. We all laughed because it revealed how ‘kułak’ was such an absurd form of 
classification. Gmina officials employed it to strengthen their monopoly on local power, 
not to meet Soviet guidelines. 
5.3. Quotas 
The agricultural quotas (kontyngenty) introduced in the Six Year Plan from 1949 to 
1956 formally connected domestic production on peasant farms to the command 
economy. From 1951 to 1952, legislation imposed mandatory, unsubsidised quotas of 
milk, livestock, potatoes, and grains, upon all peasant farms over one hectare68. Quotas 
were important markers of the state’s exploitation of the peasantry. Radosław, a 
Belarusian peasant from Podwoda village explained that, ‘Here, the formation of our 
Polish history is composed of agriculture. Oppression, mandatory quotas, every potato 
‘allocate to the state!’, pig ‘allocate to the state!’ And how heavy the fine was!’ Like the 
szarwark, the authorities imposed quotas upon anyone they wanted. German workers 
who had a <0.5 hectare allotment garden had to supply quotas and kułak enrichment 
                                                
68 Livestock (Dz.U. z 1952, Nr. 8, Poz. 46.); milk (Dz.U. z 1952, Nr. 22, Poz. 142.); 
grain (Dz.U. z 1952, Nr. 32, Poz. 214.); potatoes (Dz.U. z 1952, Nr. 37, Poz. 255.).  
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taxes like Zuzanna. Some officials supplied the quota while serving office; and others 
altered their land grants to just below 1 hectare to be exempt from it altogether.  
The gmina determined quota amounts for each farm based upon the amount of hectares 
received through the agrarian reform—and which peasants were forbidden to sell or 
rent. Each farm had to produce 150 kilograms of grain and 100 kilograms of livestock 
per hectare. Kułaks in particular were excluded from state agricultural credits for quota 
production and were forced to secure their own tools, fertilisers, and seeds. Thus, laws 
associated with the kułak propaganda actually undermined the production potential of 
the medium peasant who composed most of the peasant producers. Hiring labour was 
illegal, thus families were locked into their roles as labourers on their farms. Instead of 
providing economic relief, the gmina called for more activism to mobilise the peasantry 
into ‘neighbourly help’ (pomoc sąsiedzka, see Chapter 4) arrangements among 
themselves to decrease shortages69. 
Quota roundups took place twice a week. Peasants were forbidden to feed livestock 24 
hours before turning them over to the state (in order to use of potential surplus grains 
and fodder), but peasants commonly did and paid off inspectors to keep quiet in return 
for food from their farms. Those with wagons could transport quotas to the state 
purchasing centre called the Gmina Cooperative of Peasant’s Self-Help (GSSC) in 
Dobra, where they sold their quotas at fixed prices. There was a grading system—higher 
quality produce received higher rates from the state (Śmigielska, 1992, pg. 111). Prices 
were discouraging. Fidelis and Stanisław, both forestry workers at the time, recalled that 
a potato quota required months of labour to fulfill but was not worth more than a 
quarter-litre of vodka at the state store. If the peasant brought in a quota surplus, the 
state bought his quota on wolne rękowe (‘free hand’70) prices. This was called a premia, 
but it was rarely achieved (or bought into). Peasants then sold their quotas and received 
a GSSC receipt which they then took to the gmina headquarters to clear their personal 
accounts. The GSSC then consolidated the quotas in the gmina and subcontracted some 
of the raw materials to local state processing sites to produce bread, butter, meat, which 
                                                
69 All source material for this section comes from archive Nr. 13. (1953/1954). 
70 The state knew that peasants were selling high quality goods on the ‘free market’ (see 
footnote 74) so it attempted to co-opt that activity by offering market prices for 
peasants’ surplus goods.   
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were then sold to the workers in the gmina (Korbonski, 1965, pg. 144). The quotas 
subsequently went further down the supply chain to the Powiat Association of Gmina 
Cooperatives (PZGS), the Voivodeship Associations of Gmina Cooperatives (WZGS), 
and then to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (RWPG71).  
According to a gmina report from 1953, quotas represented the ‘fraternal cooperation of 
workers and peasants’ because it bridged agricultural production and industrial growth. 
To persuade the peasantry to accept quotas, the gmina claimed it had convinced them 
that historical processes beyond their control had already disconnected them from their 
‘old methods’. Agrarian reform expanded space in crowded prewar villages and 
eliminated petty property disputes; modernisation introduced electricity, industrial 
production, schools and education, hospitals, culture centres, roads, railways, 
employment, and waged labour for peasants. Modernisation was the gmina’s way of 
‘protecting them from capitalist exploitation by increasing production, elevating 
farming technologically, and elevating its welfare’. By ‘repressing speculation, 
lowering free marketeers, and disabling the enrichment of kułaks’ the gmina claimed 
that it had increased quota yields. In 1953, the peasants contracted 1,961,933 złoty more 
to the state than in 1952. They sold 143,734 złoty more quotas than in 1952. To 
celebrate, the gmina promised to increase the peasant’s agricultural quota by 10% per 
hectare in the following year, thus ensuring that all peasant energy would be aimed 
towards production for the state. 
Gmina archives from 1953 to 1954 were filled with peasants begging gmina authorities 
for quota reductions due to large family sizes, failed harvests, and deaths. Applications 
from peasants to abandon their land or pay lower property taxes were rejected. The 
gmina interrogated, arrested, and imprisoned peasants whom they suspected of evasion. 
Interrogation was so common that villagers in Dobra began to call it ‘onto the little 
carpet’ (na dywanek) where gmina officials arrested suspected evaders 72. By late 1954, 
the list of peasants refusing or unable to complete quotas was so high that the gmina had 
to take claims more seriously. The structural problems that generated shortages were 
never solved. In autumn of 1952, the secret police arrested tens of thousands of peasants 
                                                
71 COMECON in English. 
72 After the peasants’ competition against the nomenklatura over German valuables, 
carpets were rare on their farms.  
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across Poland who had failed to deliver their quotas. Although forced inspections of 
peasant farms were illegal and subject to penalties from the Party, it was not uncommon 
for kułaks who had met their quotas to be imprisoned for several weeks without trial 
while their quotas were confiscated by the state. In Gryfice village near Szczecin in 
1951, powiat (county) officials conducted illegal searches with the help of police and 
other authorities (Applebaum, 2012, pg. 276; Korbonski, 1965, pg. 163, footnote 9; 
Paczkowski, 1999, pg. 382). The gmina officials in Dobra inspected peasant farms for 
quota evasion—a feature of the quota system that dealt a blow to the gmina’s political 
legitimacy. 
Stasiek recalled one incident in which a neighbour, who was part of the gmina 
authorities, made false claims against his neighbour who had been evading his quotas. 
The peasant was imprisoned while Stasiek was given the order to thresh the peasants’ 
wheat. When they weighed the harvest, it was below the quota amount. The peasants’ 
wife pleaded with Stasiek not to take away the wheat because the family would have 
nothing to live off of. Instead, Stasiek wrote up a declaration to the authorities calling 
for the peasant to be released and for the family to only sell a portion of their quota to 
the state. But before he let the peasant go, a powiat-level official called Stasiek and 
chastised him for not obeying the law—possibly because of the forced extraction or 
because he attempted to get the peasant out of jail. When the peasant returned, he 
thanked Stasiek for helping save his family. There was no ‘hero’ in this story. Stasiek 
had extracted resources from a peasants’ farm and unearthed the neighbour’s 
dishonesty, but was then himself chastised when, having worked out what the peasant’s 
new quota would be, he worried that the quotas and tactics undermined the legitimacy 
of the gmina: 
Behind Communism, the quotas were a bane for peasants. It was a 
bloody pillory that was mandatory. People were bloody agonizing about 
it and if it were not for the quotas, then people would have a different 
view of the entire government. Those quotas butchered those peasants. It 
was the worst torture! 
Legitimacy was threatened by the action of the Volunteer Reserve Militia (ORMO) in 
Dobra who reported any deviant activity to the gmina. Maria, a Ukrainian small peasant 
farmer, recalled that a female friend with whom she had returned from mass one Sunday 
afternoon went upstairs to inspect Maria’s attic. The ORMO volunteer discovered four 
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tons of grain and ordered Maria to sell the quota to the GSSC. Such actors operated in a 
chameleon-like way blurring civilian and state identities and severely damaged the level 
of trust between villagers and civil society. The trend went the other way around too. 
Weronika, a Polish-German peasant turned factory worker recalled being under gmina 
surveillance: ‘It was like this: one saved some for himself, for the pigs, for the horse. 
And [one day] when I was out farming—! He came after me upstairs! And he looked 
around to see how much of the grain there was! I said, “So you see, Sir, I have to feed 
the horses, the pigs, sowing—what am I going to purchase with that later!?” And he 
calmed down somehow’. In other words, he started off as an ‘authority’ figure but then 
sympathised as a ‘villager’. It was this flip-flop between ‘villager’ and ‘authority’ that 
created a dangerous political atmosphere in the village. 
The gmina struggled to monitor worker and peasant practices around the state supply 
and distribution chain of agricultural resources. Its overriding point was that all 
shortages were caused by ‘resistant elements (elementy oporny) that are not meeting the 
quotas’ rather than by poverty. It was a ‘lack of mass-political work’ that caused 
peasants to meet only 60.5% of the livestock quota and 21.4% of the milk quota in 
1953. Without education in socialist discipline, peasants were ‘working how they want 
and what makes them comfortable’ and producing disproportionate quota amounts. 
Peasants did not ‘trust in the Committee and not enough ‘agitators’ were around to 
educate them about collective work. Meanwhile, workers lacked oversight in the state 
workplaces that processed the quotas: ‘The milk purchase points are not controlled and 
workers are working in such a way, that they fancy’. Control, according to the gmina, 
was key to lessening shortages as ‘the toleration towards speculators and kułaks, will 
increase the audacity of enemy elements (wrogich elementów)’. The gmina claimed that 
the lack of Party membership disconnected the masses from the political objectives of 
the state.  
Stasiek suggested that the gmina gave peasants partial leeway into the quota system: ‘It 
seems to me that every individual should rule his own house—the legal structures had 
to be avoided but delicately’. Peasants recalled using a variety of strategies to cut quota 
production costs. To meet their livestock quotas, they raised more beef than pork 
because cows grew faster and did not consume farm fodder. Although it was impossible 
to evade the quota totally, the gmina rented out state livestock to poor peasants who 
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then raised it off of their farm resources and sold it back to the state as their farm quota. 
Others took risks by purchasing lower quality agricultural goods on what in Poland was 
referred to as the ‘free market’ (wolny rynek) and transported these as their quotas to the 
GSSC while selling their higher quality agricultural produce for higher free market 
prices73. This was nothing unique. All across Poland, peasants ‘juggled their deliveries, 
cheated on land records, or used judiciously placed bribes to keep local officials from 
becoming too curious’ (Gibney, 1959, pg. 239).  
Hiding shortages was systemic. Officials found ways to ‘dislocate’ from the state 
supply chain that fed agricultural resources to the urban industrial areas. For example, a 
Director of a state brewery in the gmina was caught selling beer quotas on the free 
market (wolny rynek) instead of the GSSC. Officials were only unmasked when it was 
politically convenient. Stasiek even claimed that powiat officials forced the gmina to 
falsify the quota accounts: 
Sometimes we would sit late at night, accounting for the mandatory 
quotas, we interrogated peasants and what not. I remember one time, it 
was still in Dolina, not in Dobra, maybe it was 11 at night, heck. We are 
all sitting, doing the accounting, then the Secretary of the powiat level 
Committee comes—the guy I told you only finished 3rd grade, he was 
blind in one eye, this fat bull—He didn’t say “good-evening” or 
“cholera 74 ” only—“How many plans have you completed of the 
mandatory quotas?” and I say, “Sir, we are doing the accounting and we 
have about 80%”. There was a large knife with the papers and ink. How 
he hit his fist down on the desk! How the ink jumped from the casing and 
spilled all over the desk! I remember it like it was today! And he said 
“What—80%? You can only afford 100%!” And yes! He slammed the 
doors. He left without good-bye or anything! He said, “You have to 
report that you have 100%!” This is what discussions were like!  
The officials who fiddled quotas and gmina accounts did not suffer nearly the same 
punishments as peasants who were caught evading quotas. Zygmunt, a Polish kułak in 
Podwoda village, recalled that peasants faced ‘neighbourly help’ penalties for 
                                                
73 The ‘free market’ was not synonymous with the ‘black market’ (czarny rynek). The 
former encompassed transient, unregulated economic activity that existed in fields, 
buses, farms, etc. and where the exchange did not have to be immediate. The ‘black 
market’ (czarny rynek) occupied a physical market place in the city where the 
‘exchange’ occurred on the spot and the space was sometimes patrolled by the state.  
74 Akin to ‘oh heck’ in English.  
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incomplete quotas75. ‘If he did not give wheat or milk—there were a myriad of 
responsibilities. Those were the times that when one had a horse and wagon, one had to 
transport wood out of the forest because there was no storage. It was a responsibility to 
(transport) this and that amount, or the fine counted as this and that’. An archive from 
1953 indicated that due to the forestry’s high quotas, the gmina would use their special 
relationship to send peasant labour, horses, and wagons to ‘help’ in the transport of 
wood out of the forest76. This peasant labour was compulsory and the gmina imposed 
special requirements on each peasant to meet his wood transport quota for the forestry. 
Peasant refusal resulted in fines. At several gmina meetings in 1953, peasants 
complained that the transport damaged their horses and wagons and they demanded 
compensation. One peasant complained that the barley crop the Forestry Director had 
promised from the forestry-gmina field, in return for their help with the lumber export, 
had been delayed. The director responded that the peasants had told him they did not 
want the expensive barley. Officials in the archives complained that due to a resistant 
peasantry, the gmina and state forestry had to get ‘help’ from the adjacent state farm to 
transport the wood on the promise that in return the gmina would send peasants to help 
harvest the state farm’s potato quota77!  
The peasant farm became a state workplace, subject to surveillance, order, and 
cleanliness. Quotas constituted a spatial, economic, ecological, and cultural overhaul of 
the peasant farm into a state unit of production. This formal supply chain from the farm 
to the state was rigid and hierarchical. The state imposed quotas that peasants could not 
alter, without regard to differences in production or ecology, and with fixed prices and 
required sowing on available land. Further, it gave gminas the power to lower quotas. 
Production for the state was the primary function of the peasant farm; the family was 
secondary. When I explore kombinacja’s role in this process of keeping agricultural 
resources from being lost to the state, its function of differentiating a local economy 
against that of the state becomes much clearer.  
                                                
75 Neighbourly help was not eliminated with Stalinism, but were incorporated as a 
mechanism for punishing those who did not abide by Stalinist development. They were 
an effective mechanism for exercising local power. 
76 Law: Dz.U. z 1949, Nr. 63, Poz. 494; Archive: Nr. 17, 1953, pg. 3. 
77 Archive: Nr. 14, 1953, pg. 6 and Nr. 14, 1954, pg. 91. 
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Figure 20 Party representative leads peasants’ trek to sell quotas in Chojno, 1948-51. 
(http://www.chojno.pl/Lata_wladzy_ludowej_w_Chojnie_i_regionie.htm). 
 
5.4. Ostap Bender 
The gmina became increasingly paranoid about shortages, citing that while most 
peasants performed their ‘social and patriotic’ duty, there were those who went ‘into the 
hands of the speculators, helped them with elevating prices on agricultural goods, and 
promoted the disorganisation of providing for cities’. This resurgent localism, aiming to 
keep agricultural goods circulating within and between the villages rather than 
transferred to the city, was identified by the gmina as a capitalist attempt to subvert the 
state economy. ‘We see here, that peasants are cheating the Nation’, the archives boldly 
claimed. The point here is that shortages were not identified as an economic problem—
a possible structural problem with the supply chain—but as the peasantry’s usage of 
local alliances to disconnect from their role as producers for the state. In 1953, the 
gmina archive introduced a new enemy—the kombinator:  
The People’s Republic, is providing steps in the direction of shortening 
speculation, reducing black marketeers and disabling the enrichment of 
kułaks in the village by introducing mandatory quotas of grain, livestock, 
milk, potatoes, that have the objective of [...] holding-up speculation and 
  161 
forcing of kułaks, kombinators and those peasants, who are in this era, for 
the national economy, not meeting their citizen duties, and sometimes 
even their own farms, in the meeting of their duties within the State—We 
will not allow for this, for some dishonest citizens and speculators to 
disregard their duties to the State and to the legitimate and patriotic mass 
of peasants, in order to create the difficulty of providing for cities.  
The differences between kułaks, kombinators, and deviant peasants are fluid and 
complicated. Peasants who were not kułaks could be deviant through petty 
accumulation, even though they did not pay the enrichment taxes like the more deviant 
kułaks who were perceived as posing a direct political threat to the gmina. Kombinators 
could be anyone—represented as an anarchist—who aided the peasantry in diverting 
agricultural goods away from the city.  
It is intriguing that the term kombinator in the archives and in villagers’ narratives of 
kombinacja converge on this period. I am tempted to connect this emergence with the 
Sovietisation of the territories, especially the education system, which imported new 
words into the Polish lexicon. When I excitingly related my discovery of Ostap 
Bender—the ‘kombinator’—in Evgenii Petrov’s The Twelve Chairs to my mother, she 
nonchalantly replied, ‘Yeah, I know Petrov’. She could have been exposed to 
kombinators and Russian kombinatsiia through the Russian school system. This could 
explain the use of the term in the archives.  
But villagers had a different ‘origin’ story of kombinacja—one that emphasised 
continuity with the period of Nazi occupation. Kacper—who was a gmina official with 
his father Hektor in Dobra throughout the 1940s and 1950s—claimed that according to 
his knowledge, kombinacja originated under the Nazi occupation. Stealing from 
warehouses, smuggling resources on the side, and withholding mandatory quotas from 
the General gouvernement was the only way to survive. He sold calcium carbide from 
the Nazi warehouses on the black market but his kombinacja required the buy-in of the 
German brigadiers. His kombinacja aimed ‘to hurt the Occupant, the German’. Then, he 
added that Poles ‘learned during the German occupation, and then later, the same thing 
afterwards!’ During my interview with Krystyna, Zuzanna recalled how her father 
evaded the Nazis by selling food on the free market, as she later did in the 1950s. Her 
father had buyers who came at night to pick up the produce. However, there was a 
neighbour called Sajda who watched all of the activity and supposedly told on her 
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father. When the Nazis came to inspect the farm, her father went to the credenza to get 
the receipts and showed them to the officers. The receipts were all correct but then the 
officers enquired about his selling on the side. 
They ask father, “You sold that last night?” and father says “I sold it”. 
“And did you sell a pig?” “I sold it. The winter is coming”, he says, “I 
have to buy my children warm shoes, warm covers, warm clothes, 
because we all work—I have to put on warm clothes and eat well because 
we all work”. And he came up to father and said “Good Boer!” Because 
he had (resources) for the state, for himself, and for his entire family. 
And father said, “Well, someone here told on us pretty well”.  
Kombinacja stories like this told of peasants’ and workers’ encounters with the state—
and the quota system resurrected during this period in Dobra brought back the historical 
‘connection’ with the survival strategies practiced under the Nazis. They exemplify 
villagers’ narrative of how kombinacja crosses-over during regime change, can be 
transferred geographically, and can ‘jump in’ when conditions of the previous regime 
are unresolved by the new one. Thus, their explanation of the origin of kombinacja may 
not be accurate per se, given its existence in records prior to the Second World War, but 
it demonstrates their understanding of the context in which kombinacja can be initiated 
again or continued under new conditions. At some threshold, kombinacja is deemed 
necessary again for survival. Through this ‘beginning’ or ‘rebirth’ of kombinacja, we 
learn a lot about how it changes across time, that it gets appropriated by other groups 
(not only Poles), and that its manifestation is a critique of state power because it is a 
demonstration of resistance against the continuous subjugation and oppression of the 
peasantry, workers, and the poor. 
Thus, kombinacja under the Germans continued under the Soviets as a form of 
liberation from foreign occupation, but it changed slightly. Under Stalinism, villagers 
used kombinacja to subvert the formalisation of Stalinist policies in the village as 
peasants fought for control against the officials over the trajectory of the frontier. Thus, 
kombinacja became incorporated into the fabric of the local state and how the 
representatives of the state negotiated power relations between them, and how they 
worked together to evade the higher echelons of the state and preserve the local area 
from being stripped of all of its agricultural and industrial production for higher priority 
populations in the cities and abroad. 
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I am still unclear about why kombinacja is blanked out in villager narratives from the 
period of 1944 to 1949, even though they evidently used various strategies that would 
merit the term. Something important happened in this period that collectivised these 
narratives and experiences against the state. Perhaps official rhetoric, as indicated in the 
archive, had something to do with ‘narrating’ this deviant activity during this period. 
Hence, Kashubians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians expressed a similar ‘origin’ narrative 
of kombinacja dating back to the Nazi era despite different histories of the war and 
relations with the state. It seems that the kombinacja narrative was entangled in the 
processes of Polonisation and Sovietisation. Kombinacja can be transferred and linked 
up with other ethnicities and passed down; it is a learned element that peoplecan use in 
order to construct their solidarities, a flexible strategy that can be appropriated by an 
individual or group for a multiplicity of motives against a perceived ‘other’.  
The formation of class and the shared experience of poverty by the collective may offer 
some insight. Zuzanna explains how kombinacja became an expression of class 
alliances and competition over the theft of resources. For example, if peasants did not 
divert as much quota as possible for their private gain, then those quotas would be 
diverted by workers farther down the production chain. She gives an example of the 
kombinacja of quota meat in the state slaughterhouses:  
Z: Before, there was a lot of poverty, and people had to use kombinacja.  
Everywhere, everywhere. Even there was this slaughterhouse in Dobra so 
those workers, in the slaughterhouse here, stole the meat and sold it on 
the side. And the money went in their pockets [...] One stole and had 
(contact with) these receivers (odbiorcy), and so he kombinował at work 
by selling [meat] for less. That is kombinacja.  
Self: Where did they sell all of these things—the kombinators? 
Z: They had these receivers on the left (lewych odbiorców). They made 
plans, or he took the [meat] and left it somewhere, and then someone 
(picked it up) and it was this kind of kombinacja. 
Self: So it was an entire operation? 
Z: Oh, he who wanted to kombinować could. He stole from the state and 
sold it cheaper over there and put the money into his pocket. And it was 
the state’s because the state paid for the piglets, the livestock, no? So it 
was the state’s and it needed to account from it. 
 
Unlike the stories of the gmina officials or ORMO volunteers moving along the ‘official 
versus villager’ spectrum according to their whims, the rhetoric of kombinacja shows 
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that people began to manipulate that same spectrum of citizen/saboteur from the 
bottom-up. There is a sense of grasping hold of this strategy to get around the system; 
working out how the state supply chain worked and its ‘blind spots’ in order to siphon 
off resources. This maneuvering along the spectrum of ‘citizen’ and ‘enemy’ was an 
internalised part of the collective experience and the relationship with the state78.  
An exhaustive search through the PPR’s legislative journal from 1944 to 1989 showed 
no sign of a kombinator or of kombinacja. Some of the laws, however, were responses 
to this issue. Laws from 1953 fined and imprisoned those who engaged in petty theft of 
collective property; speculated, purchased, hid, or accumulated commodities that had 
been illegally purchased from state production sites, or engaged in any economic 
activity not incorporated in state plans; engaged in ‘self-proprietorship, or extract(ed) 
collective goods in any way’. Others ensured the ‘securement of a socialist discipline of 
work’, enforced strict fines for those who skipped work or engaged in non-work related 
activities; required all workers to report found resources, property, or materials to the 
state and transfer all workplace innovations to state ownership rather than using them 
for private gain79. The state was faced with an enemy who publicly resisted the 
proletarianisation process or fully rejected the state quotas; rather, the kombinator 
embraced state socialism because they could profit from and manipulate its system.  
5.5. Persuasion80  
The collectivisation drive in the territories was stronger than in any other part of the 
country. In 1953, a Powiat Committee81 sent Party cadres (aktywy) from Słupsk to its 
surrounding villages to persuade (namawiać) gminas to set up collective farms. One 
official who came to Dobra to spread the word used a lot of the official propaganda to 
persuade the gmina to accept the ‘vision’ for collective life. 
                                                
78 Lenin wrote that the medium peasantry had a ‘double nature’ as both allies of the 
state when they produced quotas and enemies when they clung onto their land. 
Kombinators  reflected this idea (Korbonski, 1965, pg. 185).  
79 Dz.U. z 1953, Nr. 17, Poz. 69; Dz.U. z 1953, Nr. 16, Poz. 64.; Dz.U. z 1950, Nr. 20, 
Poz. 168; Dz.U. z 1966, Nr. 22, Poz. 141; Dz.U. z 1950, Nr. 47, Poz. 428. Arts.1, 2, 23. 
pg. 641. 
80 For a fascinating read on ‘persuasion work’ (muncă de lămurire) during Romanian 
collectivisation, see Kligman & Verdery, 2011, pgs. 283-323. 
81 Komitet Powiatowy. 
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W.M. said that the Production Cooperative is a farm with a higher level 
of production that gives benefits for the members of the collective and 
the State. In this way, the People’s Poland gives the possibility of 
building a new life, a life that allows for the working peasant a better 
assemblage of material and cultural life. Villages that are established on 
the foundations of the Production Cooperative will eliminate the 
exploitation of small and medium peasants from the kułaks elements and 
will strengthen the worker-peasant alliance 82 , a foundation of the 
People’s Authority in Poland. And we here in Dobra have the possibility 
of setting up a Production Cooperative, so let us not waver, and get to 
work, and the People’s Poland will help us83. 
Language was key to identifying political orientation. Fearful of a backlash, the state 
carefully rebranded the Soviet term ‘kolkhoz’ as a ‘production cooperative’ 
(spółdzielnia produkcyjna). Most peasants—especially those from the East —were not 
fooled by the terminology. They called the production cooperative a ‘kołchoz’ to 
reference its Soviet origins. The choice of words was an important way of expressing 
one’s political leanings. Only the ex-gmina officials used the formal term to reference 
its Polish origin. In other words, villagers’ experiences with Soviet collectivisation prior 
to their resettlement to the territories informed them of what was ‘to come’ and primed 
them politically for the ‘import’ of collective farms on Polish soil. Thus, calling 
production cooperatives ‘kołchozy’ was a way to express that they knew the ‘true 
nature’ of the state’s goals.  
Persuading peasants to form ‘production co-operatives’ was a difficult task for the 
gmina. According to records, during a meeting about collectivisation in 1953, an official 
stated that only 35% of people were on the gmina’s side while the remaining ‘65% were 
enemy elements (wrogi element) that were only looking to intervene’. The gmina would 
have to engage in a campaign of persuasion: 
In this case we have to push with all our energy towards this important 
task and establish the Production Cooperative. In this area there is no 
lack of enemies, and in this case we need to equip ourselves and not 
allow for any plots from enemy elements (elementów wrogowych) like 
for example, there are those, who before the organisation of the collective 
had around 12 hectares and who are currently transferring this to worker 
                                                
82 The worker-peasant alliance did not mean the establishment of a worker-peasant 
class. It meant that the peasants would accept their role as producers for the urban 
workers. The ‘alliance’ subjugated the countryside to the industrialising process.  
83 Archive: Nr. 13, 1953, pg. 5.  
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allotment gardens (działki robotnicze), so as to not enter the Production 
Cooperative.  
Fearing collectivisation, some peasants abandoned land and became workers in the 
nearby state farm, where they received < 0.5-hectare allotment gardens on which they 
could grow produce and earn wages as landless agricultural workers. The gmina did not 
like this situation because it was left with surplus land but not enough labour to work it. 
The point of collectivisation was to ensure kułaks worked on the collective farms. But 
instead we have an example of how peasants could use mobility as a means to resist the 
command economy when it suited whilst supporting it on other occasions: the state was 
simultaneously resisted and accommodated.  
Collectivisation was ‘voluntary’, so persuasion through Party-recruited activists became 
the primary means through which collectivisation could spread across the countryside. 
One activist, Fidelis, explained his awkward position: ‘For the activist, it was the most 
difficult thing to set up those collective farms. Sometimes you needed to say what you 
needed to say in order to set it up. Anything to overthrow dissent’. Although Fidelis did 
not specifically persuade people in Dobra, his story shows how he was both an activist 
and shared the ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott, 1990) with the peasants whom he tried to 
persuade to collectivise. Meeting villagers who he did not know, the activists rehearsed 
the state propaganda even though they themselves did not believe the message. To 
Fidelis: 
We talked what they order us to talk about. “That this is good. That this 
is a collective! That it will be your ownership only! And that you will 
farm alone! That you will live like this! That they will not be squeezing 
you with taxes! That you will pay to the collective! That they will not 
take bread! You do not have to give away this and that!” We said it all! 
But the Director and I, we talked about it amongst ourselves about the 
subject: “What? It (collectivisation) will be even worse! The peasants are 
doing fine just as they are”. 
In instances where the peasant farmer was known, Fidelis and his partner were able to 
switch between propaganda and the hidden transcript in a performance that drew upon 
humour and sarcasm.  
I look at a peasant who lives there, is milking a cow on a Sunday after 
dinner. He was an elderly man, and we explain to him how it will be 
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good, how this and that—and he knew us and we knew him! And he says 
later in the conversation, “Yes, gentlemen, you are right!” He says, “In 
the collective, the bread comes in three forms!” And we ask, “What 
type?” And he responds, “The bread is wheat, rye, and crappy!” And then 
he says, “But the crappy one is always plentiful! There is no wheat 
[bread] and the rye from time to time!” But we laughed and we are not 
going to tell [the authorities] that this peasant said this because they 
would have locked him up. 
Using the formal transcript mixed with humour and sarcasm, the peasant was able to tell 
his friend the activist to go find someone else to talk to while still speaking the ‘truth’ 
about the poor quality of production on collective farms that would not make 
‘volunteering’ a good option. Fidelis added that sometimes, however, the discussions 
ended in a ‘consensus’ that the peasants would collectivise. Both sides knew, however, 
that this was only a performance of accepting the official transcript while at the same 
time disconnecting the village from the collectivisation process.  
There was a kołchoz here in Podwoda, in Dobra had a second one, and 
Byt, a third, but the rest held on (to land). Those villages used 
kombinacja. Simply, they promised that, “We will collectivise at ‘such 
and such’ a time”. Those establishing the kołchozy could then overlook it 
(kombinacja).  
In his explanation, kombinacja was an important tool for playing multiple roles that 
both appeased the state and local interests. By not reporting deviant activity, the 
activists gave the peasantry the space to scramble and limit the collectivisation process. 
While theoretically the collectivisation process nationally commenced before 
agricultural quotas were introduced in 1950 and 1951 in response to the shortages 
caused by lower yields on already collectivised farms, in gmina Dobra, peasants did not 
collectivise until 1953, after they had been subjected to individual quotas. This 
‘economic blackmail’ threatened small and medium peasants with higher tax rates, 
higher delivery quotas, exclusion from fertilisers, seeds, building materials, and 
subjection to szarwark, that persuaded them to voluntarily collectivise (Korbonski, 
1965, pgs. 174-5). 
5.6. The kołchoz  
Peasants who chose to collectivise agreed to give up the fields they had acquired from 
the agrarian reform and returned them to the gmina, retaining only garden plots. The 
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gmina then took on the task of creating the Agricultural Production Cooperative (RSP), 
or kołchoz. However, the gmina Dobra delayed the process of collectivisation. A 1953 
report stated that peasant members in Dobra’s kołchoz sowed only 33% of the land 
collectively, while the other 67% was sown individually in order to meet the corvée 
obligations prior to collectivising their fields. As kołchoźniki, they still were bound by 
their individual corvée debts from their previous farms, and had to repay that work in 
the kołchoz. Once the corvée obligations were met, the miedza—a several metre wide 
grassy property division between peasant properties—was ploughed over and they 
received a re-drawn 2-hectare parcel on which they were responsible for working 
towards the quota. So, the gmina ensured that the peasants paid off their debts before 
they could become kołchozniki.  
For Zuzanna and Konrad, collectivisation provided a much-needed relief from the 
enrichment taxes, individual quota deliveries, interrogations, surveillance, and corvée 
obligations that had reached an oppressive level in the early 1950s. The couple lived in 
the northern part of the village, an area populated with Poles. Before collectivisation, 
these peasants worked daily on their parcels located at the end of the street that opened 
up to vast expanses of fields. When the kołchoz opened, Konrad walked down the same 
street and onto the same fields with his neighbours; but instead of working their private 
plots, the kołchoźniki met with the Director who distributed work assignments, went to 
the Warehouseman to pick up their tools, were supervised by a Brigadier who watched 
them work, and then were paid by the Accountant after the mandatory farm quotas were 
sold for fixed prices to the GSSC. Zuzanna used pregnancy and childrearing as an 
excuse to evade work on the farm and instead spent the days working at home and 
carrying out reciprocal arrangements with other women. This division of gender roles 
became critical to how peasants diversified their economic activity outside of the 
command economy, while simultaneously accommodating the authorities. The only 
time Zuzanna ‘helped out’ (pomagała) was during major sowing and harvesting 
periods. While kołchoźniki on paper, the couple still straddled both wages and 
subsistence agriculture. 
The kołchoz was structured to work like this: once peasants agreed to collectivise, they 
pooled monetary or in-kind shares into a collective farm fund. They used that fund to 
buy or rent machines, seeds, and fertilisers from the gmina to initiate production. The 
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kołchoźniki then worked collectively to produce the quotas of grains, flax, potatoes, 
linen, beets, livestock, and dairy that they then sold to the GSSC for low, fixed prices. 
Their main function as producers for the state did not change; it is just that they had 
more access to state credits and capital to focus on that production. The peasants then 
pooled a portion of those wages to buy or rent more capital and continue into the next 
production cycle. Quotas were adjusted annually by the central government84. Thus, in 
order for the kołchoz to work effectively, there had to be a steady stream of information 
and resources exchanged between central and local authorities.  
In creating other kołchozy around the gmina, officials took a creative approach. They 
combined settlements and boundaries, and expropriated abandoned or underused 
peasant agricultural buildings as they saw fit without peasant consent. In 1953, a gmina 
official nonchalantly recommended that the gmina should transform a whole colony of 
sick and elderly peasants into a fourth collective farm or incorporate it into the adjacent 
state farm. The gmina pooled national land from the Land Fund (Fundusz Ziemi) to be 
worked by the peasants without any extra labour to offset the land85. Collective farms 
became a bricolage of whatever the gmina wanted to put into them to centralise 
production by peasant labour.  
Although they shared a cookie cutter style administrative structure, collective farms 
were built upon diverse economic landscapes, and became a pastiche of land, capital, 
and people. Since the rigid structure of the collective farms did not have mechanisms to 
adjust to the ‘uneven development of collectivisation’ (Kligman & Verdery, 2011, pg. 
143) between farms and on a regional scale, the people and local officials were left with 
no choice but to find stabilisers outside of the formal state apparatus to accommodate 
these rigid structures. There was one exception. In Podwoda village, several kilometres 
southeast of Dobra, peasants consented to collectivisation only if gmina authorities kept 
the miedza which they then continued to work by sharing machines, labour and 
fertilisers to meet the quota under the authority of the collective farm Director. The farm 
was collectivised enough to be defined as such on paper, but aesthetically ‘independent’ 
enough to please the peasants.  
                                                
84 Dz.U. z 1952, Nr. 29, Poz. 195.  
85 Archive: Nr. 14, 1954, pgs. 39, 166. 
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Figure 21 Zuzanna (top-centre) and Konrad (third from the right) on the collective farm 
in the 1950s. Zuzanna’s private collection. 
 
In reality, no collective farm could ‘produce on its own’. The collective farm ‘Hope’ in 
Starnice village was adjacent to a state farm and had a special neighbourly help 
arrangement with it—meaning, that the state farm allocated labour and resources to 
complete the kołchoz quota. To increase yields, the gmina organised labour flows in and 
out of its collective farms through neighbourly help. In 1953, Hektor ordered the gmina 
to send 200 people from the village as neighbourly help to pick potato beetles off of 
crops on other collective farms. Since independent peasants who had collectivised no 
longer had to provide neighbourly help to complete their quotas, the state was in effect 
formalising this relation with the peasants (that from 1959 included the introduction of 
wages for neighbourly help). According to a 1950 law, the gmina had to provide in-kind 
compensation of rye for neighbourly help in the form of labour, machine rentals, or 
horse services on gmina land. Neighbourly help, therefore, allowed the gmina to 
‘subcontract’ an unlimited amount of peasant services86. These were mandatory. A day 
                                                
86 On Siberian collective farms, directors forced gulag prisoners to work alongside the 
peasants (Vitebsky, 2005, pgs. 225-226). 
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before giving birth to my mother, Zuzanna had to go ‘work off’ (odrobić) her obligation 
on the farm by picking linen for the quota. 
According to accounts from 1954, some quotas (i.e. secale) in Dobra’s kołchoz had no 
chance of completion because no seeds had been delivered to the village. In addition, 
the gmina authorities divided quotas among the multiple kołchozy under its 
administration. Some farms received all of a certain seed variety, others did not. Each 
focused on meeting one mandatory quota—usually grain—while showing enormous 
deficits in all others. The gmina struggled to keep up with the quickly changing laws 
that determined annual quota prices, measurements of quotas per hectare, substitutions, 
and quota types. By the time necessary changes to the new quota law were made, 
another was passed that resulted in another reassembling of labour, capital, and space, 
in order to adjust to the new rules. Some quota yields were decreased because peasants 
decided against buying or taking out credit on expensive and environmentally 
unfriendly chemical fertilisers. They preferred cheaper, slower horses over expensive, 
more efficient tractors. In effect, production progressed at the peasants’ pace and failed 
to meet the increasing quotas provided by the state87.  
The collectivisation model centralised or ‘domesticated’ varied landscapes, economies, 
and people under the structure of a ‘collective farm’ but did not have the structural 
mechanisms to flexibly adapt to this variation. In effect, corruption and free market 
activity were a form of organising resources from various locations and people of 
different political and economic leanings, in order to ‘meet the plan’ and thus, stabilise 
the command economy. It was this system of broken-down collective farms that 
allowed peasants and officials to maintain their livelihoods. We see that kombinacja 
was the flexible mechanism that could be used by officials and the peasants to ‘do what 
they had to do’ to meet the state plan or meet their subsistence needs at home. All 
villagers realised that the less the collective farm resembled its Russian cousin, the more 
likely it would be that they would all survive through Stalinism. Differentiation was 
freedom.  
                                                
87 Archives: Nr. 14, 1954, pg.156 and Nr. 14, 1953, pg. 80. Laws: Dz.U. z 1959. Nr. 48. 
Poz. 294 and Dz.U. z. 1950. Nr. 51. Poz. 475. 
  172 
5.7. Peasant resistance 
Given the poor economic performance of the kołchoz, the question of accountability 
was raised. Who was responsible for poor production—the gmina or the kołchoźniki? At 
one gmina meeting, Ignacy, a kołchoznik, stood up and represented the collective farm 
workers’ frustration regarding the amount of grain that had been given away to the state 
in the previous quota cycle. Ignacy stated that ‘a rational form of livestock farming is 
difficult in our conditions [...] especially since last year there was a weak grain harvest 
and we gave almost all of the grain for planned purchase, and this year we do not have 
anything to feed the pigs, since there are shortages of animal feed and there is nowhere 
to buy animal feed’. He complained that the collective farm workers had asked the 
Director of the GSSC in Dobra to sell them animal feed but he had rejected their offer 
because he did not want to be accountable for selling unauthorised feed. Ignacy then 
complained that a poor farm makes life difficult for the kołchoźniki who have high 
quotas that produce poor wages which cannot cover the cost of their high taxes at 
home88. Again, the implications were not that the kołchozniki were rising up against the 
kołchoz or gmina, but that they felt their economic needs and access to resources was 
not being met by the authorities—which plunged them into poverty. 
Peasant frustration emerged not in total defiance to collective farms but as a response to 
the bureaucratic gridlock. It appears that the gmina did not do much about the peasants’ 
complaints, and tensions must have risen because at a later gmina meeting the following 
year, Zuzanna’s neighbour Teofil, a kołchoźnik, complained about the gmina’s 
inefficiency in paying wages on time; which delayed production and undermined a 
willingness to work. Peasants began to refuse to perform neighbourly help and other 
labour obligations for the gmina as a protest against their poor treatment. He said to the 
officials, 
When They (gmina) wanted to set up the collective farm, they drove 
around (persuading), but once They set it up, They left us to our own 
losses, and now They do not care to expedite their accounting process 
when collective farm members do not have anything to build up stock, 
there is no hay for horses, and this is having an adverse effect on the 
wood transport, this is why peasants are no longer taking part, because 
without hay they will not go to transport wood.  
                                                
88 Archive: Nr. 14, 1953, pg. 61. 
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In response, Wojtek a gmina official stood up and stated that the collective farm in 
Starnice village was the only one that functioned well in the gmina, ‘and the rest, work 
however they feel like it’. In retaliation, another peasant representative from the 
collective farm in Dobra, stood up and responded that ‘the caretaker of the collective 
farm members ought to be the Party leader’ and threateningly invited Wojtek ‘to come 
to the fields to take a look, and order (us) around’. But Wojtek continued with his 
‘argument’ that the only reason farms were not functioning effectively was because 
‘there are still these types of peasants, who approach mandatory quotas with strong 
resistance’. The gmina officials thought it was the peasants’ responsibility to mobilise 
resources and labour, while the peasantry thought that it was the gmina’s responsibility 
to supply them. This exchange demonstrates that the gmina officials knew how to 
manipulate the political rhetoric of peasant ownership in order to relieve themselves of 
the responsibility of fixing the problems on the farm. Ironically, it was the peasants who 
wanted ‘more’ gmina intervention. Neither party wanted to dedicate any more resources 
than they already had to the function of the collective farms. 
Peasants in the Łabuń collective farm in the gmina revolted. In 1953, a Party 
agronomist from Łabuń complained to the gmina that two groups of peasants had 
formed on his collective farm. Several peasants who got fired from the farm had sought 
out factory jobs where they got paid higher wages and incentivised the remaining 
members to drag their feet. Others abandoned their homes and sought work in the city 
while the rest were stuck with their pooled land89. There was no ‘leader’ to this 
resistance; peasants did anything so as not to work on the collective farm to produce the 
quota: setting fire to grain warehouses and barns, killing horses, breaking wagons and 
machinery, foot-dragging, drinking on the job. All of these actions subverted quotas.  
A ‘citizen’ Stanisław from Łabuń complained in 1953 that in that collective farm, 
machines worked all year, except when the sowing began for the season—that was 
‘enemy work’ (wrogowa robota). Gmina officials skeptically recorded peasants’ 
complaints that labour was slow due to hazardous working conditions with the new 
machines, their confusion about quota plans, broken machines not being fixed on time, 
or a dearth of ploughs. Officials in Dobra explained this as the ‘grey heritage of 
                                                
89 Archive: Nr. 14, 1953, pg. 101. 
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capitalism that presented itself with resistance from old classes’. This exposed the 
hypocrisy of power. Officials used past feudal institutions to establish control in the 
village, yet they critiqued anyone who ‘used’ past class alliances and strategies against 
the state plan. 
The kołchozniki used kombinacja to deal with the poor conditions in the kołchoz. The 
most profitable ventures were the kołchoźnik’s dealings with non-collectivised 
peasants. They sold kołchoz livestock to them so that the latter would not have to 
deliver their highest quality beef to the state, and others used kołchoz tractors to perform 
private services for the other peasants. Most kołchozniki, however, ‘domesticated’ the 
state property by feeding less fodder to the state livestock and diverting the rest to feed 
their own. They butchered the state livestock for private consumption and stole grain for 
private storage.  
Although there appeared to be some collective consensus that kombinacja was 
permissible, kombinators did not always work in the interest of the collective. Zuzanna 
recalled that peasants competed over limited socialist property, which contributed to the 
lack of trust even among the peasantry on the farm: 
So, I want something from you and I  will use kombinacja to take it, no? 
Or trick someone. Lie. That is kombinacja for oneself. It is this kind of 
kombinacja, and it was around in [...] the kołchoz. There was kombinacja 
or stealing, or trickery between one another, or trick the state, and there 
were such kombinators—it was this type of kombinacja. 
When Zuzanna and Jagoda reminisced about the kołchoz, they said that the only reason 
why kombinacja was allowed was because the Dobra version was not like the Soviet 
Union. Jagoda said that ‘the kołchozy were not like the kołchozy in Russia. It was like 
this. They planted seeds, took what they wanted, and they gave the rest away to the 
state. It was like this, you see? [...] It was not yet completely nationalised [...] They 
threshed, they talked, the bag of wheat they took to sell for a litre of vodka’. Zuzanna 
added, ‘Because in Russia, you could not steal anything. They were real kołchozy’. 
Half-broken collective farmers gave the peasants a lot more access to resources than the 
‘real’ collective farms in Russia.  
Zuzanna then recalled how Konrad found two kołchoźniki stealing some bags of wheat 
one time and hiding them in the fields to pick up later that night. Instead of 
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collaborating with them, Konrad stole their bags and took them home and fed them to 
the chickens so that there would be no ‘trace’ of theft. The two women called it ‘taking’ 
(branie), not ‘stealing’. This is important because they played on the state propaganda 
that collective farms belonged to the peasantry. If that was the case, then the peasants 
could decide what to do with the socialist property, and thus how they split it up would 
not have constituted ‘theft’ if it was ‘their’ property all along. At the same time, 
however, they understood that the kombinacja needed to be kept ‘invisible’ from state 
surveillance. During the wheat harvests on the collective farms, Zuzanna recalled that 
the gmina sent out watchmen. ‘There was such order, that “God forbid something is 
stolen!” Because he was so just that he had to report that immediately and they imposed 
fines for it. That is was not allowed!’ Thus, they knew the ‘formal’ rules against 
‘taking’ state property.  
Gmina officials themselves carried on this kombinacja especially where there were 
‘manipulable resources’ that were either undefined by legislation or that constituted a 
surplus to the obligatory quota plan (Humphrey, 1998, pg. 9). In 1953, one Party 
official Jacek accused Wojtek—the top Party official in the gmina—of selling wheat 
from an abandoned peasant farm, not to the nearby collective farm ‘Starnice’ to help it 
meet its quota or to workers, but to independent peasants at free market prices in order 
to complete their quotas. Wojek responded that the collective farm had cancelled its 
order and instead he sold the wheat to two village mayors and 20 ‘poor’ un-collectivised 
peasants to help meet their individual quotas. The matter ended there as the Director of 
the collective farm in Starnice, rather than enquiring further into what his farm had lost, 
took to the stand and stated that his collective farm is the best in the entire gmina. It 
does not appear to me that the officials cared about the law; rather, they cared about 
preserving their position of power by providing a public good so that they could weave 
in and out of the law. This demonstrates the grey zone of kombinacja. 
In sum, kombinacja was a response to the lack of capital, delays in distribution of 
wages, and to the gmina’s continuous breaking of the promises it made during the 
collectivisation process. It was not an attempt to find a solution to the structural 
problems plaguing the farm; rather, kombinacja represented peasants’ individual 
attempts to solve immediate subsistence problems. Keeping the kołchoz broken was 
certainly beneficial for everyone—the gmina did not have to do its job or secure 
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resources for the farm, and the kołchoźniki did not have to exert labour to earn wages 
for which they were not paid on time. ‘Taking’ resources and selling them or 
incorporating them into their domestic spheres was a way to avoid confrontations with 
the gmina.  
The collective farm structure was formally too rigid. This forced officials to use 
kombinacja to move resources and people around, to ensure that the quotas were met 
and to maintain a general level of political satisfaction. Kombinacja provided 
institutional flexibility. Likewise, the peasants were faced with structures that 
undermined their uses of mobility that had allowed them to move across a landscape, 
find seasonal work, and use it as a bargaining tactic for higher wages (Hann, 1981, pg. 
18). In the collective farm, peasants were locked into a landscape where their only 
mobility was granted by the local officials. To make ends meet, officials and peasants 
used kombinacja to leverage control over the flow (and pace) of labour and resources 
between the household and the state supply chain. Thus, the strategy was used to 
stabilise the command economy, preserve the political power of the officials, and to 
meet peasants’ subsistence needs90.  
5.8. Conclusion: flexibility is survival 
This chapter has shown how the crystallisation of the ‘formal’ state apparatus and its 
economy resulted in the crystallisation of ‘informality’ (kombinacja), both in villagers’ 
collective memory and in the state’s official archives. In its attempts to gain consent in 
its co-optation of economic activities and chaining them to the command economy, the 
state assiduously avoided using stigmatised Soviet terms like ‘kołchoz’. However, 
peasants were not convinced. They used the Soviet term kołchoz instead of spółdzielnia 
produkcyjna (production cooperative), the informal chłop (peasant) instead of the state 
term ‘rolnik’ (farmer), and dwór (manor) instead of pole (fields). While peasants 
claimed that they were not ‘forced’ to collectivise, they used the term ‘persuasion’ 
(namawianie) in a pejorative way. The use of ‘informal’ terms exposed the villagers’ 
                                                
90  In 1956, Stalinism was abandoned and peasants were given the right to de-
collectivise. The collective farm in Dobra partially de-collectivised in 1957, with the 
gmina redistributing land back to the peasants. The remainder of the farm became 
concentrated in the nearby Ukrainian colony, which continued to work on 314 hectares 
or 2.7% of gmina land until the 1980s (Davies, 1982, pg. 582; Żurawski, 1985, pg. 53). 
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political dislocation from the state’s development goals. It subversively accented the 
historical continuities of power dynamics between peasants and masters from the feudal 
period that were acting out within the framework of Soviet-modeled agriculture. Only 
officials used the ‘formal’ terms that endorsed the state’s imaginary. 
With such attention given to the choice of words and their political meanings, the 
villagers’ reincarnation of the colloquial term kombinacja does not appear accidental. 
Like the other terms, it was suggestive of continuities with the pre-1945 past. It was a 
perfect arch-nemesis to the formal state apparatus that attempted to make all economic 
activity legible and ordered. Its origins were obscure, it was not locked in a single class, 
it was vague (making combinations of what?), and its application was diverse. Anyone 
who knew that a kombinacja had been committed recognized that alternatives to the 
state economy were possible, without knowing exactly what was done to produce those 
alternatives. The term was informative but simultaneously preserved its vagueness. For 
this reason the state officials themselves, while castigating it in the archives, used the 
strategy for their own goals. It became the perfect strategy to disrupt the crystallisation 
of form. 
Villagers’ recollections from this period reveal kombinacja’s adaptability. It can be 
transplanted, from Nazi labour camps to Soviet collective farms, can be adopted by 
other ethnic and linguistic groups (it is not just a Polish phenomenon). It was also a 
form of accommodation. For one thing, state officials used it to stabilise the ‘formal’ 
economy. As people became more aware of ‘how’ the state worked, they became more 
aware of its ‘blind-spots’, and that in those spots it was possible to play, manipulate, 
and switch between both sides. That there was a way to both be a citizen and participate 
in state socialism, while at the same time, ‘filling in’ the subsistence deficits of the state 
economy’s structural problems and the gmina’s ignorance of them, was posed to the 
domestic unit of production. These sideline activities diverted the flow of resources that 
were destined for the city and helped strengthen an agrarianism and localism. 
Kombinacja partially disconnected the village from this supply chain. Narrating village 
history through this ‘marker’ of kombinacja helps unearth some of the ‘contexts’, 
‘sites’, and ‘situations’ in which the peasantry and the state sometimes agreed and 
sometimes disagreed on labour, capital, and the development of the village. 
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Chapter 6 
Worker-peasants’ kombinacja: 1956-1989  
6.1. Co-opting circles  
Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 and the failure of Soviet collectivisation in Poland set the 
stage for the process of de-collectivisation. Accordingly, the gmina of Dobra gave 
collective farm workers the option to take back the land that they had pooled. However, 
national authorities had to keep a short leash on the peasantry with ‘kułak’ tendencies. 
Any peasant who took back over two hectares of land was forced, once again, to 
produce agricultural quotas for the state. To increase quota production, the state had to 
find a way to grant access to both fertilisers and machinery without giving peasants the 
option of investing in private machines and expanding their land holding. At the Eighth 
Plenum in 1956, Władysław Gomułka—First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ 
Party—renounced the mistakes of Stalinism and promised a ‘Polish road to socialism’. 
His ‘Polish October’ reforms reintroduced Agricultural Circles (Kółka Rolnicze, KR, or 
circles), a popular and beloved form of peasant self-government widely used by Polish 
peasants in the prewar and interwar periods.  
The state hoped to ride the coat tails of the circles’ popularity as counter revolutionary 
organisations that had mobilised right-wing, Catholic, Polish peasants against an 
occupying power. A state-censored academic advertised the circles as ‘insignificantly 
subject to formalism and bureaucracy’ (Gałeski, 1973, pg. 147; in Hann, 1985, pg. 192, 
footnote 3.). Yet, rather than replicating the prewar and interwar versions, the state 
revised the system significantly to link peasant production to the command economy 
and to central state authorities. Before 1939, peasants worked their private plots and 
gave their harvests and products to circle stores that then sold them for a commission 
(see below). The new circles’ function was to provide paid agricultural services using 
state machinery on de-collectivised peasant farms to expedite their quota production to 
the state. Peasants who needed those services would benefit from those circle services. 
They could join them as ‘worker-peasants’ (robotnik-chłopy) who both produced quotas 
on their individual farms and earned wages in the circle providing agricultural services 
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to others. Gomułka transformed circles from platforms for organising right-wing 
capitalists to ones promoting left-wing socialism. 
Nevertheless, due to the circles’ nationalist undertones and history, their reintroduction 
into the Polish way of life served as a rubric for the empowerment of the peasantry. 
Furthermore, as the state had demonstrated itself, circles were flexible and could be 
recalibrated towards many goals. In this chapter I show how the peasants who joined the 
circles as worker-peasants used kombinacja to mould them so that it subsidised as much 
of their quota production costs for the state as possible. While formally called ‘worker-
peasants’, they accommodated the state by acquiring ‘proletarian’ characteristics, but 
only in order to satiate their ‘peasant’ needs. Kombinacja permeated into the state 
services sector and gave worker-peasants greater authorised movement across larger 
geographic expanses to make informal deals on the job. Finally, by tracing the actions 
of the worker-peasantry in Dobra’s circles, we begin to detect how kombinacja changes 
over time, how it both adapts to and transforms different structures, and how it bridges 
different eras, geographies, ideologies and state practices. I argue that worker-peasants 
used the circles as a platform and kombinacja as a strategy to regain economic and 
political leverage. In Bourdieusian terms, this chapter shows how this habitus 
(kombinacja) spilled over from one field to another as the same networks of peasants 
from the collective farm were transformed into a new ‘class’ by the state, but faced the 
same shortages and problems with the officials in the circles as they did in the collective 
farm.  
6.2. Worker-peasants  
Research on worker-peasants reveals how they have combined waged labour and 
agricultural production in multiple contexts, for varied motives and at different scales. 
Studies have focused on proto-industrialised sites in 18th century Hungary (Sozan, 
1976), 19th century Saxony (Quataert, 1985), 20th century Transylvania (Beck, 1976), 
Hungary (Hann, 1980), Romania (Verdery, 2011), northern Italy (Holmes, 1983), the 
Swiss Alps (Minga-Kalman, 1978), and India (Chari, 2004), and how independent 
peasant proprietors have sought waged labour opportunities in order to supplement their 
agricultural production. Germans called this class Pendler due to their swinging back 
and forth between the dual obligations of family and factory. They ‘react(ed) partly like 
peasants (e.g. in questions of land ownership or farm prices), partly like workers (e.g. 
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about wages and strikes)’ (Bergmann, 1975, pg. 87; Holmes, 1983, pg. 742). What has 
unified all of these studies is the argument that through this mobility across the agro-
industrial divide, worker-peasants partially resolve spatial, labour, production and 
wage-labour problems, caused or inhibited by formal institutions like the state. 
This last point is developed by Holmes (1983) in his study of how the state actively 
‘preserved’ a worker-peasant class in northern Italy. The research traces the worker-
peasantry back to the 16th century during the growth of the textile industry and 
peasants’ temporary migration patterns to urban centres throughout the Industrial 
Revolution in the 19th century (pg. 735). It was not until the emergence of an industrial 
base in the Friuli region that the worker-peasantry could simultaneously engage in 
peasant agriculture and wage labour on a daily basis. Then, the emergence of the 
welfare state, that directed programmes at that particular group of people, halted their 
‘proletarianisation’ and strengthened the worker-peasantry’s class position. The state 
made being a ‘peasant’ intolerable and then curbed the peasantry’s transition into the 
working class. Holmes’ study offers comparison with my research on how the state 
sought to define and control the worker-peasants in the circles, and how in turn the 
workers adopted strategies (combinazione in his study) to combine wage-earning and 
agriculture to prevent being locked-in to a class status.91 In Poland, worker-peasants 
have existed at the interstices of the socialist system. After the de-collectivisation of 
agriculture, a million peasants asked for only 2 hectares of land back from the state—a 
move that exempted them from agricultural quota production. Sixty percent of those 
peasants supplemented their domestic agricultural production with waged labour. They 
owned farms and worked in manufacturing, building and construction, and transport 
and communication industries, as well as various trades like tanning and carpentry. 
There were full-time workers who sought temporary agricultural work on state or 
peasant farms in order to secure food for their family (Franklin, 1969, pg. 211; Lewis, 
1973, pgs. 50-51; Nagenstat, 1991, pgs. 147-174). In their own ways, worker-peasants 
‘solved’ food shortages by creating informal linkages between production on their farms 
and demand in the cities. 
                                                
91 Combinazione referred to a cultivator’s improvisation in combining multiple sources 
of sustenance, like renting and sharecropping land with temporary wage-labour 
pursuits. One who used it was called a figura mista (transient actor) (pg. 736). 
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Worker-peasantries formed through demographic shifts. Peasants’ children who were of 
working age secured full-time waged labour in the factories. In her study on worker-
peasants in a textile factory in Zambrów, Fidelis (2010) shows that despite factory 
work, peasants’ world views and traditions informed their social identity, which they 
used to negotiate socialist labour by setting the pace of production. When Celia, a 
factory spinner, had ill parents, she took time off work in the factory for two weeks to 
help out on the farm. She was fined for the work evasion, but evidently fulfilling the 
potato harvest was more important than fulfilling the production plan at the factory 
(pgs. 117-118). By prioritising her family’s labour obligations in quota production over 
her own obligation as a worker, Celia had to individually ‘solve’ the contradictory 
labour obligations that the state system had imposed upon her.92 Her ‘fine’ exposed the 
state’s rigid system of keeping the working and peasant classes separate, even if they 
were in the same family. Through her actions, she accommodated some parts of the 
socialist system, at the expense of other duties.  
There is a difference between those people who displayed worker-peasant 
characteristics, such as Celia cited by Fidelis (2010), and those whom the state formally 
referred to as ‘worker-peasants’. The former sought domestic solutions across the agro-
industrial divide; the latter was a state solution to the agro-industrial divide. The latter 
formed a specific type of worker-peasants who owned peasant farms over 2 hectares 
that produced agricultural quotas for the state and earned wages in the circles that 
provided services to the peasant farms that, in turn, would expedite meeting the quota. 
These are the worker-peasants that are the subject of this chapter. The peasants in the 
previous chapter used kombinacja to wiggle out of their locked-in class. Similarly, the 
worker-peasants tried to get around their locked waged and agricultural labour 
arrangement with the state. Again, the pattern of kombinacja and immobility (property 
and class) emerges: kombinacja yet again was used as a way to loosen up class 
structures that threatened to lock them in. 
                                                
92 Celia crossed the agro-industrial divide because she was stuck in her worker class 
and her parents were in the peasant class. She went outside of her state-defined class as 
a worker, while the Rubignacchesi’s combinazione was a response to the state’s efforts 
to preserve them as a particular worker-peasant class. Both used innovative actions to 
manoeuvre along the ‘interstices of agrarian and industrial systems’ and organised 
along familiar rather than other institutional lines, but their relationship to the state 
differed (Holmes, 1983, pg. 746; Holmes & Quataert, 1986, pg. 194).  
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6.3. The nationalism of kombi(nacja) 
Circles have a rich prewar history as ‘a form of peasant self-government’ that began 
with Poland’s Prussian partition in 1862, and spread across the Austro-Hungarian and 
Russian partitions until the First World War. In the midst of Russification and 
Germanisation campaigns, circles provided an institutional platform to teach the Polish 
language, organise cultural activities, distribute loans, sell produce in ‘circle’ stores, 
open savings banks and agricultural schools, and to hold meetings. Peasants used the 
circles to pool, buy, and share machinery, as well as to establish consensus on new 
methods and technologies—all to secure a ‘Polish’ economic niche in agricultural 
production. In the Austro-Hungarian partition, circles used their facilities as informal 
arbitration courts where local conflicts between Polish peasants in the circles were 
solved at the village level. In the Russian partition, staszic circles formed which banned 
the participation of clergy and the gentry in peasant affairs. As flexible institutions, 
circles were adapted to local conditions and rose to prominence as the institutional 
platform to make economic and political demands of foreign governments (Stauter-
Halsted, 2004, pg. 129; Galaj, 1973, pg. 346). Józef Piłsudski (Chief of State after the 
reconstitution of Poland), Stanisław Mikołajczyk (fought against a Soviet takeover), 
Henryk Sienkiewicz and Władysław Reymont—both Nobel Laureates in Literature—
were raised in the circle and became symbols of the system’s power to reclaim Polish 
national identity (‘Historia Kółek Rolniczych’, 2013).  
Although dissolved during the First World War, circles as an organisational model for 
peasant agriculture resurfaced in the interwar period (1919-1939) when Poland was 
reconstituted as a nation-state (see Figure 22). This was the first time that the circles had 
emerged as legal and legitimate peasant institutions in Poland. They were controlled 
under the Central Association of Agricultural Circles—a right-wing, nationalist 
organisation—and grew to about 250,000 members in 1938.93 When the Nazis invaded 
Poland in 1939, they dissolved the circles once again and subjected members to 
mandatory quota production towards the Nazi war effort (Korbonski, 1965, pgs. 288-
289). Zuzanna’s story about her father’s simultaneous production for the Nazis and 
selling off domestic produce on the free market (see Chapters 4 and 5) revealed how in 
                                                
93 Circles (Gazda kör) in 1930s Hungary were sponsored by the Catholic Church and 
excluded non-Catholics and craftsmen (Lampland, 1995, pg. 52). 
  183 
this period, peasants who had once belonged to the circles, used kombinacja to survive. 
Here, kombinacja and nationalism, or kombi(nacja)94, converged upon the experience of 
the peasantry who now answered to Nazis, not the circles. The ‘message’ of kombinacja 
as a form of resistance against quotas, foreign domination, and subversion of the 
countryside to the needs of the industrialising cities, all posed interesting questions of 
how the peasantry would cope with the reintroduction of the socialist variant of the 
circles95. After the war, there were cases of workers attempting to reestablish prewar 
and interwar circles, but the state dismantled those attempts because their very function 
was to preserve Catholicism and nationalism. The Polish state was wary of religion as 
an organising platform for cooperative organisation which could serve as an incubator 
for anti-statist ideas96. 
 
Figure 22 Peasants belonging to a circle get together in front of the circle store to 
measure the cereal harvest in 1937. The priest (right hand side) supervises. (‘Dobra 
Koło Limanowej’, 2014). 
 
                                                
94 ‘Nacja’ means ‘nation’. 
95 After 1945, the Peasant Self-Help Association (later the GSSC), attempted to create 
circles but the Party shut them down and created Machinery Cooperative Centers 
(GOM) that subcontracted state machines to collective farms from 1951 to 1956.   
96 Catholic cooperatives also existed in Spain (Gibson-Graham, 2006, pgs. 125-126). 
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6.4. Peasant self-government or backdoor collectivisation? 
The agrarian reforms introduced during the Polish October of 1956 returned 83% of 
collective farmland back to the peasantry97. New laws authorised the distribution of land 
titles to peasants and lifted bans on building new farmsteads, buying land, and dividing 
land among family members. As a result, land sales skyrocketed as peasants sensed the 
return of a prewar-type, private sector. The state loosened its grip on the peasantry and 
abolished grain and potato quotas for peasants who took back under 2 hectares of land 
during the reforms. Anyone with over 2 hectares of land was still forced to produce 
quotas for the state, as they had done prior to the collectivisation of agriculture. Bans on 
buying agricultural machinery and equipment were lifted, but few peasants purchased 
them due to the lack of income and the residual fear from the de-kulakisation campaigns 
(see Chapter 5). Peasants went back to using less efficient ploughing methods with 
horses as well as to working land without fertilisers. This limited their quota production 
(Davies, 1982, pg. 596; Korbonski, 1965, pgs. 284-291; Kruszewski, 1972, pg. 124; 
Lewis, 1973, pg. 48).  
Gomułka gave peasants the go-ahead to voluntarily form circles to expedite quota 
production on their farms. The circles would help the private sector increase production 
while making it dependent upon the technological machinery owned by the state (Hann, 
1985, pgs. 40-41). These circles ensured that the agricultural services sector would be 
under state ownership and not under peasant control as they had been in the prewar and 
interwar periods. However, circles were their own workplaces, meaning that they 
owned land and had their own quotas to fulfill. Peasants did not have to be worker-
peasants in the circle but the circles were the only places where peasants could officially 
both work and receive agricultural services. These vertically integrated, state 
workplaces with a state administration, would link peasants with agricultural machinery 
left over from the defunct collective farms. Peasants became both producers of state 
quotas and providers of state services for peasant producers. Nevertheless, the 
reintroduction of the circles situated peasants’ struggles against the Polish state in a 
broader historical narrative of using the circles as a platform for economic and political 
emancipation.  
                                                
97 Laws: Dz.U. z 1957, Nr. 39, Poz. 172.; Dz.U. z 1958, Nr. 17, Poz. 71. 
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The initial reaction was very positive. Peasant membership swelled up to 327,000 in 
just two months. At the Third Congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) in 
March 1959, Gomułka defined the circles as ‘a mass organisation of working peasants’. 
But the state began to dislike what this mass organisation had started to look like. 
Medium peasants (5-15 hectares) dominated the circles—a pattern reminiscent of the 
collective farms—while the smaller peasants were kept out (Korbonski, 1965, pgs. 289-
294). The Party began to fear that spontaneous growth—and the opportunities for self-
governance—would subvert the circles’ socialist goals and ‘would play into the hands 
of capitalist elements and speculators’. By 1958 and 1959, news outlets complained that 
peasants had not joined with state-peasant co-operation in mind, and that they were ‘not 
fulfilling their obligations as citizens’ by evading taxes and delivering quotas (Lewis, 
1973, pg. 61).  
Circles had to be in tune with the state’s economic interests of uniting the small and 
medium peasants. The state wanted to co-opt medium peasants’ production capacity and 
knowledge, but wanted small peasants to countermand the medium peasants’ kułak 
tendencies. To this end, Stalinist-style propaganda hinted to small peasants that the 
wealthiest ones limited their entrance into the circles and that they would have to join to 
minimise their exploitation by wealthier peasants. With the return of anti kułak 
propaganda, peasants became increasingly suspicious that the state would take over 
their de-collectivised land grants once more. Wary of ‘backdoor collectivisation’ (Hann, 
1985, pg. 41), they began slaughtering their private livestock and focused their efforts 
on the reconstruction of their farmsteads rather than on production. Tax exemptions 
from heavy taxation, financial support, and machinery from the state were not enough to 
get small peasants to join. Without small peasants, membership growth dramatically 
slowed down in the second half of 1957 (Korbonski, 1965, pgs. 291-298; Kruszewski, 
1972, pg. 129; Lewis, 1973, pg. 54; Staar, 1962, pg. 90).  
Although the state initially sold the peasantry on the idea of circles, its Stalinist-style 
tactics and propaganda conjured up suspicion about the state’s real intentions. Gomułka 
was conscious of this hesitation and defended the socialist reinterpretation of circles 
during his keynote address at the First National Conference of Agricultural Circles in 
September 1959:  
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Here is the new role of agricultural circles (sic.)—their socialist meaning 
which, whether one likes it or not, is bound to increase [...] Some may 
say: we do not want such circles which will develop in the socialist 
direction. Let them go and some will quit. We are not afraid of that. They 
will be back because there is no other way. The great socialist truth that 
only through collective work [...] can productivity be raised and peasants’ 
needs be satisfied will mature in the peasants’ minds. (Quoted in 
Korbonski, 1965, pg. 296) 
But even peasants who belonged to the Party were unconvinced. By 1961, only 68,000 
out of 127,871 peasants who were members of the Party worked in circles. To prove the 
state’s patronage of the independent peasantry, the Fund of Agricultural Development 
was created by Gomułka in June 1959 to buy tractors and other modern machinery to 
replace horses in the circles. But the funds were unevenly distributed. In 1961, 873,000 
peasants (out of 13.5 million) belonged to 25,563 circles in 60% of Poland’s 42,000 
villages. But, 11,000 of those circles had no machinery and by 1969 prospects looked 
quite bleak as 34,814 circles shared only 12,165 tractors between them. These half-
functioning circles paled in comparison to the very-well funded and organised state 
farms. Hann (1985) argues that the circles’ objective was to ‘enable peasants to produce 
more without adding the private ownership of land’. Yet, concurrently, ‘authorities were 
determined not to permit the peasantry to modernise, even on these terms’. The state 
could not revoke legal ownership of land, but at the same time, ‘peasants were not 
encouraged to expand their farms to an economically warranted size’ (pg. 42). There 
was a sense that the worker-peasants were second-class citizens to the state farm 
workers98. 
Nonetheless, the circles reinvigorated the medium peasantry with an organisational 
platform that could be used for their own benefit. By 1972, 55% of Polish peasants were 
employed in circles, earned higher per capital incomes, and experienced a higher quality 
of life than full-time peasant farmers (Franklin, 1969, pg. 211; Korbonski, 1965, pg. 
295; Kruszewski, 1972, pg. 129; Staar, 1962, pgs. 92, 179; Wädekin, 1982, pg. 213). In 
the next sections, I will show how worker-peasants in Dobra’s circle used kombinacja 
to ensure that the state subsidised their domestic quota production and that they were 
able to make money on the side. 
                                                
98 Thanks to Dr. Frances Pine for this point. 
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6.5. ‘State’ and ‘domestic’ work in the circle 
In 1956, the gmina partially de-collectivised the collective farm by downsizing it and 
giving it to the Ukrainian peasants in a nearby colony to manage it on the outskirts of 
the village (until 1989). In 1957, the rest of the collective farm land was redistributed 
back to the peasant farmers. Zuzanna took only five hectares as a precautionary strategy 
out of fear that enrichment taxes, high quotas, and kułak propaganda would return. 
While her move, like that of others, supported the state’s campaign to ‘proletarianise’ 
medium peasants by making them small peasants, there was the realistic problem of 
what to do with the unused gmina land. It was in the gmina’s interest to give out as 
much land as possible so that it did not have to mobilise labour from the state and 
collective farms to work its land. The problem was probably resolved by the gmina 
adding the land to the downsized collective farm. Even so, without extra machines to 
jumpstart production, quotas of grain on peasant and the collective farms in the gmina 
slumped due to ‘poor soil and low culture in agricultural production’ in the view of a 
local historian (Żurawski, 1985, pg. 52). It is unclear how the gmina resolved this 
transitional phase from 1957 to 1960, however in 1961, six years after Gomułka’s 
speech, a circle finally opened in Dobra. The same peasants, who had once been 
identified as kułaks, re-organised as collective farm workers, and then peasant farmers, 
were being transformed once again into a new class, the ‘worker-peasantry’99. 
The circle’s circulation of currency, machines, and services increased productive 
capacity and flexibility between peasant farms and the state. This is what worker-
peasants were supposed to do: as peasants, they were supposed to order state services 
from the circle to expedite agricultural production on their independent farms and to 
produce their quotas for the state, which they subsequently sold to the GSSC (see 
Chapter 5) for fixed, low prices (Davies, 1982, pg. 596). Circles provided official state 
training for the peasantry. Peasants who ordered services worked in the circles—so they 
responded to those orders by putting on their ‘worker’ hats and providing those services 
with state machinery from the circle. Zuzanna explained how the process worked: 
                                                
99 Zuzanna first settled in the territories as a peasant in 1946, then became a ‘kułak’, 
then a kołchoźnik in 1953, then an independent peasant again after de-collectivisation in 
1956, and finally handled the domestic end of quota production on the farm while 
Konrad was employed in the circle as a worker-peasant in 1961.  
  188 
So, when you wanted to do something in the field, you went to the circle 
and ordered it, and then the tractor driver would write it down and then 
the treasurer would also write it down, and when the work was done then 
the tractor driver had this paper and wrote down the first and last name, 
and how many hours he worked, how many hectares, for there to be no 
kombinacja! It had to be done right and then the peasant for whom he did 
the job would sign. Oh and that [paper] went to the treasury and then if 
the peasant was honest he would go right away and pay, the treasurer 
would tell him how much he would have to pay the cashier, and then he 
paid for the completed work. 
From 1961 to 1973, the circle was presided over by its own administration in the village 
with all circles in the gmina vertically integrated into an Agricultural Circle Cooperative 
(SKR100), headquartered in the gmina and overseen by a single administration that 
included a Director, Vice-Director, Head Accountant, Worker Accountant, Warehouse 
Accountant, and Brigadiers. All across Poland, villages lost local control over their 
circles (and machines) to their communes (Hann, 1985, pg. 41). Figure 23 shows what 
an SKR station looked like in one gmina. The SKR headquartered in Dobra ran circles 
in ten surrounding villages, controlled a total of 500 hectares of land, and employed 59 
worker-peasants. Brigadiers from each circle made daily journeys to receive and then 
communicate orders from the gmina. Once more, the system was designed to ensure 
that state quotas were harvested from peasant and SKR land on the state’s terms. To 
illustrate the extent to which this imperative was ‘organised’, on one occasion an SKR 
from Wrocław, 450 kilometres away, sent workers to the SKR in Dobra to ‘help’101 
with the wheat harvest during a rainy season (Żurawski, 1985, pg. 52).  
While villagers loved the circles, nevertheless there was a sense from the interviews that 
kombinacja and a sense of subversion to the system persisted. When explaining worker-
peasant activity, Zuzanna continued to say ‘peasants’ (chłopy) when she referred to their 
formal ‘worker-peasant’ role in the circle. Once again, the use of language (as in many 
cases in Dobra when the peasantry did not use the same formal definition as the state 
did) emphasises the fact that the state was assigning them different names and setting up 
new institutions for the same purpose, to produce the state quotas.  
                                                
100 Spółdzielnia Kółek Rolniczych.  
101 Meaning ‘neighbourly help’.  
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Figure 23 An SKR service station (‘Witamy w Różażnce’, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 24 The circle headquarters in Dobra now privately owned by a gmina official. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
 
When he was a collective farm worker (kołchoźnik), Konrad went to the collective farm 
down the street each morning and worked there to produce the quota for wages and then 
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bring stuff home (through kombinacja) to meet the needs of his household plot. Now 
that the land was de-collectivised and the circle opened up, Konrad went to the circle 
each morning and provided agricultural services with a tractor for wages before 
returning home to work on his land to meet the quota to be sold to the GSSC. 
Previously, as we have noted that Zuzanna stayed at home with the children and 
engaged in exchange deals with women in the village. Under the new regime Zuzanna 
still stayed at home and worked during the day to meet the quota on their farm. The 
worker-peasant identity was gendered. Konrad fulfilled the ‘worker’ roles and Zuzanna 
fulfilled the ‘peasant’ roles without breaking any law102.  
These new ‘worker-peasants’ adjusted kombinacja to fit this new economic structure. 
Given that their peasant households were both the unit of consumption and production, 
worker-peasants prioritised their ‘peasant’ over their ‘worker’ identity through various 
kombinacja strategies within the circle. Zuzanna recalled that in the circle, ‘There was 
state work but private work. If one wanted to use kombinacja, then he found it for 
himself’. A shadow services sector formed as worker-peasants who performed services 
made deals on the job. Matylda, a retired circle accountant from the 1970s and 1980s, 
explained that worker-peasants used state machinery from the circle to perform private 
services that had not been ordered or reported. Konrad’s kombinacja activity was 
precisely this type of service; the work he provided on the job was extended as 
‘moonlighting’ off it and he would bring back resources from the circle warehouses for 
use at home, similar to what he did on the collective farm.  
My grandfather Konrad and father Czesław comprised a kombinacja team. Konrad was 
a tractor operator who drove to farms to provide ploughing services. My father worked 
as a (non-Party) scheduler on the farm and kept track of who ordered what, which 
services were carried out, who had outstanding balances, etc. Whenever Konrad’s farm 
required ploughing, he either ploughed it using the state tractor without reporting it to 
the circle or if and when he reported it, Arkadiusz either erased it from the record or put 
down a lower hectare amount than had actually been ploughed. This kombinacja of 
decreasing or fixing Konrad’s balance to the circle meant that Zuzanna and Konrad’s 
farm was receiving a discount from the circle for using the machinery on their own 
                                                
102 Gendered worker-peasant strategies existed in the Podhale region of Poland (Pine, 
1998) and Romania (Verdery, 2011). 
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land. The more he ploughed over with the tractor, the less he would spend paying the 
circle (for the service he performed anyway) and the less time he would spend on the 
farm. Through kombinacja in the circle, Czesław alleviated Konrad’s and his own 
responsibilities back on the farm. They manipulated the boundary of subverting the 
state’s division of resources and labour across state workplaces and farms, but displayed 
proletarian characteristics of ‘not feeling like working as much land’. Thus, the shadow 
services sector was tightly knit into the operation of the circle because workers were 
finding more ways to stay on the job rather than go home and work extended hours to 
meet the state quota. Peasants’ quota production responsibilities affected kombinacja 
activity in the state workplaces. 
 
Figure 25 Konrad’s medal from the 
circle: Fight, Work, Socialism. 
Zuzanna’s private collection. 
 
Although the shadow services sector was a new adaptation of the kombinacja strategy, 
the worker-peasants ‘took’ or ‘stole’ circle property. Since peasants had to now meet 
their personal production quotas, the incentive to take property from the circle to 
subsidise quota production for the state was intensified. The circle had its own 
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agricultural fields and hired worker-peasant labour to work its harvests to meet its 
workplace quota for the GSSC. Zuzanna explained that ‘usually in the circles there was 
a lot of kombinacja near the threshing, near the digging of potatoes, oh, there were 
many of those who used kombinacja so that there would be some for oneself. One did 
not look to the state’. Again, there was a lot of code-switching between descriptions of 
‘taking’ and ‘stealing’ socialist property. When Zuzanna and I went to conduct an 
interview with Matylda in her 1970s-era bloc apartment, built for workers and 
administrators in Dobra, the two spoke comfortably about kombinacja like old friends. 
While in other conversations with Jagoda (peasant), Zuzanna referred to kombinacja as 
‘taking’ socialist property, whereas in her discussion with Matylda, Zuzanna switches to 
the word ‘stealing’—accommodating to Matylda’s identity as having been part of the 
circle administration.  
Z: Stealing, how they stole! 
M: Yes, we had to keep watch, what is going on, where everything is, 
no? They only waited around for Him [authority] not to notice.  
 
However, both women were aware of the tactic used and the sites at which it was used 
(near the threshing sites): 
Z: And near the threshing? Near the threshers? Was not there a lot of it 
(stealing) there? 
M: Yes! When the combine came, everyone just kept a look out (for the 
opportunity). 
 
There were hints of a well-networked, underground operation of transporting circle 
resources and selling them to buyers on the free market. Zuzanna related to Matylda her 
run-in with the underground export of grain from the circle. She emphasised that she 
and Konrad had been on the circle administration’s side and had reported the ‘thief’ 
directly to the circle director. 
Jolek stole grain, brought it to our barn at night. He put the grain into the 
barn. They scratched out the hay, and the entire wagon of grain, and they 
covered it with hay, and we did not know anything about it! I walked up 
to him and said this ‘Jolek, what are you doing here?’ And he says, 
‘Quiet, quiet, quiet, quiet’. He takes out the grain on the bags, and is 
putting it onto the wagon. And I say, ‘Where is that grain from?’ ‘Quiet’, 
he says. And he put it onto the wagon for the person and the person drove 
to the GS(SC) and had the grain to himself. My husband comes home at 
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night from the field. I tell him, and he opened his eyes, ‘When did he 
bring that grain?’ He told Bartek! (Circle director).  
‘Taking’ and ‘stealing’ were politically charged terms that obfuscated rather than 
revealed the process of blurring the lines between state and domestic property. Other 
examples were when worker-peasants domesticated the circle’s grain harvest to feed 
their own livestock that they subcontracted to the state or sold it as ‘their’ quota to the 
GSSC, or sold to other peasants and worker-peasants at market prices. Through that 
process, they altered the circle’s economic standing and increased the porosity of its 
borders.  
Matylda explained that the circle worked on an honour system and would not penalise 
worker-peasants who worked their own farms with the machinery as long as they owned 
up to doing it:  
Self: Did they (workers) have any discounts on the machines to plough 
their own land? 
M: They could take it and no one counted that he ploughed it for himself.  
Z: He wrote everything down. 
M: He wrote it down but— 
Z: Bartek said that when he did a hectare, he waved his hand.  
M: Yes, but, you know, he could plough his own land, but he just had to 
say it because if he went to plough someone else's land but said that he 
went to plough his own, no? 
 
So there were some ‘permissible’ spaces of exercising kombinacja using the state 
machinery. It is this free space to use kombinacja that seemed to be at odds with 
Matylda’s later statement reiterating the old Party rhetoric; that private work damaged 
the circle and worker-peasants’ future earnings:  
There were mottos: that ‘we need to work’, that ‘this is ours’, and that ‘it 
is a cooperative’ and so and so. So, it was like as if it was ours. Everyone 
knew that he had to work honestly, one could not steal because ‘that is 
our clean money’, no? From the profits, there were various bonuses, and 
if they (worker-peasants) did not labour, did not work, did not guard it, 
then they got nothing. 
Administrators, including my father, used kombinacja in the circle. Zuzanna mentioned 
that ‘supervisors oh, the brigadiers, and the director and he cared about it, and looked at 
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it, and inspected it, but they kombinowali anyway. It the administrators did it, then 
everyone else could do it. Zuzanna interjected that Bartek worked his own fields which 
set the example for the other peasants. Kombinacja was only permitted when an 
administrator used it. Adamski (1965), who worked on circle interest groups in Polish 
villages run by circles, wrote that patronage was used in awarding more profitable State 
produce contracts, deciding the location and free usage rights of state machinery in the 
circles, private use of state-owned land, access to credits, distribution of building 
materials, as well as temporary non-agricultural jobs (cited in Lewis, 1973, pg. 77). 
Lewis (1973) writes that chairmen of circles owned large farms, held numerous State 
contracts, and ‘represented the “private future” interests concerned with keeping ties 
with the State at a minimum; for him existing links were lucrative yet they did not pose 
any threat to private property’. Administrators of the circles, who were the ‘old élite’, 
directed state credits intended for the circle for their own independent farms (pg. 77). 
Although I am not aware of such dramatic kombinacja among the administration in 
Dobra’s circle, it is clear that when worker-peasants noticed even some form of 
kombinacja by the administrators, they entered in the struggle to wrangle for those same 
resources.  
Zuzanna once highlighted how kombinacja readjusted to the new aesthetic 
transformations of labour in the fields. In the 1960s, worker-peasants initially threshed 
by hand and bagged the harvest on site under the surveillance of a brigadier or director 
by their side—which required more negotiation with those who surveyed the workers in 
order to execute kombinacja. In the 1970s, mechanical combine harvesters replaced 
worker-peasants and expedited both the threshing and bagging of the grain. Worker-
peasants followed the combine and picked up the bags while the director drove around 
in a car observing the operation. Zuzanna explained: 
When the combine was riding around, then the combine immediately 
threshed the grain, no? And the bags of grain, the grain went into the 
bags and the bags were thrown out…because there was a director on the 
field and when the field is big then the director cannot walk all around it, 
no? [so] he drove a motor [car]. And those who picked up the bags and 
threw them, they threw the bags into the bushes so that the director could 
not see. And then later, they stole them. And the money goes into his 
own pocket. Oh! And that was all the state’s. Oh you see? Because it all 
went to the state. Because if there were no combines, then people made 
mounds which were then slowly threshed next to the other, but then the 
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combines appeared, then one had to guard the wheat because people 
kombinowali so much!  
In 1972, the state introduced the contract system which mandated that all farms 
(peasant, collective, circle, etc.) should produce agricultural quotas but that they had the 
choice over what they wanted to produce and how much they wanted to sell to the 
GSSC. Peasants’ quota amounts were no longer measured by the gmina based upon 
their hectare size, but rather peasants decided for themselves how much they wanted to 
subcontract to the state to sell at fixed prices103. However, the persistence of kombinacja 
to offset quota production costs on the peasant farms suggests that even with the 
contractual quotas, the peasants evaded some facets of mandatory contracting because 
they had never consented to the fixed, low prices of the state. Most wanted to sell at 
market prices and selling to the state had become a chore. With farms decreasing their 
quotas to the state, the state had to engage with the market for peasants’ produce. 
In sum, when peasants produced individual quotas prior to collectivisation in 1953, they 
exercised kombinacja by withholding quotas from the state or purchased produce on the 
free market to sell to the state as if it was their own; in the collective farm from 1953 to 
1956, peasants exercised kombinacja when they extracted the farm quotas which they 
kept for themselves or sold on the free market for profit. In the circle from 1961 to 
1989, worker-peasants employed kombinacja by using state machines to perform and 
benefit from private agricultural services, as well as extracting circle harvest grain and 
selling it on the free market. Interestingly, when in 1972 the state introduced mandatory 
contractual quotas that gave worker-peasants the option to choose which resources and 
quantities they would want to subcontract to the state from their farms for fixed prices, 
it did not appear to initiate any change in the kombinacja culture, the worker-peasantry 
continued to prioritise their ‘peasant’ interests of their hybridised identities.  
During the economic transition from 1989 to 1999, circles diminished by 40%104, the 
circle in Dobra was privatised and all of the worker-peasants lost their jobs and their 
farms. Stasiek, an ex-gmina official, emphatically claimed that the state ought to have 
returned the circle in Dobra to cooperative peasant ownership that would have 
                                                
103 Law: Dz.U. z 1971, Nr. 27, Poz. 253. 
104 ‘O spółdzielniach: Działalność gospodarcza Jednostek Kółek Rolniczych’ (2013).  
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continued to operate as in the prewar period. In the Rolnicy gmina in the Wielkopolska 
region, Zbierski-Salameh (2013) observed that during the economic transition in 1991, 
the chair of the circle ‘skillfully used the local agricultural circles (sic.) as a form to 
channel members’ growing resentment of the one-sided policy of trade liberalisation’ 
which translated ‘into societal opposition to the state and its policy’ (pg. 199). Peasants 
still continued to use circles around Poland to organise their agrarian platform and voice 
their concerns on a national level. Many Dobranians complained that the SKR had been 
unnecessarily liquidated during the capitalist transition. Without its services and 
machinery, peasants had to invest in their own machines and find their own labour to 
continue agricultural production into the 1990s. The fall of the SKR represents 
villagers’ frustrations with the nomenklatura’s push for liquidation from which they 
would privately benefit rather than readapting the SKR to the capitalist model from 
which it had originally sprung in the pre-Soviet era. 
6.6. Conclusion: combination and (im)mobility 
How worker-peasants deal with problems and how much permissible space they have to 
do so changes across contexts105. This chapter has shown how the worker-peasantry in 
the circles in Dobra was ‘locked’ in a worker-peasant class. They had nowhere else to 
seek employment outside of their formal roles as peasant producers for the state and as 
workers in the Agricultural Circle who provided services on those farms. Such 
constraints physically inhibited their movement. A worker-peasant, who was not at the 
circle on time or working on the state quota on his farm in the afternoon was treated 
with suspicion. There were only so many ways to manipulate the divide between state 
work and private work. Kombinacja became as much an aesthetic manipulation as an 
economic one. A tractor operator, who looked like he was doing his circle job on 
another’s farm, might have been using state machinery to do private work or he might 
have been working his own farm while a relative recorded in the circle register that he 
was doing something else. Worker-peasants used kombinacja to bridge their state roles 
as waged workers and quota producers by domesticating state resources in the circle in 
order to subsidise their quota production in the domestic sphere. They reorganised the 
labour time and state resources that would be used to meet both of their obligations to 
the state in the public and domestic spheres.  
                                                
105 Thanks to Professor Gareth A. Jones for this point. 
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This differentiated them from the kombinacja used by other worker-peasants in Poland 
and others mentioned in the literature (see Holmes, 1983 for example) who split their 
time earning wages in factories and then sold their labour in return for food on peasant 
and state farms.106 The worker-peasantry in the circle was mostly concerned with ‘how 
can I manipulate my state work and access to state resources to minimise the amount of 
time and labour to produce those state quotas on my farm?’ The cheaper and easier it 
was to produce their quota, the more ‘space’ the peasant had to produce food for their 
own families. Their kombinacja pattern, that consisted of domesticating state resources 
to subsidise quota production reveal that the worker-peasantry not only bridged agro-
industrial divides but bridged the ‘state’ and ‘domestic’ spheres of everyday life. 
Through kombinacja they reworked the economic relationship between peasant and 
state, rather than just solving money or food flow problems.  
 
                                                
106 The Rubignacchesi had more rights to choose how to use combinazione like renting, 
share-cropping, and waged labour pursuits, than the Polish worker-peasants in the 
circles at least until 1972 when contractual quotas were introduced. Rubignacchesi, 
even though locked in their class status, possessed the freedom of movement to engage 
in combinazione whereas Polish worker-peasants had to manipulate the circles to 
ensure that the resources came to them without too much suspicious movement outside 
of the workplace or the village. 
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Chapter 7 
Workers’ kombinacja: 1970-1989 
7.1. Golden age 
Edward Gierek’s rise to First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party in 1970 
ushered in policy measures that sought to rapidly modernise the entire economy, with 
high investments of capital and technology borrowed from the West with hard-currency 
credits. Between 1970 and 1973, the state abolished compulsory quotas and introduced 
flexible contracts in 1972, increased prices on agricultural goods bought from the 
peasants, ushered in easier access to credits for peasants to purchase machinery, and 
improved social security provisions—all of which led to the growth of agricultural 
production (Kubik, 1994, pgs. 22-24). But, since most of these investments were based 
on ideological and political imperatives and not a drive to transform the structure of the 
command economy, mismanagement destabilised the flow of resources.  
Widespread food shortages led workers across the country to riot and protest for higher 
wages. As early as December 1970, workers in Szczecin and Gdańsk rioted against high 
food prices and demanded a 50% wage increase. After the protests, the state froze price 
increases on certain foods and commodities, however by 1974 the price of virtually 
everything was increasing faster than the real income of the population (Ibid.) The 
state’s underdeveloped services could not adjust effectively to demand and its 
dependence upon large enterprises generated delays for commodities and services 
(Kurczewski, 1993, pg. 143; Mazurek, 2012, pg. 298; Wedel, 1986, pg. 80). The 
combination of increased production on peasant farms and nationwide shortages of food 
due to market distortions caused the ‘explosion of the unofficial economy’ and 
‘unplanned secondary processes that resonated throughout social relationships’. 
Families focused on arranging their own access to food through family and other 
networks (znajomość) (Mazurek, 2014, pg. 298). People found ways to access and 
distribute resources through networks rather than relying on official channels in the 
command economy. The ‘second economy’ became publicly visible, ‘a sophisticated 
and virtually open trading community’ that took ‘place on well-travelled public 
sidewalks and over the telephone, in masked language, between respectable citizens’ 
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(Steven, 1982, pg. 48; Wedel, 1986, pg. 61). Goods were distributed through personal, 
not state, allocation. People began to ‘share the burdens of the state and undertake the 
delicate task of distribution’ and instilled their own sense of ‘rationality’ into that 
process (Kenedi, 1982, pg. 97). Wedel (1986) states that these informal networks helped 
the state meet its ‘basic food production and distribution needs’ and hence ‘stabilised 
the formal (state) economy during economic crisis (pgs. 53-60). The second economy 
became a more reliable conduit of food distribution from which both the citizens and 
the state benefitted. Yet, Wedel (1986) observed that this domestication of state 
authority twisted concepts like legality and morality: ‘what is legal is not often 
considered moral; what is illegal is often considered moral’ (pg. 61).  
During this period, Dobra saw the quiet ascent of its industrial identity and a swelling of 
its working class. The Garbarnia state tannery that opened in 1962 employed a third of 
the village (over 600 workers) and drew in migrant labour from the surrounding 
countryside well into the 1980s. A small shantytown of temporary worker housing 
emerged alongside of the tannery—as did the modern, cement block apartments for 
permanent workers in the 1970s. The sons and daughters of the worker-peasantry—like 
my mother—often worked full-time in the tannery while living in expanded family 
household arrangements with their worker-peasant parents and helped out on the 
peasant farm to meet the state agricultural quota107. This generation was eager to build 
their own lives and homes away from their parents’ farms—increasing the demand for 
building and housing materials from the ‘agricultural’ section of the village. During 
economic crises when the state stores were empty, workers wanted food that the 
peasants produced and peasants wanted the industrial commodities that the workers had 
access to in their workplaces.  
This chapter shows how workers used kombinacja en masse to gain access to food, 
commodities, and conduct wage negotiations as the state fell apart. They were model 
citizens who understood that they co-owned the workplace along with the state. 
Workers used this idea of co-ownership to justify their use of kombinacja to meet their 
domestic needs in diverse and complex ways. In effect, these ‘co-owned’ state 
workplaces (and the workers’ roles within them) became an extension of the domestic 
                                                
107 Peasant farming decreased, which represented progress in eliminating medium and 
large-scale peasant farms (Żurawski 1985, pg. 53). 
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sphere and workers redistributed and circulated state resources as they saw fit. Not only 
was their kombinacja changing the state economy, but the free market as well. In 1981, 
a ‘professional speculator’ complained to a Polish journalist that ‘There has been a 
flood of thousands of laymen, thousands of amateurs, who try to kombinować, 
grandmothers, pensioners, cashiers, drivers, various marginals and other bunglers, who 
have made a mess of a decent economic activity’ (Drozdowski, 1981; quoted in 
Kochanowski, 2010, 93). This kombinacja, in its most amplified and highly organised 
form, was the only economic strategy that kept people alive as market capitalism began 
to encroach into their everyday lives. Rather than being an expression of ‘resistance’, 
kombinacja began to insert its own organising and hegemonic power into the order and 
everyday economic and social life in the village.  
7.2. Kombinacja in ethnography 
By the 1980s, workers openly practiced kombinacja in Dobra. Most workers’ 
definitions of kombinacja revolved around the experiences of shortages and ration cards 
. Some defined kombinacja as the marginalised poor’s ‘method for survival’ and 
‘resourcefulness’ (zaradność), while others chastised it as a route towards ‘enrichment’ 
(zbogacić) in order ‘to acquire material happiness’. The resources in demand were 
‘things that were rare’ and ‘things that one could not buy’ like meat, coffee, cement, 
wood, paint, metals, stationery, fuel, appliances, mechanical parts, screws, toilet paper, 
etc. Any resource that became extracted through kombinacja was called a ‘kombinacja 
resource’ (zkombinowane). Networks were lifelines. For example, Fidelis, a gmina 
administrator by that time, had his coffee shortage solved one Christmas holiday by his 
daughter who worked in the clothing section of a state department store in the city, and 
who used her networks to illegally acquire a packet from the food section. Everyone had 
their own solutions. Workers garnered the chutzpah to use kombinacja because by now 
they were conscious that ‘everyone did it’. Fidelis, Kacper—an ex-gmina official—, 
and Gosia, an ex-factory worker, said that kombinacja ‘went full force’, and ‘was 
practiced everywhere’ across ‘the whole nation’. Those who did not engage in 
kombinacja faced suspicion as state sympathisers. 
A small body of anthropological studies, that mentioned the existence of kombinacja in 
other parts of Poland, suggests that the villagers in Dobra were right: kombinacja was a 
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nationwide phenomenon during the 1980s108. In his anthropological study of 1980s 
Wisłok village in southeastern Poland, Hann (1985) wrote that kombinować was an 
‘ugly verb’ which ‘refers to the whole undignified, frequently underhand and devious, 
maneuvers persons must make to accomplish anything’ (pg. 91). In her ethnographic 
work studying Łódź and Podhale in the 1980s, Pine (2007) writes that kombinacja was 
a skillset that one had to know. ‘Trzeba umieć kombinować’, which she translates as ‘It 
is necessary to know how to combine things, to juggle’, was a common phrase spoken 
by her informants. Pine argues that this type of work of combining resources around the 
household was ‘the most basic way in which villagers make themselves social persons 
and craft their social world’ (pg. 193).  
Other definitions of kombinacja have emphasised its negative qualities: ‘to scheme up 
an ingenious, often illegal solution involving what outsiders might define as theft’, 
‘‘finagling’, ‘searching out gaps, loopholes, and semi-legal solutions within the official 
distribution system’, ‘thinking’, ‘apprehending’, ‘trying to find a solution’, ‘swindling’, 
‘contriving’ and ‘contacts that allow one to beat the system’. Examples of it varied: 
‘stealing light-bulbs from public elevators for use in “private” flats’ or ‘ironing already 
validated bus tickets so they could be used repeatedly‘ or ‘bribing a watchman with a 
bottle of vodka to “get” a bag of cement from a municipal construction site’ or ‘using 
company time and resources for personal ends’ (Barcikowska, 2004, pg. 1; Kifner, 
1983b, pg. 1; Kusiak, 2012, pgs. 296-297; Mazurek, 2012, pg. 306; Pawlik, 1992, pg. 
79). The most accurate are Barcikowska’s (2004) broad definition of kombinacja as ‘the 
distinct way in which Poles negotiated their everyday lives’ (pg. 1), and Kifner’s (1983) 
definition of an ‘underground alternative’ (pg. 1) which opens up the definition as a 
platform for economic innovation and difference, rather than an ethically-defunct 
strategy of survival (as if the state was any ‘more’ ethical!).  
Another important contribution the literature makes is to explore just how complexly 
intertwined kombinacja is with other informal activities. Pawlik (1992) in particular has 
coupled kombinacja with code words and phrases like wynośić (‘to lift’ or ‘take out’), 
załatwić coś (‘to arrange something’), pogadać z kimś (‘to chat with someone’), coś 
przynieść (‘to bring something back’ from the workplace), opić coś (‘to drink something 
                                                
108 Conjugations of kombinacja. 
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over’ in order to arrange something), and przyswoić sobie (‘domesticate for myself’)—
all used to refer to making deals that were unplanned by the state. He explained that 
kombinacja was different from the other second economy activities like reciprocity, 
mutual help, bribery, and the other Polish phrases, because it could refer to ‘larger-scale 
wheeling and dealing’ (Pawlik, 1992, pgs. 79, 93). Stenning et al. (2010) claimed that 
there was a ‘fine line’ between załatwić (arranging) and kombinować in that the latter 
had/has ‘more dubious connotations of speculation and dealing. The border between 
these terms was policed by moral judgments of others’ behaviour, which had either 
crossed this line or veered into blatant illegality (e.g. ‘taking’ property from another 
person rather than the state)’ (pg. 260, footnote 5). How kombinacja intersects with all 
of these is still largely unexplored. 
How workers justified the use of kombinacja highlights the ‘common goods’ problem 
under state socialism. Barcikowska (2004) observed that the ‘use of kombinowanie was 
nourished by the system’s championing, even fetishising, of “common goods”’, 
meaning that ‘the ownership of all property by the state combined with the ownership of 
the state by the people meant that universal common goods belonged to all. Everybody 
was the owner of everything’ (Barcikowska, 2004, pg. 1). They knew the Party mantra: 
that state production belonged to everybody. Hence, ‘We are all robbing Poland’, said 
one informant in Pawlik’s study (1992, pg. 81). According to that rationale, ‘If common 
goods belonged to everybody, they belonged to nobody. No single owner was 
responsible for any particular item in the public realm, to care for it and ensure that it 
was used in a proper way’ (Barcikowska, 2004, pg. 1). Thus, using kombinacja was a 
state-given right to arrange the state as the workers saw fit, which happened to be into 
the domestic sphere. Fidelis’s definition of kombinacja as a ‘right’ highlights this issue 
quite well. ‘Kombinacja was not stealing. It was not stealing. It was normal. If I could 
not purchase it, I had to kombinować’. He added, ‘To steal it, it would have been that 
she would have stolen it, put it in her pocket, and would not put the money in the cash 
register. That is stealing. But, she took it and sold it to normal people. It has to be 
someone who has a right to it’. Thus, according to his definition, it was not stealing 
because the cashier was part of the workplace and a rightful co-owner of the state who 
operated the store that sold these goods. State action against kombinacja would have 
subverted that party mantra because it would be a declaration that the state had separate 
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interests from workers, and that the State held exclusive ownership over common 
goods. 
Another theme was that people were conscious that kombinacja against the hegemonic 
power corrupted them. Kombinacja was the product of, as Barcikowska (2004) put it, ‘a 
Polish reality corrupted by the communist system that ruled the country for over four 
decades after the second world war’ (pg. 1). Retaliation through kombinacja was a way 
to restore the balance of power and resources, as per the quote, ‘The State robs me, I rob 
the State, and it all comes out even’ (Pawlik, 1992, pg. 89). The notion of the state 
‘robbing’ workers of the commodities they produced was a common feeling of 
resentment. In Mazurek’s (2012) study, Grażyna, who during late socialism worked in 
the Kobra shoe factory, wondered how it was possible that the factory produced so 
many shoes at the same time that shoes remained rationed in the state economy. The 
only way to access those shoes was to use kombinacja because they were not sold in the 
store (pg. 306). In Steven’s (1982) study, a sociologist explained that: 
‘We have all been criminalised. When you start to buy meat regularly on 
the black market in defiance of the law and get away with it, it’s not long 
before you start buying other things too. From there it is a short step to 
cheating the system in every way open to you’ (pg. 52).  
Barcikowska (2004) explained how this cycle of corruption broke down the state 
system:  
The citizen may have been enslaved by the communist system, but he 
was a client of it, feeding off what goods communism offered him. These 
were supposed to come free, but in reality homo sovieticus paid an 
enormous price: a spreading corruption of mentality where 
kombinowanie was encouraged and even sanctified. Thus, although 
kombinowanie could feel like a way to outmaneuver the system, in reality 
it became a mere adaptation to its habitat (pg. 1). 
‘Adaptation’ prompted more shortages, officially, and in turn encouraged kombinacja. 
A possible explanation for this relationship between processes that seem to both 
preserve the system and prompt its apparent self-destruction, is that various local groups 
competed for scarce resources in the common goods pool—ones which even the 
nomenklatura were competing over. In Pawlik’s (1992) study, a 30-year-old mechanic 
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explained the layered corruption of not only the state economy but the nomenklatura’s 
—‘them’—kombinacja activity against the ordinary worker (‘us’): 
In every trade there’s an opportunity [to make money on the side]. If you 
can’t steal, then you can take bribes. Even the director, who doesn’t 
trouble himself with production, steals: he “arranges” something from 
someone, “takes” from him in return and this is really stealing from him. 
Maybe this is an even worse crime than stealing from society, since 
society as a whole gets robbed [by the Communist state]. But that 
director robs an individual (pg. 80). 
An us/them binary emerged that split ‘good’ kombinacja among those who exercised it 
in their milieu and ‘bad’ kombinacja when the competing group exercised it against 
them. Although this dichotomy existed that set the rules of the game for a family or 
milieu on what they ought and ought not to do, there was no debate about the necessity 
of kombinacja in everyone’s lives. ‘Everybody did it’ was a major justification for why 
people engaged in good and bad kombinacja activity. A foreman in Pawlik’s (1992) 
study stated that ‘Everyone has some “in” (‘dojście’) somewhere, regardless of his 
occupation’. Another store manager explained that ‘I live according to one 
assumption—that today you can’t “arrange” (‘załatwić’) anything without gifts, money, 
and so on. In Poland this is the one law of the universe’ (pg. 79). This was not so much 
about ‘getting in the game’ as much as it was that ‘this is the way that Poland works’. 
Pawlik (2004) argues that colloquial terms like ‘kombinowanie’ or ‘wynoszenie’ 
(‘carrying out’) represent a worldview in which the marginalised only perceive 
themselves on the ‘outside’ of resource pools and that accessing them was only possible 
through transgression (pg. 140, footnote 3). Not engaging in kombinacja was a 
dangerous way to stand out in the crowd, of being a sympathiser to the state109. 
However, the classification of good versus bad kombinacja in the redistribution of state 
assets was a narrative device that competing groups in the village used to define the 
parameters of their economic interests and reproduce their social identities through their 
                                                
109 Firlit and Chłopecki (1992) stated that factory workers who would not be open to 
favours and to returning them would be considered ‘antisocial’ and ‘legalistic’ (pg. 
101). 
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engagement in their ‘brand’ of kombinacja110. Networks were reproduced through this 
engagement with state assets.  
The lack of consequences and responsibility for kombinacja was furthered by the 
eschatological idea that their socialist world was coming to an end. Poland’s increasing 
credit line from the West, which exceeded 20 billion dollars in debt by 1979, and the 
rise of Solidarity, which had over nine million members by 1981, signified to the 
ordinary citizen that the state was falling apart and that they would have to survive the 
transition (Davies, 1982, pg. 627; Kurczewski, 1993, pg. 210). According to Wedel 
(1986), the introduction of Martial Law prompted fear that they had eaten their ‘last 
piece of cake’ and drunk their ‘last bottle of alcohol’ in preparation for war with Russia 
(pg. 12). This apocalyptical reasoning justified the widespread theft of state resources 
and the second economy became ‘a dominant vehicle for consumption’ (Mazurek, 2012, 
299). I remember my mother telling me of the transition period when she would keep 
taking out housing credits (loans) from the state knowing that the state would collapse 
and that they may or may not have to repay them (they did not). The ‘state is collapsing’ 
mentality justified kombinacja because of villagers’ perception that whatever they did at 
the end of that world would not bring real legal consequences in the new one.  
7.2.1. (Anti)hero 
Kombinators were depicted as enemies and anti-heroes. The state defined these private 
entrepreneurs as enemies. In one famous example, the director of a state-run meat 
warehouse, Stanisław Wawrzecki, who had admitted to taking bribes received the death 
penalty for ‘economic crimes’ against the state (‘Syn Warzeckiego’, 2012, pg. 1). 
Richard Kowalski, who was Jewish, was persecuted for selling water instead of wine to 
the state on a 26 million złoty contract. He owned several dozen 100-hectare apple 
orchards, each under a different name because at the time private ownership of over 100 
hectares was illegal. The unmasking of a Jewish entrepreneur fed into the undercurrent 
of anti-Semitism (see Steven, 1982). The state was sending a message to deter people 
from kombinacja because it was linked with Jewishness.  
Some progressive scholars did not have a positive view of the kombinator. Gliński 
(1992) claimed that the kombinator was a ‘schemer, and sometimes even swindler in 
                                                
110 Thanks to Professor Gareth A. Jones for this point. 
  206 
engaging in clever speculation’. The kombinator was one who benefitted from 
arranging economic loose ends, rather than an activist for reform and real change: 
‘Rather, his work serves to reinforce it. Most often he is active in areas of the private 
sector that offer opportunities for large if illegal profits’ (Gliński, 1992, pgs. 147-148). 
According to this perspective, kombinators’ sole purpose was not to make the world a 
better place, but to benefit from the broken system.  
Other stories about kombinacja lauded the ingenuity of ordinary people. For example, a 
Party member who had been turned away by a bus tram conductor at a station in 
Warsaw received an odd response from the state bus office after she complained at her 
treatment. Apparently, no such bus number as the one she provided existed. Months 
later, she saw the bus again and gathered witnesses. An investigation revealed that two 
bus operators had cleaned up an old bus and hooked it into the tram system and ran it as 
a ‘free enterprise bus’ for eighteen months (Steven, 1982, pg. 56). It was an odd 
example of the nomenklatura being treated as second-class citizens by the kombinators. 
In Łódź, a pensioner and trout fisherman, who lived across the street from a state nylon 
thread manufacturer, cast a line with a hook through the factory window and onto a 
giant bobbin allowing him to draw a single thread to his room where he had a similar 
giant bobbin. Drawing a single thread across the street he became Poland’s largest 
supplier of nylon thread on the ‘free’ market (Ibid.). These stories celebrated 
kombinators’ more robust economic presence in the public sphere.  
Context is everything when we speak about kombinators. It was common for an 
informant to explain their kombinacja activity proudly or with a few chuckles and then 
later in the interview chastise someone else for being a kombinator (even without the 
good/bad distinction). For instance, Kacper, the ex-gmina official, who had told me so 
much about his kombinacja activity during the 1980s later said that the kombinator was 
someone who ‘wanted to live through it easily’ or who ‘wanted to drink’ and ‘not to 
work too much’. Being labeled a kombinator meant that the individual had drawn too 
much attention to themself to the point that they had acquired a so-called ‘form’—
which was against the rules of kombinacja. Yet, those who temporarily became 
kombinators recreated their perfectly executed plans in duping authority. Kombinacja 
was like a drug. 
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7.3. Kombinacja as a miracle 
Kombinacja’s ‘magical’ or ‘miraculous’ qualities deserve mention. I was struck by 
Barcikowska’s (2004) description of kombinacja as a ‘magical and extremely flexible 
word’ with ‘endless and multiple’ variations and which ‘refer to almost every attempt to 
manage a situation’ (pg. 1). During fieldwork, villagers often ended their kombinacja 
stories in an absurdist tone and the phrase, ‘Cudy się działy!’ (Miracles happened!). The 
term miracle (cud) carried negative connotations and was used in multiple ways to 
describe a dystopian reality produced by the exploitation of or profiteering from others’ 
labour. The idea behind the ‘miracles’ was that the subjects already lived in a dystopian 
reality and necessarily used dystopian or immoral strategies in order to survive. To 
acknowledge miracles was to deal with two competing dimensions of rationality that 
converge on a given landscape.  
The state used ‘miracles’ to force people to work, who then responded with kombinacja 
by extracting the tools the state provided for them to give the gift of free labour. When 
Fidelis explained to me how subbotniks (czynny społeczne) were organised so that 
workers could give the gift of free labour to the socialist revolution, he said: 
The tools had to be supplied by the enterprise. So they would buy all of 
these rakes, and shovels, and miracles. Then they distributed them during 
the czyn because one had to work somehow! But then, it was like this: 
one person walked off somewhere from the czyn—because no one 
patrolled it!  
Peasants’ kombinacja in evading quotas were examples of miracles. When I asked 
Stasiek, the ex-gmina official, whether the state knew about the evasion of quotas, he 
responded, ‘Everyone knew! Those were miracles! Miracles occurred here’. 
Kombinacja was proof that within a specific ‘mixture’ of economic and aesthetic 
activities, the kombinator could produce an alternative to the plan.  
The coupling of kombinacja stories and ‘miracles’ emphasised kombinacja’s evasion of 
form, like a ‘spirit’ that temporarily transforms a villager into a kombinator. Zuzanna’s 
statement ‘if it is not frame-able (ujęte), then it is kombinacja’ emphasises the 
importance of existing in between ‘form’. Fidelis similarly pointed out the importance 
of kombinacja as escaping from structures—‘Use kombinacja! Think! One’s own 
method! To, somehow from the poverty or from this structure (załorzenia) or whatever 
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it was, to somehow escape from it in some method’. Vagueness, Pawlik (1992) writes, 
gives kombinacja a ‘functional advantage’ because ‘it enables people to avoid 
elucidating how they get scarce goods and services’ (pg. 79). Fidelis explained that he 
used the term to preserve secrecy when he exchanged resources with another person: 
‘So I would say “I used kombinacja” but I did not say from whom. Yes! It is my 
secret’112. The idea of kombinacja’s miracles captures the vague back-door strategies 
peasants used to partially disconnect from the economic and political structures that 
exploited them. The emergence of ‘miracles’ to describe these activities could expose 
the encroachment of capitalism in the late socialist period.  
7.4. Progressive alcoholism 
In the late 1980s, there was a Polish joke: ‘Between the stages of advanced socialism 
and full communism, there is an intermediate stage—progressive alcoholism’. I was 
taught this narrative by my parents—that the state used vodka in order to ‘dumb down’ 
people’s will (chęć) to act and quell resistance —and it was occasionally heard during 
fieldwork as well. This argument was amplified by the leaders of the independent 
labour movement at public rallies, that the alcoholism that has eaten away at farms, 
homes, villages, and city streets, was the result of disordered state policies that have 
‘succeeded’ in spreading the seed of socialism (Darnton, 1981, pg. 1). Indeed, a state 
over alcohol production had been a long-standing symbol of the state as far as 1944 
when the first law passed by the PKWN provisional Communist government 
nationalised alcohol production and distribution113. The PRL cracked down on domestic 
bimber (moonshine) production and public alcoholism (500 złoty fine), making the 
consumption of state alcohol a financial backbone for the socialist revolution (Chase, 
1984, pg. 417). The state’s ability to control alcohol consumption and production 
demonstrated its grip on power. 
                                                
112  This resembles Taussig’s (1980) story about the ‘highly secretive’ and 
‘individualised’ stories about contracts with the devil as a form of peasant resistance 
against the capitalist exploitation of their labour—‘so that he could get money without 
working’ (pgs. 96-97).  
113 Dz.U. z 1944, Nr. 9, Poz. 45.  
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Figure 26 ‘Bimber: cause of blindness’. Man on the 
poster is Wojciech Jaruzelski, Prime Minister from 
1981 to 1985114 (http://propaganda-
prlu.bartlomiejspeth.com/). 
 
Although vodka was rationed at half a litre per adult per month during Martial Law, 2 
million people out of 35 million were excessive drinkers and needed medical care in 
1981 (Chase, 1984, pg. 417). Alcohol consumption made workers lethargic, unruly, and 
uncontrollable. By 1981, the price of vodka had shot up 55%—in part due to the state’s 
anti-alcoholism campaign—and was unobtainable in many places (Hann, 1985, pg. 89; 
‘Poland Raises Price of Drinks’, 1981, pg. 1). The New York Times reported that it was 
the lines for vodka that were the longest, especially during the holidays (Kifner, 1983a, 
pg. 1). Yet, the quality of the vodka was questionable. One newspaper, Kurier Polski, 
reported that some customers who had received their vodka rations ‘upon unscrewing 
                                                
114 Thanks to Dr. Frances Pine for this point. 
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the caps, found to their dismay and fury that it contained only ordinary water’ (seen in 
Tagliabue, 1988, pg. 1). Those with network connections in the state stores acquired 
vodka through kombinacja.  
An important phenomenon emerged during this period in Dobra and on a national level. 
People distilled their own bimber (90-100% ethanol) to serve at family occasions and 
celebrations (see Hann, 1985). Poles knew the basic ‘Battle of Grunwald’115 recipe by 
heart and most families in Dobra guarded recipes to produce legal liquors (nalewki) 
from berries, sugar, and cherry leaves or ‘wine’ (wino) by adding wheat and yeast to the 
nalewki. To produce bimber, people needed copious amounts of (rationed) sugar and 
distillation technology, which was unavailable in the state stores. Kombinacja offered 
an option. One had to be cognisant about who had a sugar ration and which networks to 
use to gather knowledge. Who used less sugar or had extra? Who stole enough sugar 
that I can benefit from in my production of bimber? Whom can I bribe? Whom can I use 
kombinacja on? Answers to these questions required keeping of tabs on the circulation 
of rationed sugar across the entire village. The resurgence of widespread bimber 
production not only symbolised Poles’ rejection of the state monopoly on alcohol and 
the retreat of state surveillance from the domestic sphere, but the introduction of a 
mature form of kombinacja that allowed the domestication of state property to the point 
of splintering off from state production. ‘Private’ production of a state monopoly began 
to take off to a point that the state could not suppress it.  
While the state militia uncovered over 15,000 bimber operations annually, most 
households risked the 10,000 złoty fine to produce it (Chase, 1984, pg. 419). I only met 
one person, a Belarusian woman who had worked on a state farm adjacent to Dobra, 
who had a run-in with the militia due to her family’s bimber production:  
For the baptism, my husband made bimber. And for that bimber, we 
suffered so much! There was one man, he was not from our areas, but he 
was not good, let him live there in peace. Because of him, many people 
sat in prison. And he contacted Słupsk. They took my husband to prison 
for a year. 
                                                
115 The Battle of Grunwald in 1410 was a decisive victory for the Polish Lithuanian 
Empire against the German-Prussian Teutonic Knights (Davies, 2005, pg. 98). The 
recipe was 1 kilogram of sugar, 4 decagrams of yeast and 10 litres of water. 
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It would appear that most state interventions were symbolic gestures. In 1989, Jan 
Cieślak’s famous vodka and bimber recipe book was published and made it onto many 
families’ bookshelves, including ours. By that time bimber production had many 
different variations and recipes. With kombinacja, villagers were able to ‘reclaim’ 
domestic production from the state monopoly as a form of symbolic reclamation of 
national victory. 
Illegal meliny—private household bars that sold vodka and bimber to customers—
emerged to solve alcohol shortages during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the alcohol 
was purchased on the free market or produced at home (Kochanowski, 2010, pg. 221). 
In Dobra, the meliny were often run by women who pooled their vodka rations and sold 
them at high prices to workers in 50 ml shots. This was the case in Frances Pine’s 
ethnographic study of the Górale ethnic group in Nowy Targ, southern Poland, where 
the researcher observed that the women served vodka in their basements to village men, 
their ‘customers’ (Pine, 1993, pg. 238).  
 
Figure 27 ‘Bimber rules’, 1980s. Police officer succumbing to bimber production. 
(Langda, 2013). 
Without a doubt, these private spaces where zkombinowane state vodka was sold were 
sites where people held political debates and made further kombinacja deals. During 
one interview in the industrial section of Dobra, a retired factory worker expressed the 
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sense of camaraderie she felt when people visited her melina: ‘We had the television in 
the window in the other room. We put it out in the window [...] the men would come, 
we put down half-a-litre, they drank some, they talked, they did not get drunk but they 
drank a half litre, sat, talked, and somehow it was good’. Meliny represented the 
physical emergence of a culture which revolved around kombinacja and alcohol. 
When local authorities sought to shut down the meliny, Kochanowski (2010) writes, 
clients would defend the owner, because the melina was the only place where they 
could have access to vodka every day of the week (pg. 223). To protect the meliny from 
the state most were not operated by a single family but carried out by a trusted network 
of friends, family, and neighbours. The alcohol would be held in the neighbours’ 
basement or in the trunk of someone’s car (pg. 224). When authorities burst in, the 
melina could have just pass the scene off as a group of friends sharing a drink, not an 
enterprise that was selling smuggled, state produced, vodka and home-made bimber. In 
effect, people protected the private sphere as an entrepreneurial space by manipulating 
the aesthetics of both to evade the state. While they ‘saved’ or preserved the domestic or 
private sector, they did so at a great cost to their bodies and future economic potential.  
7.5. Vodka as currency 
When vodka was rationed to half a litre per person per month in the 1980s, it became 
more valuable than currency. High inflation rates in the 1980s lowered the value of the 
Polish złoty, and many people started using foreign currency—then worth about $2 
billion—sent by family abroad or earned on a foreign trip. The value of the dollar on the 
free market was approximately five times its real value. Not everyone had access to 
dollars and the złoty was worthless, so in Dobra vodka became the new currency in 
many relations (Łoś, 1990b, pg. 37). Workers who moonlighted during state work 
received half-litre bottles of vodka for any private services that they performed in their 
clients’ households (see Hann, 1985 on vodka as ‘gift, usually in the form of shared 
consumption after a service has been performed, pg. 89). So, one can imagine a 
kombinator taking out state property from his or her workplace and then installing it 
into another person’s house for which he would be paid with state produced vodka. The 
state both supplied and paid for the private services! 
As vodka replaced currency, moonlighting became a means of drinking rather than 
making extra money for the household. ‘The nation drank—it was like this under 
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Communism, I will tell you honestly. They drank! They even kombinowali for vodka 
alone, yes!’ Gosia, an ex-factory worker, told me. This appeared to have been the case 
in Pawlik’s (1992) study on informal practices across multiple workplaces in Poland. In 
one workplace, a 26-year-old worker stated that, ‘When I’m paid less, I go to work on 
the side…Otherwise I couldn’t survive. I treat this as part of the salary that I have to 
bring home to keep the family going. As for fucha (informal earning), that’s when I 
don’t take money but vodka instead. That’s become the custom; vodka as pay for side 
work’ (pg. 81). Firlit and Chłopecki (1992) wrote that when there were services 
performed between fellow employees, ‘the most common form of payment for a service 
is a “treat”—usually drinking a bottle of vodka that one person brings to consume with 
his cohorts’ (pg. 101). They claimed that this was the ‘main integrating factor of the 
worker community in all factories, the lubricant that facilitates friendship’ because it 
was ‘a mode of informality, drinking promotes entering into informal contracts and 
facilitates informal business dealings at work’ (pgs. 107-108).  
But there was another reason. Vodka was a safer way to engage in kombinacja than in 
paying the private services with złoty—which would have attracted state surveillance. 
Fidelis explained: 
Usually people were working on construction, then simply, he sold 
something for a half litre (of vodka). For money, no. Because what was 
in the law, that if I took a złoty, then it was a big crime. But if I gave him 
a half litre, then it was not a crime. [chuckle] That is how it was. It was 
still evident, but it was not as threatening in the court, or elsewhere. So, 
one did not give money.  
Which is not to say that vodka and the money economy were not linked. In Firlit and 
Chłopecki’s (1992) study, a construction company inventory clerk explained: ‘That’s 
why I sit up late at night so often writing reports, making calculations, sometimes 
giving them to someone who is drunk for signing, or treat this someone [his superior] to 
vodka’ (pg. 103). Availability of vodka allowed shortages in the accounts to be 
‘overlooked’. As Wedel (1986) explained, vodka facilitated the ‘transition from an 
official to an unofficial situation’ which allowed ‘wrangling which could not be done 
officially’ and promoted the ‘privatisation of public roles’ (pg. 29). Vodka was a 
fundamental form of indoctrination in workers’ and nomenklatura’s kombinacja 
networks. ‘[W]hen one put the half litre [on the table] it meant for there to be silence 
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and that was that’, Zuzanna explained. Sharing vodka represented a code of silence 
among those engaged in kombinacja. It reproduced the ‘milieu’ and shared economic 
interests. 
7.6. Securing construction materials  
The reforms of the 1970s and 1980s eased the state’s grip on the private housing 
market, and most Poles began to renovate and modernise their homes. Many of these 
homes were still the original German structures that they or their parents had moved 
into after the Second World War. Most people wanted to repair and modernise walls, 
roofs, plumbing, sinks, toilets, etc. But, although the private sector was being legalised 
this did not mean that the state economy had adjusted sufficiently enough to provide 
access to the materials needed for that private activity to flourish (Kenedi, 1982). As my 
mother put it, ‘Let’s say I have money. I want to build a house. I will use kombinacja to 
extract the bricks from here and there because it will be cheaper’. An ordinary worker 
could get resources on the free market, however these were often expensive; so, they 
used their networks to access those very resources in the state workplaces for ‘free’ or 
through other exchanges like vodka. In one outstanding example, when the gmina in 
Dobra began the construction of four worker apartment blocks to house the influx of 
workers in the 1970s, the materials for an entire building disappeared; only three were 
built! Most of the everyday instances of kombinacja, however, occurred in the state 
tannery and the ZNMR mechanical enterprise; because they were both connected to a 
state production line and their warehouses were regularly replenished with new 
materials sent from the powiat level of their enterprises.  
Most kombinacja was performed by individual workers who worked in the factory. 
Kacper, an ex-gmina official, and Gosia, an ex-factory worker, who lived together in the 
industrial part of the village adjacent to the Garbarnia tannery explained that individuals 
hoarded state materials whenever they could get access to them (even if they did not 
need them right away) with the possibility of selling or exchanging them in the future.  
K: There was nothing in the stores. 
G: There were no such things!  
K: If one wanted to paint something— 
G: With what?  
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K: There was no paint or anything anywhere. If someone worked in a 
painting enterprise— 
G: —he stole it! 
K: Then he had his own supplies 
G: He stole it and that was that. Then he sold it and had it (money/vodka)!  
K: He stole it and saved it up next to some finishing work they had, he 
used it up and the rest he smuggled out. 
Self: But what for example could they steal from Garbarnia except skins. 
G: Skins, everything. Hydraulic things.  
K: From the warehouse all of the hydraulic things. All of the electrical 
things— 
G: Electrical things, of course! All of Dobra was building, so everything 
from cables, not cables, they carried everything out! They carried it out!  
K: Well, now they are building. Before, they were not building as much. 
But even into the house, into one’s private home.  
G: Whatever it was, they used kombinacja to extract out of it. One brought 
it home. 
 
It appears that a lot of this kombinacja of resources occurred during the ‘finishing’ stage 
of the production line, where workers diluted paint and saved the rest for themselves. So 
there must have been some loose form of organised kombinacja in order for individuals 
to take the resources from the state workplaces back to their homes. My mother recalled 
that everyone in Dobra had the same colour walls and fences—an aqua green—that 
accented their properties because a group of kombinators had stolen the paint from the 
State Agricultural Machine Enterprise (ZNMR; henceforth mechanical enterprise) in the 
village and sold it off to their networks. She remembers this fondly because when one 
walked into someone’s house and saw that colour, they knew that they had engaged in 
some form of kombinacja.  
The state, however, neither provided those types of services nor sufficient access to the 
resources necessary to make those repairs, renovations, and construction plans. One of 
the benefits of working in the state was that if one was a repairman for toilets, they 
could use that expertise to use kombinacja to acquire those toilets and then install them 
into private clients’ homes. Kombinacja, as a solution to the housing problem, ran in 
conjunction with the private services sector and everyone openly used it to modernise 
their homes. Franciszek, my brother who grew up in Dobra, explained a similar scenario 
of moonlighting: ‘A very common case: let us say a welder would accept a private job, 
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but perform the work in the factory during work hours. Double salary!’ Much of the 
moonlighting consisted of installing factory resources like pipes for plumbing, screws 
for washing machines, and sink fixtures, into private homes. Those who wanted to 
modernise and fix up their homes found access to commodities that were not in the state 
stores through their family or networks in the factory or enterprise in the village. Kacper 
and Gosia explained how it worked:  
K: For example, the sink broke here. 
G: Oh. There were no sinks! 
K: There are none! There were no parts!  
G: So then the repairman has to use kombinacja. He says that he will use 
kombinacja and he will bring it.  
K: He said that he would use kombinacja and he brought it, yes.  
G: And will it be or not? So he brings it, and now he says “this and this 
much for vodka or half litre”. Whatever it cost, one gave it to him. That is 
how it was. 
 
This was not specific to Dobra—according to Firlit and Chłopecki’s (1992) 
observations of informal activity in five villages across multiple voivodeships116 in the 
1980s, state workers ‘carried out’ (wynośić) nuts, screws, plaster, plastic pipes, scraps—
all of which were necessary for household renovation (pg. 98). Workers took time out 
during their work day at a municipal construction company to move furniture with other 
workers for 400 złoty and a beer; or spread soil in a private garden for 500 złoty each. In 
all cases, their public displays drew attention from passers by who might offer them 
private jobs (pgs. 105-106). A 1983 article in Życie Warszawy (Warsaw Life) about the 
Lenin Steelworks in Kraków reported that 10% of the workforce was out on sick leave 
each day, presumably working ‘on the side’ (in Wedel, 1986, pg. 63). Moonlighting was 
a way for workers to (re)organise the production cycle and bring commodities to the 
locals. Firlit and Chłopecki (1992) observed that this ‘free time’ began to be considered 
separate from ‘work time’ in that it was highly valued as an additional source of income 
for the household, and was ‘one form of “organising” in a factory’ (pg. 103). When all 
of the workers were organising private activity, then it would have been difficult for the 
state to crack down on such widespread activity. The effect, as put by economist Marek 
Bednarski in an Życie Gospodarcze (Economic Life) article in 1984, was that state work 
                                                
116 Administrative subdivision. 
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became secondary in importance to private work when workers treated ‘the job in the 
state enterprise mainly as a basis for qualifying for social insurance benefits and, often, 
as a source of free materials and orders’ (in Wedel, 1986, pg. 62). 
 
Figure 28 Tannery in Dobra, now owned by a German businessman who employs 
locals part-time to produce mink fur accessories. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Moonlighting and protection were synonymous. Many workers’ informal activities 
within the state workplaces occurred under the support or knowledge of Party officials 
and directors (Łoś, 1990b, pg. 42). My brother recalled in an email about how my 
father’s co-worker in the Agricultural Circle had a side job in the mechanical enterprise 
just down the street: ‘He worked together with our father, but was much better off than 
him. It turned out that he gained his wealth stealing auto parts from the ZNMR and then 
selling them. His bosses knew about it, but, since they were paid off by that person, they 
would allow it’. A similar pattern existed in a metalwork factory in Firlit and 
Chłopecki’s (1992) study: ‘A mechanic fixed the shop director’s private car during 
work hours, using state-owned tools and materials. The director paid him and promised 
to let him use the metalwork factory’s tractor for his own purpose’. They claimed that 
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such services were difficult to observe because the payment was not immediate (pg. 
101).  
In other instances, workers paid off those above them, like brigadiers, to keep their 
kombinacja quiet. Firlit and Chłopecki (1992) observed that a worker at the municipal 
construction company would ‘skip out’ for an hour with the foreman’s permission to 
use the state power-shovel to level ground in front of an acquaintance’s house. The 
foreman would warn him to come back at a specific time before the boss got back. They 
stated that the foreman knew ‘very well that he has no choice’ because if he would 
refuse, then the power-shovel would soon ‘go out of order’ or work would go very 
slowly, etc. (pgs. 100-101). Without informal activity, the workers rescinded their 
consent to carry out state work.  
The authorities turned a blind eye because they too needed services. Kacper (who 
himself was an official) and Gosia again explained ‘They were looking through their 
fingers, the Directors, and in the enterprise just like here in Garbarnia, they stole all the 
time!’ In addition, by the 1980s and the subsequent economic crisis of Martial Law, 
kombinacja became so pervasive in the factory that the trade unions organised trips to 
Bulgarian black markets where workers sold factory leathers for extra income to bring 
back home. Unlike in the other examples, where kombinacja occurred under the state’s 
radar, in this case the state workplace helped its workers to supplement their incomes by 
liquidating state capital.  
7.7. Kombinacja in the legal ‘private’ sector 
The state opened up the ‘legal’ private sector in the 1980s. The 1981 resolution of the 
Council of Ministers called for equal treatment of both private and socialised 
handicrafts and other branches of the small-scale economy. Such legal private 
enterprises were taxed and registered. From 1982 to 1984, 600,000 new employees (5% 
of the work force in the state sector) transferred into the non-agricultural, non-state 
sector. Agricultural, housing, small-scale industry and handicrafts dominated the private 
sector. By 1984, there were 470,000 private, non-agricultural enterprises. The 
handicrafts sector employed 74% of all private employees, transport employed 12%, 
retail and catering 8%, and there were 670 foreign firms that by 1987 employed 62,000 
people, accounting for 5%. As a whole, the private sector produced over 20% of the 
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national income and employed 33% of the population (Łoś, 1990b, pgs. 29-31; Gliński, 
1992, pg. 145; Wedel, 1986, pgs. 53-54).  
Although the private legal sector was not synonymous with untaxed and unregistered 
free market or with kombinacja activity, it relied heavily on smuggled state resources. 
Mazurek (2012) writes about a Warsaw man named Romuald who left his public sector 
job and became a private taxi driver upon gaining entrance into an exclusive ‘informal 
guild’ of entrepreneurs (przywaciarze) in the 1970s. Romuald exercised 
‘kombinowanie’ when he negotiated with state gas stations for extra fuel or found 
creative ways to avoid taxes (pg. 303). For better or worse, the legal and illegal private 
sectors were ‘linked’ with the state sector and kombinacja was important in that 
relationship. In Dobra, there were two examples of this: the emergence of a ‘private’ 
factory alongside the state tannery and the infiltration of nomenklatura privileges into a 
privatised state restaurant. 
Private sector enterprises that struggled with constant supply shortages acquired their 
materials through the free market or kombinacja. Again, kombinacja was not 
necessarily synonymous with the free market because it provided a cheaper option by 
directly taking resources from the state. Workers used kombinacja to secure state 
resources from their workplaces and sold these to the private sector entrepreneurs. 
Many managers of state enterprises reportedly adjusted their production to the needs 
and preferences of other kombinators with whom they collaborated to sell off state 
resources. For example, in June 1985, police shut down 80% of furniture shops in 
Warsaw because they were selling 60% of the furniture on the free market. However, 
the practice was so open that even the furniture sales clerk told the state media that ‘One 
cannot live on wages alone. When they fix our income they already assume that 
everyone will earn something on the side’. Once the legal private sector enterprises 
finished their required production, they then sold their commodities to state companies 
(which faced shortages) and further increased their interdependency in supplying 
materials, producing, and distributing commodities (Łoś, 1990b, pgs. 30-43).  
In the 1980s, kombinacja was such an ingrained part of the culture in the state 
Garbarnia tannery in Dobra that a worker started his own private tannery in the village. 
When my uncle and mother recalled this story to me, they claimed that this was 
‘advanced’ or a higher form of kombinacja. My mother, who worked as an accountant 
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in the Garbarnia factory for 15 years said that the ‘private’ business was not legally 
registered. Yet, this ‘private’ tannery produced leather and fur goods using locally-
caught foxes and mink by using chemicals and processing equipment systematically 
extracted from the state tannery at night by commissioned kombinators. The ‘private’ 
tannery was the most organised form of kombinacja in the village.  
 
 
Figure 29 My mother’s fox shawl and fur cap she bought from 
the ‘private’ tannery that existed along-side the state tannery. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
 
The private tannery met local demand for fur and leather goods. State production of 
these commodities was geographically distributed—the Garbarnia in Dobra only 
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performed part of the production process (tanning) before selling its product to another 
state factory in Słupsk to complete the commodity for foreign export. Locals received 
nothing. The private tannery met the demand by producing hats, scarves, and gloves on-
site in Dobra and selling it to locals. It was wildly successful and to this day even my 
mother owns a fox shawl (pictured above) and fur hat which she purchased from this 
‘private’ tannery117. My family members spoke positively of this ‘private’ tannery 
because it provided a service to the village that answered to a ‘local’ demand. It even 
provided a more ‘ethical’ economic activity because it allowed locals to benefit from 
local natural resources.  
The Garbarnia director knew about this private tanning operation. When he was 
interviewed for a small book that was published for the village’s 40th anniversary in 
1985, he made a remark that allows us to peek into his mentality and power regarding 
factory profits: ‘It does not matter to us, obviously, to work up to large profits. It 
[meeting quota] is enough—unless a production site would burden in any special way 
the development budget. And we have already accomplished that [the quota]’ 
(Żurawski, 1985, pg. 81). The non-competitive environment in the state economy was 
ripe for hiding profits by selling off surplus factory materials to ‘private’ businesses. By 
doing this, he would have simultaneously kept state authorities at bay for suspecting 
him of engaging the factory in private competition against other state factories and 
would have helped the ‘private’ business to flourish. Exercising such self-preservation 
of both the state factory and his position was an economically advantageous position 
especially if he helped the ‘private’ tannery flourish on the side. 
Kombinacja during the nascent privatisation period did not benefit everyone in the 
village at all times. For instance, my mother benefitted from the ‘private’ tannery 
because she purchased a fox shawl that she otherwise may not have been able to buy in 
the city. In the late 1980s, when the gmina began the privatisation process of its state 
workplaces, one of the first in Dobra was a state restaurant associated with the GSSC 
(the state workplace that processed all of the peasant agricultural quotas in the village). 
My parents, who waited part-time at the state restaurant, decided to take over the 
operations when the gmina offered it up for sale. But when they became the new 
                                                
117 When state control of the factory collapsed during the transition into capitalism, so 
did the shadow private business that fed off of state capital. 
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‘private’ owners, the socialist-era norms continued to dictate how the restaurant would 
run. My mother explained her unfortunate experience with the kombinators who came 
to eat:  
It was 1987118. In those years communism was no longer around, but 
people lived under the communist ghost. One of the bigger problems was 
people’s dishonesty. Often people did not have money but they came to 
the restaurant, ordered meals and alcohol and after eating or drinking said 
that today everything was na kreche. That word means, “Today, I do not 
have money and when I get paid then I will pay the bill”. Often, the 
‘krecha’ visited our restaurant. We set up a notebook of debtors but all 
for nothing because they were in talks with the sly foxes (cwaniakami) 
and hooligans who played pranks and vandalised the restaurant. The 
police did not react to our complaints. It could have been the case that the 
police was afraid or was waiting for extra money.  
It is interesting to see this ‘switch’ between kombinacja as being something positive 
when it was exercised on the state’s account, versus negative when it was exercised 
against a private individual or entrepreneur. Along with the ‘communist ghost’ came a 
new ‘transcript’ of how to identify such kombinators who were once the people’s 
heroes. The account attests to the blurred private-state sector relations—even a 
restaurant under private ownership could not deal with the embedded kombinacja 
among clients, especially the nomenklatura, who had not paid bills in years and still had 
the ability to threaten the owners. They acted as if there was no ‘real’ change to the 
restaurant and continued to operate in the same manner as they had before. The ‘private’ 
restaurant went bankrupt and they sold it in 1990.  
7.8. Achieving socialist utopia through kombinacja 
Kombinacja in the workplace was such a widespread and open phenomenon in the 
1970s and 1980s that workers began to make decisions about where to work based upon 
the tolerance of kombinacja (Firlit & Chłopecki, 1992, pg. 96; Wedel, 1986, pg. 63). 
Kurczewski (1993) observed that some people rejected well-paying jobs if not enough 
informal benefits were promised (pg. 368). There is no better example of this in Dobra 
than the ‘lure’ of the three state farms adjacent to the gmina that were the most lenient 
workplaces for exercising kombinacja. Some like Roman, an ex-mechanical enterprise 
                                                
118 Note the different ‘timeline’ to the end of Communism. It ‘ended’ when workers 
could buy and privatise the GSSC cooperative store in the village.  
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worker who was once sent out by his workplace to fix silos on state farms, equated the 
very definition of kombinacja with the state farms: ‘take from the state and the state—
the PGR—pays for it’.  
 
Figure 30 A 19th century German Junker estate in Krynica which was transformed by 
the Red Army into a headquarters for the state-farm in 1945 then privatised in 1990s. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Ironically, the state farms were the exemplars of the Soviet-inspired socialist revolution 
in Poland. They were considered to be the bastion of socialist modernisation, with even 
airplanes landing on their fields to deliver and export equipment. State farm workers 
boasted the best wages and owned the most cars of anyone in the gmina, and were often 
most closely linked with the success of Soviet agro-industrialialism. They resembled, 
and operated like, enclosed worker colonies where workers received everything from 
the state like free housing, clothing, food, education, and medical care. Workers stayed 
on the farm and did not participate in trade union activity. Each family received a 0.25 
hectare allotment garden (działki) where they could produce for their own private 
consumption and bi-annual shares (deputat) of clothing, livestock, milk, potatoes, etc. 
Theoretically, the state farms would be enclosed economic ecosystems in which 
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workers were the ‘co-owners’ —which in the sense of kombinacja caused the farm a lot 
of trouble.  
The farms were simultaneously associated with grandeur and the ‘good life’ in the 
official discourse as well as poverty, but turning a blind eye to kombinacja was the only 
way that workers could ‘achieve’ and ‘live’ the vision of that utopian socialist 
workplace. Irena, an ex-state farm worker who now resides back in the village, 
associated the lure of the state farm conditions with kombinacja due to the conditions of 
poverty. 
A lot of people went in the PGR because in the PGR, one had a home and 
guaranteed work. Because in the PGR, one did not earn a lot—one could 
steal a lot because one was raising a cow and pig and everything to that, 
right? It was the state’s. Everyone somehow made it through. Everyone 
received their own ration, but if one wanted more, one stole it, right? 
Brought it and fed it and no one was interested with that because the 
earnings were small and the work was difficult in the PGRs, but many 
people made ends meet in the PGRs. The mind has to work! Use 
kombinacja! Without kombinacja, no one will make money, because one 
would only make pennies! Yes! 
Most stole food from the fields and warehouses. There were many examples of state 
farm workers recalling stories about poverty. ‘We did not have any tools. So father took 
the PGR horse and ploughed a small area of wasteland and planted potatoes to have 
something for the following year’. Mothers milked the state cows to feed their children 
who relied upon more milk than the 2L allowance. Some state workers admitted that 
they divided up state fertiliser and (illegally) sold it to the peasants in the gmina. With 
Directors’ permissions, some used state farm tools, seeds, and fertilisers to produce 
food on their allotment gardens for private consumption or sold what they produced on 
their gardens to other workers who needed food in the gmina. Halina, an ex-
administrative worker in the gmina explained how she used her personal networks to get 
a PGR to renovate her house for her:  
I sent a letter home and my sister came. We poured water, scrubbed it 
with the shovel, and cleaned it all. A building group from Skarszów 
came, because my husband worked in the PGR. The PGR came, painted 
it, renovated my house. For a worker, that is what they did. The building 
group came and did everything. This was a gmina house, an ownership 
house, the gmina gave me the house to own. But since my husband 
worked in the PGR, within those boundaries, for their worker, they came 
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and cleaned the house. They did it for free. They did not take money, no, 
no. It was done for free.  
Kombinacja, either as petty theft or ‘favours’, seemed to have been an equaliser of some 
sort for the conditions, which these non-unionised workers could supplement their 
meager wages with. Kombinacja, through the systematic ‘taking’ of state resources for 
private use, was a creative form of ‘collective bargaining’ with the state farms’ 
administration. 
State worker interviewees justified kombinacja through their creative twisting of the 
idea of ‘common goods’—the idea that the workers collectively owned the state 
workplace and the means of production. If that was the case, according to such a 
rationale, then they could redistribute the state resources to ensure that they were 
‘compensated’ for any additional labour or any slumps in their wages or quality of life. 
‘They did not steal over there. They did not steal. When they dug-out the potatoes, one 
took some potatoes in one’s pocket or in a bag for dinner. I did not consider that 
stealing’ or ‘ No one even saw’. or ‘What they stole was not visible’ or ‘People took, 
they walked around, they stole, they took!’ all suggest that kombinacja was an open and 
positively sanctioned activity. Some perceived this to be a part of the job or a form of 
self-compensation for free labour that they were forced to carry out in order to help 
other state farms meet their production quotas.  
One private farmer Cobra (see Section 8.3) called this type of state farm worker, who 
compulsively used kombinacja because of their notion of the ‘co-ownership’ of state 
resources, a ‘HomoPGRicus’ —a play on the idea of Homo sovieticus—to refer to his 
or her ‘natural’ reptilian compulsion to disregard state property and accumulate for 
private gain. To explain it, he rehearsed the idiom: ‘Nie grabie się od siebie, tylko do 
siebie (One does not rake away from oneself, only toward oneself)/ Tylko kret ma ręce 
od siebie, wszyscy inni, do siebie (Only a mole has hands [positioned] away from it, 
everyone else has hands that are positioned toward them)119. The difference between a 
HomoPGRicus and a kombinator is subtle but important. The former used ‘co-
ownership’ as a means to complete the socialist vision of a workers’ utopia. The 
kombinator emphasised the existence of a broken economic system from which 
                                                
119 October 7, 2009 Fieldnotes. 
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resources could be extracted. HomoPGRicus was utopia’s cheerleader; the kombinator, 
using Zholkovsky’s (1994) phrasing, was ‘dystopia’s Provocateur’ (pg. 254). They 
both, however, used the similar strategy of extracting resources from the state.  
State farm workers believed that the farm was theirs, to use kombinacja to their needs. 
Marek recalled that during potato harvests urban dwellers drove to the state farm fields 
at night and filled up bags of potatoes from the mounds. State farm workers would wait 
until these poachers had filled their bags and then shine a light on them, and took the 
bags to their own homes when the poachers fled. Some explained that kombinacja on 
state farms carried a high risk of imprisonment; others claimed it was a type of everyday 
relation. Most workers, however, did not get ‘caught’ and kombinacja was practiced 
openly and without the fear of consequences. Franciszka, an ex-state farm worker, 
explained: 
G: Supposedly, they kept watch, but people stole anyway! How much 
could one steal? Either in the pocket or in the sack! I will admit today 
and I even admitted before: wherever I went, whether to the threshing, or 
I went to the cleaning division in the warehouse, I never came back with 
an empty sack and stuff in my pockets and in trousers. 
Z: I did that too! 
G: Peas, wheat, because it was needed. Yes! It was needed. Barley, 
which mother burned on a metal plate on the stove and it was coffee! 
Z: Coffee! 
G: Yes! And that is how a human had to live!  
 
And when someone got caught, they used the ‘art’ of humour and their personal 
networks with the authorities in order to avoid punishment. Helena, a postal worker, 
explained what happened when she got caught: 
But they (PGR administration) did not say anything. There was theft but 
no one was punished for it. I put my fingers into the soil, and took a 
couple of potatoes. And the director is driving by from the PGR. He 
comes, and says this, ‘Hello, what are you doing?’ And I said, ‘Mr. 
Director, I do not have potatoes, I do not have a husband. I do have my 
own field, but it is very far. And here, I have them so close (to the PGR) 
and I did no harm’. And he said ‘Helena’ because he knew me well 
because my in-laws lived in that PGR. So he says, ‘Helena’ he says, 
‘You know it is not allowed’. And I said, ‘I know it is not allowed, but I 
did it quickly!’ 
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Allowing wide-spread kombinacja was the surest way that the farm administration 
established a work environment that produced consent among the workers. The 
conditions were ripe for a worker uprising on a state farm: the administration was small, 
the settlements were isolated, manual work was gruelling, the working hours were long, 
wages were low, severe shortages existed for years at a time, and workers were pushed 
aboutto help during harvests on other state farms, etc. State farm workers had no 
independent trade union representation so workers who were unhappy with their wages 
and lifestyles on the farm could not easily make their voices heard. Domesticating 
resources and selling them was a way to increase a workers’ income and foot-dragging 
was a way to control the hours being put into the job—activities that helped define the 
equilibrium of wages and hours that would have normally been sought after by an 
independent trade union. The Directors had a lot to fear, thus turning a blind eye to 
kombinacja was one of the ways to win over the workers’ consent to the conditions and 
in turn, the preservation of the power structure. This way, everyone but the state won.  
7.9. Conclusion: the withering away of the state? 
The economic crises in the 1970s and the transformation of the state in the 1980s 
necessitated a new organising logic to ensure that resources were circulated to as many 
people as possible. This was the golden age of kombinacja during which the strategy 
became public, morally sanctioned, and used to order the state rather than to be ordered 
by it. The site of morality was ‘private’ while the public sphere became a free-for-all 
space for hunting state resources and domesticating them into the household. This 
process unified all classes in their common project of taking apart the state. There was 
an enormous degree of differentiation and competition between individuals’ and 
groups’ kombinacja for a limited amount of state resources. Kombinacja’s implicit 
message became wrapped up in Catholic, nationalist, cultural, and economic ideologies.  
People used it as a platform for renegotiating how resources ought to flow (through the 
exchange of state resources and services for food), how much their transaction cost 
(half-litres of vodka for example) and ought to be, etc. They used it to build their own 
socialist utopias, sometimes at the expense of others. The state farm workers used it to 
distribute resources among themselves, a big payday at the end of decades of work on 
the farm. The nomenklatura continued to pressure private business—such as with the 
case of the restaurant—to subsidise their lifestyle like the state had done. Those with an 
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entrepreneurial spirit established their own ‘private’ businesses that thrived off of state 
resources gained through kombinacja, and created their own state-private mode of 
production. Bimber producers used kombinacja to take their production system to the 
next level; the elderly saw ‘miracles’ of kombinacja in an eschatological light; vodka 
became currency as workers moonlighted, installing state property into domestic homes 
and so on. It was at this point that the workers could be said to have truly ‘owned’ the 
state and to have decided for themselves what they wanted to do with it.  
In a way, kombinacja’s golden age shows that it can partially replace the function of a 
modern-state and its formal economy. It can be used to form new cleavages between 
new publics. It was an expression of freedom of the ‘private’ in the public sphere, of 
wanting to sell or buy whatever one wanted in public. It was an opportunity to create 
new public spaces (like meliny). However, while it is an agent of transformation of 
space, capital, landscapes, and networks, kombinacja itself has its limitations. While it 
was a force of innovation to produce alternatives to the ‘formal’, it was never shown 
how the process in itself could be an engine of production or industrialisation without 
state capital. It seemed to be a response to the ‘formal’, building or subtracting from it, 
rather than a model of innovation in itself. This furthers my argument that kombinacja 
exposes the interplay between informality and formality. Although both constantly 
change one another and make new inroads into each other’s territories, they cannot 
survive without the other. Kombinacja exposes this. 
In 1992, Gliński posed the important question—‘Will the kombinator, Capitalist, 
Committed Craftsman, or the Enfranchised Nomenklatural Man model prevail?’ 
Sceptical, he stated that Poles ‘learned how to do business’ by ‘arranging’ and 
‘exploit(ing) informal contacts to overcome bureaucratic barriers’ instead of acting in a 
competitive market (pg. 151). The following chapter investigates whether kombinacja 
neatly aligned with capitalism, if kombinators found new ways to ‘arrange’ or 
‘domesticate’ capitalism, and if so, how they have creatively solved (or benefitted from) 
the structural and economic problems in the post-socialist era. 
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Chapter 8 
Post-socialist kombinacja: 1989-Present 
8.1. Domesticating neoliberalism 
Building upon Creed’s (1998) thesis that people ‘domesticated’ socialism by reworking 
the state through everyday practices in order to survive, in their research on everyday 
economic strategies in post-socialist Poland and Slovakia, Stenning et al. (2010) note 
the prevalence of kombinować in the broader set of activities they define as 
‘domesticating neoliberalism’ (pg. 260)120. They argue that neoliberalism ‘is not just an 
economic project which sits “out there” in the circuits of international policy and 
business, but a set of practices, rationalities, and commitments which flow through 
homes, communities, workplaces, and institutions’ (pg. 224). People supplement their 
low-paying formal wages with illegal and informal employment opportunities, 
temporarily migrate overseas, produce food for domestic consumption and trade on 
their privatised workers’ allotment gardens, organise private caregiving due to the lack 
of affordable and adequate state caregiving programmes for the elderly, as well as 
engage in activity like squatting, accessing electricity illegally, and claim benefits while 
working. These ‘acts of desperation’ are in response to inadequate state programs and 
rising under-employment (pg. 221).  
Similarly, in her empirical study of Polish families’ migration patterns to the United 
Kingdom after Poland’s entrance into the EU in 2004, White (2011) writes that families 
that chose to stay in Poland commonly used the term kombinować121. Luzia, a nurse 
from Grajewo who rejected her son’s invitation to become a migrant worker in Iceland, 
explained to White how she fed her family of five: ‘“And how about dinner and supper? 
Well, it’s a pity, but you need money. That’s why you find different way to make ends 
meet [dlatego człowiek kombinuje jak może]”’122. By pooling resources from her son’s 
remittances and her husband’s job, she did not become the cheap labourer that many 
                                                
120 They only referred to ‘kombinować’ by its deviant and illegal qualities.  
121 White defines it as a process, ‘to find a clever way of getting something done’ using 
personal networks and ‘exemplifying the idea of combining various assets’. 
122 My translation: That is why the human uses kombinacja however he can”. 
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Poles have become; rather, she preserved her socialist-era position and networks to put 
food on the table.  
An unexpected site for kombinacja in the post-socialist period has been in the start-up 
technology boom. Barcikowska (2004) writes that while kombinacja was expected to 
fade away with socialism, it has gone through a renaissance in which the ‘old 
communist mentality has been given a new cut-throat “entrepreneurial” twist’ in which 
people ‘think that there must be a trick to everything and that if only they could find out 
what it was, life would be easier’ (pg. 3). For example, in October 2012, The Wall 
Street Journal published a piece on Poland’s start-up technology scene in which 
Arkadius Hajduk—who started Huge Thing accelerator—spoke about the ‘strength’ of 
the Central European region, which is the ability to ‘find a way through’ to get ahead of 
the competition with the spirit of innovation. He said: ‘“We have a word in Polish—
kombinować—it’s not really translatable, but it sort of means finding a way to do 
something but without a lot of resources”’ (Rooney, 2012, pg. 1). Kombinacja can 
embody the entrepreneurial spirit in the start-up scene. 
During fieldwork, I found no consensus among villagers on how kombinacja exists 
today123. For the old nomenklatura in the village, like Fidelis, it is possible to claim that, 
‘Today, there is no such thing that I would have to use kombinacja if I can go to the 
store and buy everything! I only need to have money for it’. He explained that 
kombinacja has been phased out because food is no longer scarce: 
That kombinacja disappeared very quickly from the post-Communist 
times. It lasted, maybe, up to three years. So one used kombinacja here 
and there. Maybe it exists somewhere, but it is very, very, minimal these 
kombinacja. Maybe someone uses kombinacja here, but they use 
kombinacja for vodka, but it does not count, it does not count. Absolutely 
not, because we do not have a need to use kombinacja. The need today is 
money. Money. If I do not have money, then I cannot buy anything!124  
Yet, in Dobra, for most people the main function of kombinacja remains a reliance upon 
networks (znajomość) to access food by negotiating supply routes, services, labour, and 
exchanges in order to get the cheapest and highest quality food from other villagers or 
                                                
123 Thanks to Professor Sharad Chari for this point.  
124 Earlier, he mentioned however, that kombinacja still is used by those who believed 
in socialism. Those who converted to capitalism no longer have a ‘use’ for it. 
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from other private farmers (prywaciarze) in the gmina and region. It is as if kombinacja 
is undergoing a transformation that, yet again, has unclear boundaries and parameters.  
This chapter investigates how kombinacja transformed from domesticating state 
socialism to domesticating neoliberalism and the ways in which it is being used today in 
Dobra125. First, I explore kombinacja’s role in the nomenklatura’s preservation of their 
positions of state power throughout the 1990s. Second, I investigate how ex-state farm 
workers are using kombinacja to negotiate access to food and labour on privatised state 
farms and thereby reworking the idea of ‘private property’. Third, I provide two 
examples of an emerging gendered dimension of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ kombinacja practiced 
in Dobra. The first is the ‘bad’ kombinacja exercised by male ex-workers and peasants 
in the village, who pool resources to buy alcohol and force their labour upon the 
villagers to secure diminishing labour niches. The ‘good’ kombinacja is exercised by 
part-time female workers who sell surplus candy they produce in the local factory in 
order to supplement their earnings126. This is not an exhaustive explanation of how post-
socialist kombinacja works, but it provides some insight into how it is entangled in the 
struggles of property, labour, and resources between the various interest groups within 
the post-socialist village.  
8.2. Nomenklatura privatisation 
On 1 January 1990, the Balcerowicz Plan127 launched Poland’s neoliberalism project via 
the ‘shock doctrine’128. Its reforms sought to privatise state property, slow down 
inflation, eliminate shortages, increase market-based mechanisms for the economic 
system, devise a framework for divesting state ownership, begin the sale of state assets, 
break up monopolies, and eliminate central planning (Telgarsky & Struyk, 1991, pgs. 
107-111). Jeffrey Sachs, an architect of the shock doctrine, was so confident of Poland’s 
                                                
125 The state continues to mediate the population’s relationship with the economy—i.e. 
the transition to neoliberalism is not done without the state reform and regulations. 
126 There are no specific terms for good or bad kombinacja but the binary exists. 
127 Named after Polish minister Leszek Balcerowicz.  
128 I use Harvey’s (2005) definition of neoliberalism as a ‘theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of 
the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices’ (pg. 2). 
  232 
‘jump to the market economy’ that he wrote that ‘The hardest part of the transformation, 
in fact, will not be the economics at all, but the politics’ (1993, pg. 3). While shock 
therapy was aimed at a sense of ‘systemic transformation’, Buchowski (2003) argues 
that for rural people, these were ‘just links in a chain of history’ that had controlled their 
agricultural production (pg. 48). Zuzanna’s phrase, ‘for me, not much has changed’, 
rings true.  
Zbierski-Salameh (2013) claims that in order to understand post-socialist ownership, we 
cannot look at the transition as one from homogeneous state ownership into private 
ownership. Rather, ‘post-socialist ownership changes should be conceptualised as 
multifold, mutually interdependent transformations of heterogeneous state socialist 
conjoint property into various (incomplete) exclusive ownership forms’ (pg. 25). In 
other words, the existence of mixed property under post-socialism highlights a 
transition not from the ideal-type of state to private property, but from not-quite state 
property to not-quite private property (pg. xii). During the ‘transition’ from socialism to 
post-socialism, entrepreneurial actors created public-private assets and new property 
forms by pulling horizontal and vertical personal networks into chains of inter-
enterprise ownership and to spread risk among multiple units of measurement during 
economic transition.129 The failure of the shock doctrine to identify the exact property 
forms under socialism and the centrality of socialist networks in moulding the 
neoliberal project give us ample space to investigate the ways in which kombinacja was 
utilised to create makeshift, mixed property. 
The gradual privatisation of the state farms (sovkhozy)—the symbols of the Soviet-
inspired socialist tradition—began in the 1980s when the nomenklatura still held the 
reins of power and could leverage privatisation for personal gain (Zbierski-Salameh, 
2013, pg. 232). In 1986, the State Enterprise Law allowed state-owned enterprises ‘to 
enter into associations with private partners and contribute a part of the physical assets 
as a share’, and as a result, Directors and gmina officials undervalued those physical 
assets to generate higher profits—which gave rise to a popular rage among the majority 
that the nomenklatura were ‘using their position to transform themselves into fledging 
                                                
129  ‘Recombinant property’ (Stark, 1996; Stark & Bruszt, 1998) in post-socialist 
Hungary also explains how the neoliberal project was reworked through socialist-era 
personal networks. 
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capitalists’ (Hardy & Rainnie, 1996, pg. 124). The widespread process of the socialist-
era administrators, managers, and nomenklatura seizing state property into their own 
private hands during the privatisation process is known as the ‘second 
embourgeoisement of the nomenklatura’ (Zbierski-Salameh, 2013, pg. 222) or 
‘nomenklatura privatisation’ (Myant, 1993: 238; Hardy & Rainnie, 1996, pg. 124). The 
liquidation of the state property represented the nomenklatura’s form of domesticating 
neoliberalism—taking the biggest chunk of the state through kombinacja into their own 
pockets once and for all. 
Laws in the 1990s further cemented the nomenklatura’s grasp on state farms’ 
privatisation. In January 1992, the Polish state created the State Treasury Agricultural 
Property Agency (AWRSP) to lead the privatisation of the 1,576 state farms—900,000 
hectares of state farm—that had an amassed bank debt of 7.4447 billion złoty. After six 
months, 16,000 petitions from the old owners whose properties had been expropriated 
after the Second World War had been filed with the agency disputing ownership. 
However, the state was reluctant to pass comprehensive legislation regarding 
reparations because of the threat this would pose to potential buyers who might be too 
afraid to make investments out of fear of the old owners’ return (Zbierski-Salameh, 
2013, pgs. 222-223). Although these procedures prevented the return of the previous 
owners, the state farms were not sold quickly to newer entrepreneurs in large part 
because the properties were complex entities with colonies of ex-state farm workers still 
living on them.  
In Zbierski-Salameh’s (2013) study of the Wysoki gmina in 1992, the state retained or 
‘restatised’ the farms and allocated managerial control to the old nomenklatura (pg. 
209). Although the privatisation policy prioritised PGR employees’ formation of joint-
stock companies out of the state farms, the ex-state farm workers complained that they 
had not been properly informed about their roles and eligibility to participate in the 
privatisation process. The Wysoki administrators responded that the workers had 
displayed no interest in the matter. In reality, employees who were well informed faced 
financial barriers—not least the necessary advance of 2 million złoty—a month’s 
salary—to belong to a joint-stock company. Even employee-formed joint-stock 
companies leased the state property to a narrow managerial and administrative group 
who had governed the farms under socialism. The nomenklatura recruited only just 
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enough employees to meet the ‘employee’ quota for the joint-stock company, but in 
reality secured profits and benefits within their nomenklatura networks (pg. 226). The 
privatisation process, therefore, mostly excluded peasants from contending for those 
assets and afforded a preference for either state ownership, nomenklatura, or 
bourgeoisie ownership of the farms. As Verdery (2003) writes, the reforms were 
supposed to ‘rectify an historical injustice’ through the restoration of rights (pg. 162), 
yet privatisation in Poland and much of the eastern Bloc shows the continuation of 
socialist-era injustices.130 
 
Figure 31 Alfred showing me a liquidated state farm. Photo by Neil Anderson (2008). 
 
The most prevalent form of privatisation of state enterprises, between 1990 and 1995, 
was ‘ liquidation privatisation’ or sale of state assets (Hardy & Rainnie, 1996, pg. 127). 
In Dobra, the liquidation of state farms was deemed kombinacja on the part of the state 
and nomenklatura. Zuzanna said that ‘When they took apart the PGRs, it was 
kombinacja [...] because they were liquidating the PGRs and people were pushed to the 
                                                
130 Bridger (1997) argues that the privatisation of state farms in the USSR was largely a 
change of names rather than power and authorities on the farms (pg. 39). 
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side. And those who liquidated them, benefitted from that. It was their kombinacja!’ 
After the enterprise or state farm had decided to liquidate, its assets were passed to the 
Ministry of Privatisation to be sold piece by piece. This piecemeal asset sale was literal 
as the state farms lay in ruins; anything of potential value was stripped out of them. Or, 
a new company would be created which would then lease the assets and liabilities from 
the Treasury (Zbierski-Salameh, 2013, pgs. 235-336, see footnote 45). Even those 
partnerships were tenuous. In Dobra, the vice-gmina mayor who co-owned an ex-state 
farm with a German investor played off of his gmina/private owner status to privatise 
the property under his name and sold it to a Danish owner—who cultivated the farm—
without sharing profits with the German.  
Today, when someone in Dobra conspicuously uses or buys gmina land, locals suspect 
kombinacja and begin to gossip profusely about how the deal was made (Figures 32 and 
33). Leonid, a Ukrainian peasant who still owns one of the last horses (named Basia) in 
the village and who still works a small portion of his farm, explained to me in a 
frustrated tone that in 2009, the mayor’s 131  brother purchased the gmina-owned 
Agricultural Circle house and base, and then somehow acquired EU structural funds 
intended for gmina—not private—projects to plough the fallow land that had belonged 
to the circle. He hired a man with those funds who harvested the cereals and transported 
them to a private processing facility in the adjacent village where it was then sold for 
private profit. Although Leonid himself has received a 10,000 złoty (about 2,390 EUR) 
grant from the EU, he was still frustrated that the mayor’s brother could buy expensive 
agricultural machinery while he only had a horse and wagon. He said that he did not 
understand the process of how the EU and Polish state could give away such 
disproportionate sums of grant money to some farmers while neglecting others like him. 
Leonid may suspect kombinacja, although that is difficult to prove, but the story does 
demonstrate peasants’ perception that nomenklatura’s power over the distribution of EU 
funds poses a major constraint to ensuring peasants are well informed about funding 
opportunities. The problem is who gets to access the EU funds available to the villagers. 
The issue of funds, access to the state and kombinacja extended beyond agriculture and 
‘liquidation privatisation’. A scandal broke out in Dobra during fieldwork over the 
                                                
131 The mayor twice refused an interview with me about the gmina’s transition since the 
1990s. His father was mayor during socialism. 
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acquisition of EU funds for road works in the wealthiest part of Dobra village where the 
administrators and bureaucrats lived (see Figure 35). Most villagers had never heard of 
such funds132. Gosia summarised the general feeling, that ‘Authority kombinóje now, 
yes. People no—Authority. Now, they call it “corruption”’. In order to gain access to 
EU funds, peasants would have to get around the nomenklatura’s kombinacja 
centralised in the gmina. The nomenklatura in this case had absorbed funds meant for 
public goods for their own private gain. It was able to do so through its continued 
control of the gmina—interviewees noted that this was composed of just a few families 
who all pull one another into administrative positions and strengthen the grip on 
information and resources—and their flexibility to being ‘politically rehabilitated’ 
(rehabilitowani) in order to continue their grasp of state power.  
 
Figure 32 Fallow fields surrounding the village. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
The socialist-era nomenklatura still have a physical presence and access to the gmina. 
Matylda, the retired treasurer of the Agricultural Circle, was very willing to help me 
                                                
132 Many do not even try to look for funds because they do not know who to ask and 
ultimately feel excluded from the club of private property farmers who vie for them. 
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with my project, and used her networks to get me face-to-face with the mayor in a 
matter of minutes. She opened the door, walked freely past the lines of people, opened 
doors and informally chatted with the secretaries and even a village academic in the 
gmina attic who wrote about property transformation. Then, she briskly opened up the 
main conference room lavishly furnished with carpets and wooden beams and banners 
(from the socialist-era) at which point she spotted a retired state farm director sitting at 
the main conference table. He opened up to an interview, speaking with authority and a 
manner as if he was in his own home. Time had stopped inside the building. 
 
 
Figure 33 ‘Land for Sale: North Neighbourhood’. Gmina advertisement intended 
to attract urban professionals to buy ex-state farmland under gmina ownership. 
Notice that ranches have no vegetable gardens or farmland. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Angry villagers have begun taking to the Internet. Since 2012, forums have been 
dedicated to criticising the nomenklatura. Villagers complain that the mayor is buying 
out private forest land for himself, misusing EU funds, buying allotment gardens and a 
new car with taxpayer’s money, raising taxes so that his staff could use more petrol to 
go farther distances to conduct their informal business relations, only promising 
renovations before elections, and so forth. They accuse him of corruption (korupcja), 
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cronyism deals (układy kolesiostwo), and of having a ‘super appetite’; the ‘gmina and 
people do not interest him’. One villager wrote, ‘He does not think, he just does it, and 
to add, corruption is unraveling beautifully133 but as always there is silence, etc’. At one 
point, a pro-mayor villager writes that the mayor had hardly finished high-school but 
managed to lead a business and then get elected. A responder wrote that ‘he had to use 
kombinacja a lot’ (musiał dobrze kombinować) to get to that point. The entrepreneur is 
no longer valorised; he is demonised as a bad kombinator. One villager sarcastically 
wrote that ‘the people are sowing taxes and [the mayor] is gathering the harvest, a true 
peasant of the people’.  
 
Figure 34 Posts on an online forum annotate this cartoon with the 
comment, ‘the reconstruction of roads in Dobra’, July 2013 
(http://forum.gp24.pl/gmina-[Dobra]-w-innych-gminach-ok-a-u-nas-
bagno-dlaczego-t78813/page-13). 
 
We get a sense of kombinacja being a site of privilege in post-socialist society. Only 
those close to power can access the last resources left over from socialism, and by 
definition, they are corrupt in doing so. Another entry from December 2012 states that 
‘Clearly, he [mayor] is not the only one, look at what villa his vice-mayor built…and do 
you know how much he paid for the “Agricultural Circle” with machines??? For a 
laughable 40,000 złoty!!! That is how one uses kombinacja (Tak się kombinuje)’. The 
                                                
133 Similar to Reymont’s description of kombinacya unraveling upon landscape.  
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vice-mayor is even more hated. They call him, ‘The Expert of Nothing’ and recommend 
cutting his job first to balance the budget (Gmina Dobra, 2014). Villagers, seeing the 
positive change in other communes, are angry that corruption hinders their development 
projects (see Figure 34). Many villagers are too scared to speak up. Most online forums 
have been calling for a referendum for two years without progress.  
 
 
Figure 35 Cobble road built with EU funds in Dobra. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
 
8.3. Negotiating privatised state farms 
Today, the rural and provincial regions with the highest percentage of privatised state 
and collective farms have the highest concentrations of poverty in Poland (Stenning et. 
al., 2010, pg. 8). Stasiek, the ex-gmina official, was very upset about the privatisation of 
the state farms that left workers stuck on isolated settlements with no jobs or way out: 
I would hang [Lech] Wałęsa by his legs and Balcerowicz by something 
else. Those sons of bitches! What have they done with the PGRs!? They 
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argued that socialist farms could not exist but what did they do with those 
people? Did they take care of those people? They destroyed everything! 
Those who were close to power stole and sold the machines, the 
inventory and abandoned everything. There were wooden barns left, the 
authorities took them down and burned the wood. They took apart the 
grain ethanol plant and sold it at the scrap metal yard. They destroyed 
everything! And yet they left such a massive amount of people out in the 
cold! They should have merged the enterprises together, freed the people 
from taxes for 3 to 4 years and let the ex-PGRs be managed by the ex-
PGR workers. But “No”. 
The Polish state has yet to provide humanitarian relief for these isolated rural colonies 
of ex-state farm workers who suffer from alcohol addiction, poverty, low education, 
violence, and insecure property rights. Even on the state farms that have been 
privatised, many of the inhabitants live off of welfare, retirement cheques, still pay rent 
directly to the state, and grow their own food. The relationships between the new 
private property owners of the ex-state farms and the underemployed ex-state farm 
workers living in the state housing blocks vary. I outline three state farms—Lipowa, 
Buda, and Krynica—to show the ways in kombinacja gets entangled into the politics of 
how resources are negotiated on these farms. 
In Lipowa, an ex-state farm bordering Dobra, the barns and other infrastructures look as 
if they have been bombed. All of the windows, metal, and bricks have been stripped off 
of the barns. Spotted white and black pigs roamed the street. Marek suggested that we 
stay in the car as we drove down the street. I felt that all eyes were on us from behind 
the curtains in the kitchen windows. Some men were processing a grain in a large 
warehouse that stood in the middle of the village, but there was no sign or indication 
that this was a registered operation. A German investor has bought out a portion of the 
land (not the estate) and cultivates rapeseed but does not live on the premises. He 
employs some of the ex-state farm workers to work the land using private machinery. 
The estate is still state owned and is used as public housing occupied by ‘squatters’ 
(many of them children of the ex-state farm workers). Many ex-state farm workers 
never privatized their apartments and still pay monthly rent to the state. The rest of the 
farm is a fuzzy assortment of fallow fields and small-scale agricultural production on 
the ex-farm workers’ allotment gardens (działki). The economic activities are tied to 
collective life by paying rent to the state, receiving state welfare, and using state land 
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for food (there were no stores, schools, or supermarkets on the premises). Residents 
continue to be mostly dependent on the state and ‘control’ the ex-state farm.  
 
Figure 36 Fallow fields in Lipowa. Ex-state farm workers 
working on a deceased neighbour’s allotment garden in the 
background. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
The state farm in Buda village revealed a much more conflicted relationship between 
the ex-state farm workers and the new owner (whom the ex-state farm workers 
nicknamed ‘Cobra’ for his stringent rules) who lived on site as the ‘new’ bourgeoisie. I 
spent an evening with Cobra and his German-Polish wife discussing property 
transformation. They were the most ‘Western’ individuals I had encountered throughout 
my fieldwork. After having saved up money working construction jobs in the United 
Kingdom in the 1990s and 2000s where he learned English and met his wife, Cobra 
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came back to Poland to buy a German Junker estate and become a large-scale private 
property owner (prywaciarz).134 Their beautifully renovated house has been the subject 
of German documentaries about the Heimat (Recovered Territories) and the site of 
German tourism trips that did not always go well. Cobra and his wife live in Gdańsk 
where their children go to school for most of the year, but they come to the estate 
regularly because they employ the same ex-state farm workers that continue to live on 
the premises.  
Cobra’s relationship with the workers could, at best, be described as antagonistic and 
has resulted in altercations that on one occasion resulted in a group of workers 
threatening him with a knife to his neck. In our discussion, Cobra complained that his 
farm workers, whom he calls ‘HomoPGRicus’, do not respect ‘private ownership’ 
(własność). Instead of pressuring the gmina to build better roads, the ex-state farm 
workers drive over his fields. They steal from the farm because during the socialist 
period the authorities allowed them to steal from the farm. Their actions affect him in 
the same way that they once damaged the state farm and affected the state. This 
explanation is reminiscent of Fidelis’s description of post-socialist kombinacja as being 
a vestige of the socialist past: ‘it is difficult to uproot kombinacja. The mentality! The 
“something from somewhere”. Because they are still accustomed to it, the elderly. In 
general, it is those who believed more in communism. They are accustomed to it, to 
“use kombinacja for something!”’ Like the socialist state, Cobra complained that he 
now picks up the bill for their kombinacja, and their wrecking and mismanagement of 
the farm capital. Riding the wave of kombinacja from the socialist period, the 
HomoPGRicus renegotiate the collective versus private boundaries of their privatised 
state farms rather than changing into the new Homo economics. The ex-state farm 
workers, who were told for decades that they ‘co-owned’ the state farm and had a lot of 
leeway in recalibrating its resource flows and labour arrangements, are struggling 
against the rules imposed by Cobra’s ‘ownership’ that set out how the farm should now 
be run.   
                                                
134 Cobra has taken advantage of EU agricultural subsidies and his wife receives EU 
funds to conduct summer school lessons for Romanian orphans throughout the summer 
on their estate. 
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Krynica, another ex-state farm that lies across the street from Lipowa and borders 
Dobra, presents another case of domesticating neoliberalism. A Danish man bought the 
state farm and the German Junker estate but does not live on site. He uses the farm for 
large-scale, mechanised, potato production and employs a handful of machine operators 
from the ex-state farm to harvest the potatoes. However, in Krynica, the German Junker 
estate is managed by the ex-state farm Directors’ son (another example of nomenklatura 
privilege) who had once worked on the farm. The warden now uses the German Junker 
facilities for his own small projects (bimber production, cooking potatoes, fixing 
machines, etc.). Even in the case of our unannounced arrival with Marek and Zuzanna, 
the warden (who knew Marek) simply took us into the house and showed us around 
without any regard to inform the owner. Exclusive property appeared not to exist in that 
moment. Inside the building was a socialist time capsule with the old Director’s 
furniture and curtains still in place as if the authorities were on a lunch break. 
Nevertheless, in other respects the place was falling apart and numerous small projects 
around the building were suspended. The mansion itself looked like it was used for 
whatever purpose the warden felt like exploiting it for; there were beds and other 
belongings of squatters arranged around the house, alcohol, and the original German 
furniture. We only got a small taste of access to private property without the notification 
of the owner (Figure 37).  
What Lipowa, Buda, and Krynica show is that private property, regardless of whether 
owned by a Pole or foreigner, is renegotiated in various ways by the ex-state farm 
workers who still live in those colony-like villages. In farms where the private owner is 
not around and the villagers rely upon the state for welfare, there is more flexibility in 
renegotiating the private property to access the villagers’ old subsistence grounds or 
needs. On farms where the farmer is present, tensions arise between who owns the farm; 
the ex-state farm workers who have worked on it for decades, or the new private 
property owner. On farms where the owner is absent but the property is managed by the 
nomenklatura, strangers can come and go as the nomenklatura permit. All three state 
farms continue as terrains of struggle for the rural poor to gain access in order to 
supplement their non-existent or meager incomes wrought by the privatisation process. 
Through kombinacja, the rural poor express their claim to the land. 
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Figure 37 Interior of Krynica. Old furniture of the farm 
administration’s meeting headquarters still untouched a 
quarter century later135. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
8.4. Foraging across private and public land136 
After having completed archival work in the city on a rainy day in late October, I took 
the bus back into the village. Usually, the thirteen-kilometre stretch of multiple, 
privatised farm fields that buffered the city and village were expanses of a single crop 
with a few combine-harvesters or tractors in the distance. That afternoon, however, the 
                                                
135 The estate is guarded by the ex-PGR director’s son who lives in the warden’s house 
by the gate entrance and has managed it for multiple foreign owners since the 1990s. 
The furniture may have some sentimental value (gotyk). 
136 Initially, I defined this as ‘stealing’ and ‘poaching’. I thank Professor Gareth A. 
Jones for helping me find the right word ‘foraging’ and who helped me synthesise my 
data about its expression across public and private land.  
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fields of the Krynica and Buda state farms were dotted with dozens of cars haphazardly 
parked and people surrounding them filling up white pillowcases with potatoes. The 
small groups were spread out. Upon my arrival to the village, I encountered Mychajlo, 
an elderly Ukrainian peasant, who had cycled back from the harvest action on his bike 
holding three pillowcases full of potatoes. He proudly informed me that people from the 
village and the city were picking potatoes in Krynica that the harvesters had missed on 
the private farms. I frantically called Marek and we sped toward the fields.  
The potato foragers arrived at the same time and sought safety in numbers, reproducing 
the socialist-era aesthetic of manual potato harvesting that sharply contrasted with the 
mechanised harvesting on the private farm. This communicated the message that ‘we all 
need this food’. They were the middle-aged and elderly poor from the villages and 
Słupsk who were moving around and quickly filling up the sacks (Figure 38). Then they 
heaved the lumpy pillowcases into the trunks of their vehicles and kept on filling and 
packing them to the brim. When they saw my camera, the potato foragers turned their 
faces away or looked at the ground and the children huddled closer to the adults. Far off 
in the distance, I saw small groups congregated around tractors. Tarkowska (2002) 
writes that in Poland, theft caused by poverty is considered by many Poles to be 
justified. ‘The truly guilty is, in such circumstances, not the acting person, but the 
authorities: the government—“them”—are responsible for poverty and unemployment 
in the country’ (pg. 426). People feel entitled to use the land to feed themselves, even if 
it means crossing private property137. A private property ownership document is not 
enough to keep people off of these vast expanses of land. More importantly, the fact that 
Krynica is a private property managed by the nomenklatura suggests that there is more 
leeway in renegotiating the boundaries of private land. I could not imagine Cobra 
allowing something like this to happen on his farm. I remember when Roman 
mentioned that while kombinacja still exists, ‘maybe that kombinacja has become 
smaller because one is more afraid of the private property owner (prywaciarz)’. Where 
the private owner is not present, that fear subsides to some degree. 
                                                
137 Thanks to Dr. Frances Pine for this point.  
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Figure 38 Foraging potatoes on private land in Krynica. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
People looked like they were ‘stealing’, however they could have not done so en masse 
without the cooperation of the warden I had previously met, tractor drivers, police, 
gmina authorities—that is, if these figures of authority were not out in the fields picking 
potatoes too. Marek explained to me that during the Danish owner’s potato harvest on 
the field, the Polish tractor drivers and combine operators left behind patches of 
unharvested potatoes around electrical poles and between each row on the fields. Once 
the first harvest was complete, villagers who had the ‘will to work’ (chęć do pracy) 
could come to the fields with the tractor operator’s permission to manually pick the 
second harvest for free. This was more economically advantageous for the ex-state farm 
workers, who would rather go and pick the potatoes than work for 60 grosze an hour 
and then buy those same potatoes from the farmer.  
Marek explained that foragers were not doing anything illegal. They took loose potatoes 
that otherwise would have rotted on the field. If foragers thought that they were doing 
something wrong, they would have not picked in broad daylight. He contrasted this 
situation to the socialist-era foraging when urban dwellers arrived at night and packed 
potatoes into their pillowcases that they consumed and sold on the free market. 
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Somehow, the performance of foraging in daylight (like with mushrooms below) 
justified the action. Marek’s explanation was not based upon how this action related to 
existing private property laws (asking permission from the owner, paying for produce 
from the farm, police protection of private property, etc.), but how it related under 
conditions during the socialist period.  
Again, people have figured out a way to work ‘in between’ the surveillance and 
production pace of agricultural production. Whereas authorities used to be physically 
present at the properties and monitored the mounds on the fields, now, many private 
owners were based abroad and exported the potato harvest, which meant that those who 
came to pick the second harvest were relatively safe from getting caught by the owner. 
For mass trespassing to occur without the owners’ permission (or economic benefit), the 
cooperation of providing legal overhead was necessary between the private farm 
workers, gmina authorities, and the police. Thus legal overheads must be provided 
during temporal loopholes for poor villagers and urban dwellers to pick potatoes and 
fulfill their subsistence needs for the upcoming winter. This was a clear indicator that 
kombinacja was taking place en masse, by ordinary villagers, who were making a public 
claim to the privatised commons that were still their subsistence territories, especially 
after becoming economically marginalised in the post-socialist era (Pickles, 2006, pg. 
178). 
Although it was implied by Marek that the owner did not know about this foraging fest, 
one could argue that the farm benefitted from foraging in the sense that the owner saves 
money on labour and machines by having people who rely on these socialist-era 
subsistence territories to weed out the leftover potatoes. Their unpaid labour performs a 
sort of service within the full production cycle of the farm. If the owner does not know 
about it, then the workers he does employ to plough the fields cut their labour time by 
allowing ex-state farm workers to do the work for them. Thus, it is interesting to see 
how workers and locals ‘rework’ access rights to the now Danish-owned farm so that 
everyone ‘wins’—the workers, the ex-state farm workers, and even the owner—without 
any monetary transaction taking place. 
Through kombinacja, the marginalised poor rely on their socialist-era networks for 
protection in order to encroach on the privatised farms owned by foreigners and meet 
their potato subsistence needs. This exemplifies the act of domesticating neoliberalism 
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that the marginalised poor use on these large farms, because they are ignoring the idea 
of exclusionary property and instead use a different set of justifications for their action 
that would clearly be ‘theft’ in the market economy. The ex-state farm, as a site of 
extraction—or kombinacja—has remained constant from the socialist to the post-
socialist era—the kombinators come to the farms, extract resources from the farm with 
extra-legal overhead, and use them to meet their subsistence needs. Given that the 
warden is part of the nomenklatura, it is an interesting ‘twist’ to see how he manipulates 
his position with the Danish owner to open up the fields for the public to use after the 
primary harvest.  
In sum, after the torrent of ‘bad’ kombinacja discourse directed against nomenklatura 
privatisation in the 1990s, this case displays how the nomenklatura’s allowance of this 
activity in the 2000s helps preserve their position of power. It bears close resemblance 
to their allowance of pilfering on state farms in order to keep the ex-state farm workers 
happy and their positions safe. In the case of state farms, ‘bad’ kombinacja is classified 
as a critique against class inequality; ‘good’ kombinacja activity is protected through 
the moral economy. The nomenklatura have found a way to play on both sides. 
8.4.1. Mushroom foraging 
The expansion of the forests in the post-socialist era represent this blurring of 
boundaries between public and private property, and in effect, the foraging across these 
two property regimes. One October morning, while on my way to an interview on the 
southern side of the village adjacent to a large forest, I noticed that the last bus stop in 
the village was populated with middle-aged and elderly mushroom foragers ready to 
head back to Słupsk138. Many urban dwellers had roots in the village and still returned 
to their foraging territories (swoje ścieżki)139. At the bus stop, some carried mushrooms 
in plastic bags or cages; others had traditional baskets adorned with caps of the prize 
mushrooms showcased on the top like a bouquet of flowers. I got on one of the buses 
with the foragers and their full buckets to head back to the archive office in the city. The 
                                                
138 Skulans (1998) writes that Latvian forests provided physical refuge during invasions 
and have symbolised physical survival as well as a site where one can achieve agency 
(pg. 82).  
139 In the 1970s and 1980s, state workplaces organised mushroom foraging trips to far-
off foraging grounds that were only available to the workers and their families. 
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bus filled with excited chatter as foragers inspected each other’s baskets. It was one of 
the few moments you are able to see Polish people cheery in the public sphere in the 
village. They exchanged stories about mushroom locations, quality, processing ideas, 
recipes, and networked future excursions to other territories. One man asked another 
why he hid his mushrooms and pressured him to show them to the fellow passengers. 
Another man negotiated to buy an entire basket for 50 złoty from another forager, but 
the forager replied that he would sell his top basket only for 100 złoty. He could 
probably earn more by disseminating it to his trusted informal networks in the city.  
Foragers perform a free service to the state owned forestry, as poachers do to the private 
owner of the ex-state farms. By foraging mushrooms and berries and circulating them 
among other villagers through various reciprocal relations to meet their subsistence 
needs, they take the pressure off the gmina to initiate poverty-reduction programmes. 
The younger generation (<50) sells them through a skup selling point to urban and 
foreign customers. Skup points are homes with a blackboard outside with the day’s 
harvest and prices per kilogram. The elderly generation usually consider skup points 
taboo and purchase mushrooms below skup prices from unemployed foragers who 
canvas them for vodka money. When I asked whether a village drunk who goes to 
forage mushrooms and then wants to sell them to her is a form of kombinacja, Zuzanna 
responded: 
Z: No, that was not, because if he goes to mushrooming and picks them 
himself, and wants to sell them, no? Then, then, that is not kombinacja. 
Because he is not stealing but is rather working on it, because he is 
picking them, no? 
Self: Yes, but, yes.  
Z: Because if he went to someone’s garden and dug something out and 
brought it to me, then that is kombinacja, because he rips it out, steals it, 
and now wants money from us. If he has a receiver (odbiorce) then he 
will sell it cheaper a little bit and the rest he will put into his pocket. 
 
Zuzanna was sensitive to such kombinacja because her neighbours often came at night 
and stole her vegetables. Here we see that the rule of kombinacja does not apply to the 
commons like the state-owned forests, where everyone can go and forage mushrooms. It 
does not even apply to the contexts in which those foragers try to sell the mushrooms. 
Kombinacja only applies if someone had encroached on a person’s garden plot, 
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extracted their vegetables, and sold them to someone else. It would be synonymous with 
theft—where someone extracts something they have no legal or granted access to and 
then capitalises from it. Access rights define whose activity is kombinacja and whose is 
not. However, one person’s kombinator is another person’s thief. According to Fidelis, 
kombinacja is only an outdated term for outright theft. He explained that anyone who 
manipulates or steals ‘are the kombinators but they are criminals, they are not 
kombinators—we maybe call it like that in the old ways, kombinacja! But they are 
normally criminals. In the law, they are not kombinators but are criminals’.  
 
Figure 39 Processing wild mushroom harvest. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
There are no rules about foraging on public land in Poland that I have come across, 
however, kombinacja would occur if for example someone encroached on a villagers’ 
well-known mushroom territory. For instance, when I went to interview a Ukrainian 
peasant in the nearby colony, my driver went to forage mushrooms in the forest behind 
her home. When the interview ended and he bought back a bucket full of mushrooms, 
he thanked Anna for letting him use her foraging territory. She did not seem to mind at 
all, however, the exchange stuck with me because why would anyone need permission 
or to thank someone else for using public forest land? If he had hidden them away or 
returned again to constantly feed off her subsistence territory in the forest he would 
have committed a kombinacja. But because he showed them to her and revealed his 
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harvest, he had used a light version of kombinacja. However, such activity and whether 
it was kombinacja or not, could be the subject of debate between two Poles. This would 
not have been the case under socialism where the rules of kombinacja were more 
identifiable. 
8.5. Men’s kombinacja 
Reunification Street, running through the centre of Dobra, is lined with liquor and 
convenience stores heavily stocked with vodka. Long, wooden, bus-stop benches 
adjacent to the gmina headquarters are populated by elderly men with red faces, 
toothless smiles, missing fingers, and dusty hair wearing trucker hats, woolen sweaters, 
and old worker clothing. These men who suffer from alcohol addiction are called bumy 
and they represent Dobra’s broken dreams. Some are passed out on or underneath the 
benches or half-consciously prostrating to their knees; others, with propped elbows on 
their knees, are engaged in slurring conversations until one spots a patron, jumps up 
from the bench, and asks for spare change. Then they pool their złoty, purchase vodka, 
beer, or cheap wine from the store and split it. Władysława, a retired machine operator 
who lost her son to alcoholism on the benches, explained their modus operandi: 
When they get together in the morning, they are so deprived! One 
searches, searches, and meets a known face and ‘Lend me [money] sir, 
lend me’. And so they pool [the money] together, come to the store, and 
in the store, they are short 2 to 3 groszy140 and the woman at the store 
waves her hand because they are regular customers. Or the store clerk is 
sweeping outside of the store, so then he grabs the broom from her and 
helps out. Then she gives a grosz or two and they beg like that. He will 
stand and will see a female acquaintance coming, ‘Can you please lend 
me [money]’ so for holy peace, one gives it to them, and that is how they 
help one another. Some will find bottles and cans, yes, yes. Sometimes, 
that Szymon—when there is some place to cut some wood, or to hold 
even the piece of wood, then he is there. When here Janina was cutting 
wood, here (gestures), the neighbour Władek was doing it (for her). So, 
Szymon—no one called him over here. He came and looked, and then 
they were holding something up and he immediately came and helped 
them carry it. And then at the end, she, because he stayed behind. They 
finished cutting the wood, she gives Władek the money and (Szymon) 
says, ‘And me? 5 złoty?’ and she says, ‘For what? I didn’t ask you!’ and 
he says, ‘But I was helping’ and she said, ‘And did I ask you to help?’ So 
they force, they force [money] out like that. 
                                                
140 1/100 of a złoty. 
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Here is an example of how Szymon tried to impose his labour where there was no 
granted access and then attempted to use kombinacja upon an existing arrangement that 
Janina had with a ‘helper’ (pomocnik, a neighbour Władek). The kombinators, who had 
under socialism domesticated state resources had several major trajectories to choose 
from during the transition: from private businesses that enveloped those services in the 
formal economy, become migrant workers, or continue working in the informal 
economy. The men on the alcohol benches ‘chose’ the latter route but have been 
excluded from the labour market due to old age, lack of training, and their ever-present 
struggles with alcohol consumption. They refuse to migrate overseas because they rely 
on their networks and regularly perform alcohol libations at homes and pool money 
together. Each raises money individually in his neighbourhood before congregating on 
the benches, pooling it, and raising more from old co-workers, friends, and family who 
pass through the village centre. This territorial centralisation of funds on a daily basis 
provides a consistent demand for alcohol in village stores, attracts alcohol business, and 
drives up competition between liquor stores in order to attract their patronage. They 
repeat this cycle all day, every day, until they pass out, fall into a ditch, or are brought 
home by the police. 
Socialist-era networks are all they have left to secure some odd jobs around the village. 
This is not only particular to those with alcohol problems. According to Stenning et al. 
(2010), ‘pooling’ is one of the defining facets of domesticating neoliberalism, in that its 
‘social transfers are becoming an increasingly important part of family budgets and state 
benefits can be seen to enable economic practices in other spheres’ (pg. 71). These 
victims of alcoholism use the benches as an organisational platform to find innovative 
ways to secure informal labour using their socialist-era ties to family and friends in the 
village. However, they pool their earnings back into the informal guild in a self-
destructive way and repeat the cycle. Because these men rely on the social reproduction 
of their networks as a form of gaining access to temporary labour, they could be in the 
category of what Leonard and Kaneef (2002) call ‘post-socialist peasants’ who ‘draw 
inspiration from the relative security they experienced during the socialist period’ but 
who do not mean to recreate the socialist past (pg. 30).  
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Figure 40 Alcohol benches before the men wake up. Taking a photograph 
while they were there was too dangerous since Roman was one of them. 
Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Their skillful usage of time to domesticate neoliberalism needs mention. They are 
skilled at switching between dual labour and capital cycles on the benches and in the 
domestic sphere. In the former, they fundraise, pool, and imbibe, to reproduce fraternal 
and labour identity. In addition to the services mentioned above, they scare children 
away from traditional helping jobs like holding church gates during weddings for 
candy, foraging mushrooms and blueberries in the forest, or foraging vegetables from 
farms and selling them to the elderly below market prices. Women and children fear 
them and give in to their services—which furthers the confidence and support of their 
new services.  
Roman is a regular on the benches. Until he suffered a massive stroke in 2013, he had 
been the proud ringleader of the group because everyone else who kept up such habits 
had died off. His body was especially ‘strong’, an expression of peasant-worker 
masculinity. Roman became unemployed when the mechanical enterprise shut down in 
the 1990s. He has struggled with alcoholism since the 1970s—after he returned home 
from the Polish People’s Army—and unsuccessfully underwent multiple detoxification 
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programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. Whenever he returned to the village, the 
alcoholism returned as soon as he met up with his drinking fraternity. 
He assumed the role of the patriarchal head (Gospodarz) of Zuzanna’s farm after his 
father’s death in 1997. While his role requires him to work on the farm, secure it from 
poachers, produce profits, reinvest into production, and so forth, the agricultural 
collapse in the village has left behind only the patriarchal authority of the title. Zuzanna 
and Roman have in reality lived off of Zuzanna’s 1,000 złoty retirement cheques that 
pay monthly for taxes, alcohol, medical expenses, food, clothing, seeds, water, ploughs, 
hay, and fertilisers. With rising prices, this budget has pushed them into poverty. 
Without structural funds, adequate rehabilitation programmes, and community action, 
Roman and those like him, who are in their middle-age but do not qualify for retirement 
and are too stricken with alcoholism to even dedicate the time to register for 
unemployment or welfare benefits, are left stranded. When Zuzanna gave him money to 
secure welfare in Słupsk city, he never got past the bus stop. 
Roman had liquidated the farm by advertising its valuables to villagers who wanted 
cheap goods. Depending on the resource that season, flowers or eggs, Roman directed 
the fraternal guild members and others to his farm. In the 1990s and 2000s, Roman sold 
his rabbits to the village and urban patrons during Christmas for alcohol money. When 
the extended family put an end to this in 2010, he began selling off family gotyks for 
vodka, which Ludwik then had to find and buy back from the villagers. He makes deals 
with villagers and urban dwellers by promising resources on his farm in return for 
alcohol money. 
One day, a city couple drove into the yard and told Zuzanna that they wanted to pick up 
the horseradish they had paid for through Roman. On another occasion, a fraternity 
member entered Zuzanna’s farm without asking her permission and hacked away at 
another horseradish bush. The system worked the other way around too. Once, Roman 
and Zuzanna walked across the street to another fraternity member’s house to take, 
without permission, several bundles of hay that came in on a wagon. To pay-off his 
alcohol pooling debts to other neighbours, Roman allows others to access the resources 
on his property; when other fraternal members are indebted to him, he goes to access 
resources on their properties. Zuzanna benefits and participates in this debt system 
negotiated by the men in this guild. 
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Figure 41 De-capitalised peasant farm. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Ludwik, his brother who is a migrant-worker in Norway, claims that Roman is a 
kombinator, a master of disguises who manipulates space, events, and faces–all to end 
up with money for alcohol. Roman has ‘neoliberalised’ his domestic duties. He collects 
fees for his chores that he is expected to fulfill as the patriarchal head of the farm. 
Instead of hiring a private sector construction crew to take down an agricultural barn 
that is costing them high property taxes, Zuzanna ‘hired’ Roman who has been taking it 
apart for over a year. She pays lower rates for poor-quality labour with major delays in 
addition to property taxes on the unfinished barn. Hiring crews would betray Roman’s 
labour ‘niche’ and could be potentially dangerous to her safety as Roman is territorial 
about the job and will not let anyone help out. In addition to the larger projects, each 
morning Roman performs a small ‘job’ like loading the coal oven to ‘earn’ money from 
Zuzanna. Then after breakfast, Roman asks Zuzanna for ‘cigarette money’ (pieniądze 
na papierosy), meaning alcohol money.  
Tarkowska (2002) who has studied gendered dynamics in Polish rural households, 
points out that men have allotted a special portion of ‘private money for personal 
spending’ that is not allotted to women (pg. 423). Often, Roman would not even have to 
ask Zuzanna for the money. When I was in the kitchen, the two skirted around me, 
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working together as a team to evade my eye and to make sure that the 5 złoty were 
passed unnoticed. When I asked Roman about post-socialist kombinacja, from his 
viewpoint, it existed everywhere—‘Where is there no kombinacja? It appears to me that 
it exists in every country—that kombinacja. It appears to me like that. Someone always 
does something “on the left” (na lewo)’. He justified his kombinacja because he lived in 
a world that was riddled with it. Roman, even though he earns no money and ruins his 
body, refuses to eat any store-bought produce. He says that they are riddled with 
chemicals and do not taste good. He only eats food produced mostly by Zuzanna on 
their farm. Even though they cannot afford it any longer, he ploughs over the land to 
grow fresh food even though Zuzanna pleads for him to stop because of the costs 
involved. However, to him, opting out of this way of life is his resistance against it. 
 
Figure 42 Roman get a helping hand on 
taking apart the barn to pay less property 
taxes. This has taken him over 6 
months—what normally would have 
taken 1 week. Author’s photo (2009).  
 
Figure 43 Roman (back) being ‘good’ 
and working on sauerkraut production 
with Zuzanna for which he earns 
cigarette money. Author’s photo (2009).  
 
The men on the benches secure and negotiate agricultural jobs on their farms among 
themselves. One autumn afternoon, Roman opened up the front gate into the yard. 
Leonid, an elderly Ukrainian man, rode in on a half-mechanical, half-wooden wagon on 
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rubber wheels, pulled by an old, brown horse. Leonid unharnessed Basia, took an old 
plough, and went with Roman to the back yard where he began to plough the field. The 
precision and expertise in Leonid’s work was awe-inspiring and Basia needed little 
direction. He split the field down the middle and perfectly ploughed each without 
respite. Leonid ploughed into the fallow land (odłogi)—something Zuzanna told Roman 
not to do because it forced her to put more labour into the farm. Roman, however, 
wanted extra vegetables to exchange for alcohol money. Instead of paying Leonid for 
the job, Roman boarded Leonid’s wagon, and Zuzanna informed me that the two were 
off to drink. Looking out the window, I saw the back of two men jovially talking as 
Basia pulled them toward their libation. 
 
Figure 44 Leonid and Basia plough Roman’s vegetable garden for free while he 
watches. Author’s photo (2009). 
 
Socialist-era networks are all these men have left to secure labour in the post-socialist 
era. They do not hold formal jobs and many do not receive welfare from the state. 
Rather, they split their time monetising their domestic labour, liquidating their farms 
and valuables, and scoping out informal jobs for cheaper prices than the formal services 
sector can provide. Their aggressive activity secures agricultural labour—or what is left 
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of it—in their guild. Because all of their investment goes into purchasing alcohol and 
collectively consuming it on the benches, these men do not reinvest into the private 
sector, but bring in more alcohol business and price competition to the village. What is 
most important is not getting out of poverty, but doing everything in the neoliberal era 
to reproduce their socialist-era identity and networks. Their struggles have certainly 
been unresolved in the transition and all they can do in their marginalised status is to 
rely on those who shared their past. 
 
8.6. Women’s kombinacja  
DAMA is a small, private candy factory hidden along Reunification Street in Dobra. It 
is owned by Jolka, a Polish woman who kept close contact with the German family who 
had owned the factory prior to the German expulsion in the late 1940s. In the 1980s, the 
German family invited Jolka to West Germany where she received investment funds 
and training to restart the candy factory under her private ownership. Thus, DAMA is a 
prime example of how the continuing transnational networks, between Germans 
families who had been expelled from the territories and the Polish families who had 
settled on their properties have continued to reap rewards for both parties. Jolka got 
ahead of the entrepreneurial game with funding while the Germans could socially 
secure their property by having someone they knew and could influence the factory.  
The factory produces its own recipes of Polish candy such as bird’s milk (ptasie 
mleczko), a rectangular, vanilla-flavoured, spongy ‘milk’ covered on all sides with a 
thin layer of hardened chocolate; fruit-flavoured gelatin candy covered in sugar crystals 
or chocolate, and chocolate-covered gingerbread cookies (pierniki), etc. DAMA blends 
in to the dilapidating warehouses and factories that are surrendering to nature after the 
state’s retreat from production in the province. In 2009, there was no sign in front of the 
rectangular, one-story building with pastel blue paint chipping off and large, dirty, 
windows and a metal fence; there were no cars, trucks, nor people that stood outside of 
the parking lot. Yet, as lifeless as the factory grounds appeared, the bird’s milk candy 
were neatly stocked in their signature yellow boxes in the small convenience stores, 
priced at 11 złoty and competed on the same shelf against the global candy 
manufacturer, E.Wedel, that produced bird’s milk and sold it for 13 złoty. DAMA’s 
bird’s milk was larger, darker, grittier, with the external chocolate covering less sweet 
and crisp, and with the vanilla interior more watered down than its competitor. Wedel’s 
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candy underwent a much more streamlined manufacturing process with taste experts, 
more rigorous inspections, more advanced machines. DAMA’s production process was 
less advanced and the candy had—what I would describe as—a more ‘Soviet’ feel to it. 
On an early October night, when the usual thick smoke caused by coal fires coated the 
village streets, two DAMA workers, Leona and Ola, made their way toward Zuzanna’s 
front door. Leona and Ola looked like most middle-aged women in the village. They 
had thick, non-manicured hands, self-dyed hair, second-hand industrial shirts, and jeans. 
Magdalena, a migrant worker in Norway, sat in the kitchen but looked much more 
polished. With the exception of Zuzanna, all three women were ex-tannery workers. In 
1991 the state tannery was privatised and downsized its workforce from 600 to 100 
workers, which left most of the workers in the village unemployed. After multiple 
workers’ strikes due to major lay-offs and unpaid wages, the tannery collapsed in 1994. 
Today, a German owner produces small fox and mink furs in the tannery employing 
seasonal, temporary labour. While Leona and Ola stayed in the village and have worked 
temporarily in Jolka’s candy factory at 7 złoty per hour, Magdalena chose migrant 
labour. Leona and Ola were Zuzanna’s neighbours, both with husbands who suffer from 
alcoholism, and the three women engaged in constant economic exchanges of food and 
services because they were the breadwinners of their households. Tarkowska (2002) 
writes that many women in rural households take on temporary, unregistered jobs in the 
‘shadow economy’ (pg. 426) or what is usually called na czarno (‘on the black’, see 
Buchowski, 2003, pg. 53). 
The women sat around the kitchen table drinking 50ml shots of homemade cherry-plum 
fruit brandy (śliwowica). Magdalena brought out a thick chunk of cured bacon from the 
pantry, placed it on a wooden cutting board, and kept it warm atop the iron furnace that 
was slightly ajar with wood and coal crackling inside. Leona placed a plastic bag filled 
with DAMA bird’s milk on the table. When I enquired about which candy took the 
longest to produce, she said that machines did all of the work, but that candy types and 
quantities depended upon the production cycles. Leona casually mentioned that in late 
October, the factory was making its final push for candy production for the Christmas 
season. The stores only received the boxed version of the candy, but loose candy was 
available for purchase for the workers at 10 złoty per kilogram. Zuzanna then interjected 
and asked for Leona to bring her a kilogram of the bird’s milk for Christmas and to 
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bring some for me, which she would pay Leona for. The friendly chat quickly 
transformed into a business meeting of women using their long-standing networks to get 
candy for free or for less than price at the supermarket.  
But there were several factors that did not sound right in the exchange and which lead 
me to suspect that there was kombinacja in play between Zuzanna and Leona. No 
money was exchanged, only free food and services. Perhaps there was no loose candy 
sold at DAMA for 10 złoty nor was Zuzanna expecting Leona to accept her payment for 
the delivery. Nor did Zuzanna pay Leona for the large bag of candy Leona brought out 
on the table. In a village where everyone lives on or below the poverty line it would 
have been a risky purchase to spend 10% of her seasonal daily-wage to put bird’s milk 
on Zuzanna’s kitchen table during a friendly visit. Either the candy did not cost 10 złoty 
and Leona increased the price to make a future profit from Zuzanna’s purchase or the 
candy cost nothing and Leona just wanted to show Zuzanna that she was taking care of 
Zuzanna’s guests—an act for which she would win future favour since she relies so 
much on Zuzanna’s free produce during harvests. This experience exposed to me just 
how confusing ‘finding’ kombinacja is in the present moment. If it is not encapsulated 
in a story about the past as the interviewees had recalled it, it is difficult to identify it 
playing out in real time. 
Upon my departure from Dobra, Leona again came by with several boxes of bird’s milk 
that would have represented an overwhelming cost for both her and Zuzanna. 
Regardless of the details, the deal showed that DAMA workers used factory candy to 
carry on other economic activity in the village by selling, exchanging, or distributing 
them to their networks. The selling of loose bird’s milk at below market prices, less 
than the DAMA boxes in the local supermarket, lowers DAMA’s competitive edge 
alongside the E.Wedel boxes. How could the owner allow this? I was reminded of my 
conversation with Stasiek, the ex-gmina official, who claimed that the activities that 
would have constituted kombinacja under socialism began to qualify as theft because 
the workplace structures and capital flows became more closely monitored. Yet at 
Jolka’s factory, it appeared that workers were comfortably making deals involving 
‘surplus’ candy among their female acquaintances (znajome) like Zuzanna in the 
village. 
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After the kombinacja deal, Leona and Ola complained about Jolka which shows that the 
workers and employer did not share similar economic goals. Jolka was once a tannery 
worker among these middle-aged women, but in the 1990s, she chose the 
entrepreneurial route while most of her co-workers became workers. Whenever Jolka 
needs temporary labour, she telephones the middle-aged women in the village and asks 
them to come ‘help out’ (pomóc)—without individual or group working contracts—for 
twelve-hour shifts in the factory for two or three consecutive days. She exploits 
socialist-era networks to access a cheap labour pool. DAMA only produces its products 
in batches and puts workers on the workshop floor only during production bursts. Thus, 
before each production cycle, Jolka organises unemployed women in the village to 
come in to work temporarily. These middle-aged women were particularly desirable 
because they had enough years of work to secure retirement but had yet to reach the 
proper age; thus Jolka did not need to hire them full-time and take on the responsibility 
of paying workers’ benefits to the state branch (ZUS141) and that would count towards 
retirement years. Thus, to stay competitive, DAMA relies upon cheap labour organised 
through socialist-era networks and the ingrained logic of ‘help’ to complete the 
production quota.  
While the non-union women workers despise the arrangement and want full-time 
employment, most grudgingly consent because they have no other employment 
opportunities. Leona complained that when Jolka calls each individual worker, she 
expects them to drop everything and rearrange their plans for the production period and 
to exert themselves in long shifts. If they try to negotiate, Jolka threatens to call other 
willing women. Some workers, however, have begun to reject Jolka’s request for help 
because the work is temporary, earnings are only enough to cover a single supermarket 
trip, and there is no guarantee of a call-back in the next production cycle or of job 
security. They describe these arrangements as moving ‘from work to labour’ (od pracy 
do roboty), meaning descending down the slippery slope of full employment under 
socialism into temporary, hard labour under post-socialism. Without formal 
employment, union representation, or pay negotiation, when the factory women gather, 
they communicate their dissent in social terms. For example, Leona complained that 
Jolka is acting like a robot, does not communicate properly with the workers, and 
                                                
141 Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych.  
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ignores them. The women compared their struggling livelihoods to Jolka’s opulent 
lifestyle, for example that she is building a brand new house in the village and that her 
daughter brags about purchasing from the top shelves at the supermarket—an attitude 
Leona claimed she hated. Gossip was an important medium they used to communicate 
these economic hardships in the factory. 
The function of neighbourly help (sąsiedzka pomoc) for mobilising and organising 
workers towards production goals without proper compensation under socialism 
continues as a management strategy that coincides with the increasing flexibility and 
temporary contracts in the Polish workplace today. Women workers who once helped 
the state economy meet its workplace quotas are mobilised by their old co-workers to 
help private factories stay competitive. In both cases the women are not independently 
unionised and are organised based upon this management principle. What this means is 
that they use kombinacja as self-compensation for this labour that they consent to out of 
necessity rather than will, which exists in some form. This exemplifies another way that 
‘help’ and kombinacja jar against one another: Neighbourly help is bad kombinacja, a 
top-down extraction of labour from the workers, while good kombinacja is a bottom-up 
extraction of commodities. If Jolka was a good employer, she may even use loose bird’s 
milk as an incentive for workers to take on the labour and then sell or exchange the 
surplus candy to supplement their earnings. This may be her way of ‘domesticating 
neoliberalism’ by exploiting socialist-era networks and using socialist-era strategies to 
ensure she saves some money on labour and taxes in the long run.  
After they made candy deals and gossiped about their temporary jobs, the women asked 
me not to bring Jolka into any sort of trouble (kłopotów). This caught me by surprise, 
partly because they were not looking to voice their economic conditions for the world to 
save them—in fact, it was a non-nostalgic comment. In its most exploitative form, 
DAMA, even in spurts of production, is one of the few employers in the village, 
especially for female pensioners. Jolka’s kombinacja was well known, as was the 
factory workers’ kombinacja—however, their strategies were a negotiation tactic to 
make both the producer and the workers agree on labour-work conditions. Outside 
surveillance of Jolka’s exploitative economic practices would put both her factory and 
their temporary employment at risk, as well as their access to whatever kombinacja 
activity they were carrying out with the bird’s milk to supplement those temporary 
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wages by making deals with their networks. While the labour conditions disenfranchise 
these women workers, some work is evidently better than no work because there is 
always the possibility of kombinacja. The women factory workers still exchange 
commodities from the workplace with peasant produce to supplement their sporadic 
wages and to socially reproduce their domestic roles as mothers who secure candy for 
Christmas. 
8.7. Conclusion: diverse economies of kombinacja  
This chapter has drawn together multiple strands about how kombinacja has been 
adapted to domesticate neoliberalism. I have shown how the rural poor who once 
engaged in these acts of kombinacja in the state workplaces have been excluded from 
full-time jobs, information about EU funds, access to proper medical care, etc. Access 
to the benefits of EU funds, subsistence territories on ex-state-farms, or cheaper produce 
all still have to be ‘arranged’ through networks. Networks are essential to carry out the 
neoliberal project. 
I agree with Williams and Onoschenko’s (2014) that families in the post-socialist period 
‘show a textured mapping of the diverse economic practices’ as families secure 
livelihoods through an array of formal employment, informal employment, reimbursed 
favours, paid household labour, formal unpaid employment, off-the-radar unpaid labour 
in groups, one-to-one unpaid labour, and self-provisioning labour (pg. 32). Informal and 
formal are not ‘binaries’, but as Morris (2014) puts it, occur in a ‘continuum’ (pg. 64). 
This idea of an economically fragmented landscape through which individuals flow in 
and out of in a type of continuum, establishing relations and bringing back resources 
into the household, links it well with Creed’s (2006) and Stenning et al’s (2010) notion 
of ‘domestication’, that opens that channel between the merging of economies, public, 
and private spheres. ‘Domestication’ does not necessarily mean bringing back resources 
to the site of the household, but can occur in public spaces, as in the case of pooling 
resources on the alcohol benches in order to socially-reproduce working-class identities.  
This investigation of kombinacja—the way it has been fragmented depending on the 
opinions of each milieu—shows that socialist-era strategies are not simply ‘reworking’ 
neoliberalism; rather, they too are changing in the process. This brings to mind Morris 
and Polese (2014) claim that informality undergoes partial transformations, adopting 
some element of the past with the present. They add that it has ‘an important role to 
  264 
play in reinforcing the relevance of a multiple modernities perspective…away from 
homo economicus and towards more “embedded” forms of economics: human, diverse, 
and “real-world”’(pgs. 7-9). Kombinacja, even the bad kind, that was once lauded by 
almost everyone is now demonised and covertly used by those in the gmina who are 
most desperate for an exchange of resources. Whereas in the socialist period there was 
more of a consensus that kombinacja was something that was used as a bottom-up 
strategy by the people against higher echelons of the state, there is a loose consensus 
that kombinacja is now being exercised against them by neoliberalism, the state, etc. 
The post-socialist period eerily feels more like a ‘dormant’ kombinacja period, much 
like during the transition into socialism in the post-war era where the ‘formal’ had not 
been clearly defined until Stalinism.  
Accommodation to one part of neoliberalism has the opposite effect of resisting against 
its organisation of economic space. For instance, the nomenklatura’s privatisation of 
state property and monopolisation of EU funding is the most blatant example of how 
socialist-era networks stifle economic growth for the peasantry but support the 
gentrification of the countryside; however, without the nomenklatura’s legal protection, 
ex-state farm workers would not have access to forage foreign-owned, ex-state farms, to 
secure a potato harvest on their old subsistence territories. While poachers exercise 
kombinacja by extracting resources that they have no legal access to, they 
simultaneously perform a ‘free service’ to the private property owner and increase the 
cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the farms’ production cycle. Private property, EU 
funds, and control of gmina power all flow into the system of patronage which 
emphasises socialist-era power relations filtering into neoliberal reforms. However, they 
help fight poverty that the state itself has not adequately tackled and help those private 
farms become more efficient with a free labour force. Morris and Polese (2014) argue 
that post-socialist informality is ‘evidence of a lack of hegemony of capitalist relations 
in these spaces’ (pg.7). But by implementing kombinacja through a complex system of 
local protections, those who are the ‘losers’ of the transition use kombinacja to secure 
their own supply chains and labour niches in order to unfix their rural livelihoods from 
the gentrification of the countryside. They themselves are staving off hegemonic 
capitalism through their diverse economic practices using kombinacja. 
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Chapter 9 
Kombinacja across time and space 
9.1. Refusing boundaries 
This thesis has mapped kombinacja’s polysemic expressions across the treacherous 
historical terrain of postwar reconstruction, collectivisation, decollectivisation, late 
socialism, and post-socialism. In doing so, I have pinpointed contentions over scarce 
resources that have occurred between competing groups, at specific sites in different 
points in time and on various spatial scales. I have found that kombinacja defies 
boundaries and form. No one owns kombinacja—it can be used by anyone for any 
purpose. Neither are any two kombinacja activities identical—each is an amalgam of a 
previous recombination. Kombinacja’s linguistic meaning has been used relationally 
and its applications to new sites and fields have changed over time. However, these arts 
of combination are linked by the common thread of innovation that people have used to 
adapt to changing fields and to access scarce resources within them. They also expose 
historical continuities of corruption and marginalisation; states that promise change 
through ‘socialism’ or ‘capitalism’ continue to recreate the very conditions of inequality 
that foster the social reproduction of kombinacja.  
Kombinacja’s diverse expressions and evasion of form subverts any holistic theoretical 
framework that attempts to wholly encompass it. Although this thesis initially framed 
kombinacja as a type of informality, I have found that informality provides a limiting 
framework for understanding this institution’s slippery and polysemic expressions as 
well as the social reproduction of its social and cultural dimensions. Informality is a 
more amenable concept when kombinacja is depicted as a historical-geographic concept 
within a given time and space. On the other hand, Bourdieusian terms like habitus (feel 
for the game) and fields (sites of competition for resources) are better suited when 
kombinacja is depicted as a transhistorical process across time and space142. They are 
more effective tools for understanding how struggles over resources map and remap 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, how people rework their economic systems over 
                                                
142 Thanks to Professor Sharad Chari and Professor Gareth A. Jones for these points. 
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time and how, in the process, they socially reproduce kombinacja on individual and 
everyday scales143. Unlike habitus and fields, however, informality is still an important 
concept that pinpoints the specific role of the state within these very struggles. In this 
chapter, I will first explain my five general findings about kombinacja using habitus and 
fields. I will then discuss kombinacja’s tenuous link with informality and will argue that 
a more theoretically and methodologically enhanced understanding of informality is 
necessary to complicate our understanding of the modern state. Lastly, I will outline my 
future studies into transnational kombinacja.  
9.2. Shifting fields 
In this section, I will outline five main findings about kombinacja and its 
transformations from the postwar period to the postsocialist era. Tracing kombinacja in 
this fashion can help us get an ethnographic glimpse into how fields and habitus 
crystallise, how language can be discursively used to frame the habitus and identities 
between competing groups within fields, how habitus itself is socially reproduced, and 
how both habitus and fields differentiate and diffuse. My purpose in thinking through 
these concepts is to show how a focus on group dynamics, access to resources and 
distribution of them can remap binary divisions of space propagated by transition 
narratives that put socialism and capitalism, capitalism and noncapitalism, informal and 
formal, private and public into different camps. 
My first finding was that kombinacja is a specific type of habitus in a specific field of 
struggle over resources at a given point in time. In postwar Dobra, the reemergence of 
the term kombinacja coincided with peasants’ perception of the nomenklatura’s 
exploitation of state power. Unlike their vivid recollections of using kombinacja during 
the Nazi occupation, peasants initially omitted it in their description of their unregulated 
activities in postwar Dobra that would have been called as such during the Nazi 
occupation. One explanation for this is that during that time, the Party was still 
struggling to consolidate power and the command economy was still in its nascent 
stages. There was no sense of what the formal was and who represented it. It was not 
until gmina officials deployed feudal institutions and forced peasants into unpaid labour 
on state and their private land, that the term resurfaced. The ‘formal’ now had a human 
                                                
143 Thanks to Professor Sharad Chari for this point. 
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face—corrupt families who exercised state power to their desired ends. Kombinacja at 
this point did not encompass all informal activity nor was it a critique of all state 
‘formality’. It unmasked a specific type of ‘formal’ power and economy negotiated by 
informal relations. Perceiveing the nomenklatura as kombinators working against 
peasants’ interests justified their retaliation with a counter-kombinacja (habitus) to 
control as much of the resource flows within subsequent fields (e.g. collective farms). 
This finding that kombinacja marked the encroachment of nomenklatura hegemony 
sheds light on how a field crystallises, which parties get involved, and how they reach a 
‘consensus’ on the habitus within it.  
Second, kombinacja was discursively used to define the scope of a given network’s 
strategies (habitus) in juxtaposition to those exercised by competing networks in a field. 
In the gmina archives during the Stalinist era, local officials accused ‘kułaks, 
kombinators, and peasants’ of sabotaging the command economy’s supply chain (field). 
Since no other trace of the state acknowledging kombinacja in national archives or laws, 
I think that gmina officials used this term to unmask ‘bad’ kombinators who 
outmaneuvered them in securing fungible state assets. Having been accused of being 
‘bad’ kombinators, officials used the state archives to ‘formalise’ their specific 
definition of the ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ kombinacja to increase their control over the field. 
Habitus was relationally applied. Officials could act as the state and hunt down ‘bad’ 
kombinators that disrupted the supply chain (their private interests) while also being 
‘good’ kombinators acting on behalf of the villagers against the ‘higher’ echelons of the 
state. For example, they cited using ‘good’ kombinacja to secure resources for the state 
plan, furnish state schools, and even sell state assets on the ‘free market’ (wolny rynek). 
If peasants did that, it was ‘bad’ kombinacja. The converse was true from the peasants’ 
perspective. Officials who diverted resources were committing ‘bad’ kombinacja, but 
when peasants consented to collectivisation and then purposely kept farms half-broken 
in order to divert state resources to their own farms, they committed a ‘good’ 
kombinacja that was aligned with the peasants’ plight for liberation since the prewar 
period. People redefined kombinacja to occupy multiple fields and increase their 
chances of acquiring resources while keeping their activities ‘in line’ with their group’s 
political and moral economies.  
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Third, the social reproduction of kombinacja along kinship lines reworked how state 
resources would be acquired within a given field of struggle. Between the postwar 
period and the decollectivisation of agriculture in 1956, many settlers occupied a single 
class position (peasant, collective farm worker). For example, peasants’ kombinacja in 
the collective farm was mostly defined by their competition over resources against the 
nomenklatura. By the 1970s, however, those peasants’ children were reaching working 
age and entered administrative, gmina, bureaucratic, factory, mechanical enterprise, 
circle, and state farm jobs across the village while still living on the farm. Kombinacja 
competition over resources was no longer defined solely by class but between families 
with more diverse networks scattered across the village workplaces (and in the right 
places). A single kombinacja operation could be deployed by family members at 
multiple sites of the field. In effect, different families began to corner different ‘niches’ 
of the field of resources through their strategic positioning of kin in the right places and 
exercising their familial brand of kombinacja. This reformulation of the group 
exercising habitus changed how resources were accessed within that field.  
Fourth, kombinacja has shown how a habitus can create fields. In the 1970s, the state’s 
vertical integration of the Agricultural Circles under a single administration located in 
the village headquarters of the entire gmina paved new opportunities for kombinacja to 
acquire new dimensions. The circle allowed its working peasants more mobility across 
the gmina in order to perform state services for the peasants who ordered them. The 
machine operators of these services used this access to state resources and authorised 
mobility to establish a shadow services sector cloaked under the ‘formal’ service. They 
finagled the conditions for the performance of the job—ploughing more than the 
peasant requested or ploughing their own private farms without reporting the job—often 
in exchange for arranged benefits. These services went unchecked because kin in 
administrative positions offered protection. This variant of kombinacja manipulated the 
spatial dimensions of the field (away from the state’s gaze) in order to create a shadow 
field of activity (services). This was further demonstrated in the late socialist period 
when kombinacja became popularised, public, and socially sanctioned—which resulted 
in the transformation of new sites into fields. Workers appropriated state resources from 
state factories and installed them as a private service during work hours; the 
nomenklatura opened up small ‘private’ factories alongside their state factories; 
peasants directly sold produce to workers in the cities. These fields were so valuable to 
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everyday survival that villagers did not even celebrate the transition into ‘capitalism’. 
Their collapse threatened to sever access to state assets, cut off distribution networks, 
and thwart social reproduction of kombinators’ group identity. People politically 
aligned themselves not with ‘isms’ but which people who could keep fields open.  
Fifth, kombinacja’s transition into from socialism to postsocialism demonstrates how 
differentiation can form within a habitus and field. Some groups continue to dominate 
the same fields. In the 1990s, the ‘old’ nomenklatura from the socialist period took 
charge of privatisation and liquidated the state workplaces. Villagers considered this to 
be kombinacja because the nomenklatura distributed state assets to themselves and their 
own networks. Officials today—the kin of socialist-era officials—continue to 
misappropriate EU funds for private projects. To counter this ‘bad’ kombinacja, 
villagers complain on internet forums and build group alliances against them. Other 
groups like ex-state farm workers continue to struggle to access their old fields 
(literally) now controlled by a new authority who defines access rules. Access to old 
fields sometimes this requires negotiation, like in the case of the women factory 
workers who offer protection to their boss who employs them illegally but who gives 
them access to the candy. Other times this involves violence, as in the case of the the 
nomenklatura who threatened new restaurant owners who did not give them free meals. 
Then there are those who claim to have abdicated kombinacja altogether and only 
operate in the legal and formal economy because there is no longer a ‘need’ for 
kombinacja. The continuity and change of certain fields and not others shows who is 
benefitting from the transition and who is reeling from it. 
These findings show how habitus and fields take shape and change over time and space, 
but they are by no means an essentialist depiction of how these categories form and 
transform. They merely show how the arts of combination are relational—they can be 
expressed differently, in different sites, toward different ends, in different points in 
time. Habitus and fields cut across many ‘formal’ rules of access to limited resources.  
For example, the men on the alcohol benches whose only interest is reproducing 
socialist-era fraternal bonds first use ‘noncapitalist’ strategies like pooling money and 
then turn into consumers to buy alcohol which in effect attracts more alcohol shops to 
the village and lowers the price of alcohol for their future consumption. They use 
‘noncapitalist’ habitus to transform a ‘capitalist’ field. Their innovative usage of 
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kombinacja ‘marks’ this blurred boundary between capitalism and non-capitalism. 
Interpreting ethnographic data using these terms and in the spirit of the arts of 
combination can help locate sites at which binaries get blurred, which in effect, lends 
empirical support to Gibson-Graham’s diverse economies.  
9.3. Informality’s limitations 
When J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006) introduced the idea of diverse economies, they 
encouraged further research into informal economies—especially in ex-Soviet bloc 
countries—in order to complicate the capitalocentric discourse of capitalist hegemony. 
The problem that I immediately ran into was that the concept of informality and 
informal economies was predominantly a term used to refer to ‘capitalist’ development 
in first and third world countries since the 1970s. Even Chris Hann and Keith Hart 
claimed that ex-second world needed a term comparable to informality in the rest of the 
world. Thus, one of the immediate issues was that the literature treated second 
economies and informal economies as symptoms of two separate worlds rather than 
economies created through the regulatory powers of the modern state. Although some 
scholars of postsocialism have adopted the diverse economy and informality language, 
they did so without explaining the theoretical linkages and repercussions of abdicating 
second economies altogether. My objective was to bridge these literatures by tracing 
how a certain type of informality could exist both under so-called ‘capitalism’ and 
‘socialism’. This would show how informality is socially reproduced and thus 
constantly adapting to new conditions that in effect reproduce differentiation and 
empirically support the idea of diverse economies.  My results are rather mixed.  
In tracing informality’s transformations, my most pertinent finding is that informality 
plays an important role differentiation (deconstructing an imagery of hegemony) and 
co-optation (building an imagery of hegemony). In the postwar period, the state co-
opted the energy dedicated to informal labour and integrated it into the command 
economy. Its continuation of various feudal-era obligations that—although integrated 
into the command economy—were unpaid gifts of labour that burdened peasants to 
subsidise quota production and maintenance in the commune. Co-opting peasant labour 
was a way the state manipulated informality to build an imagery of hegemony (through 
the continuation of links with power dynamics from the past). Conversely, in order to 
partially liberate themselves from these obligations, peasants used informality through 
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foot-dragging or the theft of socialist resources. In effect, this was ‘differentiation’ from 
the formal economy that subverted the imagery of hegemony. This treacherous terrain 
of ‘informality’ that could be used towards economic liberation and subjugation, adds a 
precautionary footnote to Gibson-Graham’s optimistic spirit in exploring economic 
possibilities and their romantisation of informality as a process of differentiation that 
debunks the ideal-type of capitalist hegemony. Anyone can use informality to explore or 
co-opt economic alternatives towards many different ends. A more complete 
ethnographically and theoretically informed theory of informality must acknowledge 
this spectrum.  
I also encountered informality’s limitations. What initially drew me to informality was 
Alsayyad and Roy’s (2004) definition of it as the ‘unmapping of space’ (pg. 5) that 
linked up with kombinacja’s refusal of form. Throughout the course of writing my 
thesis, however, I began to see the pattern that while all cases of kombinacja might be 
classified as informality, not all cases of informality (e.g. mushroom foraging) are 
identified as kombinacja. Kombinacja too shed light on only a specific brand of 
informality occurring at a specific point in time—it never charted the entire terrain. One 
may write about post-socialist informality on the alcohol-benches and in the candy 
factory, but without kombinacja, one would not be able to identify the gendering of 
good versus bad kombinacja practices that reflect villagers’ moral economy. In other 
words, the term informality is a neat term for locating activities occurring in the present 
to juxtapose them from the ‘formal’ economy, but it does not possess the language nor 
the methodological tools for investigating the social reproduction of these practices. 
Informality needs a methodological overhaul that theorises its change over time, like the 
Bourdieusian concept of habitus and fields that prioritise social reproduction and access 
to resources rather than a subject’s specific positionality vis-à-vis a ‘formal’ state or 
economy. It also needs a visual repertoire that helps readers imagine its processes, kind 
of like Creed’s idea of domestication that helps us imagine the process of centralising 
resources acquired in a given ‘field’ into a single site144. Without these substitutions, 
informality is a limiting concept to place at the centre of an historical ethnography.  
                                                
144 Creed (1998) and Stenning et al.’s (2010) show that domestication takes pressure off 
the state to pass reforms to help ease the conditions that force people to domesticate 
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Comparative studies into specific types of informality (e.g. kombinacja and 
combinazione) that co-exist across varied political and economic contexts can bring 
greater enthnographic precision to understanding how modern states produce similar 
conditions that influence groups to engage in certain brands of informality. Or, focusing 
on a single brand of informality across space can shed light on how it may 
simultaneously express itself differently across economic and political landscapes145. 
Investigating brands of informality operating in close proximity to one another can 
reveal on how they overlap, diverge, link-up, and perhaps even produce hybrid brands 
(e.g. how do Russian blat and Polish kombinacja relate to one another in a Slavic 
immigrant community in London?). We need to map the real resource flows and 
linkages that exist between these system in a globalising world.  
Lastly, future explorations of informality should not overlook kinship and the household 
as sites for the mobilisation and social reproduction of strategies that give expression to 
informality. Rather than investigating how entire ‘informal’ economies change, we 
should rather investigate the transformations of individual networks and households to 
get a more detailed picture of the multiplicity of transformation. Informality and kinship 
need further exploration. At the moment, I have shown that some networks and sites 
have made more incremental changes to their habitus and moved onto less competitive 
fields (e.g. migrant workers using transnational kombinacja between Norwegian farms 
and Dobra). Others have not had to make as many changes to their habitus and continue 
to control the field itself (e.g. ex-state farm workers in Lipowa who still live in state 
housing, receive state welfare, and have access to their foraging territories on the 
partially privatised property). I think that domestication literature has already made 
some headway into this theoretical terrain because it focuses on how the household and 
groups twist legal rules and cultural norms surrounding access to resources in order to 
reproduce their identity. It draws attention away from resistance against the state and 
towards the everyday innovations to improve their quality of life. Just like J.K. Gibson-
Graham have asked us to start in the ‘here and now’ to build alternative economies, we 
can also start investigations into informality by look at its effects into our own lives as I 
have attempted to do in this thesis.  
                                                                                                                                          
resources. By seeking non-capitalist alternatives, people produce economic alternatives 
that support and resist hegemony. I make a similar claim about informality. 
145 Thanks to Dr. Alena Ledeneva and Dr. Roxana Bratu for this point. 
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In sum, informality is predicated upon the existence of the formal, yet we know much 
more about how formal economies have formed and transformed over time. Informality 
literature still lacks the theoretical language that help map the processes in play in its 
social reproduction across time and space. We have very little ethnographic and 
empirical evidence to display informality’s autobiography. How does it form alongside 
the ‘formal’, is discursively used to justify or reprimand encroachments upon fields, 
adapts to changing access rules to limited amounts of resources, and is remembered (or 
not) by the people who use it? Without a more historically informed understanding, we 
will never really understand the intricacies of how modern states continue to create 
similar economic conditions that cause people to seek solutions that rework its very 
order. This could change our very understanding of the modern state.  
9.4. Towards transnational kombinacja 
Kombinacja’s pirouettes across the stage of history, as a preserver and a subverter of 
feudalism, industrialisation, Sovietisation, and Nazi occupation present both a 
frightening and an empowering slice of consciousness about what it means to ‘inherit’ 
kombinacja and view history through its prism. Imagine finding out that your 
grandmother had been forced into unpaid feudal labour and had received no restitution 
from the state? Or to learn that due to state shortages (or local corruption) during the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, you received iodine medicine but your parents did not? I am 
angry at these injustices; not only what the state did to its people, but what neighbours 
did to each other, and what individuals have done to their own bodies. The very people 
who had essentially forced people into unpaid labour are still living out their lives down 
the street. I am also perplexed that up to this point, there has been no national 
conversation about the existence of kombinacja—an activity so fundamental to 
everyday life. Not one sociological or anthropological text in Poland has positioned this 
phenomenon at the centre of investigation. There is no template on a personal or 
academic level on how to deal with kombinacja. 
Kombinacja as a colloquial term shows how the words we use ‘mark’ our struggles and 
have direct influences on access or exclusion from resources. The usage of the term 
helped signal either suspicion on vague activity that someone else was using or to hide 
the details about the specifics of vague activity that one was performing herself. 
Keeping kombinacja vague protected identities and probably saved lives. On a personal 
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level, I am troubled by the idea that kombinacja is a type of kinship-based corruption 
that gets socially reproduced. In such cases, I am comforted by Zuzanna’s survivalism. 
Without her kombinacja with which to adapt to each state attempt to control her life, 
who knows if I would have even been born. In a very personal sense, therefore, I feel 
empowered by kombinacja, but am aware that romantic depictions of ‘good’ 
kombinacja should not overshadow the pain that ‘bad’ kombinacja can bring. I still 
harbor mixed feelings about it, but through this research I have come to understand its 
various dimensions.  
This institution is so much ‘bigger’ than just a historical ethnography from 1945 to the 
present, located along the boundaries of Poland. Today, kombinacja is beginning to 
mark villagers’ encounter with the ‘global’ in diverse ways.  Villagers are increasingly 
using internet forums as a site to ‘out’ nomenklatura kombinacja and build political 
networks against them without revealing their identities.  In response to Western oil, gas 
and energy companies that are using political leverage to build an American-style shale 
gas revolution on their lands, Kashubians are stealing and breaking equipment (like in 
the collective farms) to protect their private property and agrarian identity. This does 
not only occur on the ‘local’ level. Throughout the late stages of my doctoral research, I 
became increasingly ‘aware’ of kombinacja’s transnational characteristics. Migrant 
workers are using transnational kombinacja146 between Poland and Norway to cut living 
costs; milliennials are adopting it to increase their competitiveness in the Berlin start-up 
technology scene; undocumented immigrants have adopted it to build a network of 
protection in the United States. Transnational kombinacja is currently adapted to 
navigate and creatively rework host economies outside of the ex-Soviet bloc. Based 
upon this preliminary data, I think that kombinacja is beginning to represent people’s 
activities within this economic ‘grey zone’ between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’.  
Looking ahead, I want to develop one final piece of research on kombinacja, returning 
to study a group mentioned at the start of this thesis—Polish cleaning maids in 
Trenton—and consider how they have adapted a form of transnational kombinacja to 
run informal businesses, hire cheap labour, and supplement income in order to navigate 
and rework the American brand of market capitalism. An investigation into women’s 
                                                
146 Thanks to Dr. Keith Halfacree for this phrase. 
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kombinacja networks, resource flows and discourses in Trenton may shed light on how 
transnational informality adapts across spatial, legal, and economic divides and in the 
process forms its own resource flows that play by its own rules. Women may be 
relinking post-productivist cities to global capital flows and producing diverse 
economies that negotiate formal economic policies. This project may add to policy 
debates regarding the role of informal economies in bolstering economic development 
in post-industrial cities like Trenton.  
Starting in the ‘PGR’ where I grew up, I will use a snowball sample to conduct open-
ended interviews with undocumented and documented immigrant women who work (or 
have worked) in an informally run cleaning service. Trenton has only one legally 
registered Polish cleaning service—the rest are informally run out of private vans. In 
addition to my mother, there is another maid living in Trenton who emigrated from 
Dobra and another one who emigrated from Słupsk. Their narratives will provide an 
important bridge across these two projects. I have learned from experience that bringing 
a lengthy questionnaire on paper is not a useful tool for interviewing people about 
sensitive topics. I will simply ask them to tell me about their occupations in Poland, 
their arrival to the United States, what sorts of adjustments they had to make from living 
under ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism’, how they chose to become cleaning maids, if they had 
any memorable stories about events that happened on the job, what the benefits and 
drawbacks are of cleaning for cash rather than waged labour in a factory, how they 
make ends meet during the course of a year, and if they could tell me of any difficult 
economic event that they overcame through kombinacja or ‘resourcefulness’ 
(zaradność). Depending on the interview, I might outright ask them to tell me how their 
kombinacja strategies have continued or changed from Poland to the United States.  
The participant observation stage of this research will seek these same answers exactly 
in the place that I have tried to avoid for years—the Polish cleaning service van. I will 
temporarily join an informal cleaning service to meet fellow immigrant women, get a 
sense of their daily conversations in the van, work alongside of them, better understand 
how they negotiate their labour with themselves, their bosses and their clients, how they 
manage and invest their earnings, and try to understand their goals and aspirations both 
in the United States and back in Poland. It is only by working with undocumented 
maids that I may get some insight into their daily lives and economic worlds. Since 
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many of these vans are filled with Slavic speaking women—not only Polish—I am 
curious to find out how kombinacja interacts with other informal economies and niches 
carved out by other ethnic groups. How does kombinacja interact with blat? I do not see 
a need to clandestinely conduct this part of the project. Women have different reasons 
for entering the service at different points in their lives and it may even be beneficial to 
my project if I explain to them that I am writing a chapter about them.  How to react to 
my status and perhaps even establish economic relations with me may be key to 
understanding their needs and the ways in which they use economic relations with 
documented immigrants to stay afloat. Ironically, this experience will double as a sort of 
‘rite of passage’ for me into Polish immigrant womanhood. 
In combining my data from the interviews and observations in the cleaning service, I 
hope to map out the sites and contours of kombinacja being practiced by women in the 
immigrant community.  How do they use it to socially reproduce their identities back in 
the Polish village (if they think that they will return) or build their futures here in the 
United States?  What elements of their socialist era kombinacja were retained, and 
which elements have changed? How does it overlap (or not) with similar institutions 
imported by other Central and Eastern European immigrants from the ex-Soviet bloc? Is 
there a reason why Trenton has not cracked down on this informal service sector? How 
has the city benefitted? Furthermore, I am interested in the potential policy implications. 
How can these informal assemblages of resource flows breathe new economic life into a 
postindustrial city like Trenton? By completing this project, I encourage more research 
both on how people use transnational kombinacja in innovative ways to survive and in 
the process, build possible worlds. 
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Appendix 
Informed Consent Form 
Dear Sir/Madam         
You are invited to participate in a research project conducted by Edyta Materka, a doctoral 
student from the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom. 
The purpose of this project is to better understand the development of micro-histories in the 
communist-era. I would like to know how and why people arrived to this village and what the 
dynamics of village life were up to the point of collectivisation. Have you ever thought that 
living in this village was temporary? When did you feel that this village became “yours?” What 
were some of the ‘visions’ for how this new village would be build?  
To achieve this goal within the time-frame of 2 months (August-September in Dobra and 
October-November in Zag), I will need your help as I conduct at least 20 semi-structured 
interviews (total) in both villages with people like you who can share their experiences about 
their migration to the village since 1945, their lifestyles from 1945 to 1950 and personal 
opinions about the collectivisation process. Each interview will consist of open-ended questions 
in addition to a short questionnaire to be filled out by each interviewee. The open-ended 
interview is designed to bring out your personal story while the questionnaire is designed for me 
to better understand some broader, quantitative patterns between the characteristics and life-
processes of all interviewees.  
The interview process will take a relaxed approach as I will stop by your house (or we can 
schedule a home-stay) at a scheduled time periods spanning a couple of days. I will ask you 
some questions and will give you a 2-page questionnaire to complete. Most of the time I will be 
writing key points down on a notebook and if need be, I will digitally record our conversation. 
You can decline to be digitally recorded if you feel uncomfortable. Please make sure to reserve 
a substantial amount of time for this interview. You have a right to stop the interview and/or 
questionnaire at any point if you begin to feel uncomfortable with the questions, are fatigued, or 
would like to terminate it altogether.  
Any identifiable information such as your name, address, photographs of the face and name of 
your village will be kept strictly anonymous and confidential and will not be used in any 
unpublished, published work, interview or personal discussions. All personal names and names 
of villages will be changed. Your identifiable information will be used for my personal 
reference only and will be kept in a private safe during the course and upon completion of my 
work on this project. If you would like all of the information about you destroyed upon the 
completion of this project, please tick this box  . 
Please contact me at the above address (right hand corner) if you should have any questions or 
comments about the interview and the usage of your information.  
Upon the completion of my research, please tick this box   if you will like to receive a copy of 
the chapter in which your story is used. 
Thank you for your valuable participation! Your contribution to this project will be a vital 
source of information for generations to come about the struggles and successes in the creation 
of new villages in the Reclaimed Lands.  
Signature of Interviewee: ______________________ Date _______________________ 
Signature of Interviewer: ______________________ Date _______________________ 
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